Dissenso e normatividade na esfera pública

Abstract

In this work, I ask what is the normative capacity of dissensus in a theory of social normativity. I investigate the fundamental elements of a deliberative theory of social normativity set forth by Jürgen Habermas and argue that, in a project of deliberative normative justification, not only consensus but also dissensus has normative capacity. I present a minimal formulation of Habermas‘ normative project, which encompasses the concepts of discourse, consensus and public sphere, and then proceed to distinguish three different realms in a deliberative theory of social normativity – politics, the political, and the dispute for politicity – approaching the nature and the role of dissensus in each one. I argue that (a) politics is a realm of the institutions of liberal democracy, where dissensus takes the form of conflict among groups and models of public spheres, having the role of keeping the public sphere multiple and inclusive; (b) the political is the realm of interaction of discourses about the imperative of human coexistence in the world, where dissensus takes the form of adversariness and has the role of maintaining the disagreement necessary for pluralism; and (c) the dispute for politicity is the pre-discursive realm where struggles for the capacity to issue political claims take place, where dissensus has the role of pointing out the unjustified partiality of the discursive genre as the only one capable of conveying social interactions with normative potential.