A teoria epistemológica da memória e os seus críticos

Abstract

The content of this paper deals with fundamental issues of epistemology of memory, in particular the notions of belief, justification and memoriais knowledge, as well as conceptually analyzes the main traditional theories and current research in this area of contemporary epistemology, namely preservationism and epistemological theory of memory (TEM), and alleged that they suffer criticism from his opponents. The preservationism basically is the view that justified true memorial belief precisely the canonical definition of knowledge implied by propositional memory, remains in the time since its acquisition in the past, tl, for any S a knowing subject, yet this, in t2, when the evocation of such knowledge by S. This view, which is structurally endorsed by TEM, whose conceptual bases bind as necessary and sufficient conditions to be propositional memory that S knows that P tl, S knows that P in t2, and that this knowledge between tl and t2 is properly connected, receives criticism from certain authors, particularly Sven Bernecker and Jennifer Lackey, for which the faculty of memory, respectively, not bind neither justification nor knowledge, but mere mental representation, and this college not only preserve such epistemic properties but yes to generate over time, constituting the retention of such properties have insufficient condition for propositional knowledge, although necessary. Such criticisms are presented by these authors through counterexamples that have established a thriving and dynamic current epistemological debate in the community, in which the main goal is the analysis and discussion of them with the reference of these theories, given that the conceptual scope of these theories is that this perspective would be in check, and a verdict about the plausibility of these counterexamples is arguably seek to establish throughout this work, and this is precisely the crucial and essential point that characterizes the present research