Sobre lógica e racionalidade inferencial

Abstract

What is the connection between classical deductive logic and inferential rationality? For common sense, the archetypal case of rational belief is the upshot of good reasoning and, traditionally, logic is understood as having a normative role for the performance of good reasoning. Recent literature on the subject, however, suggests that such an idea is confusing and that certain claims about the normative significance of validity in reasoning do not provide suitable models for achieving rational belief. Some contemporary logicians claim that logical implication and consistency have a normative character. This essay aims at offering the theoretical basis for a robust, coherent and formally well-articulated conception of the thesis that logical consistency establishes the normative connection between logic and rationality. The main challenge is, to a large extent, to show that some of the obstacles such as the 'preface state' can be overridden by alternative considerations, be they regarding normative consistency or alternative models of doxastic attitudes.