Realismo político e cooperação internacional : valores internacionais e consenso sobreposto como alternativa de estabilidade

Abstract

I propose the Thesis that the stability offered by the searching for a (moral) overlapping consensus of States, which is sought using the method of reflective equilibrium, is more efficient than the one based on a balance of power or prudential actions and can be achieved more easily than the creation of an international institution with exclusive use of the force. This Thesis needs a theory that supports it. To get to it, I raise some of the issues that this sketch of theory will deal with, after an exposition of the thoughts of Carr, Morgenthau and Waltz, relevant thinkers of the realist school of I.R.I consider the limits that their theories have in order to address the problems proposed by themselves, in the perspective of Carr's bargains of power, Morgenthau's problems brought by the ethics of different nationalisms, the three images of Waltz, as well as the limits of his systemic theory. I understand that there are three realist obstacles to stability and international cooperation: those arising from the attempt to universalize national values, the struggle for power and concerns with relative power. Since international actors can recognize that cooperation can bring greater benefits than the non-cooperation, they may seek a scenario where cooperation can occur with greater security. To this end, a solution to the first obstacle, like the one I propose, can minimize the magnitude of the other two. To propose such solution I make use of the concepts of overlapping consensus and reflective equilibrium in a way similar to the one they appear in John Rawls' Justice as Fairness. I give my theory the name of Legitimacy as Fairness and establish as temporary fixed point the values of International Jus Cogens. I establish a virtue correlative to Aristotelian prudence for international agents and I divide the Legitimacy as Fairness in a preliminary stage and an institutional stage. I defend the use of reflective equilibrium in Legitimacy as Fairness against its major objections, ensuring its validity. The Thesis proposed, when supported by a theory like the Legitimacy as Fairness, is justified.