@PHDTHESIS{ 2020:2017504675,
 	title = {Comparative probability as a foundation for rational credences : a new hope},
 	year = {2020},
 	url = "http://tede2.pucrs.br/tede2/handle/tede/9448",
 	abstract = "Probabilistic comparativism consists of two central claims. First, comparative beliefs are more fundamental than numerical credences. Second, a rational agent?s comparative beliefs are representable by a probabilistic credence distribution (precise comparativism) or a set of such functions (imprecise comparativism). Although this is not an entirely new approach to rational graded beliefs, comparativism has been considered a minority view among formal epistemologists and decision theorists. This dissertation is my attempt to develop and defend probabilistic comparativism. After introducing some technical background, I distinguish between two different kinds of priority or fundamentality claims: metaphysical and conceptual (or representational). Also, I examine and reject two comparativist approaches to belief-like attitudes, namely the preference-based and measurement-theoretic comparativist accounts of graded beliefs. Later in this essay, I propose a new form of probabilistic comparativism, known as epistemic interpretivism, which has important advantages over the other two comparativist alternatives. I develop this view in light of recent contributions in the area of epistemic utility theory. As appealing as it is, probabilistic comparativism faces a range of unanswered questions about the rationality of graded beliefs",
 	publisher = {Pontif?cia Universidade Cat?lica do Rio Grande do Sul},
 	scholl = {Programa de P?s-Gradua??o em Filosofia},
 	note = {Escola de Humanidades}
}