As epistemologias modais e seus críticos

Abstract

This thesis is about some theories, here called modal epistemologies, that attempt to explain and/or analyze knowledge by means of counterfactuals principles or conditions, that is, principles that talk about what would be the case in non-actual circumstances. Initially, I explain the tracking theory, proposed by Robert Nozick, that employ two counterfactuals conditionals, the sensitivity and adherence principles, to analyze knowledge and solve difficult epistemological problems, such as the skeptical problem. After explaining tracking theory, I present multiple objections to Nozick, which were here divided in four main kinds: restrictive, permissive, violations of epistemic closure and problems regarding Nozick’s conception of methods. I claim that the objections here presented strongly suggests that Nozick’s theory cannot be correct. I also explain the main competitor with tracking: safety theory. The two main proponents of safety are Ernest Sosa and Duncan Pritchard, and I study each author within a separate section. Concerning Pritchard, I claim that he cannot explain knowledge and ignorance attributions in lottery examples. I also try to show that some replys to safety’s objectors, such as the Halloween's party counterexample, originally made by Juan Comesaña, are not correct, and that the main response’s available against Comesaña’s objection are not very promising.