Os fenômenos da contradição e dos paradoxos na linguagem : uma avaliação de teorias e de estudos da pragmática inferencial

Abstract

Philosophers have used paradoxes to develop arguments and discussions through deductions based on rules of Classical Logic since Ancient history. We observe that this phenomenon commonly occurs in everyday language, as well as the contradiction structures are regularly perceived. Therefore, we consider important to study linguistic occurrences of this nature not only in the traditional areas of Philosophy and Logic, which are usually studied, but as well in Linguistics. This work is a theoretical investigation in which we seek to show how apparent contradictions and paradoxes, even those that do not follow a Classical Logic construct, can be evaluated from the point of view of Pragmatics. For this purpose, we assume an approach of Informal Logic advocated by authors such as Walton (1989) and Costa (2009, 2016), that is, an approximation of natural language allied to Logic. In our previous study (BEHLE, 2014) we have concluded it is possible to treat classical paradoxes under an approach of the Theory of Implicatures (GRICE, 1967). In this current research, the main objective is to evaluate Inferential Pragmatics theories and studies, which are based on Gricean theory, to verify if and how they can deal with the linguistic phenomena discussed. The theories and studies evaluated are the neoGriceans Q-based and R-based Implicatures (HORN, 1984), the Theory of Generalized Conversational Implicature (LEVINSON, 2000) and the post-Gricean Relevance Theory (SPERBER, WILSON, 1986, 1995). In order to achieve this purpose, we begin by tracing the path of inferences in the studies from Classical Logic assumptions until the theories of Inferential Pragmatics. We present concepts of Logic and notions developed in the studies of some philosophers, like Frege (1892), Russell (1905) and Strawson (1950). We also reflect about which are the phenomena of contradiction and paradox in order to define and to exemplify them, according to authors such as Strawson (1952), Quine (1976), Sainsbury (1995), Cirne-Lima (1996), Rescher (2001), Olin (2003) and Sorensen (2003). We can observe that not all classical contradiction is a paradox as well as not all paradox presupposes a contradiction. Assuming these notions, we analyze the selected linguistic theories to verify how they can provide us an account of the phenomena in question. For this, we consider how they can describe the emergence of contradiction or paradox and how they can explain the way a receiver interprets the meaning of the speaker. Therefore, we reflect about the apparent irrationality of these statements that frequently do not cause strangeness to the interlocutor during the communicative process.