Resposta institucional ao risco de fuga de carbono no regime de comércio de licenças de emissão da União Europeia : uma análise fundamentada na teoria dos custos de transação

Abstract

The European Union Emission Trading System, the first and the largest emissions trading system in the world, is a centerpiece in the European Union’s strategy to contain pollutant emissions within its territory. However, there is a phenomenon that can compromise the efficiency of this market: carbon leakage. Such an occurrence arises when a stricter environmental regulation in a region causes emissions in other areas to increase, which can harm the general objective of the global reduction of anthropogenic emissions. The European system has created a mechanism to curb the risk of carbon leakage. This devise is primarily based on the offering of free emission allowances for sectors and subsectors of the economy that are exposed to carbon leakage. This dissertation investigates the inefficiencies contained in the rules created to prevent carbon leakage in the European Union Emission Trading System, which cause too many sectors and subsectors to benefit. It is also evidenced how the theory of transaction costs, with emphasis on the assumptions linked to the concepts of limited rationality and opportunism, helps to understand the causes of these institutional design flaws.