Sobre a possibilidade do (im)possível : adorno e a filosofia moral como expressão do sofrimento

Abstract

This thesis constitutes an attempt to read the criticism of the concept of philosophy, in general, and of moral philosophy, in a more particular way in the thinking of Theodor W. Adorno (1903-1969). Reading that basically has two objectives, or better, two motivations: (I) on the one hand, it intends to particularize the Adornian criticism within the framework of other criticisms of the concept of identity that has marked the field of philosophy since practically the beginning of the 19th century; (II) on the other hand, to differentiate both Adornian criticism and to defend it on the hypothesis that from it it is possible to find new elements to think about a concept of non-repressive subjectivity and, consequently, rethink another model of thought for the subject-object relationship. This will imply highlighting the dialectical character of the criticisms I address here, i.e., it will imply in showing that in Adorno there is an oscillation between system and moment and that the model analysis must accompany and differentiate the movement of these criticisms. The purpose, then, is to show that Adorno's philosophy can be read as an ensemble of minimal moralities or as a dialectic of otherness since, and this is the thesis, the abolition of suffering.