A metodologia filosófica apriorista e seus críticos

Abstract

This work deals with the role of intuitions, specially, intellectual intuitions, whose desired characteristic is to be a priori, as a source of justification of beliefs. Within the tradition of the conceptual analysis philosophy, intuitions are seen as an important element of evidence that supports the beliefs that derive from them, even though they are seen as fallible. This idea parallels with sensory perceptions as sources of beliefs about the external world. This paper’s aim is to defend a minimum view that a priori intellectual intuitions maintain their status as a reliable source of justification for beliefs. This happens in the face of criticisms made by naturalists, by defenders of no relevant role for intuitions in philosophy, by those who claim intuitions are not part of the philosophical practice and by those who affirm the lack of reliability of intuitions due to research results carried out by experimental philosophy. This minimal defense is that proposed by George Bealer's understanding of intuitions, which is coupled with the defense of seemings within the phenomenal conservationism advocated by Michael Huemer.