Uma defesa meinonguiana dos objetos não-existentes

Abstract

Meinonguianism in general defends that: Given any conditions of properties Φ, there is necessarily an object that has exactly all the properties that satisfy Φ. In this sense, the Meinongguian domain of discourse presents different types of objects such as: complete, incomplete and impossible. But according to Russell, such objects violate the logical principles of the excluded third party and that of non-contradiction. And according to Quine, we cannot commit ourselves ontologically to objects that do not exist. Thus, Russell and Quine will use the paraphrase method in order to eliminate the expressions of a sentence that denote non-existent objects as belonging in some way to the domain of being. But, the basic idea of this work is to present a Meinongguian defense of non-existent objects; responding to Russell that Meinguangianism does not violate either the principle of the excluded third party or the principle of non-contradiction, and to Quine that Meinguangianism does not commit itself ontologically to any non-existent object. Finally, I will defend a Meinongguian domain, where objects are understood as logical objects of a discourse. The objective is to establish the reference conditions for all the denoting expressions of any given language.