Liberdade ou Intersubjetividade : um dilema no pensamento de Hegel

Abstract

A dilemma emerging from Hegel's logical-ontological system, from the project proposed in the Phenomenology of the Spirit - to unite the necessary substance of Spinoza to the free subject of Kant - is the reconciliation of individual freedom with the determination of universal reason (the idea), or of the particular will with the rational will. For, on the one hand, intersubjectivity is a condition of possibility for the conquest of freedom within the hegelian civil state, and on the other, intersubjectivity undoes the particular will in the concrete universal will, overcoming particularity. Faced with this dilemma, the central objective is to seek, in the Science of Logic, the logical process that transforms substance into concept, which is the passage from necessity to freedom, as well as the logic intrinsic to the development of the concept and then follow the logical unfolding of the idea of freedom in reality, as free will and determinant of effective figures in the legal field that, in the Philosophy of Right, emerge as necessary conditions for their self-determination as intersubjectivity. From these considerations, the thesis defended will be the incompatibility of individual freedom with the intersubjectivity of the Hegelian State and, consequently, the predominance of espinosana freedom over the Kantian free subject in the system.