Anulabilidade epistêmica e o problema de Gettier : um ensaio sobre o conhecimento proposicional

Abstract

This is an essay on The Gettier Problem and on the plausibility of two epistemologies that promise to solve it, namely, the so-called ‘anti-luck epistemology’ and the defeasibility theory. Chapters 1 and 2 set the stage for the subsequent discussion. After we provide the reader with enough information for a proper reflection on propositional knowledge and on The Gettier Problem in chapter 1, we examine in detail, in chapter 2, tracking and safety theories, as instances of anti-luck epistemology. However, we will find problems for both the alternatives. In chapter 3, we will look carefull at the analysis of knowledge proposed by the defeasibility theory of knowledge, and we will show some of its alleged advantages over anti-luck epistemology. Yet, in chapter 4, we will focus on problems that threaten the defeasibility theory and may turn out to be obstacles to its success.