STÉPHANE RODRIGUES DIAS

AGENCY VIA DIALOGUE:
A PRAGMATIC, DIALOGUE-BASED APPROACH TO AGENTS

Advisor: Prof. Jorge Campos da Costa, Ph.D.
Coadvisor: Prof. Felipe de Matos Müller, Ph.D.

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I'm nothing special, in fact I'm a bit of a bore
If I tell a joke, you've probably heard it before
But I have a talent, a wonderful thing
'cause everyone listens when I start to sing
I'm so grateful and proud
All I want is to sing it out loud

So I say
Thank you for the music, the songs I'm singing
Thanks for all the joy they're bringing
Who can live without it, I ask in all honesty
What would life be?
Without a song or a dance what are we?
So I say thank you for the music
For giving it to me

Mother says I was a dancer before I could walk
She says I began to sing long before I could talk
And I've often wondered, how did it all start?
Who found out that nothing can capture a heart
Like a melody can?
Well, whoever it was, I'm a fan

I've been so lucky, I am the girl with golden hair
I wanna sing it out to everybody
What a joy, what a life, what a chance!

"Thank You for The Music" is track #7 on the album The Album, by Abba.
It was written by Andersson, Benny Goran Bror / Ulvaeus, Bjoern K.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I have many agents to thank. This work is a result of much deliberation on the theoretical realm. Core aspects of it have been discussed in conferences and workshops in the area of Linguistics, Dialogue Studies and Philosophy, one of which was held in Lebanon (Beirut, Dialogue Under Occupation VI) another in Portugal (Lisbon, 1st European Conference on Argumentation) and the others in Brazil (especially, in Curitiba, I Workshop de Pragmática; in Fortaleza, 3rd Latin American Analytic Philosophy Conference; in João Pessoa, Projeto 15 da ALFAL, "Estudios del diálogo"; in Porto Alegre, Symposium on Justice and DUO VII) and in the United States (in Los Angeles, 3rd International Conference of the American Pragmatics Association; in Princeton, Penn-Rutgers-Princeton Social Epistemology Workshop 2015). Thus, again, I have many agents to thank.

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ABSTRACT

This work addresses human communicative agency. The competence to instantiate a set of communicative procedures is taken as a component of human rationality that meets a key role of regulating our cognitive environment (a set of mental states, centrally assumptions and emotions), in order to maximize practical goals and sociability. The linguistic-inferential approach offered here for such scope of rationality covers two levels: cognitive and practical, treated hierarchically, according to the assumed regulations. We consider that the cognitive apparatus (the inferential, representational and metarepresentational basis), along with the linguistic apparatus (computation plus interpretable expressions), allows us to operate from the most basic levels of linguistic processing to higher levels (where agents consider assumptions about other minds). In the practical domain, we consider that the linguistic and communicative behavior is used by agents to affect mental states and others’ courses of action, thus being in the basis of our social cognition. In this scenario, we not only interact with agents, but we also create a social agency via language. We, therefore, consider a communicative agency framework in which acts are performed within a dialogical structure. The general thesis is that communication requires the use of skills that incorporate practical rationality parameters. This regulation would be dependent on a cognitive and practical structure of agency in which human cognition represents three types of agents: individuals, group members and groups (collectives or representatives). Each of these levels presents characteristic features of communicative agency. In all of them, however, there is the possibility of disagreement among agents, cognitive or practical, in dialogue situations. We illustrate this aspect with a scenario of conflict between agents that are supposed to reach a peace agreement. The illustrative analysis focuses on real negotiation dialogues between group members and representatives of the State of Israel and of Palestine. We observe how practical goals of agents of these types regulate their cognitive and dialogical goals. As a result, we present an alternative proposal to the standard scenario of negotiation, or conflict mediation. As a theoretical benefit, ad hoc pragmatic issues (relevance to the individual qua agent, conflicts between agents) are given prominence and effective treatment. As a practical benefit, the model can be applied to the area of conflict mediation, given the downsizing of a biosocial disposition: our cognitive states are particularly affected by stimuli from a class of agents (artists), with potential effect on individual and collective agencies.

Keywords: Agency. Dialogue. Rationality. Social facts. Conflict mediation
Este trabalho tem como tema agência comunicativa humana. A competência para instanciar um conjunto de procedimentos comunicativos é tomada como um componente da racionalidade humana que cumpre a função central de regulação de nosso ambiente cognitivo (um conjunto de estados mentais, destacadamente suposições e emoções) tendo em vista maximizar metas práticas e sociabilidade. A abordagem linguístico-inferencial desse escopo de racionalidade que oferecemos abarca dois níveis: cognitivo e prático, tratados hierarquicamente em função das regulações supostas. Primeiramente, consideramos que o aparato cognitivo (base inferencial, representacional e matarrepresentacional), junto com o aparato linguístico (computação mais expressões interpretáveis), nos permite operar do nível mais básico de processamento linguístico a níveis mais altos (em que se consideram suposições sobre outras mentes). No domínio prático, por sua vez, consideramos que o comportamento linguístico-comunicativo é usado por agentes para agir sobre estados mentais e/ou cursos de ação de outros, estando na base de nossa cognição social. Nesse domínio, não apenas interagimos com agentes como também criamos uma agência social via linguagem. Consideramos, assim, um quadro de agência comunicativa em que atos são performados dentro de uma estrutura dialógica. A tese geral é a de que a comunicação exige o uso de habilidades que incorporam parâmetros de racionalidade prática. Essa regulação estaria dependentes de uma estrutura cognitiva e prática de agência, segundo a qual a cognição humana representaria agentes de três tipos: indivíduos, membros de grupos (integrantes) e grupos (agentes coletivos ou representantes). Cada um desses níveis apresenta traços de agência comunicativa característicos. Em todos eles, porém, há a possibilidade do desacordo, cognitivo ou prático, em situações de diálogo. Ilustramos esse quadro com um cenário de conflito entre agentes que supostamente visam a chegar a um acordo de paz. A análise ilustrativa se foca em diálogos reais de negociação entre membros de grupos e representantes do Estado de Israel e da Palestina que estão encarregados do processo de paz. Observamos como os objetivos práticos de agentes desses tipos regulam seus objetivos cognitivos e dialógicos. Como consequência, apresentamos uma proposta alternativa ao cenário padrão de negociação, ou mediação de conflito. Como benefício teórico, questões pragmáticas ad hoc (relevância para indivíduo qua agente, conflitos entre agentes) recebem tratamento e destaque. Como benefício prático, o modelo pode ser aplicado na área de mediação de conflitos, dado o redimensionamento de uma disposição biossocial: nossos estados cognitivos são particularmente afetados por estímulos de agentes de uma categoria (artistas), com potencial efeito sobre agências individuais e coletivas.

**Palavras-chave:** Agência. Diálogo. Racionalidade. Fatos Sociais. Mediação de conflitos
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INTRODUCTION

We attempt to offer an approach of a key aspect of human rationality and sociability. Linguistic communication, taken broadly, has a relevant role in our mental and practical lives: it is our central source of epistemic vigilance (content), connectivity (among agents), sociability (social practices), success (mastering), and emotional health (given conversation and connection and as a reward to the senses). Throughout a day, we think to ourselves, representing a wide range of information. We also express our feelings and other mental states by linguistic and non-linguistic codes; we get in contact with other peoples’ behavior and take part in the decision-making of certain groups. In this research, we will engage ourselves on the analysis of such contexts of linguistic scenarios.

The current debate on communication invokes many areas. It involves cognitive science, since we process inputs, which other agents can be the source of, and generate outputs, which other agents can be the target of. Centrally, we can define communication as an exchange, among agents, of evidence on internal and external states, as well as a high-level biosocial form of contact. The first aspect has been developed by formal and cognitive models, and the second by biosocial models. The structure of relations among agents lies inside a more general domain of action and data processing. Rational thinking and rational action are very close notions. As Walton (2007) mentions, by “asking questions and offering replies and arguments” people reason together. We can mention the Socratic Period, when a dialectic practice was crucial. By formulating hypothesis, offering reasons and refuting conclusions, we could reach knowledge, since we could present counterarguments (thus pointing to the falsity of some conclusions or weakening someone’s thesis), or advance towards a proposition resulted from good reasoning and supported collectively. Classical models of rationality, then, miss the social and especially the emotional component, not considering social aspects of individual and collective decision-making, made possible via communication.

The theoretical picture we will draw here take human beings as agents. Throughout many
disciplines¹, an agent is defined as an individual, singular or collective, who has goals and who makes use of their means in order to achieve these goals, thus bringing about a change in the environment. This view of agency refers to action or acting, putting the discussion in the practical domain, the domain where different sorts of goals interact for decision-making. It is equally possible, though, to treat agency by a purely epistemic perspective. By such a view, the changes at issue are only cognitive states, and reasoning is a central process targeting truth. We connect these two levels of agency here, in the scenario of communication.

Communication is the proper ground to pass from changing our own mental states to changing others’ mental states and courses of action. Acting, in any level, from reasoning to acting politically, seems to pass by a linguistic-communicative mechanism of the type described by speech-act theories. Dialogue-based theories made the point that a common dialogue structure of action-reaction was missing in the default framework of speech acts. We will not only agree with them in this regard, given the full accounts on language games they provide, but we will claim that some theoretical tools are still required to address communicative agency properly, to address the agents in question. Agency seems to be a central feature of pragmatic theories concerned with communicative meaning, given the centrality of agents’ acts and their intended effects, for communication. This is a central point, since agents recognize agency features and calibrate the interaction in virtue of that recognition. We are focusing on human agents here, considering that we are committed to a view of cognition enabling the communicative agency; however, it is possible to explore the same agency structure in computational agents.

By saying, “Unfortunately, Brazil is facing a political drama”, an agent can be described as committed to many acts, from linguistic to high-level acts, such as a political one. The agent can be said to be doing at least two things: informing and complaining, for example. And the fact that agents can be committed with multiple acts by the use of language is not trivial. This brings the “agent sphere” to the pragmatic discussion. It has further implications for the treatment of cost-benefit operations, goals and commitments in communication. Moreover, it focuses on the agents’ perspectives over what was done, opposed to a view of what was in fact done. And this

¹ Such as Artificial intelligence, dialog-systems and philosophy of action.
point is relevant for the consideration of we-intentionality, given a set of intentional states and features recognized by the agents involved in the communicative exchanges. People crucially perform certain acts as certain agents and understand those acts as performed by those agents.

The guiding question to be considered is, then, ‘What are the central cognitive and practical features of communicative agency?’ In order to account for the guiding question, we will consider options in the contemporary literature. The analysis targets: (i) the role of *positions* (especially those attributed to *groups*) in communication and (ii) representational capacities required for action of certain types.

Additionally, we will address the fact that the set of beliefs of the agents may be different from the one that the agents attribute to themselves (in public) – ‘manifested beliefs’. These entities, entities of speech, are the ones we are interested in, since they take the form of positions in dialogues.

As Jonathan Cohen says,

we must distinguish between *the disposition to execute certain utterances and actions*, which is normally but not necessarily a sign of a person’s belief, and the disposition to have certain feelings, which is what constitutes the belief. It is normally, but not always, by discovering a disposition of the former kind that we can infer one of the latter. (1992: 10, emphasis added)

And the disposition to execute certain utterances and actions is centrally related to agency conditions:

In other words, even if we grant that a *person* is normally disposed *to speak and act* in accordance with his creedal feelings - i.e. to do this if *he has the opportunity* and if doing so furthers *the achievement of his desires* - it does not follow that his disposition constitutes a part of the belief. (ibid, emphasis added)

The disposition to execute certain utterances and actions under certain conditions, given the achievement of certain desires, evocates our main point here: communicative agency. But what kind of agent does Cohen’s account refer to or presupposes? He explicitly refers to a person, but this is not enough to say here, we advocate. A person is an agent under a certain scope of agency. A human person certainly has mental states, such as beliefs and desires. The same person,
though, can walk in the shoes of many, many agents every day, such as a father, a neighbor, a director, a representative, and we are able to recognize this fact and these roles when we talk to this person. Thus, in order to address the foundations of rational speech acts, we need to offer an account of the agent who performs these acts, considering the mechanisms required and the types of goals involved. A cost-benefit paradigm, then, is valuable.

Crucially, we have to say something about how to address ‘actions’, and we have at least two options here, as pointed out by Traum (1999: 19) in the context of speech acts. One option is to approach action ‘objectively’; the other, it is to approach action ‘subjectively’. In the first case, we focus on the phenomena that ‘happened in the world’, according to some specified occurrence constrains and having some effects; and, in the second case, we focus on actions as “corresponding to a particular agent's views of what has been performed”.

We will follow the second option, since we are interested in dialogue agents and social facts of the sort addressed by Searle (1995, 2010). Given that we endorse intentional states as being in the base of actions (at least of the type we are interested in), we assume the ‘subjective’ way of approaching acts. This subjective way, however, encompasses more than the individual’s mental states. Note that Searle’s approach departs from the view of ‘what I think we did’ towards a proposal of ‘what we think we did’, that is, towards a collective intentionality2. This is not to say that there are no independent effects or objects, such as insulting materials, marriages, political parties and contracts, that have a counterpart that is independent of the cognitions involved; rather, it is to say that those effects or objects are created by and exist as such as subject-dependent entities. We are, thus, committed to a structure of human intentionality. These remarks are brought to justify the methodology, but we will have more to say about that later.

We need to say, though, that pragmatic studies have a contribution for the discussion. Paul Grice (1957, 1967) developed an analysis of the rational basis of communicative behavior based on a cooperative principle. After him, Sperber and Wilson have directed their work towards the natural basis of this rational behavior based on a relevance principle, centered in a processing

2 This is a crucial point against the objection of the methodological individualism this framework is considered to be committed to.
cost-cognitive benefit paradigm. Costa (2005\textsuperscript{3}), in his turn, suggested a more basic principle operating in the ground of communicative action, according to which humans have a tendency for communicative connection, also found in Weigand (2009, 2010, among others), as the Dialogue Principle. These last two contributions advocate for a Dialogue Theory, a step forward in the linguistic studies of communication, after Speech Act theory. Centered in or taking into account the foundations and nature of human communication, Tomasello, Pinker, Costa, Searle, Vanderveken, Walton and Weigand bring significant contributions to the discussion of a set of communicative dispositions to action, as well as authors like Sperber and Wilson, which are central to the debate about the cognitive and social foundations of our pragmatic competence. Taking them together, these views compose a scenario where agents connect themselves (psychophysically) via dialogic acts (one agent’s act after another agent’s act, a reply to a comment, an answer to a question, etc., i.e. a reaction to an action), in order to strengthen connection (the core of sociability and emotional regulation) and/or (but not necessarily in an optimal way) to share information relevantly to improve minds and actions (the core of rationality).

We suggest that this picture offers good insights to the guiding question. Assuming here a soft notion of rationality in the communicative domain, where 'rational' is predicated for agents (i) who ask and give reasons to be considered in their reasoning processes and communicative actions, (ii) who take into consideration preferences and other volitive states as reasons, and finally (iii) who use their means to fulfill their goals, in many levels of agency.

Since we assume dialogue as central to social life and since conflicts are in the base of social life as well, we need to say something about them, in view of the hybrid framework we offer. Our approach, thus, deals suitably with conflict among rational agents, since we assume that epistemic and practical disagreement among agents may follow in a scenario where one of the agents in the interaction may believe, assume or aim the opposite of what the other agent believes, assumes or aims. This seems to hold for all types of human agents of the kinds we

\textsuperscript{3} The first version of this article appeared in 2004. You can access it on the author’s web page here. From now on, we will make reference to the version published in the Journal.
consider, as it will be discussed.

Moreover, a linguistic-communicative mechanism can be the source of conflicts as well as it can be used to seal deals and to solve disputes between agents; complex conflicts, involving institutions and groups, though, require more resources than linguistic acts can offer us. But the path towards solutions seems to go through communication, but of a specific communicative type: the expressive dialogue.

In this dissertation, we aim to offer reasons to assume a biosocial perspective of dialogue, and by doing so, to derive a set of conclusions for natural and social sciences in a justified way. Ultimately, we target an application of the model to the field of conflict mediation.

To sum up the main point, we may say that we embrace most of Searle’s model (1969, 1995, 2010), particularly in the consideration that all of human institutional reality is created and maintained by we-intentionality (representational capacity) of the type made possible by a linguistic mechanism enabling the emergence of speech acts of the form of declarations, explicit or implicit (such as “Peace!”). Here we are, thus, focused on the capacity related to social functions, via action. Consequently, the use of language is described inside a framework of action and of conceptual architecture. But you go further on it, since it misses the point that speech acts are part of a dialogic game, of a linguistic-communicative mechanism.

A speaker is, therefore, understood to be competent and to perform according to an internalized\textsuperscript{4} dialogue framework, in many levels of agency, i.e. qua agents of three types. Consequently, the use of language is described inside a framework of dialogic behavior, enabled by a conceptual architecture proper for this type of agency. As the assumption behind the title of this dissertation, we aim to go further in the pragmatic dimension of linguistic knowledge (we-intentionality) for communicative action, instantiated in dialogic behavior.

In short, this work aims to deal with dialogue as an instantiation of a competence or a set of related competences, better described as a ‘competence-in-performance.’ As Weigand (2010: 56) claims, human abilities, perceptual and cognitive, are the key to meaning, since they restrict the universe of meaning recognition. These mental acts, then, both ground practical action as

\textsuperscript{4} Where cultural, individual and situational variations play a role.
well as are influenced by practical constraints. Desires, needs, purposes, interests are the driving states for actions. ‘Competence-in-performance’ is, therefore, the capacity to regulate abilities towards action (Weigand, 2010: 40-41).

This view converges to a perspective of the human cognition as social cognition. It is central to notice that the focus on behavior does not imply an opposition to the treatment of the mechanism that underlies it; it is just an option for connecting the device to the output structure; not the token output, but the type. Analyzing speaker-types and dialogue-types is a methodological choice here.

The central point of the approach is to understand how agents act-together and think-together, as Aristotle observed, with the addition of how agents feel-together, alongside with the understating of how this dimension can be related to the other two dimensions.

Thus, the approach of rationality we will pursue focuses on practical rationality (in the scope of action), which embraces epistemic rationality (as a treatment of ‘what reasoning processes are involved in thinking’, in achieving accurate states about the environment).

Our leading perspective is linguistic, mainly pragmatic, since we are concerned with the question, ‘What does the dialoguer mean?’ and, consequently, with the question, ‘What is the dialoguer doing?’ We, therefore, advocate for the centrality of the concept of dialogue and agency in the studies of meaning and communication.

By now, we are able to make explicit the interdisciplinary mapping in the basis of this enterprise: Linguistics (via Semantics/Pragmatics), Cognitive Sciences (via Cognitive Linguistics: language comprehension and processing and social intelligence) and Philosophy (via Social Epistemology and Philosophy of Language). We will assume that all of these areas are concerned with a level of analysis.

The general thesis is that communication requires the use of skills that incorporate considerations of practical order, which will depend on a cognitive and practical structure of agency, represented by the human mind as three types of agents: individuals, group members and groups (collectives or representatives). Therefore, we communicate by operating with a set of skills governed by parameters of grammaticality inside parameters of communicability, which,
in their turn, are inside parameters of practical rationality. This claim is inside an account of agency, by which humans operate as individuals (human beings), as members of groups (in-group agency) and as groups (collectively). Each chapter, then, represents a premise of this claim. The abductive hypothesis behind it is that our linguistic competence interacts with our communicative competence. This has some theoretical relevance, since it is necessary to explain the evidence, in the form of data on infant cognition regarding social agency. Infants in the same age group demonstrate a conversational competence (disposition to ask questions, to provide answers, to make comments, to identify turn-takings, to greet people, to start a conversation, etc.) besides a grammatical linguistic competence (to use language according to the parameters of a natural language); to access data on infant social cognition, please see The Cambridge Handbook of Child Language (2009), and the work of Michael Tomasello, Elizabeth Spelke, Alan Leslie, and others.

On the other hand, despite an instinct for dialogic contact, disagreements among agents do appear and persist. In some scenarios, they remain for long periods of time and cross geographical boundaries, regardless of dialogic efforts to solve them. We aim at exploring this situation inside our framework of dialogic rationality. We will use the case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an illustrative case. By means of an analysis of a negotiation dialogue, which is part of negotiation efforts, we will reflect upon the agency involved.

At the end of the day, we will have a hybrid model of communicative competence. Given that we also target a practical application of this theoretical framework, we hope to shed some light on the scenario of negotiation, which involves conflict, or disagreement, among agents. We assume that in the context of negotiation, there is a chain of positions\(^5\), which are made of natural language. These positions are inside a dialogic framework (partially invariable among cultures). This could explain the possibility of complex, international dialogues, involving agents from different cultural backgrounds inside international institutions.

To justify this choice, we should say that agency is a central theme not only in sub-areas of philosophy, psychology and computer science, it is also crucial for Pragmatics. However, its centrality is little explored in this last discipline. We aim, therefore, to point out the fact that many

\(^5\) A concept to be explored in its dialogical and practical functions.
concepts of the pragmatic tradition need to refer to agents. Moreover, we seek to apply the theoretical framework to a scenario of international significance.

The dissertation is divided into 6 chapters. Each part contributes to the general claim, but each of them focuses on one aspect of it. Some of the arguments have already been published and presented in national and in international conferences (centrally the ones concerning the key role of artists as peacemakers and the framework of collective agency). In Chapter 1, we will present properties that must characterize a linguistic agent. In Chapter 2, we will focus on central cognitive assumptions regarding the concept of agency we want to address in this study. In Chapter 3, we will address a set of logical properties of rational agents of the types we assume, and in Chapter 4 a set of social properties of these agents. In Chapter 5, we will present an illustrative scenario of conflict, considering the properties presented in the previous chapters, which will be the basis for the proposal of conflict mediation we will finally present in Chapter 6.

The reader may take certain claims as committed to a methodological behaviorism or functionalism. We reply in advance that the claims may be behaviorist in the weak sense that we focus on the agent’s action under certain constraints; and functionalist in the weak sense that we focus on a set of behavioral outputs that fit certain conditions. These methodological choices may appear to go against the focus on human agency (once they apply to any kind of agent that fit those conditions); in fact, we are committed to some sort of biological naturalism of the type of Searle’s or Chomsky’s, who assume that the human brain, to a certain extent, causes the human mind.

**Final remarks**

Of course, each of the areas involved can separately approach this topic in detail. The result will, then, be a proper characterization of one level of analysis. Alternatively, following the proposal of the Meta theory of Interfaces (Costa, 2007; Costa and Feltes, 2010), we can deal with a generality of the phenomenon by means of a relation among areas and their subareas. The output can represent theoretical benefits at the level of their fundamentals. However, the
interdisciplinary effort is by contingency asymmetric, since we map concepts mainly from the point of view of one area (Dias, 2012). Guiding the construction of this architecture is the presumption of a potential application to current practical issues. We, thus, offer a proposal of application to conflict scenarios with a perspective of resolution. By means of the first chapters, which contain theoretical discussion, we aim to explain; by means of the illustrative chapter, we aim to describe. By means of the last chapter, we aim at a normative consequence by the form of a proposal of conflict mediation. In reality, though, all of these goals are mixed in the action, given token subgoals that appear in the course of those actions.
Figures 1 and 2 - Thesis' Intrafaces on Dialogic Rationality
1 THE GROUNDS OF A COMMUNICATIVE RATIONALITY: DIALOGUERS AS LINGUISTIC AGENTS

We now think that human communication is first and foremost a matter of inference and that language is the add-on. Here is the new story. (Sperber, 1995)

Introduction

Let us start with some basic assumptions: children\(^6\) tend to engage conversationally with the people around them, and like other humans, in different developmental stages, they tend to start a dialogue appropriately, calling people’s attention by, for example, asking questions, making comments or requests, greeting them; children\(^7\), when competent speakers, tend to expose sets of content through intelligible ‘linguistic acts’, centrally aiming to change others’ mental states or course of action\(^8\), like adults. We assume, abductively, then, that dialogic competence has innate routes and that it is connected to linguistic competence. A linguistic competence takes the form of natural grammars, which are humans’ most sophisticated tools for communicative, given their discrete and recursive properties. With some variances, linguistic competence or linguistic knowledge is understood as a by-product of a natural capacity for language, a special type of know-how (to master grammars)\(^9\).

\(^6\) See, for example, Moll & Tomasello (2010). Tomasello (2003) also provide support for the hypothesis that human infants communicate in sophisticated ways. See also Salomo et al. (2011) on young children’s question answering.

\(^7\) See Tomasello et al. (2007) for an account of some features of what is called “a platform of pre-linguistic communication”. Pointing, for example, is taken as a universal communicative tool, already present in human infants’ communication. “Although there may be some variations of form (e.g., in some cultures the norm is lip- or chin-pointing), the basic interpersonal function of directing someone’s attention to something is very likely a human universal (Kita, 2003)” (705p.); just as eye-gaze, it requires mindreading abilities. The authors call attention to the account of Bruner (1975), which focuses on pointing as representing communicative acts inside an interactional exchange. We will again presuppose a rich cognitive basis to explain both the common structure and the “communicative motivation”.

\(^8\) “[...] the question is whether young infants are attempting, in their pre-linguistic communication, to influence the intentional/mental states of others (cause them to “know” something) or whether, alternatively, they are simply aiming to achieve certain behavioral effects in others (cause them to “do” something)” (Tomasello et al., 2007: 705-6).

\(^9\) Or ‘knowledge-how to learn a language’. See Chomsky (2000) for some discussion on the difference between ability and competence regarding natural language.
Let us start with the concepts of language and communication\textsuperscript{10} behind these initial assumptions. Like the Scott-Phillips’ book (2015), the conception of language embraces both cognitive and social dimensions, cognitive here understood as computational rules, plus entities generated by it, and social here understood as the switches made in virtue of the environment plus content generate by it. We, thus, target the human linguistic endowment, here understood in a Chomskyan broad sense\textsuperscript{11}: the computational system (syntax) in interface with the sensory-motor system (phonology) and with the conceptual-intentional system (semantics-pragmatics\textsuperscript{12}), in addition to usability principles (a proper pragmatic competence).

Let us take any natural language token as input, such as “Welcome to this country,” and observe that requirements of the grammar in terms of externalization, such as word order, vocabulary and relation among meaningful units, are fulfilled. To the sentence-proposition pair we can add another one. If we are going to analyze the token as an instance of a type of a given language, we will assume that other requirements are also part of the speaker’s knowledge of that language. A natural language token is not only syntactically well-formed and composed by units of that language in a meaningful combination, they are used properly in a token situation and are performed inside a structure-type of expectations regarding such use, since people seem to be doing things, such as greeting others, when they utter structures such as “Welcome to this country”. This is to say that the pair utterance-dialogic move is also a key pair of analysis when we want to address meaning in the context of natural language exchanges.

\textsuperscript{10} It seems relevant to have in mind that expression and communication are, themselves, two canonical entities, functions of language use. The first is based on a function that connects individuals to the things around them and with their own mental or intentional states (representation), and the other is based on a function that connects individuals among each other (metarepresentation).

\textsuperscript{11} There are many features to be considered here as it is mentioned by Pinker and Jackendoff, “To reconcile the recursion-only hypothesis with the fact that vocal learning and imitation are distinctively human (among primates), HCF refer to a “capacity for vocal imitation” and assign it to the “broad language faculty” which subsumes non-language specific abilities.” (Pinker and Jackendoff, 2005: 2009). “Thus “capacity for vocal imitation” in humans might be better described as a capacity to learn to produce speech, contradicting the idea that grammatical recursion is the only human-specific and language-specific component of the language faculty” (Pinker and Jackendoff, 2005a: 2009).

\textsuperscript{12} We will have more to say about this aspect of linguistic faculty, since we claim that the conceptual structure of agency is nuclear in the debate. We call attention to the fact that competent speakers have a sophisticated conceptual architecture of agency.
As cultural by-products of this capacity, users have specific grammars and their specific conditions of usage. What Austin and his followers have called felicity conditions of the use of language in society, refer to constraints made by institutional parameters, i.e. conventions, given cultural and situational contexts. These conditions are addressed along with the observation that people act not only in producing an utterance, acting also by producing that utterance. Thus, by performing an utterance, users do things in the world, and they also do those things in order affect other users and the environment. That is to say that natural language use is of central importance to human agency.

We assume, then, that an agent has a biological disposition for language acquisition and for language use in communication. Chomsky has a central argument supporting the view that language is badly designed for communication: elimination of structural elements in externalization causes difficulty in communicative comprehension but maximizes computational processing. For Chomsky and colleagues, human linguistic capacity is centrally designed for representation (for thought, reasoning and knowledge). Pinker and Jackendoff, among others, say that our linguistic capacity is a complex adaptation for communication. By ‘communication’, we do not mean any type of linguistic externalization or information sharing, but we focus on ostensive communication. Chomsky (2000: 26) endorses naturalist theories of language use (C-R theories), according to which to have an I-language, i.e. a generative procedure that creates structural descriptions (structured sets of phonetic, semantic and other features), “is something like having a ‘way to speak and understand’, which is one traditional picture of what a language is”. For the author, though, “there is reason to believe that the I-languages (‘grammatical competence’) are distinct from conceptual organization and ‘pragmatic competence’, and that these systems can be selectively impaired and developmentally dissociated (see Yamada 1990;

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13 “Specifically, the language faculty evolved in the human lineage for the communication of complex propositions” (Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005: 204).
14 Tomasello advocates for such a view but his perspective differs from Pinker’s in some important respects, which we will not explore here.
15 ‘C-R’ means computational-representational systems, understood as a level of description of brain activity (see Chomsky, 2000: 24-6).

Concerning pragmatic abilities, we assume the Gricean view that intention-recognition is a required process for meaningful exchanges; thus, the recognition of a communicative intention (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995), as the recognition that an agent has the intention to manifest a set of assumptions, is a necessary condition for communication of the type we are interested in. However, this is not a sufficient condition for the performance and understanding of the types of institutional acts we will address. “[...] speech acts involve intentional undertaking of a publicly accessible commitment; further, that commitment is not undertaken simply by virtue of my intending to undertake it, even when it is common knowledge that this is what I am trying to do” (Green, 2015). Social constraints will, then, be taken into account.

As a consequence, we need to account both for the social (we-intentional) and the natural (cognitive grounds) basis involved in agents’ acts of answering, replying, greeting, asking questions, making comments, and so on, within a dialogue structure. That is to say that, just as Wilson (2005) argues that data on the mindreading abilities of children is convincing evidence of the pragmatic competence from a young age, data on this “communicative motivation” of infants (Tomasello, 2009) seems to be convincing evidence of a dialogic competence from a young age.

Considering these assumptions, we advocate that the ‘representational’ and the ‘communicative’ views of language deal with different, but interconnected, aspects of linguistic competence. At a higher level, communication depends on reasoning and reasoning can be performed, externalized or obtain content via communication; at a lower level, the computation

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16 There are relevant attempts to characterize which mechanisms would compose this faculty, and we call attention to the one made by Pinker & Jackendoff (2005: 205): “HCF also argue that some aspects of the human conceptual system, such as Theory of Mind (intuitive psychology) and parts of intuitive physics, are absent in monkeys, and questionable or at best rudimentary in chimpanzees. They are special to humans, though not special to language. We add that many other conceptual systems, though not yet systematically studied in non-human primates, are conspicuous in human verbal interactions while being hard to discern in any aspect of primates’ naturalistic behavior. They include essences (a major component of intuitive biology and chemistry), ownership, multi-part tools, fatherhood, romantic love, and most moral and deontic concepts. It is possible that these abilities, like Theory of Mind, are absent or discernible only in rudimentary form in other primates. These too would be uniquely human aspects of the language faculty in its broad sense, but would be part of a system for non-linguistic reasoning about the world rather than for language itself.”
behind symbolic (representational) states is in the core of the capacity for having meta-representational states.

Costa (2005) assumes that human language is essentially form (syntax), content (semantics) and usability (pragmatics). Dan Sperber claims there are basic mechanisms governing linguistic behavior and that language is an additional element in the process. According to Sperber (1995: 3-4\(^{17}\)), this natural inference-making or reasoning process is the result of our capacity for metarepresentation.

A complex inferential device seems to be in the core of our linguistic competence, guiding the content activation and derivation, being central to an understanding of rational dialoguers. We claim that the ability of meta-representing gives us content to fill out the premises used in the computation – and the ability of computing them (reasoning with them) gives us the mechanism of processing the content (in a relevant way). One seems to be input to the other.

Humans are endowed with representational abilities that enable us: (a) to have the capacity to represent states of affairs, such as a situation, a need and an intention; (b) to have the capacity to represent that other agents have the same capacity (they form their own representations), and (c) to have the capacity to find out in the course of observation or interaction which representations the others have, i.e. a metarepresentational capacity.

According to the ‘new story’ of communication told by Sperber (1995:4),

Language made inferential communication immensely more effective. It did not change its character. All human communication, linguistic or non-linguistic, is essentially inferential. Whether we give evidence of our thoughts by picking berries, by mimicry, by speaking, or by writing - as I have just done -, we rely first and foremost on our audience's ability to infer our meaning.

Centrally, though, the capacity for communicative interaction is characterized by a dialogic format; i.e. it is set in a basic framework of dialogic expectations and procedures, the standard form of communicative interaction (see Costa, 2005, 2012; Walton, 2006, 2007; Weigand, 2009, 2010, among others). This point has to be addressed by a pragmatic theory, if a pragmatic theory

\(^{17}\)This page number refers to the version of the text available on Sperber’s web page and it may be different from the original published version.
is interested in how linguistic knowledge interacts with the human capacity for communication, from understanding an utterance to the kind of psychological effects (both I and we intentional states) intended or obtained by means of its use. Pragmatic theories embrace both models of comprehension and action, when they aim to provide a full account of “mutually manifest meaning”, “verbal communication”, or human verbal “interaction”.

The dialogic behavior is the expression of an innate set of principles that are tuned by conditions of the environment (such as particular grammars, agency-goals, communicative situations, conventions) and constrained by conditions of a rationality design\(^{18}\). For example, the same informative content, said by different speakers, can generate different cognitive effects in the same hearer in view of certain cognitive conditions; the same argument can be judged differently by the same person depending on the speaker, her role in the context and her rhetorical abilities; that is, there are properties such as personal bias involved.

In this scenario, we approach dialogue as a set of intentional \textit{procedures} or \textit{acts}. By making use of the terminology\(^{19}\) applied by Fogelin and Sinnott-Armstrong’ (2005), let us analyze ostensive communicative acts by describing linguistic behavior into three levels: linguistic-act level, speech-act level and communicative-act level (since we assume levels of analysis):

1) \textit{Linguistic-act (LA)}: An act of performing a syntactic-semantic-pragmatic, well-formed formula.

\textit{LA: If you are reading this, you are a linguist, or a philosopher, or both.}

2) \textit{Speech-act (SA)}: An act performed by an agent by virtue of the linguistic act.

\textit{SA: Thank you for reading this!}

\(^{18}\) We conceive the dialogical phenomenon as a plural entity, which involves neurological capacities, logico-cognitive tendencies and social conventions.

\(^{19}\) I justify the decision for replacing the Austinian canonical terms ‘locutionary’, ‘illocutionary’ and ‘perlocutionary’ for the use of a new terminology in view of rhetorical benefits. It seems that the new terminology has semantic features that make the understanding easier for the reader. I am aware of Peirce’s criticism over replacing terminology.
3) **Communicative-act (CA):** An act of changing someone’s cognitive states or course of action through a speech act (there are cognitive or behavioral effects in the hearer, in terms of assumptions or course of action).

**CA:** The interface between Social Epistemology and Pragmatics should be strengthened.

This chapter, then, intends to be a fresh characterization of linguistic features used in communication. Meaning *in language* is approached here as meaning *conveyed by the use of language*.

**Communicative agency**

The term ‘communicative rationality’ implies the existence of specific (rational) behavior in this domain. We need, then, to specify what kind of domain that is. First, we can conceive of establishing dialogic contact in a *non-contentful level* (or in a low-level of content), only for purposes of interpersonal contact — and this kind of dialogic contact, which may also involve linguistic code, seems to be usual in everyday life, when we shake hands with people and smile and say ‘hello’ to them. In *Social Intelligence*, Goleman (2006) endorses the movement from “a one-person psychology — those capacities an individual has within — to a two-person psychology: what transpires as we connect”\(^{20}\), given the recognition of properties that emerge by means of this biosocial contact, “rapport only arises between people, as a property that emerges from their interaction”\(^{21}\).

At the same time, we take communication as requiring *comprehension*, as a process conducted by activating, recovering and processing information, a set of cognitive activities triggered by an intentional process of information manifestation, assuming a contentful organization on the individual level.

On both levels, we can identify some patterns of coordinated action and we can assume that people are rational in acting in such a coordinated way.

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\(^{20}\) See [http://www.danielgoleman.info/topics/social-intelligence/](http://www.danielgoleman.info/topics/social-intelligence/).

\(^{21}\) See [http://www.danielgoleman.info/topics/social-intelligence/](http://www.danielgoleman.info/topics/social-intelligence/).
Therefore, assuming *dialogue* as a *biosocial behavior*, we claim that there are two basic levels involved, following Costa (2005): a level of pure connection, where dialogic exchange represents an instantiation of the natural tendency for *communicative contact* (expressed by the *principle of non-trivial connectivity*, Costa, 2005).

*Principle of non-trivial connectivity: tendency for connection/communication*

This means we are supposing that there is a cognitive direction of the brain/mind for the communicative connection, among other forms of connection, as for example, the physical-sexual, etc. Such tendency, at the human level, should be understood as only a subset of a more unspecific typical of the animals in general. (Costa, 2005: 119)

And a level of content sharing, where dialogic exchange represents the tendency for *relevant content-sharing* (expressed by the *principle of relevance* – Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995, 2012).

*Principle of relevance: tendency for relevance*

*Cognitive Principle of Relevance* (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 260-66; Wilson and Sperber, 2012: 6): “*Human cognition tends to be geared to the maximization of relevance.*”

*Communicative Principle of Relevance* (Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 266-72; Wilson and Sperber, 2012: 6): “*Every act of overt communication conveys a presumption of its own optimal relevance*”.

What these descriptive principles address is the existence of a default natural behavior in human agents. The first principle goes in the direction of a Goleman’s claim: “We are wired to connect”. The second goes in the direction of a picture of optimal rationality. As stated in Wilson and Sperber (2012: 6), “[w]anting her communication to succeed, the communicator, by the very act of communicating, indicates that she wants the audience to see her utterance as relevant”. More specifically, relevance is a property of inputs, such as linguistic acts, to *cognitive processes* (human cognitive agency). It is a relational property, since processing this kind of data requires some cognitive *effort* – such as decoding, resolving ambiguities and referential indeterminacies,

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22 The original excerpt, written in Portuguese, can be found [here](#).
supplying contextual assumptions, deriving or computing implicatures (see Wilson and Sperber, 2012: 7, 38) – and some benefit worth processing – such as true contextual implications, warranted strengthening or revisions of agent’s assumptions (see Wilson and Sperber, 2012: 6). Yet, it may require other kinds of effects, such as emotional effects (see Costa, 2009). To this extent, we can deal with this picture of complex rationality, which seems to embrace the following cases,

Agent$_x$ declares: ‘I forgot what I said at that time but not how much I enjoyed it’.
Agent$_x$ declares: ‘I can understand you completely’.

Agent$_x$ forgot the propositional content, but not the ‘emotional’ content attached to it. As Wilson and Sperber (2012: 38) mention, “ostensive behavior automatically activates in the addressee some conceptual structure or idea”, as well as the addressee has a default behavior operating beyond her/his action. This disposition to sociability and to the selection and processing of overt data is part of our social endowment: “As advanced science helps us to explain, minds are partly products of socially acquired linguistic structures. We are born with cognitive mental dispositions, some of which allow us to verbalize cognitive content” (Stein, 2012).

Accordingly, we assume **dialogic** performance as psychophysical exchanges, and this is a key property of our rationality. The psychophysical exchanges is part of our interactive behavior, and supralinguistic and paralinguistic data, such as gestures, intonation and facial expressions, are as important as linguistic data to the process of understanding. Sometimes we can deal with dialogic conflicts by operating with these basic properties of contact (eye contact, gestures, handshakes, smiling), since we can offer high-quality evidence of our mental states. This calls the attention to a triangle of relations:

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![Figure 3 - Thought, language and emotion](image-url)
It is possible that the relation between the content of a speech act and the content of a mental act (a set of assumptions) is null or weak. That is, it is possible for agents to say something (to act linguistically) they do not believe or do not even entertain in full extent; for example, agents can talk about politics or the weather by means of just repeating highly used utterances (pragmatic level), without going further in content analysis (semantic counterpart). It is just a communicative behavior, a set of linguistic acts in the base of a speech act - without a strong relation between thought and linguistic behavior. Moreover, when the agents start to process the set of mental assumptions involved, they change their mental states (review of assumptions\textsuperscript{23}). This point can be translated into popular expressions such as “paying lip service” (in Portuguese: “falando da boca para fora”) or “small talk” (in Portuguese: “jogar conversa fora” or “ficar de papo furado”).

Another applicable relation is the one that directly connects language acts and emotional states. We can think about linguistic emotional triggers, that is, the set of linguistic acts that result from or activate agent’s emotional states, such as anger, fear and pain. These linguistic acts are an output of a set of emotional states, and they are activated as fast as it appears to be the intensity of the emotional states. In this context, language seems to mediate the process of externalizing basic cognitive states. Therefore, we can think that language fulfills an inner linguistic role when it is not centrally mediating the externalization of mental states, thereby playing the role of a means of contact. We can exemplify this scenario with a situation in which we seem to perform speech acts such as agreement (“oh, yeah”, “that’s true!”, “Oh, yes, yes!”).

It is relevant to say that to be dialogically competent means being competent in all these levels. It means that you have the ability to perform and understand a set of linguistic, speech and conversational acts.

\textsuperscript{23} Such as strengthening, adding or weakening assumptions.
Dialoguers as intentional agents

It so happens that sometimes what is meant by the agent is different from the set of assumptions made manifest to other agents in the dialogue, resulting in no establishment of a mutual cognitive environment (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). The goals of identifying intentions (by the regulation of metarepresentational states via relevance) are conceptual adjustment and prediction or coordination of behavior.

I assume, along with Sperber and Wilson (1995), that every act of communication creates an expectation of relevance; thus directing the pragmatic investigation to the question of what a dialoguer means by the use of a linguistic act (utterance, the content of a speech act). In this direction, semiologists and semioticians have been making a great effort to describe and explain the process of meaning construction on the side of interpreters (cognitive agents or not). Considering ostensive communicative behavior, relevance theorists and other cognitivists have brought good insights to the understanding of language processing for comprehension, by emphasizing cognitive contexts and cost-benefit cognitive computation.

A reasoning agent is a goal-directed agent who decides to take a course of action based on its goals, reasoning processes and the information about the external context. Thus, this agent uses its reasoning capacities to act and, thus, to maximize its goals. Moreover, each agent is capable of representing or metarepresenting the other agents of interaction as having similar goals and acting in view of such goals, thus being in the arena of practical reasoning or practical rationality (Walton, 2007).

Moreover, communication is central for intentional agents to maximize their goals in a context of social interaction; and linguistic communication is effective to this kind of structure of behavior. Socially intentional agents not only act-together but also reason-together to decide the course of action that best fit their goals. We can predicate such intentional agents as autonomous, in the sense they are goal-directed entities “that can carry out actions by using means-end

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24 In the arena of computer sciences, the notion of “reasoning agents” is used in a similar way to the one that appears in practical reasoning approaches or in the Aristotelian practical syllogism (Walton, 2007: 11).
reasoning” (Walton, 2007: 15). What follows from this fact is that, in order to decide and to conduct a course of action, agents deliberate, as Walton states. He defines deliberation as “a process of deciding on what to do, based on one’s goals and needs, and on the means that appear to be available” (2007: 15). In order for agents to conduct a collective or joint course of action, deliberation is often triggered²⁵. For this to be possible, though, it is necessary for the agents to recognize each other as agents of this sort; as Walton states, such a capacity is called plan recognition in computer science. A similar ability is called theory of mind (ToM) in cognitive sciences. It refers to human cognitive capacities for recognizing other agents’ inner states and representations (we will approach it in more detail in chapter 2). The relevant point here is the fact that both natural and computational systems of this sort have as a necessary condition for communication that these agents are capable of formulating hypothesis about the mental life of other agents: what they are thinking, intending, desiring, etc. It is a cognitive aspect of practical rationality that we will explore. Moreover, social cognition skills or competences, such as empathy, have a central importance in our debate.

In his turn, Searle assumes that rational decision-making represents choosing among the set of possible actions you could have chosen to do; differently from natural events, you have reasons for doing what you do. With respect to humans, as the author states, there are higher-order levels of reflection involved, as, for instance, reflecting on the very act of reflection, on the fact that you are reflecting on that, etc. A broad picture, as Searle says, embraces the fact that ‘my decision causes my act’ (activation of conscious psychological properties) is compatible with the view that ‘my act is caused by the communication among the cells’ (biochemical properties), being in different levels of description.

²⁵ “Clearly then, in order to perform group tasks, negotiation between agents is a necessary form of dialogue” (Walton, 2007: 20).
Dialoguers as (social) cognitive agents

Our inferential linguistic perspective of ostensive communication covers formation, activation, computation and review of mental representations on an agent’s side, who operates with assumptions about its own and others’ inner states.

In the core of the rationale of the dialogical process of understanding, we have social moves made by agents (which we intend to explore in some detail). Humans convey information verbally in the form of utterances in natural language. These token propositions (utterances) are part of the content made manifest by speech acts, which carry direct evidence of higher-order intentionality used to restrict the set of representations made mutually manifest.

For Sperber and Wilson (1995, among others), we are dealing with underlying human innate mechanisms of information processing that operate with semantic representation, new or existing ones (reinforcing or weakening them in our belief system or eliminating them from our system). In this sense, such positive cognitive effects are the result of the relationship between the input (overt acts and their contents) and cognitive environments. On the authors’ view, communication is a process that aims precisely at changing the addressee’s representations of the world, i.e. aims to produce cognitive effects.26

Thus, communication involves mutually manifest information. The content that is made mutually manifest is treated as assumptions (propositions assumed or accepted by the agent as ((possibly) being the case) or beliefs (propositions taken as to be true) of a cognitive system. These assumptions are stored in the memory of a cognitive mechanism, or made available or constructed in the moment of the interaction, to which agents can apply logical procedures (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995). For these authors, cognitive systems deal with representations of the world – factual or possible – that are premises of specific inferential calculations, i.e. the non-trivial and non-demonstrative calculation (we will expand on this account in chapter 3). The

26 For Fogelin and Sinnott-Armstrong (2005), argument users can have as goals both changing or affecting audience’s mental states through persuasion, as well as giving reasons for believing in a certain conclusion, justifying it, or even presenting reasons regarding why something happened or is true, explaining it.
premises of this inferential process are not fixed (they come from memory, perception, decoding and application of logical rules) and they pass through content analysis; consequently, the derived conclusions are not entailed by the truth of the premises but just supported by them. As a result, a conclusion inferred by such a process is not taken as a valid conclusion but it is better understood as a conclusion justified by the premises, where the agent forms and confirms hypotheses by analysis of the content. As we can see, the process of forming representations about the world is directly related to the process of using these representations in communication, since it is the most common way of adding and revising beliefs in a system.

By this perspective, communication and comprehension are intimately related processes, once proffered utterances are evidence of a certain set of beliefs entertained by an intentional and rational agent. Human cognition needs to hold a capacity (i) to identify a double intention—informative and communicative—, (ii) to decode the evidence, (iii) to infer the content made manifest by means of that evidence, (iv) to respond to this evidence in the form of action and (v) to share the information (see Walton, 2007: 19). Centrally, communicating requires production and interpretation of specific evidence: evidence produced by communicative-cognitive agents.

The output of these rules is a semantic representation that can be used as input of another calculation – that is, it can suffer the reapplication of the rules. Therefore, utterances are taken as logico-linguistic structures inside a dialogic basis, as well as implicated conclusions of a cognitive process, whose agency is both individual and collective.

Dialoguers as speech agents

I will assume the idea of theoretical levels of context, motivated by the proposal of Berlin (2007). Let us entertain the following levels: the cognitive context is composed by the set of assumptions available or formed to the agent at the moment of the communication; so, it is the broadest one at the level of the individual, since it comprises the conceptual structure about the external world, taking into consideration the agent level. It may be the case of a situation s to exist even though
a specific agent does not recognize it, tough\textsuperscript{27}. For descriptive purposes, let us consider other levels, taking as reference the proposal of Berlin (2007) in a related discipline. Accordingly, the \textit{linguistic context} is composed by the information available at the level of the utterance. The \textit{situational context} is composed by the considerations about the physical environment, geographical location, activity under way (type, duration, conduction, etc.). The \textit{internal interactional context} is composed by goals, intentions, dispositions, motivations, hypotheses, and plans by the part of the agent regarding the interaction, and by metarepresentations about the states of the other agents. The \textit{external interactional context} is composed by the commitments involving roles and the appropriate acts to fulfill them (powers relations, actors-functions involved, etc.). And, finally, the \textit{extrasituational context} is composed by synchronic and diachronic features of social, cultural and political spheres (see Berlin, 2007: 173). Appropriateness then is a context-relative predicate, considering all these levels, in the scope of communicative agency (see Berlin, 2007: 175). As speech agents, we can think that we need to fulfill certain conditions in order to act efficiently.

Chomsky has pointed out in \textit{The Logical Structure of Linguistic Theory} that there are some conditions that are relevant for a linguistic theory of \textit{competence (ToC)}, of \textit{linguistic knowledge}, and others for a theory of the effective \textit{use of language}, of \textit{performance (ToP)}. For the latter, the central concept is \textit{acceptability}. Chomsky relates acceptability to conditions of form and interpretation of sentences (linguistic acts). A sentence then can be suitable, adequate, appropriate, being judged in view of the purpose according to which they are used. Differently, for a theory of grammaticalness, of competence, sentences are judged by standards related to the system of rules underlying natural language outputs. By this view, a sentence needs to be well-formed (in accordance with a grammar), and it will be well-formed if it fits the set of rules of structure-formation. Sentences, according to this approach, are derivatively outputs; they are generated by and in accordance with a grammar (grammatical knowledge). We endorse this view.

\textsuperscript{27} Considering a perspective of we-intentionality, we hold that, for a situation \( s \) to exist, at least two agents need to collectively recognize it.
The hypothesis

Just as the abductive hypothesis that language is a universal phenomenon rooted in our biological endowment seems to be the best explanation for the cross-cultural and developmental data we have about linguistic behavior, a similar hypothesis can be selected to explain dialogic behavior. People seem to share a basic knowledge about how to interact conversationally. And even though it seems right to think that addressing primitives in terms of a communicative competence is more complex than addressing primitives in terms of linguistic knowledge, much progress has been made regarding the identification of such entities.

Indeed, describing unique properties of a dialogic competence (if they exist) is a hard task, since central ones are in an interface with other biological/cognitive functions; let us think of language capacity (we can use it in private representational contexts), or physical contact (we can have sexual and other basic types of contact directed at species preservation), or theory of mind (we can use it in order to predict various types of behavior), or empathetic disposition (we can find it early in generator-offspring relationship), or reasoning (we can use it privately for the improvement of individuals’ cognitive environment – yet there is defense of the optimality of reasoning in argumentative contexts, see Mercier & Sperber, 2011, among others). However, as we argue, most of these properties can be explained in relation to a dialogic competence.

We are committed to treat dialogue as a natural phenomenon: the default format of psycho(physical) contact, whose instantiation in particular settings makes adjustments in the initial state of the mechanism; just like it seems true for linguistic knowledge. Some research
programs pursue this direction explicitly\textsuperscript{28}.

Even if it seems to be more informative to approach the social basis of linguistic communication by describing its situational and cross-cultural variances, addressing it the other way around enables us to analyze linguistic communication, or dialogic contact, as sharing a common basis beyond its variances. We should, then, be able to point out a set of basic, universal components of dialogic competence.

Since one of the most basic components of human societies is precisely their dialogic behavior, dialogic disposition itself may be treated as a primitive faculty regarding sociability, and other (social) dimensions can be analyzed as based on it. Searle (1995, 2010, among others), for example, advocates the existence of a linguistic mechanism as a process that enables the creation of our social world\textsuperscript{29}. He assumes this position when arguing for the metaphor that language is the glue that connects society. The philosopher is concerned to the performative aspect of language, to the fact that people use language to represent (describe or create) institutional facts and also to act on them.

With that in mind, we will address the natural dialogic basis of this disposition. For that aim, let us start talking about language functions. Scientists often claim that natural language has two main functions, where the first is at the base of the second: information processing (basically, computation for representation) and communication. More precisely, we often claim that agents use natural language for representation (of objects and states of affairs\textsuperscript{30}) (and metarepresentation – as in the case of the representation of an idea, proposition or someone’s thought, for instance) and for externalization of information (its expression for information-sharing and sociability). Clearly, to make the second phenomenon possible we need the first. We use language instrumentally (in a lower level description, it is something that happens to us, like walking, since we cannot prevent anyone from mastering it), that is, in order to do something else, our main target. The missing point here is that just as we have a disposition for entertaining

\textsuperscript{28} See Weigand’s work on dialogue, especially Weigand (2009, 2010), and Costa’s proposal of a research program on the inferential structure of dialogues, especially Costa (2005).

\textsuperscript{29} We are making reference to the concept of Status Function Declaration, which has as its default form “X as Y in C”.

\textsuperscript{30} As entities apart from the agents’ representation of them.
“mental” states, we have a disposition for interaction (using them instrumentally), in the form of linguistic contact\textsuperscript{31}.

The roots of this direction are well-known. The so-called “animal instinct” in the language domain – or as Darwin puts it, “an instinctive tendency to acquire an art”, and more restrictively “to speak”, or “to learn” (Gould & Marler, 1984, 1987, in Marler, 2004) – refers to animals’ genetic endowment, or developmental plasticity (considering cues from the environment). Centrally, just as it seems right to say that we have an “instinct” for language learning, it seems right to say that we have an “instinct” for communication.

According to Wilson (2005), human beings must have a pragmatic module of verbal information processing in communicative contexts. It means that we must have specialized brain area(s) and, derivatively, a cognitive root for interpreting verbal inputs when they are ostensive stimuli\textsuperscript{32}. Wilson (2005: 1141) argues that reported dissociations between general mind-reading abilities (roughly, reasoning abilities regarding relations between mental states and behavior, such as tracking someone’s beliefs about the world or about someone else’s beliefs) and abilities related to inferential communication (such as monitoring the speaker’s referential intentions by checking the direction of her gaze, and dealing with interpretation of metaphor and verbal irony) would be evidence for the modularity of pragmatics. Wilson, then, dissociates verbal

\textsuperscript{31} In \textit{The expression of the emotions in man and animals}, Darwin states, “With social animals, the power of intercommunication between the members of the same community,—and with other species, between the opposite sexes, as well as between the young and the old,—is of the highest importance to them. This is generally effected by means of the voice, but it is certain that gestures and expressions are to a certain extent mutually intelligible. Man not only uses inarticulate cries, gestures, and expressions, but has invented articulate language [...] (1872: 60)”, “The Cistercian monks thought it sinful to speak, and as they could not avoid holding some communication, they invented a gesture language, in which the principle of opposition seems to have been employed” (61p.), “A man often wishes to make certain gestures conspicuous or demonstrative, and will raise his extended arms with widely opened fingers above his head, to show astonishment, or lift his shoulders to his ears, to show that he cannot or will not do something. The tendency to such movements will be strengthened or increased by their being thus voluntarily and repeatedly performed; and the effects may be inherited” (356p.). In \textit{The descent of man}, he states, “Since monkeys certainly understand much that is said to them by man, and when wild, utter signal-cries of danger to their fellows; *(3) and since fowls give distinct warnings for danger on the ground, or in the sky from hawks (both, as well as a third cry, intelligible to dogs), *(4) may not some unusually wise apelike animal have imitated the growl of a beast of prey, and thus told his fellow-monkeys the nature of the expected danger? This would have been a first step in the formation of a language” (189[1871]: 91-2). You can have access to a digitalized version of the book here: \url{http://darwin-online.org.uk/converted/pdf/1871_Descent_F937.1.pdf}.

\textsuperscript{32} That is, evidence of someone’s communicative intention.
communication from linguistic and general mind-reading abilities.

Going further, she claims that clear dissociations between mind-reading and general reasoning abilities would be supported by data about people with Williams Syndrome, who may show poor general reasoning abilities but good abilities for mind-reading and communication (1135p.), and also by data about people with Asperger’s syndrome, who may show good general reasoning abilities but serious impairments in mind-reading ones. She then argues against the view that “speakers’ meanings can be inferred from utterances using the same general mind-reading mechanisms that attribute intentions on the basis of regular, non-communicative behaviour” (see Wilson, 2005: 1137). Besides assuming that mind-reading may involve a set of dedicated sub-modular abilities, she centrally advocates for the existence of a special-purpose inferential comprehension procedure. This specialized comprehension procedure, a submodule of a general or of a set of mind-reading abilities, would work over data from the domain of overt communication only. This line of thought is anchored, in her own words, by a modular approach to pragmatics pioneered by Sperber (1994, among others).

Those are the kind of empirical evidence the foregoing hypothesis wants to explain: selective impairment. Costa (2005) then claims that there is another, more basic principle involved. He refers to the apparently innate human tendency for creative communicative connection, what he calls The Principle of Non-Trivial Connectivity. Costa points out that this disposition for communicative interaction can be taken as a property shared with other animals. In humans it would be instantiated in a default dialogic format and, in the most sophisticated case, by making use of our linguistic competence in its structural base, its representational power and its usability restrictions (see Dias, 2012, 2014).

We can easily assume that language brings a great advantage to this basic communicative

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33 She presents three main reasons for this position. First, the gap between sentences uttered and speakers’ intended meaning is substantial if compared to non-communicative behavior and non-communicative intentions. Second, we need to explain how two-year-old children can process efficiently the multi-levelled representations (of intention) described in overt communication by means of a general mind-reading ability and fail regular first-order false belief tasks. Finally, the procedure used in utterance interpretation cannot be explained by the standard account of inferring an agent’s intention behind an ordinary action, since it says that we first identify an effect targeted by the agent, but the desired effect in overt communication is precisely the recognition of the agent’s intention, so that to solve the problem we need first to solve the problem.
instinct (for evolutionary aspects of language, see Sperber, 1994, 1995; Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995; Origgi and Sperber, 2000). For its representational power, we are able to check, regulate, enlarge and qualify our cognitive environment.

In Darwin’s work, he calls attention to the fact that expression of emotions is of central importance in many animal species; as so it is dialogue. We share a pattern of communicative interaction: dialogue templates. In earlier writings I assumed along with Costa (2005) that the smallest communicative unit is dialogue. It deserves here a further comment.

Taking Darwin’s monkey example, we may agree that when one monkey utters a sign of danger to another monkey, and the latter recognizes it, we may say we face a typical case of what we call an act of communication (Sperber and Wilson, among others, would say that, if there is no recognition of a communicative intention, there is no act of communication involved). Let’s us imagine now that the other monkey runs and utters a similar sign to another one. We may still say that there is communication there, in any default sense, but not yet dialogue, in any default sense. If, on the other hand, the monkey who received the first message “thanks” the other one, i.e., acts communicatively in return to that speaker’s act of cooperation, then we have more than information-sharing. Humans developed this kind of practice.

Dialogue: a communicative unit

Neil Smith states in the foreword of Chomsky’s New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind

34 “The movements of expression in the face and body, whatever their origin may have been, are in themselves of much importance for our welfare. They serve as the first means of communication between the mother and her infant; she smiles approval, and thus encourages her child on the right path, or frowns disapproval. We readily perceive sympathy in others by their expression; our sufferings are thus mitigated and our pleasures increased; and mutual good feeling is thus strengthened. The movements of expression give vividness and energy to our spoken words. They reveal the thoughts and intentions of others more truly than do words, which may be falsified” (The expression of the emotions in man and animals, 1872: 385-6).

35 Under a Chomskyan interpretation (1988, among others), the way we have been using the term “communication” in the literature has led us to misleading claims, if we intended to refer to the externalization of language for information processing or for information exchange purposes. For Chomsky (1988: 38), “Other organisms have their own systems of communication, but these have properties radically different from human language, and human language is far more than a mere system of communication: Language is used for the expression of thought, for establishing interpersonal relation with no particular concern for communication, for play, and for a variety of human ends”. As I understand it, this argument puts forward a view under which (human) communication refers to high-
that, “One area where Chomsky is pessimistic about the reach of scientific understanding is the characterization of our use of language as opposed to our knowledge of language (...) how we put that competence to use in our performance is (...) perhaps a mystery” (2000: IX).

One way of dealing with this challenge is by differentiating two kinds of competence, instead of approaching a competence and its use in performance, or externalization. The result is that we are able to describe specific pragmatic and other socio-cognitive variables that play a role in communication. For Neil Smith, though, “we are still as far away as Rene Descartes was from knowing why someone chooses to react to a picture with how beautiful, or it reminds me of Bosch, rather than by silence” (2000: IX, emphasis added).

However, if we assume something like Weigand’s perspective, we can say that the point is not fairly stated for the linguist36.

Why in a concrete dialogue the interlocutor picks out any one way of reacting from all the possibilities available, why, in other words, he either reacts with a positive or negative decision or, for example, asks a question in return, is, however, not a question that could be answered by the linguist (cf. also Hundsnurscher 1989: 131). The linguist lists the different possibilities and describes their conditions. (Weigand, 2009: 30-1)

For Weigand (2009: 31), the account of communication in the form of dialogic action in fact must describe the potential of possibilities of action in the course of expected moves. According to this view, the rules beyond a sequence of linguistic moves can be rationally or conventionally derived from the initiative speech act. That is to say that we can provide an account of the range of possibilities that grammar imposes to interlocutors, as well of cultural and situational environment constraints, aside to the set of abilities, preferences, goals and values agents have.

Grammatical possibilities are in the scope of general and parametric restrictions; cultural order information sharing; that is, it assumes an information-driven apparatus. However, this scenario is not only false for human societies, but it is equally false for animal societies in general. Animals, humans or not, use language externalization (or any other system of signs) not only for informative purposes but for interaction purposes, or, in other words, for sociability (see Darwin’s work on animal language and communication, for example).

36 For Searle (2001: 61,69), reasons and other cognitive states that an agent can be committed to are not causally sufficient conditions to explain action. The question as formulated by Searle is, ‘Why this action occurred rather than some other action that was also possible, given the same set of antecedent causes?’.
and situational constraints are in the scope of institutional restrictions. All of them are instantiated inside a basic common dialogic framework. To visualize this scenario, let us consider three token dialogues (1-3):

1) Dan: Welcome here, Susan!
   Susan: Thank you, Dan!

2) Dan: Deirdre said that you are more than welcome here!
   Susan: Thank you, both of you. I am pleased to hear such kind words.

3) New York Times: The Foreign Minister said that the country is welcome at the table of negotiations.
   President: We want to publicly thank the Foreign Minister for his words.

We daily face dialogic interactions of the type illustrated in (1-3), and we are quite good in dealing with the required moves (the communicative structure) and in understanding agents’ communicative goals (rational agency). We see what is going on when an agent introduces a person to an audience as a host; when she makes comments over a book as a student; when she engages in a light talk as a neighbor or makes a joke as a family member. All the possible combinations involving agents’ properties in certain functions: abilities, preferences, values, knowledge, assumptions, degree of manifestability, dialogic moves, rhetoric strategies, goals, etc., lead us to a degree of uncertainty when coordinating in communication.\(^{37}\)

As Edda Weigand and Douglas Walton, among others, point out, human agents look at the set of possibilities open by a communicative move. The possibilities themselves are the result of the constraints we just mentioned. Greetings, for example, are highly institutionalized moves: the set of actions and reactions obey socio-cultural conventions in a way they do not vary.

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\(^{37}\) Yuri Penz called my attention to the “but factor” constrain, “Cause communication, as we know, may not be successful even though we dispose of the best conditions for its occurrence.” The point is that all the aforementioned are not sufficient conditions for pragmatic success, once agents can fail in performing the required processes (e.g., inferences) and actions. He adds, “you can expect absolutely ANYTHING from the human being”. The point here is the fact that we may expect not only the highly probable but any move by the part of agents, given the means they have. This aspect does not trivialize our pragmatic disposition system, but makes it prone to failure.
considerably inside these groups. For example, if we were considering default reactions to a
greeting, we should reply with something like:

1) Another greeting of the same type/function:
   A: *How are you, my friend?* B: *Hey, how are you doing?*

2) A thank:
   A: *Nice to see you here!* B: *Thank you, same here!*

3) A comment on the greeting/speech act:
   A: *Thank you for coming!* B: *No thanks required, our pleasure!*

4) A comment on the agents' use of the speech act:
   A: *What a pleasure to have you here!* B: *So kind of you!*

5) A gesture/ facial expression of acknowledgement.

This kind of observation is supposed to bring light to the problem stated, instead of just restating
the puzzle inside another framework. If the challenge is precisely to work on a methodologically
powerful and empirically adequate way of describing our linguistic-communicative competence,
then the story we need to tell must address *dialogic agency*. Even those working on other
properties of language, as Chomsky, point out, “The term *house* is used to refer to concrete
objects, but from the standpoint of special human interests and goals and with curious
properties”, “Even the most elementary notions, such as *nameable thing*, crucially involve such
intricate notions as human agency” (2000: 21).

Let us finally assume that our communicative competence operates with restrictions
imposed by a complex rational design, such that a proposition $p$ uttered by different speakers can
lead a hearer to different propositional attitudes in, let us say, the same circumstances. This
seems to be the case given the interaction between a linguistic system and other cognitive
systems, particularly affective ones. The product of such interaction is in the core of our
communicative competence. Let us proceed in our description of this competence.
Conclusion

It is worth-noting that we can identify a default communicative format. Dialogue is taken here as the expression of a communicative capacity, a framework of rational procedures or acts. It is intuitive to think that one-sided\textsuperscript{38} action does not characterize this unit or even two agents acting at the same time or performing disconnected actions. Thus, it seems plausible to assume a minimal coordinated action framework, such as the \textit{action-reaction model} (Weigand 2009, among others). According to Weigand (2009: 30), we ask “what reactions are opened up by the initiative function of action”.\textsuperscript{39}

It is easy to perceive that it is not limited to dialogic agency, since many \textit{games} share this same minimal structure. It means that it is necessary to go into more detail in our dialogic competence, addressing components of our competence that can be identified as related to individual and social agency levels, in order to approach its sophisticated action-reaction nature. The dialogical behavior is the relevant way for us to access, check and modify our universe of mental states in view of maximizing our practical benefits: ultimately, integration in society and happiness, as practical goals of survival and welfare of organisms like ours.

\textsuperscript{38} I am not talking about monologues (see Weigand, 2009). I am talking about pure information sharing contexts, such as the monkey case; we can also think about cases of an action performed without a target audience, or a more trivial one that fails to reach the audience or fails to get a reaction by the audience.

\textsuperscript{39} This intuitive model is in accordance with other approaches, such as Walton’s.
Language is so tightly woven into human experience that it is scarcely possible to imagine life without it. Chances are that if you find two or more people together anywhere on earth they will soon be exchanging words. When there is no one to talk with, people talk to themselves, to their dogs, even to their plants. In our social relations, the race is not to the swift but to the verbal — the spellbinding orator, the silver-tongued seducer, the persuasive child who wins the battle of wills against a brawnier parent. (Steven Pinker, 1994)

**Introduction**

The size of the human brain is directly related to requirements of sociability and language-use, and the latter is considered the most complex cognitive task and a central capacity to start and regulate social relationships. In the core of this capacity, it appears to be key pragmatic abilities, allowing interpersonal communication and social skills. On a deeper level we can find two general capacities: the capacity to read one’s own and others’ minds and to process this kind of information in a relevant way.

Socio-neurocognitive capacities described in human dialoguers can bring light to the question: which biological resources do agents use to draw inferences and to plan actions when they are in interaction with other agents? In this arena, ToM and language are side by side. Another important point is the fact that true conclusions are desirable effects in the agents’ cognitive systems. A cognitive system is a set of mental states, centrally a set of implicated conclusions, rational outputs.

In order to approach this problem, we will focus on human dialogic competence (part of a broad inferential competence) as a feature of our complex rational design, which enables us to operate in a predictable way (at least on some level). Let us centrally consider: (i) dialogue as a universal behavior, expression of a competence; (ii) the inferential ability as the main feature of this competence in order to form metarepresentational states in a motivated way; (iii) the

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41 We assume the linguistic system as itself a cognitive system inside many cognitive (representational) systems.
competence as instantiated in levels of agency, and (iv) communicative agency as a central instantiation of practical rationality.

We will approach the linguistic communicative device and its processing, which gives as output a type of behavior executed by the agent, since the use of symbolic codes, more specifically of linguistic code, is central for our rational behavior. We assume here the predicate rational as applying to agents: who ask and give reasons to be used in their reasoning and communicative operations (McBurney et al., 2007), who take into consideration preferences and other volitive states as reasons (Searle, 2001), and who use their means to fulfill their goals in many levels of agency.

Linguistic communication requires specific capacities and knowledge (-how and -that). Thus, our cognitive potentiality will be under analysis precisely regarding how the biological apparatus is related to the behavioral phenomenon. Here we are interested in which abilities enable us to communicate, to act in many levels and to recognize agency through communication. Characterizing dialogue requires describing this structure of biosocial operations, since we cannot assume that humans learn the structure of the game (dialogue) from experience.

According to Chomsky's perspective, the most specific aspect of the human linguistic apparatus is recursion, which is a computational property instantiated as a logico-cognitive property in human cognition. Inside Maturana's theoretical framework, language is not in the brain, or putting differently, the phenomenon does not occur in the brain (2009: 27). For Maturana, language as a phenomenon occurs in a space of relations, in the scope of coordination of action. This scope is, however, dependent of the human biological structure. Following this view, the author defines recursion differently from Chomsky. Recursion is applied to the human operation inside language (2009: 28), it is an output of auto-consciousness, not of the brain. As we see here, both language and recursion represent concepts that come from different levels of analysis.

The use of reasons as premises for communicative goals (even taken as purely dialectical moves) presupposes reasoning in the basis of it. But the fact that you can also update your belief system (or cognitive environment, updating your representations of the world) by means of dialogue moves is a relevant aspect of our communicative endowment and social practices.
The relevant operative hypothesis here is the assumption that there is a direct connection between mind-brain properties and behavioral-communicative properties, where the inferential processing is the most central computational operation of this mechanism, and the meta-representative capacity is the one that enables us to generate the data that allows the gear to operate communicatively. Moreover, the output is instantiated in a format of, and also enables, dialogic contact (interface between agents). Such assumptions direct what follows.

*Linguistic-dialogic knowledge and behavior*

Relevance Theory (RT), as proposed by Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995), can be read as a general theory of optimal dialogical behavior (communicative principle) or even of coordination of cognitive behavior. This coordination can fail in its cognitive aspect when there is no establishment of a mutual cognitive environment. Thus, we can read RT as dealing precisely with the coordination of cognitive environments, taken as a (quasi)automatic process. Relevance, by the traditional approach, is a property of inputs and outputs (implicated conclusions). However, it is better interpreted as a function that assigns comparative values to cognitive objects, given agent’s cognitive environment. That is, agents algorithmically maximize the relevance of a given stimuli that is worth processing, considering that cognitive environment. This accounts for both production and interpretation. To the same external stimuli, different values can be applied depending on the cognitive context inside which it will be processed. Thus, the function on the basis of it is the same and the stimuli can be the same, even though the input is already a result of previous selection and processing, in different function applications, in face of informative, emotional and social costs and benefits.

In order for this to work in an ostensive context, i.e. in a dialogue, it is intuitive to think that at least two *neurocognitive conditions* must be fulfilled:

1) *the interlocutors have cognitions with functional similarity*: for example, the interlocutors are beings of the same species, or at least one of the interlocutors are able to infer the intentional states of the other; and
2) **the cognitions involved are fulfilling at least some minimum operating conditions**: the interlocutors do not present severe neurological disorders or are mature enough in terms of developmental stages, for instance.

This issue indicates the need to have *necessary and sufficient* conditions to characterize the dialogical behavior under analysis. These conditions can be formulated to characterize the kind of disposition that human agents possess in order to be identified as communicating among themselves.\(^4\)

Again, linguistic behavior is taken as part of our cognitive potentiality. In this context, characterizing dialogue requires describing an underlying structure of sociobiological operations. The binomial mind-brain, then, is relevant for our analysis, since we consider the biological apparatus as enabling and restricting the behavioral phenomenon; let us consider basic examples, such as the sounds we may or may not produce or the use of a restricted number of vocabulary units in a sequence, given the human brain’s power of processing, or even the blocking of trivial tautologies during a dialogue, for example. That is, given the overall capacity of a certain agent, there are things that are possible, and, among them, things that are probable to be produced or activated.

Different theories treat differently the role of linguistic representation in communication. Human communication is commonly associated with expression and recognition of thoughts or beliefs (content). One of the most intriguing points about the linguistic device is that it is used for communication, a creative arena, which seems to have some limitations in terms of the set of contents that it brings into use. The point is that the human cognition tends to be conservative in terms of the set of beliefs that it operates with. That is, in dialogic contexts, agents often behave in a way to look for other agents who have compatible **cognitive states**, as well as they tend to behave in a way of blocking or rejecting cognitive states that are not compatible with their own.

\(^4\) This directs us to the debate of Searle and theorists of the computational mind and also the debate between Chomsky and Putnam.
ones. This behavior may be biologically driven, considering the organism’s cost for processing, reviewing and considering the impact of states that are not coherent with their own.

The dialoguer, as a cognitive-communicative agent, is biologically determined in a way that some biological features play a role in the agent’s behavior. For example, when a dialoguer stores a belief, her whole system is impacted by that information. A belief can also be characterized by having some features, such as emotional weight, degree of belief/justification and energy cost. Considering the whole picture, we need a biological perspective that makes interface with other features we assume. Throughout the work, we advocate for a social perspective of the biological aspects, following Goleman, Spelke, Pinker and others.

*Our complex assumption-action basis*44

Our behavior is an evidence of internal capacities and states of the organism. In terms of dialogic behavior, we can describe a chain of dialogic acts or moves, composed by inner acts or moves, notoriously speech acts. Each dialogic move is inside a wider communicative framework, though, since they are not isolated or disconnected moves. Such rational behavior must be anchored in cognitive principles, and here we address two. Analogous to the natural direction of contact expressed by the Principle of Non-Trivial Connection (Costa, 2005), already mentioned, there is a rational direction of content-sharing expressed by the Principle of Relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995, 2012). These two principles are complementary, since the former accounts on the first level of communicative approximation among human beings, at the level of contact, and the latter provides an explanatory account on the communicative process of information exchange (in the sense of representations of the world) at the level of content.

Dialogue, then, as part of our social endowment, as the proper form of instantiation of a general tendency for information sharing (guided and restricted by a Principle of Relevance) and of contact among agents (such is claimed by the Principle of Non-Trivial Connectivity, Costa, 2005;
and by a Dialogue Principle, Weigand, 2010). It is claimed, under this view, that communication is a result of interactions between bio cognitive properties of the mind-brain and sociocultural properties of human relations, and that it is instantiated in a dialogue framework. In other words, the framework is understood as being the result of restrictions of the mechanism as well as of cultural type-properties (basic dialogic structure; types, forms and contents), and cultural token-properties (context-specific properties).

The socially and biologically determined acts of communication are designed as being guided by general properties. One of the main properties we assume is the (EDC): the expectation of dialogic consistency, i.e. people are expected to think, talk (communicate) and act in a coherent direction (Dias, 2013b). The degree of expectation, though, can vary according to cultural-token parameters.

The consistency among beliefs, statements/implicated content, decision-making and actions is understood as a property that applies to: (i) assumptions and (implicated) statements; (ii) dialogic units themselves (each dialogic exchange of a chain is expected to be consistent with each other – taking into consideration the whole process); (iii) what is communicated and the decision-making process assumed (made mutually manifest to the dialoguers), and, finally, (iv) the decisions (communicated) and the actions (performed). So, it is claimed that the three major rational dimensions (to think, to communicate and to act) are expected by to be dialogically integrated and consistent.

According to Cohen (1992: 10), “The disposition to speak and act accordingly may normally accompany any disposition to have certain creedal feelings, without that companionship being necessary to constitute a state of belief”. Even though it is not necessary to be rational that people who have certain creedal feelings towards p speak and act accordingly, we claim that speaking and acting accordingly to those creedal feelings is expected by natural (humans) and social agents (members of groups and groups).

But this assumption goes against Cohen’s view on the matter. For him, “there is a strong reason to suppose that any connection between the two dispositions is in fact a contingent one” (1992: 10). He, then, provides us an example,
Consider what is involved in a person's appearing to have a belief that not-\( p \) while in reality he secretly believes that \( p \). Perhaps by carrying an umbrella he appears to believe that the dry weather will not continue, while in reality he believes that it will continue and carries the umbrella as a decorous means of self-defense. Such a person acts on appropriate occasions as if he is firmly disposed to feel that not-\( p \). Indeed, he may truthfully be said to have taken on a firm disposition to act in this way. So he cannot at the same time have a disposition to act as if he is disposed to feel that \( p \). Such a case certainly illustrates the contingency of the connection that exists in normal cases between a person's disposition to feel that \( p \) and his disposition to speak and act as if he feels that \( p \). (10p.)

We shall say that this example illustrates precisely the existence of a principle of consistency that ties both dispositions closely. The case is such that agents act as if they feel that not-\( p \) in order to appear believing that not-\( p \). If there is no connection there, then it would not exist ‘self-defense’. It is because people expect such a consistency that the agent behaves as if his actions were consistent with his creedal feelings; otherwise, he would not bother to appear acting the way he did.

Cohen (1992) finally claims that there is an asymmetry between those dispositions, or our intuitions regarding them. He says that an agent may have a disposition to feel that \( p \) but not to speak and act accordingly. In this case we are not inclined to deny that the agent believes that \( p \). Differently it is the case that the agent “has a disposition to speak and act as if he is disposed to feel that \( p \), though in fact he is not disposed to feel that \( p \)” he says– “You would say instead that he appears– misleadingly–to believe that \( p \)” . His point is that (speech) acts such that the agent seems to feel that \( p \) do not guarantee that other agents will be disposed to ascribe a disposition to believe that \( p \) by the part of this agent. The fact is that we, human agents, are only in contact with (speech) acts of other agents as evidence of their beliefs. We cannot have direct contact with their creedal dispositions towards \( p \), in order to say if there are misleading us or not. To expect consistency among states of mind and behavior is relevant for rational agents to cooperate. On the basis of that, we can have reasons to believe agents are misleading us or that they have different goals.

Moreover, the dialogic process, i.e. the history of dialogic exchanges, is a sequence of dialogic moves (representing an event), which are expected to be communicatively credible and
internally consistent among them – what the political common sense understand as a coherent
dialogue.

Another relevant dimension here is to feel. Agents decide a course of action based on their
representation of their own emotional states, as for example, in this line of thought:

Premise 1: I don’t have enough money in my bank account.
Premise 2: I feel bad in these clothes.
Decision-making conclusion: I will buy new clothes.
Hidden rational premise: I am justified in following my feelings.

Dialogues, thus, represent biosocial oriented instances, being directed towards human
connection and human content sharing. Dialogue is observed as a connector of minds (and also
bodies); that is, individuals are mentally connected by dialogues, regardless any content interest.
In a second moment, agents are connected by their concepts (or beliefs) or positions (as we will
discuss); that is, dialogue is a hyper relevant medium of connection and content-sharing in
support to decision-makings and actions.

The dialogic architecture is also regulated by inferences, as we will discuss in the next
subsection. Accordingly, we assume that in all dialogues we have explicit/implicit contents
involved in varying degrees and forms (Grice, 1989; Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Levinson, 2000).
Explicitly and implicitly communicated information is understood as part of a continuum (Sperber
and Wilson, 2008, among others). Following this vein, the speakers' intentions can be established
before starting a dialogic move, as well as can be regulated in the course of communication, as a
reaction to other moves. The degree of the intentions’ explicitness, however, can be a point of
tension (as, for example, dialogues in a context of conflict, as in the political scenario of the
international relations), since the participants want to infer others' beliefs, passing necessarily
through a cost-benefit computation as stated by the Principle of Relevance (Sperber and Wilson,

Dialogues, thus, represent biosocial oriented instances. At the same time, it regulates
inner states of the organism, as well as it is directed towards human connection and content-sharing. A dialogue is observed as a connector of human minds (and also bodies, in the case of non-technological mediated communication); that is, humans are mentally connected by dialogues, regardless of any content interest. In another level, humans are connected by their beliefs or positions (as we will discuss); that is, *dialogue* is a hyper relevant medium of connection and content-sharing in support of decision-making and action. Then, assuming an inferential biosocial approach of dialogue is a fruitful way to describe and explain dialogic behavior.

For instance, the act of *rejecting* can be seen in this biosocial interface. From the perspective of social psychology, rejection may refer to an interpersonal relation set, when an individual is excluded by other(s) from a group. In Zoology, *rejection* can make reference to the segregation of one or more individuals in a group. As observed, it is possible to map both scopes inside a wide biosocial one. When an individual does not communicate a belief, or properly saying, he does not engage himself in a dialogue in the virtue of fearing rejection, we can approach it in a biosocial framework, since it is central to consider what makes one individual rejects aversion – ultimately, we will evoke a natural argument.

Therefore, the definition of *dialogue* used here is apt to deal with properties such as *emotional constraints* and *power relations*. In addition, we can deal more properly with concepts such as *intuition*, *impulse* and *feeling*. The rational system that can be described by this design is inserted inside the scope of natural human behavior, based on a complex rational foundation.

*Figure 5 – Biosocial universe of dialogic interaction*
Centered on the study of the gear device, biolinguistic studies focus on the abstract computational mechanisms – and on the efficient underlying computational system – dissociated from its relationship with communication. That is, it focuses on the generative procedure addressed separately from the organism’s external behavior (language externalization, communication, etc.). Hauser et al. (2002: 1569), however, suggests that this view should not be taken as a claim against the connection between computation and communication. From this perspective, the computational system (an internal component), associated to other systems, exceptionally the sensory-motor and the conceptual-intentional, would enable us to acquire and use (“to master”) natural languages, thus being the central component of our language faculty.

Rooted in the mind-brain, this capacity would generate the knowledge of language, as a set of procedures for the formation and interpretation of internal representations (structural descriptions) to be mapped in externalizable and interpretable sentences in natural language (complex structures with phonetic and semantic features). Such knowledge would be the product of a specialized faculty, and more specifically of a sophisticated computational system, which would have recursion as its core property – result of evolution and transmitted via DNA.

Linguistic competence is thus treatable by a naturalistic methodology. The communication apparatus, or the communicative competence, in turn, lacks the status of being treatable by the same methodology. According to Hauser et al. (2002), humans lack a universal communication code. However, we argue, there appears to be a standard procedure that regulates the production and interpretation of overt inputs in conversational exchanges between human agents. In any sense of the expression “communication code”, there is a certain consensus that it must be outside of a proper “linguistic module” (for acquisition, generation and interpretation of I-forms). For Wilson (2005), pragmatic skills for understanding communicative behavior consist of a submodule of a more general inferential mind-reading module. For Chomsky (2000: 26), it is

45 This subsection is an extended version of a text published in Portuguese in the proceedings of ALFAL Conference 2014. It can be found here: https://www.academia.edu/7698925/ToM_e_o_Aparato_Comunicativo_da_Linguagem.
reasonable to think that “grammatical competence” is distinct from “pragmatic competence” and conceptual organization in general. By this view, there are aspects of language use that lay outside the domain of language and inside the domain of use (of systems for communicative purposes). The borderline still remains unclear. Relevant methodological claims apart, though, grammatical knowledge embraces semantic representations and the latter depends on other information activated in the cognitive environment of the agent to be triggered by the agent. This brings syntax closer to pragmatics.

We can call this the default view. The faculty of language in the narrow sense (in which the computer system is independent of the other two systems) would generate an array of discrete expressions, which are potentially readable in a natural language. This happens when they are processed and elaborated “in the use of language” (and making the use of language possible) by the sensory-motor and the conceptual-intentional systems, having as output the sound-meaning pairing (Hauser et al., 2002: 1571). According to this model, we could identify what is central in the mechanism for it to operate.

On the other hand, taking the faculty of language in the broad sense (considering semantically interpreted expressions) would lead us to relate the mechanism with other representational functions. Understanding linguistic competence as having centrally a representative function forces us to ask basic questions, such as: Is linguistic representation merely the output of an individual’s recursive procedure of information processing (pairing structures and concepts, symbols and representations)? As such, it appears isolated from pressures of expressive externalization. In other words, when defending the exclusivity of a representative process of understanding (even if taken relative only to the evolutionary origin of language), we are left with the burden of describing and explaining the assignment of meaning of expressions that depend on more sophisticated processes. If taken just as a methodological choice, it is clearly stated.

Explanatorily, the problem appears when we dissociate, in the base of linguistic knowledge, the process of representation (interpretation and generation of associations between linguistic structures - constrained by a grammar - and thoughts) and the process of sharing these thoughts. It does not invalidate an inferentialist approach of language use, since the pairing
between the material and the significant part of language is seen as the result of a computational process and must correspond, both in communication or in reasoning, to the *user-meaning*.

User-meaning is more complex than linguistic meaning (isolated linguistic structures), and the approach of linguistic meaning in the scope of reasoning makes the explanation of the linguistic device restricted to the function of representation that is apparently dependent on others, as for example the gathering of information from other minds and behaviors. Thus, some questions arise: how are these kinds of representative relations instantiated? How does the linguistic device relate one type of representational state with more complex representational processes? How does the cognition access this complex set of information? Is the mechanism the same for any representative levels?

It is consensual to consider natural languages as sophisticated representational systems anchored by a natural base. Malle (2002) notes that a key component of natural language is that it “offers choices in its representational repertoire”. A linguistic agent, then, is endowed with the ability to *represent this set of representations*. The metarepresentational ability is also seen in the literature as *theory of mind* (ToM). Malle (2002: 3), for example, refers to ToM as the ability to “represent, conceptualize and reason about mental states”. In his view, a ToM underlies “all cognition” (conscious and unconscious) of human behavior, including driving the further processing of perceptual inputs, such as inferences.

In this scenario, it is central to evaluate the process of understanding linguistic inputs (metarepresentation) related to more complex processes of metarepresentation, expressed by the fulfillment of an *informative* intention (the intention to manifest a state-of-affairs) and of a *communicative* intention (the intention to manifest the first intention) (see Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995). Enabling such representations would be a component that refines the linguistic mechanism itself: the inferential component.

In the language interface (capacity instantiated in natural grammars), this component seems to be at the basis of the computational, perceptual (sensory-motor) and conceptual-intentional systems. That is, in linguistic terms, it appears to be present both at the decoding level (perception of structures and trigger of semantic counterparts, as presented in Sperber and
Wilson, 1995) and at the level of enrichment of inputs in the context of premises and implicated conclusions (as expressed in the relevance theory proposal). We add the assumption that these levels operate within a structure of dialogic interaction internalized by dialoguers.

According to an interpretation (see Hauser et al., 2002), the information sharing via symbolic language (a complex cognitive ability in biological terms, demanding many resources of different orders), would have been a result of an ad hoc process, during the human evolutionary walk. However, it requires a metarepresentative capacity. Thus, we return to the beginning: How do we identify mental states of other agents? And based on what kind of information?

The evidence is behavioral: linguistic or non-linguistic behavior, or the content made manifest through that behavior (assumptions). The mechanism has already been named: our inferential ability. And the way intentions are identified was fully described by Grice (1967).

The argument of Wilson (2005), in turn, focuses on the assertion that mindreading skills do not represent a single module operation, being best interpreted as a dedicated set of mechanisms, such as the mechanism dedicated to the interpretation of ostensive communication, which focuses on the meaning intended by the communicator.

Sperber (1994), when dealing with the human communication apparatus, argues that the first assumption involved in verbal comprehension would be something like: My boyfriend said: “It is still early!”, which would involve a first-order metarepresentation, i.e. the representation of a representation: a statement. The conclusion, in turn, would be about one thought, for example: My boyfriend is communicating (he “means”) that it is not yet time to go, one high-order metarepresentation.

The author points out that, the relevant property to attribute to speaker-listener is an intention, the intention that the audience should believe in what is being communicated. An intention would be “a mental representation of a desired state-of-things” – “state-of-affairs in which some information becomes represented in the mind of listener-speaker as a result of [the] statement” (Sperber, 1994: 6) – that is, an informative intention, a first-order metarepresentation (when it comes to be simple informative intentions, a concept that will not be explored here).
Considering Relevance Theory, not only an informative intention would be involved in such cases, but also an intention of recognition of shared information. For Sperber and Wilson (2005: 228), understanding is achieved when the communicative intention is fulfilled. As pointed out by Dias (2009[2008]: 23) sometimes it is desirable to express that something has been made more manifest; or, differently, one may not want to make the informative intention mutually manifest (see Sperber and Wilson, 1995: 61-62, about the social implications of mutual manifestability). Moreover, Costa and Dias (2011) suggest that there is also an intention of contact in an exchange dialogical at a lower level than the informative one, considering the non-trivial connectivity principle (Costa, 2005).

In this sense, we argue with Sperber (1995) that human communication, taken here in terms of the production and understanding of dialogical inputs, is first and foremost a matter of inference and that language is the add-on. As Sperber and Wilson state, there is communication in the absence of code and even communication via code is not exclusively fulfilled by (de)coding. The mechanism, though, operates based on data. By its turn, the representation of a set of data – without which communication would be problematic – requires a specific skill. Going back to the beginning, then, we assume that in the center of the communicative-inferential process are sophisticated representational skills. Thus, not only sentences (utterances) are represented, but also representations of other individuals’ states, high-order metarepresentation. According to this view, in the scope of the Western philosophy of language tradition, understanding undergoes a metarepresentational dimension – and so does communication, since communicative behavior is typically seen as calling “ideas to the mind of the audience” (Sperber, 1994: 8).

Therefore, in a natural dialogue, the speaker-listener, by stating, for example, “It is still early!” to his girlfriend, who is inviting him to leave the party, is making manifest a thought, a set of assumptions – and making that set of assumptions manifest, in order for him to change his mental states and then act on the basis of that, is her aim. In this case, by a relevance reading, the speaker-listener was intending to express an informative set, which would be best identified through such linguistic clues. The audience, in turn, the listener-speaker identifies this informative
set, and more, identifies that speaker used this linguistic evidence to make her identify precisely such assumptions in order to infer something else. In this case, not just a thought was mutually manifest, but the intention of sharing that thought and manifesting reactions, which compose other information.

Conclusion

The dispositions addressed here, as we understand them, compose our biological heritage such as a faculty of language, of the type assumed, does. We agree with Sperber and Wilson that human beings are directed towards an efficient information-processing and information-sharing. At a more conscious level of processing, though, agents are also targeting practical goals. Besides basic levels of intention manifestation and recognition, such as informative intention and communicative intention, we find other goals. We, thus, interpret the dialogical behavior as an instantiation of a complex rational design, which compute goals of various levels. This human behavior, or competence-in-performance, using Weigand's terminology, meets the central cognitive function of regulation of our environment cognitive (where the agent adds and reviews information, driven by expectations of relevance, and regulates emotional states) in order to maximize practical purposes (of various orders). These practical purposes can be, from convincing people of something or to do something to selling commodities, or even to strengthen or establish new social connection via expressive acts.

In observance of such relations, we endorse a theoretical scenario in which communicative agency or dialogue behavior has centrality in pragmatic studies; we claim that we can address dialogue in terms of agency, embracing a set of biosocial procedures, expression of innate dispositions. Taking into consideration the arguments presented above, it seems necessary to considers both the structure and the relationship between the different human abilities and of other species, as well as the processes and functions of these devices, towards an explanatory account of human behavior. We pointed out then that it is the linguistic-communicative behavior, not the language itself, which seems to be the window into human nature.
Some theoretical consequences of this view regards Pragmatics itself. We do not have a methodological consensus of the object of the discipline. We agree with Gricean tradition in that linguistic meaning in the context of human interaction is at the service of speaker-meaning (a thought intentionally made more or less manifest). We also agree with the Austinian tradition in that it is also at the service of doing something, but we agree precisely with the dialogue turn, when considering that what humans do in such cases is acting or reacting (via inner acts) inside a framework, as we will explore in the next section.

We highlighted during this exposition that in trivial contexts (not creative ones), the listener-speaker operates from what the speaker said (and other manifest information) towards the recognition of what he meant. And it seems impossible without inference, since it requires recovery/recognition of non-coded information, and without metarepresentational skills, which enable us to recognize intentions

For Sperber (1995: 3-4), “human communication is a by-product of human metarepresentational capacities”, and the human capacity for communication has created an environment in which language would be extremely advantageous. It is a skill of performing sophisticated inferences, of entertaining high-order representations. Such operation made it possible to act socially via language: understanding and predicting behavior, as pointed by Sperber (1995), and certainly coordinating behaviors, as pointed by Malle (2002).

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3 SPEECH ACTS: DIALOGUERS AS RATIONAL AGENTS

 [...] an utterance is a kind of action, and like other actions is directed towards fulfilment of a goal or end. (Allott, 2007: 274)

In a weak sense, any being that engages in linguistic practices, and hence applies concepts, is a rational being; in the strong sense, rational beings are not only linguistic beings but, at least potentially, also logical beings. This is how we should understand ourselves: as beings that meet this dual expressive condition. (Brandom, 1994)

Introduction

We have been dealing with agency via addressing linguistic-communicative competence. Since the concept of agent is at the center of a debate of action, and since we can conceptualize and perform many types of agents in everyday communication, then a taxonomy of types of agency is crucial to the debate. Moreover, a cost-benefit regulation in terms of content and contact may vary at the level of the same human being, given different agencies one performs. For instance, a bee may not represent itself as a particular being apart from the hive, a representation conditional to their biological structure, but human children can recognize themselves and others in different categories, and this must equally be anchored in their cognitive endowment. Our linguistic-communicative competence enables us to express such categories since early age and it also enables us to create new instances of such categories to be used in everyday communication according to common expectations. This is an important part human rational design, since human beings expect to talk to people who will understand them, who will be part of groups, who will represent themselves in institutional contexts, who will agree or not with each other’s position in face of reasons and interests and who will have common and similar goals. To understand the implication of utterances for communication, we must address the communicative agency.

Any understanding of what a speaker means by the sounds she makes, the way that she waves her hands around, and so on, relies on two assumptions: 1) that she is behaving rationally, so that her behaviour serves her purposes, or is at least intended to, and 2) that she intends to convey meaning. (Allott, 2007: 10-11)
It is common sense in Pragmatics to say that a speaker “meant something by means of an utterance” (a Gricean tradition) and that someone “did something” (an Austinian tradition) by the use of that linguistic act. This second claim may embrace many levels of actions, thought, and most of them are part of an account of communication. The utterance is interpreted by agents not only regarding the linguistic level. Agents require that an utterance, as an act made by a rational agent, must not only be grammatical, but appropriate “for the purposes of the communicative exchange”, as Grice claimed. The notion of adequacy, on the other hand, requires consideration of pragmatic restrictions and of rational restrictions in the scope of communicative agency.

In view of such levels of interpretation, we may ask along with Allott, *Is utterance interpretation a species of reasoning, or does the hearer merely act as if reasoning?* In general, it is quite easy for us, dialoguers, to recognize certain patterns of dialogic moves, such as commonsensical comments. We are also good in justifying actions or in explaining problems, in different forms. In short, we are good in reasoning for communicative purposes. This aspect does not appear isolated from others that compose what we assume here by communicative rationality.

*Reasoning and communicative agency*

Reasoning has always been the core part of the sense of rationality, as the process that is in the base of our conclusions, making them possible. However, reasoning is a broad concept that embraces a set of categories of relations among structures of a certain type.

One type of structure is the argumentative type. Let us start by the notion of *argument*, which appears in the form of relations among natural language sentences. These relations are a set of patterns of inference. We also call the content derived from their application *inference*. Regarding its internal structure, an argument is made up of *propositions or statements*, which can be claimed to be *true or false* and which function as *premises or conclusions* in the argumentative structure.
As stated by Walton (2006: 2), the “internal core of an argument is a reason, or set of reasons, offered to support a claim, called the conclusion of the argument”. Thus, an argument is a structure with which the agent offers reasons to support a claim. Agents are sometimes expected to support a claim in a deductively valid or inductively strong way\textsuperscript{47}. An argument, as a set of reasons, is then the content of a move made by an agent in a dialogue. The linguistic-act that made the argument manifest is the basic act used in service of a move. “Each party takes turns making a move that responds to the previous move of the other” (Walton, 2006: 7).

It follows that, the ‘framework of argument use’ is as important as its internal structure. For Walton (2006), a successful argument is the one that gives good reasons in favor or against a claim. For the author, “Dialogues are conventional frameworks that make rational argumentation possible” (Walton, 2006: 2). This position comes from a tradition of a discipline called Informal Logic, which has its basis in the Greek development of dialectic.

Following the Aristotelian tradition, we can address practical inferences and theoretical inferences. As Vanderveken (2013: 7) points out, conclusions of theoretical inferences are either true or false assertive illocutions. This is related to the fact that “Whoever asserts a conjunction is committed to the truth of each conjunct”. On the other hand, practical inferences are “commissive, directive, declaratory or expressive illocutions representing actions of the speaker or hearer”. Thus, “Whoever asks a question requests an answer from the hearer”. According to the illocutionary logic approach (Searle and Vanderveken, 1985), dialoguers follow some logical patterns.

There is an entire debate to be mentioned here. In the beginning of the 80’s, Searle expressed skepticism about the possibility of an adequate theory of conversation, such that it could provide us with constitutive rules of dialogues, similar to those ascribed to speech acts (see Searle, 1992). In 2001, Vanderveken published his ‘Illocutionary Logic and Discourse Typology’, advancing on the topic by analyzing “only the structure of conversations whose type is provided

\textsuperscript{47} “The most basic distinction, then, is not between two kinds of argument, but instead between two standards for evaluating arguments. The deductive standard is validity. The inductive standard is strength” (Fogelin and Sinnott-Armstrong, 2005: 250).
with an internal discursive purpose” (2001: 246), given the assumptions of the existence of four possible discursive goals. This debate deserves much attention, but we will not address it here.

We assume that our communicative apparatus is composed by innate mechanisms, many of them socially routed. In Vanderveken’s words, “linguistic competence is inseparable of from performance. It is the speaker’s ability to perform illocutions” (2013: 40).

Firstly, we assume here a soft notion of rationality, in opposition to strong normative parameters found in the history of Philosophy\textsuperscript{48}, such as the use of induction. In that tradition, being ‘rational’ meant having strong evidence or good reasons, as pointed out by Merlussi (2012). In terms of communication, we make use of reasoning ‘strategies’ in many steps of the process. At any stage, you can “come up with a hypothesis that you are pretty confident about”, or you can use what Walton calls “good guesses”. The point is that, even though we may use deductive reasoning, as claimed by Sperber and Wilson, every day we derive conclusions by means of other processes.

Grice (1957; 1975) argued that working out what a speaker meant by an utterance is a matter of inferring the speaker’s intentions on the presumption that she is acting rationally. This is abductive inference: inference to the best explanation for the utterance. Thus an utterance both rationalizes and causes the interpretation the hearer constructs (Allott, 2007, abstract).

It is relevant to observe reasoning movements by observing linguistic reasoning markers, or discourse or argument markers. For example, the lexical item ‘generally’ is evidence of inductive reasoning; similarly, lexical items can serve as evidence of deductive reasoning, such as ‘definitely’, in: “What we can definitely conclude from the premises is that (...)”. This use implies that our dialogic capacity embraces a non-trivial and non-demonstrative deductive mechanism, and also an inductive reasoning mechanism (probabilistic rules) as well as, and specially, an abductive reasoning mechanism (creation of hypothesis, see Rauen, 2014; Walton, 2006, 2007; Allott, 2007).

\textsuperscript{48} See, for example, Strawson’s solution to the Humean problem, for example. The so-called Induction Problem mainly stresses the risks involved in making a general claim based on samples as evidence, and in making predictions about future states based on evidence of past states.
More than the specific kind of language that dialoguers use to form arguments, we can see a rational direction, in the sense we have been using here, in dialogic intercourse. As Sinnott-Armstrong and collaborators point out, through the words that compose an argument we can identify indications of reasoning moves, such as certain sentences used as reasons for others (conclusions) or as a response to an objection. At the same time, the use of ‘and’ can have many pragmatic implications, as, for example, temporal sequencing and causality; it can also have the functions of dialogic marker. From a logical, semantic point of view, it implies that we are conjoining two phrases, sentences, propositions, claims or stating two facts, just as the use of ‘so’, ‘thus’, ‘then’, ‘therefore’ can indicate that one statement is a reason or evidence for the other. Thus, they serve as linguistic evidence of the presence of an argument: when agents use a stated fact as a reason for a claim, i.e. a conclusion.

Accordingly, they are all linguistic forms that can be used to play a role in cognition, when triggering rational relations.

At the same time, not only linguistic knowledge may be required for an agent to understand another agent’s arguments or the reasons these arguments convey. Again, an argument has a function inside an agency framework. Agents provide arguments in order to do something else, to achieve their goals. And, in order for agents to understand an argument, they need to assume the role of those structures in a framework of action.

As Fogelin and Sinnott-Armstrong point out, an agent can give reasons in view of persuading another agent, i.e. in order to change their mind or behavior. That is, one provides reasons to be computed by others for decision-making and action. We commonly use the expression ‘to give reasons’ or ‘to provide reasons,’ thus focusing on the action made by one side; however, for other agents to compute these reasons, they need to understand each of them as a reason. Moreover, reasons are not the only thing being computed. On the basis of intention recognition, for instance, an agent may not perform the action supported by the reasons

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49 Think about the meaning conveyed by the agent using the operator ‘and’ in a sequence of the following type: agent S1 states, ‘I did something nice yesterday!’ and S2 replies, ‘And?’ More than ‘What is next? What else do you have to say?’, it additionally may convey, or imply, something as ‘I do not care about this fact.’
provided/understood. Thus, reasons may be necessary but they are not sufficient for rational action.

We advocate here that communicative rationality is in the scope of practical rationality. As we could see, though, we cannot abandon epistemic standards, since reason formation and evaluation are in the base of reason manifestation.

Given that, our next step here is to point out the relevance of abductive reasoning for agents to decide a course of action in the dialogical arena.

**Abductive reasoning**

Rauen (2014: 595) endorses the claim of Lindsay and Gorayska (2004, among others) that relevance is a goal-dependent or purpose-driven predicate. For the authors, “*P is relevant to G if and only if G is a goal and P is an essential element of any plan that is sufficient to achieve G*” (2004: 6950). It follows that we can plan the near future, or plan a future where some initial goals are fulfilled51.

Accordingly, then, individuals tend to process a stimulus, or act proactively, in accordance with certain purposes based on interests previously entertained. We would add here that individuals process stimuli as agents, in certain circumstances, having certain goals that line up with the type of agency, and the role they perform as agents of that kind. Thus, for example, a politician representing a party, and in charge of presenting counterexamples to claims made by members of the opposition, will both process information and act based on that general goal.

In order to account for the reasoning process of humans faced with proactive goals, and consequently with the need of formulation and the evaluation of ante-factual hypotheses, Rauen (2014) reconsiders the relevance-theoretic comprehension procedure as follows,

[...] Sperber and Wilson propose a deductive module in this procedure. This module

50 The authors’ claim has already appeared in previous work.
51 Goals are considered in their proposal as cognitive symbolic representations of states of the world, which can be objects of planning. For Lindsay and Gorayska (2004), goals can be either ‘cognitive’ or ‘final’. We use the terms ‘cognitive’ and ‘practical’ for the same cognitive objects.
captures assumptions from perception or memory, and deduces non-trivial and non-
demonstrative conclusions only by elimination rules such as elimination-and,
elimination-or and modus ponens. Note that this model is essentially reactive, because
both procedure and module are mobilized by the emergence of an utterance. The
speaker’s goal is presumed and generally inferred in the interpretation, and the
hearer’s goal is just limited to improve his/her cognitive knowledge. Furthermore, the
creative emergence of hypotheses in the required increasing of the context is
undeveloped.

I argue that this increasing is abductive, and the cognition is moved by a
presumed conclusion rather than by the emergence of premises. Thus, the deductive
procedure is only one part of the checking process of abductive hypotheses (Rauen,
2014: 596).

Given the premise that agents target goals and presumed conclusions, the main contribution of
Rauen’s proposal is that he offers a four-stage model to describe problem-solving contexts, where
humans need to find solutions. Humans, by this view, look for premises that best contribute to
the achievement of the goal. It also seems to apply to reactive contexts, where “the presumption
of optimal relevance and the very principle of communicative relevance are nothing more than
inferences to the best explanation for the ostensive emergence of an utterance” (2014: 596). The
author (2014: 598) adds that the scenario he presents aligns with Tomasello and colleagues’
model of intentional action, in the assumption of an adaptive circular system of self-regulation of
an organism (considering goals, actions and perceptual monitoring) with the environment. We
should call attention to the fact that the work of Tomasello and colleagues (2005) is not restricted
to the goals of individuals as isolated agents, given that they focus on the human ability to engage
in cooperative efforts with other individuals, and consequently on the agency involving shared
goals and intentions. Since they need to account for shared intentionality or we-intentionality\(^\text{52}\)
enabling the behavior, they assume that humans have the crucial capacity to represent each other
as agents who share common goals and commitments, as well as the capacity to coordinate action
roles to achieve them.

Similar to Lindsay and Gorayska’s distinction between cognitive and final goals, Tomasello
and colleagues (2005: 676) make use of a distinction between ‘internal goals’ or simply ‘goals’,
i.e. mental representations of desired states, and ‘external goals’ or ‘the desired result’, i.e. states

\(^{52}\) Regarding these concepts, the authors refer to the work of Gilbert, Searle as well as of Tuomela.
of the environment, which represent the achievement of an internal goal. In the practical realm, the realm of action, intentions play a special role in the authors’ model. Intention is taken as a broader, operational state that embraces the goal entertained by the agent and also a plan of action to fulfill the goal. Accordingly, as Rauen points out (598p.), it is possible to assign different intentions to the same action/to fulfill the same goal.

In his four-stage model, Rauen (2014: 599-603) addresses the designing of a goal, the emergent hypotheses formulation to achieve it, as well as its implementation and correspondent success or failure in achieving it. The four-stages consist of:

1° stage: Designing the (internal) goal:
An individual \( i \) designs a goal \( Q \) at the time \( t_1 \).
Where: a) Time \( t_1 \) represents the instance of the goal designing; and
b) Goal \( Q \) is a future state that does not exist at the time \( t_1 \).

2° stage: Formulating at least one ante-factual abductive hypothesis to achieve goal \( Q \):
The individual \( i \) abducts an ante-factual hypothesis \( H_a \) to achieve the goal \( Q \) at the time \( t_2 \).
Where: a) The time \( t_2 \) is the instance of the formulation of the ante-factual abductive hypothesis \( H_a \);
b) The time \( t_2 \) succeeds time \( t_1 \);
c) The ante-factual abductive hypothesis \( H_a \) corresponds to a formulation like ‘If \( P \), then \( Q \),’ so that \( P \) is an antecedent action and \( Q \) is a consequent state;
d) The goal \( Q \) is admitted by the individual \( i \) as a consequential state in the scope of the ante-factual abductive hypothesis \( H_a \);
e) The antecedent action \( P \) is admitted by the individual \( i \) as at least probably sufficient to achieve the consequent state \( Q \) in the scope of the ante-factual abductive hypothesis \( H_a \);
f) The ante-factual abductive hypothesis \( H_a \) is the first formulation which is consistent with the principle of relevance, due to the lowest processing cost faced with the fixed effect projected by the consequent state \( Q \);
g) Simultaneously, the ante-factual abductive hypothesis \( H_a \) is taken by the individual \( i \) as
an inference to the best plausible solution to achieve the consequent state Q.

**3° stage: the probable implementation of the antecedent action P:**

[3a] Individual $i$ performs $P$ to achieve $Q$ at the time $t_3$; or

[3b] the individual $i$ does not perform $P$ to achieve $Q$ at the time $t_3$.

Where: a) The time $t_3$ is the instance of the execution of the antecedent action $P$ in the context of the hypothetical formulation “If $P$, then $Q$;”

b) The time $t_3$ succeeds time $t_2$;

c) The model [3b] is implied by the inaction in [3a];

d) The inaction can be voluntary or involuntary.

**4° stage: Deductively checking the hypothetical formulation:**

[4a] Individual $i$, considering [2] “If $P$ then $Q$” and [3a] “$P$,” achieves $Q'$ at the time $t_4$; or

[4b] individual $i$, considering [2] “If $P$ then $Q$” and [3b] “$\neg P$,” achieves $\neg Q'$ at the time $t_4$.

Where: a) The time $t_4$ is the instance of achieving the goal $Q$;

b) The time $t_4$ succeeds $t_3$;

c) The model [4a] is the model of the attainment of the action $P$ [3a], and the model [4b] is the model of the attainment of the inaction $\neg P$ [3b];

d) The consequent state $Q'$ is the result of the action $P$ [3a], and $\neg Q'$ is the result of the inaction $\neg P$ [3b];

e) The consequent state $Q'$ or $\neg Q'$ is an actuality at the time $t_4$.53

The four stages can be represented in the following way, as Rauen suggests:

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[1]</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Designing the (internal) goal;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[2]</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Formulating an ante-factual abductive hypothesis;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[3]</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Implementing the antecedent action;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

53 “The expression $Q'$ highlights that the achieving of the external goal is always different from its projection – the internal goal.” (Rauen, 2014: 603 footnote 7).
At the fourth stage, an agent can both check the achievement, or not, of the goal \( Q \), as well as the means used, i.e. the ante-factual hypothesis formulated. It is also at this moment, as Rauen argues, that we can consider goal conciliation and hypothesis confirmation:

By goal conciliation, I define the actual state \( Q' \) at the time \( t_4 \) that satisfies, coincides or corresponds with the goal \( Q \) at the time \( t_1 \), i.e., the result of the action \( P \) (the external goal) is similar or congruent with the result the individual \( i \) previously designed (the internal goal). (Rauen, 2014: 603)

Considering an agent performing an action in virtue of a goal and of a hypothesis about to achieve this goal, this agent may affect the environment in accordance with this intentional chain. It may happen, on the one hand, that the agent perceives a change in the environment in accordance with their goal, but not by means of the designed means; or, on the other hand, it may happen that the means designed will prove to be ineffective. In Rauen’s proposal, we have four possible scenarios. Let us consider again the representative of the political party \( x \), who wants to win the debate by means of an appealing argument. In the active conciliation scenario, (a) the agent uses the argument and wins the debate; in the active non-conciliation scenario, (b) the agent uses the argument but does not win the debate; in the passive conciliation scenario, (c) the agent does not use the argument and even so wins the debate, and in the passive non-conciliation scenario, (d) the agent does not use the argument and does not win the debate. These four scenarios can be represented by means of the following table:

---

54 Rauen pointed out to me a historical example that could be suitable here. Back in 1989 in Brazil, in a presidential debate between two candidates, Collor and Lula, Collor undermined the debate by stating that Lula has had an extramarital affair. In a counterfactual setting, though, in which Collor had not used this rhetorical resource (by hesitation or as an option) and even so had won the debate, this would characterize a passive conciliation scenario.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stages</th>
<th>Active conciliation (a)</th>
<th>Active non-conciliation (b)</th>
<th>Passive conciliation (c)</th>
<th>Passive con-conciliation (d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[1]</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[2]</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Q</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[3]</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>P</td>
<td>Q</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[4]</td>
<td>Q’</td>
<td>¬Q’</td>
<td>Q’</td>
<td>¬Q’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 6 - Possibilities for achieving goals*

Source: Rauen (2014: 604)

It is relevant for the emergence of future states that the agent evaluates their current intentional chain and its accordance to changes in the environment. So, it is plausible to presume the agent checks the resulting scenario.

By hypothesis confirmation, or confirmation of an ante-factual abductive hypothesis $H_a$, Rauen refers to a scenario in which “the state $Q'$ at the time $t_4$ satisfies, coincides, or corresponds with the hypothesis $H_a$ at the time $t_2$, i.e., the consequence of the action $P$ reinforces the ante-factual abductive hypothesis $H_a$ that the antecedent action $P$ causes the consequent state $Q’” (2014: 604).

As important as the possibility of achieving the final target by means of an antecedent action, it is the strength of the relation between that action ($P$) and that final result ($Q$), *qua* represented by the agent.

According to Rauen (2014), humans can hypothesize strong or weak connections among the elements; the author’s claim is that, by default, individuals may expect that the action is sufficient, necessary and certain for obtaining the target result, which is also sufficient, necessary and certain (categorical connection $P\Leftrightarrow Q$, *certainly if, then*). That is, the tendency is that “ante-factual abductive hypotheses $H_a$ emerge as categorical in conscious or unconscious circumstances” (2014: 605), where the individual only admits *active conciliations (a)*, being limited the possible scenarios in which alternative hypotheses and achievements are entertained.

Alternatively, $P$ and $Q$ may emerge as sufficient and necessary, but not certain
(biconditional ante-factual abductive hypothesis, \( P \leftrightarrow Q \) or \( \neg P \rightarrow \neg Q \); if, then), in which case people admit passive non-conciliations (d).

Another possibility is the one that the antecedent action \( P \) is not a necessary condition for the subsequent state \( Q \) but it is sufficient for it (conditional ante-factual abductive hypothesis, \( P \rightarrow Q \)), so that the individual may also entertain passive conciliations (c) (605p.). On the other hand, the antecedent action \( P \) may be thought as necessary, but not sufficient for achieving \( Q \) (enabling ante-factual abductive hypothesis, \( P \leftarrow Q / Q \rightarrow P \)), in which case active non-conciliation states (b) may emerge.

Last but not least, let us suppose in scenarios of generalized uncertainty or lack of knowledge, where people may imagine possible actions for possible results, they would consider that \( P \) and \( Q \) are not sufficient, necessary, or certain (tautological ante-factual abductive hypothesis, \( P \rightarrow Q \)), and consequently (a), (b), (c) and (d) are possible results.

The following table tries to capture this key aspect of the reasoning process involving final goals, antecedent actions and expected changes in the environment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conciliations</th>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Categorical ( P \rightarrow Q )</th>
<th>Biconditional ( P \leftrightarrow Q )</th>
<th>Conditional ( P \rightarrow Q )</th>
<th>Enabling ( P \leftarrow Q )</th>
<th>Tautologic ( P \rightarrow Q )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Active Conciliation</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Active Non-Conciliation</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Passive Conciliation</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Passive Non-Conciliation</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
<td>T</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7 – True table for modelling hypothetical utterances

Source: Rauen (2014: 606)

Let us consider now two members of the same political party \( x \) and \( x' \), who may formulate and use a better argument to win the debate. \( X \) and \( x' \) will need “to coordinate common goals and subgoals”, via communication. The agents agree, by making it mutually manifest, that the practical, external, final or main goal they need to coordinate is to win the debate by means of a convincing argument. For that, they need to have an appealing argument, their goal, and to
exchange ideas in order to formulate the argument, their subgoal.

We can adopt the formulation offered by Rauen (2014: 611) regarding the steps involved in the reasoning process. In our scenario of we-intentionality, in which the agency is collective, that is, the final goal is achieved by coaction or by more than one actor’ actions in a cooperative effort, the content of the steps would suffer some adjustment. Each agent may entertain, we assume, the following states:

\[\text{[1]} \quad Q \quad \text{We, as members of the same group } M \text{ and representing the group } G, \text{ want to win the debate;} \quad \text{(Internal [Shared] Goal)}\]

\[\text{[2]} \quad P \iff Q \quad \text{Certainly if we use an appealing argument, then we will win the debate;} \quad \text{(Abduction Formulation)}\]

\[\text{[3]} \quad P \quad \text{We design using an appealing argument;} \quad \text{(Internal Subgoal)}\]

\[\text{[4]} \quad O \iff P \quad \text{Certainly if we formulate an appealing argument, then we will use an appealing argument;} \quad \text{(Abduction Formulation)}\]

\[\text{[5]} \quad O \quad \text{We design exchanging ideas, in order to formulate an appealing argument;} \quad \text{(Internal Subgoal)}\]

\[\text{[6]} \quad N \iff O \quad \text{Certainly if we exchange ideas in order to formulate an appealing argument, then, we...} \]

55 Rauen follows the use of a proper name to represent the actor in the model, as if the agent would process the content of the steps in third person. Here, we prefer to adopt the first person plural representation and we make use of personal pronouns, rather than proper names, providing the reference of the (type of) agency they activate in that mental model. This would be more adequate to our framework, which points out agency identification as central to the reasoning process aiming at action, and we think this is more accurate if we consider the way people usually communicate. We will have more to say about this in the next chapter, but we need to make this crucial point clear: “John and Paul”, or “John plus Paul”, or any other form of conjunction of individuals does not capture the joint action shared intentionality framework that, we argue, “we” and other personal plural pronouns capture. As Searle (1992: 22) observes, “when we are pushing a car together, it isn’t just the case that I am pushing the car and you are pushing the car. No, I am pushing the car as part of our pushing the car [….] I though not just that I was pushing (I was right about that) but that I was pushing as part of our pushing” – i.e., there are intentional states about the joint action (where individuals are a part of) and the respective agency in progress (collective). This maybe not the best example to illustrate strong collective agency cases (the ones that the joint action is made possible only collectively, or by status function operations; for a discussion of collective agency, see List and Pettit, 2011), but it offers a sufficient description for the point we make here. Accordingly, definite descriptions (such as ‘the CEO of Startes’) and personal pronouns are assumed as better clues for (mental models involving) agency descriptions than proper nouns. Their advantage is to convey semantic information about the level of agency; the reference assignment will not identify a person in the world, but an abstract entity, i.e. an agent this person is in the shoes of, in a narrow scope.

56 We choose to assume the categorical hypothetical formulation as the emergent one here by the sake of the illustration. We may rely on the fact that agents consider the strength of the intentional states (action $P$/goal $Q$) the parts involved, themselves included, are committed to or seem to entertain. Considerations over agents’ confidence or commitment to a certain state may play a key role in decision-making, including in the scope of communication.
will formulate an appealing argument;  
(Abduction formulation)

[7] N  We exchange ideas in order to formulate an appealing argument;  
(Action)

[8] O'  We formulate an appealing argument;  
(External Subgoal O Achievement)

[9] P'  We use an appealing argument;  
(External Subgoal P Achievement)

[10] Q'  The members of the same group M and representing the group G win the debate.  
(External Goal Q Achievement)

In the case of coordinating goals, such as in step [5], and coordinating actions, such in step [7], the agents need to coordinate cognitive environments by making mutually manifest a set of assumptions (some of which may already be mutually manifest in virtue of the institutional communicative scenario). And this is made possible via communication, especially via linguistic acts. By uttering ‘Let us exchange some ideas to formulate an appealing argument now’, one of the agents may add (to the other’s cognitive environment) the assumption that they share a common goal and intention. As Rauen observes, by following a comprehension procedure of the type Relevance Theory ascribes, the other agent would decode the linguistic stimulus, enriching the logical form until having a complete propositional form, an explicature, as follows:

**Linguistic Form:** Let us exchange some ideas to formulate an appealing argument now.

**Logical Form:** (Let x, y (exchange x, y z (formulate x, y, z, goal, time)))

**Explicature:** Let, x, y [exchange x, y z (formulate x, y, z, goal, time)] us, [politicians of the same party, now, time] ex, [politicians of the same party, exchange] talk about some [at least one] ideas, [tentative appealing arguments] in order to [mentally, written form] formulate [politicians of the same party, by means of the ideas exchanged by us] an appealing [convincing] argument, now, time.

**Expanded Explicature:** The member of my group M invites me to talk to him right now in order for us to formulate an appealing argument by means of a conversation.

As Rauen notes, an explicature of this type does not encapsulate a communicative intention (that is, an intention to make an informative intention mutually manifest; in this case, to inform about

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57 This form is intended only for descriptive purposes; we are not committed to any logical system.
an intention to joint action); rather, the agent has to figure out (to infer) what kind of communicative intention this is evidence of.

The linguistic-act has structural cues, such as the imperative mode of the sentence, which serves as evidence of the speech-act of order or invitation or request. For the agent to choose the option that best explains the evidence, other elements of the communicative situation, such as recognition of agency, will be required. Since both politicians have the same status-function in that communicative situation, the agent activates the assumption that the speaker is not in the position to give an order to him, for example. This restricts the options available.

Considering that and following Rauen’s (2014: 612) descriptive modeling of the post-factual abduction scenario, we will focus on the cognitive environment of the agent who listens to the utterance and abducts both the goal and the speech act the speaker is committed to:

\[1\] \(Q\) The member of my group \(M\) asks me to talk to him for us to formulate an appealing argument;

\(\text{(Utterance [Expanded] Explicature)}\)

\[2\] \(Q \Leftrightarrow P\) Certainly if The member of my group \(M\) asks me to talk to him for us to formulate an appealing argument, Then [it is because] the member of my group \(G\), also a representative of \(G\), intends to invite me to formulate an appealing argument with him;

\(\text{(Post-Factual Abduction)}\)

\[3\] \(P\) The member of my group \(G\) intends to invite me to formulate an appealing argument with him

\(\text{(Implicature/ Agent’s Supposed Goal)}\)

\[4\] \(P’\) The member of my group invites me to formulate an appealing argument, by means of a conversation.

\(\text{(Implicature/ Agent’s Supposed Speech Act)}\)


Given this scenario, the ante-factual modelling of this agent’s states follows as such:

\[1\] \(Q\) The member of my group \(G\), also a representative of \(G\), invites me to formulate an appealing argument with him to be used by us, as members Ms of the same group \(G\) we represent, to win the debate, our common goal, as Ms representing \(G\);

\(\text{(Goals)}\)

\[2\] \(P \Leftrightarrow Q\) Certainly if I talk to him right now to formulate an appealing argument with him,

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58 This step was added since we need to account for both the resolution of the linguistic communicative act and the final communicative act.
Then we will use an appealing argument to fulfill our common goal as Ms representing G;

(ante-factual abduction)

[3] P’ I talk to him right now to formulate an appealing argument with him;

(execution)

[4] Q’ We use an appealing argument to fulfill our common goal as Ms representing G.

(goals external concretion)

In fact, we have a chain of goal conciliations regulated in a context of joint acting or collective agency. The whole process, from designing a goal to external achievement evaluation, can involve one single agent, who self-conciliates states of the mind with states of the environment, or more than one agent. Illustrating this latter scenario, the agents in our example must hetero-conciliate the goals Q and the achievements Q’, coordinating subgoals to achieve a high level goal; and, therefore, they must be able to check, each in their own way, if the achievements Q’ are conciliated with the goals Q. As Rauen (2014) adds in the footnote 20, problems at any point of the chain can block goals conciliation (e.g., in this case, the agents may be not entitled to deliver the argument, or the time is over) or subgoals conciliation (e.g., in this case, the agents may be not able to talk to each other).

The example illustrates some goals they may share as M and as representatives of G.

Conclusion

Crucially, the same individual may abduct different hypotheses to achieve a goal and may form different goals and subgoals, precisely because that fits best their purposes inside that specific scope of agency. Therefore, the relevance computation is in fact made by an agent. Our claim here is also methodological, since we can explain regularities in the reasoning and, consequently, in the communicative process that would otherwise require the use of ad hoc entities by means of a typology of agency.
Unfortunately, most references to social intelligence relate to an individual's social skills. Not mentioned, and more important, is how social intelligence (speaking of a group or assembly of groups) processes information about the world and shares it with participants in the group(s). [...] The bigger question is how groups and societies map the environment (ecological, social and personal) into a social structure. How is that structure able to contain a worldview and to reveal that view to the participants? How are decisions made?  

Introduction

Unproblematically, we say that agents have goals (of different sorts) and use their resources in order to achieve these goals, therefore changing the environment. Agents can be targeting an optimal cognitive environment, forming justified true beliefs, avoiding reasoning mistakes, etc. (epistemologists call them ‘epistemic goals’). At the same time, agents may pursue success in a transaction, such as buying or selling a good, or even maintaining a relationship or establishing a connection with a group of agents (philosophers of action call this sort of goals ‘practical ones’). As a consequence, epistemic and practical disagreement among agents may follow – S1 believes or aims the opposite of what S2 believes or aims – and guess what, S2 feels the same regarding S1’s states. This seems true not only for basic natural individuals but, for social kinds, such as members of groups (as we will discuss). Chomsky (2000: 21-22), for instance, claims that “The terms of language may also indicate positions in belief systems, which enrich further the perspectives these terms afford for viewing the world”.

In our social world, agents can make use of sophisticated tools of mass effect, with impact

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59 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_intelligence. This quote sets the stage for a relevant debate.
60 In some cases, we do that not even consciously or voluntarily (see Searle, 2010) (we reduce the force of the notion of goal here).
61 We may not choose to form a belief, but we can deliberately choose to assume a position, even in contexts of exposition to counterevidence. Moreover, we can hold a position that is different of our own beliefs or intuitions. Think about the personal and the scientific commitment of scientists to the claim that humans are responsible for global warming. That is also to say that the set of beliefs of S may be different from the set of beliefs that S publically attributes to herself – her manifested beliefs. The last ones are the ones I am interested. I assume, though, that there is a principle regulating this relation: there is an expectation of consistency between assumptions, utterances, decisions and acts (and also feelings) (Dias, 2013b, among others).
over agents, their resources and relations, in such a way that conflict mediation turns out to be of great importance to humankind, a common ground we share as human agents. And since dialogue is the main form of contact among these agents, it plays a central role. Note that natural kinds function in society by means of social roles, as if we could plug in social identities in a device (conveyed in natural language by definite descriptions: the father of S, the president of X, etc.); thus revealing an underlying sophisticated conceptual structure we may share. Humans, when communicating, identify other agents as identity-tags, and calibrate interaction (goals and actions) based on that classification.

One way of operationalizing this is by assuming that our society operates in three main levels of communicative agency\textsuperscript{62}: individual, in-group (as a member) and collective (as a group). We recognize this division particularly in Margaret Gilbert’s epistemological proposal\textsuperscript{63}. We will broaden her theoretical intent as an epistemologist to the domain of communicative agency, considering speakers’ competence.

Let us start with the most basic individual level: the organism. We, as agents, can identify other humans and their basic goals in their attempts at surviving. We see, for example, agents looking for food by noon, buying water, and asking for the direction of the closest restroom. We identify ourselves with them. Now, consider the idea that the same person who is asking for the direction of the closest restroom can also be our department fellow or your neighbor, or the president of our association. Finally, consider that the same person can also be in the UN representing our country. In this situation, when the person votes, the country votes. Note that we not only act inside this net of relations, we conceptualize the world this way ever since we are young kids.

It follows that, in order to evaluate arguments used by agents in dialogues, it is relevant to be clear about which agents we are addressing. We use language to refer to these relations.

\textsuperscript{62} When we talk about ‘agency’, we are addressing human’s or individual’s agency; that is, what the individual does, alone or with others. Methodologically, however, we are addressing types of relations individual enter; that is, an individual “in the role of x” or “as x”, ‘x’ being a role. Thus, communicative agency addresses here the types of agency created or done by linguistic acts. X as a professor, X making a claim.

\textsuperscript{63} And in proposals involving the concept of identity in Discourse Analysis and of personhood in Psychology and legal theory.
Clearly, proper nouns map to a set of identity tags, and people know how to refer and recognize the reference to each of them in ordinary interactions. This kind of assumption changes the goals, values, costs and benefits involved in the analysis, and therefore the arguments used by the parts.

_A universal game we play together_

As Weigand (2010: 29) states, ‘When trying to understand competence-in-performance we cannot dismiss the concept of action. (...) It is the concept of speech acts, dialogically reshaped, which establishes the connection between communicative means, among them speaking, and purposes of action’. Rational agency presupposes the computation of reasons, epistemic or practical, by the agent. We assume with Searle (2001), though, that reasons do not _cause_ actions. Searle claims that intentional human agents have many gaps between entertaining _reasons to act_ and acting. These gaps, in his view, are properly the ground of rationality, given the fact that agents can deliberate and follow different courses of action, not being in a context where their actions are _caused_ by internal states. Regarding the reasons triggered in communicative situations, we will make six points:

1) **Core-assumptions.** Let us call “core assumptions” central mutually manifest assumptions, i.e. assumptions that are part of the _common sense_ of a group. For Searle (1998: 11-12), “‘Common sense’ is not a very clear notion (...) [it] is largely a matter of widely held and usually unchallenged beliefs. (...)”. “Common sense is, for the most part, a matter of common opinion. The Background\(^{64}\) is prior to such opinions.” We assume core assumptions as highly activated assumptions assumed as true. These assumptions may be the strongest ones in the agent’s cognitive system and the ones that are often used when facing hard\(^{65}\) decision-making (this point deserves experimental analysis). Core-

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\(^{64}\)Background, for Searle, involves assumptions about metaphysical questions: “I do not, for example, hold the opinion that the real world exists, in the way I hold the opinion that Shakespeare was a great playwright. These taken-for-granted presuppositions are part of what I call the Background of our thought and language” (Searle, 1998:10)

\(^{65}\)In practical reasoning, assumptions of practical order have central relevance. A person may be judged inconsistent or incoherent by an observer if he does not recognize an assumption of practical order that the agent computes. For example, S strongly believes that her job is not good for her as an individual but S decides to stay there. Her decision-
assumptions are also the ones that are necessary and sufficient to recognize an agent as part of an *epistemic group* - what does not block someone of positioning herself as part of a group under no epistemic conditions. In this research, I consider the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for illustrative purposes. Regarding this, it is relevant to consider that the assumptions that S holds may be different from the ones S attributes to herself as an individual or the ones she accepts as member of a group (*manifested* assumptions). *Manifested* assumptions are the ones we are dealing with in this research and we can approach them in terms of their forms in arguments and in terms of their use in dialogues. I assume that there is a principle regulating this relation: precisely the expectation of consistency between *assumptions, speech acts, decisions, acts* and *feelings*.

2) **The role of mutually manifest assumptions**: let us assume that two or more agents *can* have a common assumption stored in their memory (system) and that they can have access to this information, making it part of a mutual cognitive environment, and licensing people to attribute assumptions to other (collective) agents.

3) **The extension of agency**: The UN / The Prime Minister / The Minister *accepts* that *p*. This is especially important in my analysis of political (and, in particular, conflicting dialogues) in terms of *entities* and *roles* involved. This is extremely important because the same person *qua* different agents can consistently hold different attitudes or use the same reasons to choose different courses of action, as well as:

4) **The extension of content/object of assumptions**: S believes *that the prophet is Muhammad* x S believes *in the Islamic principles*.

5) **Cost-benefit paradigm**: let us assume that a cost-benefit calculation is crucial to analyze

making is based on another strong belief: that S needs to keep her job for her livelihood. In communication, agents may not explicitly manifest such beliefs of practical order but they are implicitly mutually manifest.
communicative rationality in both descriptive and normative\textsuperscript{66} approaches by observing two kinds of benefits involved: cognitive and practical\textsuperscript{67}.

6) \textit{Epistemic entropy}: let us assume that the proportion of assumptions added in a cognitive system is directed proportional to the weakening of the set of assumptions available. Via communication, agents constantly rearrange their cognitive environment, since each assumption has impact over the whole system, where the impact is constrained by variables such as energetic cost.

Dialogue, then, is central when considering not only individual rationality, but collective rationality: group’s organization and decision-making (see Searle, 1995, 2010). Considering, for example, beehives as constructs created to guarantee protection and feeding for the continuity of the bees’ lives, we can understand them as biosocial products. By assuming communication as a process that share functions of self-preservation and welfare, we can similarly understand it as involving biosocial products. By this point, we can consider human group agency as a biosocial construction, i.e. inside a practical-cognitive arena. Thus, we can identify natural, or universal, cognitive and practical patterns related to it.

We seem to have a theory of mind about the goals and expectations of individuals as members of groups (M) and as representatives of groups (G). In this arena, it is crucial to operate with \textit{common sense}. As we have argued in chapter 1, regarding the communicative arena it is probably more accurate to state that most of the time we are manifesting assumptions only assumed as true or false, in a certain degree proper for each dialogical context. Thus, we are assuming ourselves as cognitive agents that operate in different levels of truth-seeking\textsuperscript{68} in trivial


\textsuperscript{67} It can be developed in interface with Game Theory.

\textsuperscript{68} On a discussion about the role that ‘circumstances of the speaking’ play in determining conditions for truth, please see Travis, Charles. \textit{Meaning’s Role in Truth}. Mind, Vol. 105. 419. July 1996: “We see words as taking responsibility for serving certain purposes, in that we will count them as having said what is correct, so true, only where we count these purposes as (adequately) served. Jones says “The oven is hot”; Pia inserts the pizza. On learning, shortly, that
dialogical exchanges. If this is so, what are the agents mainly concerned when they engage in dialogue? The hypothesis assumed here is that the agents are concerned with manipulating assumptions in order to maximize communicative/practical goals. The default aim in dialogic interaction in general seems not to be comprehension (in the strong sense of cognitive benefit) but behavioral relevance: in the level of connection and practical aims. This may be assumed as the expression of a natural direction, where better cognitive states result in better behavior to maximize practical goals. This point may have further implications for our main purpose.

Collective Agency by Dialogic Interaction

I advance in the claim that the formation, organization and maintenance of institutional groups, i.e. their agency, presuppose joint commitment via communicative exchanges put forward by speech acts that function as positions and that can vary in degrees of manifestability. 

Groups ➔ Collective agency ➔ Speech acts

the oven is at 140°, she will take herself to have been misinformed. On her understanding of the words, what they said is incorrect. Such are the sorts of understandings we take words to bear. Again, without such perceptions, we would have no standards by which to judge the accuracy of what is said; so there would be no judging it” (463p., emphasis added). “Pia may perceive wrongly. She may not grasp what the circumstances of the speaking are, or may miss some crucial fact as to what one could do if the oven were, in the right sense, hot (perhaps it is a trick oven), or may be plain unreasonable. (…) What would Pia have to get right about the circumstances for her perception of Jones’ words to be right? (…) So what Pia would have to perceive is what the words Jones used (the English “the oven is hot”) would be for on that occasion. But so much importance has been attached in the last forty years to a speaker’s intentions, and there has been such a strong temptation to suppose that a speaker may fix the standards by which the accuracy of her words is to be judged merely by intending that they express “the proposition (such-and-such)”, or by making this evident enough, that it is perhaps worth distinguishing two sorts of case: a default case; and exceptional ones. (…) Then there is a default case—what her “brill” meant in the absence of special reasons provided by her for thinking otherwise; and there is the exceptional case where she supplied such special reasons. It remains so that in the default case what we have for working out what her “brill” meant is just what “brill” means.” (464p., emphasis added). We may understand “just what ‘brill’ means” as making reference to a “default sense” or the “core meaning” of the word. However, how agents regulate such expectations, in a context of reasons provision and supply of special reasons, must pass through “making this evident enough”. I agree that speakers “may fix the standards by which the accuracy of her words is to be judged” previous to ostension and that they share a framework of expectations. I advocate, though, that some expectations are innate, others are acquired during language acquisition and others are learned. The selection or activation of token-expectations, however, may pass by inference-making, mind-reading and ostension. More specifically, it may pass by a cost-benefit calculation as predicted by the Communicative Principle of Relevance (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995).
By this account, groups are created and maintained because of pressures of practical order and of sociability. The first aspect will be considered in this chapter and in chapter 5, and the second aspect will be addressed in chapter 6.

The claim that groups ‘as such’ are built in virtue of pressures of practical order can be compared with Searle’s (1995, 2010) claim that groups, as institutions, are built to increase human power. The fundamental entities we will address are agency, dialogue interaction and communicative goals, by focusing on the manifestation of a set of propositions that can cause mental effects in individuals.

In this chapter, we will explore what I call Gilbert’s joint acceptance account modified, a proposal that, instead of being a “joint acceptance account of the semantics of everyday collective belief statements” (Gilbert, 1987: 199), it is a “joint acceptance account of the semantics-pragmatics of everyday collective position statements”. The basic idea is that collective agents function by means of positions.

To begin with, McBurney et al. (2007) explores the notion of commitment in the same sense I intend here. Their focus is on deliberative dialogues; this type of dialogue aims at collective decision-making regarding a course of action. The authors follow Hamblin, to whom commitment “is purely dialectical”, considering that the participant who has made the commitment expresses a willingness to defend that commitment in case it is under attack (McBurney et al., 2007: 11). Like the authors, I assume that commitments need not correspond to the participant’s ‘real beliefs’, nor even to participants’ individual positions, since they are representing collective commitments, or joint commitments. I follow Walton and Krabbe (1995) in the consideration that commitments “are obligations to (execute, incur or maintain) a course of action”, given that a “propositional commitment is a special case of action commitments” (McBurney et al., 2007: 11).

Gilbert (1987) proposes that commitments of this special type create an agreement that the members of a group say and act accordingly. In addition, these commitments can be understood as having further consequences, such as observed by Colombetti and Verdicchio (2002) and Singh (1999), who address the notion of social commitments as “an expression of wider inter-personal, social, business or legal relationships between the participants,” in such a
way that “utterances in a dialogue are a means by which these relationships may be manipulated or modified” (McBurney et al., 2007: 11).

In short, we have dialectical obligations that can ground further consequences outside the dialogue. I argue, then, that these dialectical obligations in fact are reasons to pursue a certain course of action, since agents are expected to act accordingly. This is considered a feature of our rational design, where action is grounded in reasons (Searle, 2001, 2010).

Secondly, I will address ‘joint acceptance’ and ‘collective position statements’. In the practical arena, we will deal with assumptions or reasons taken as positions, since they have practical value in this realm because they are moves made by agents. An assumption has a propositional content, which can be evaluated and can have cognitive value, and can be expressed in a linguistic propositional form inside a communicative scenario, thus having practical value; consequently, the focus is the expression of an assumption in the form of a position, inside a dialogic framework.

Consequently, to assume and to accept an assumption in communication characterizes speech acts; and they are core ones. We can accept assumptions non-conversationally (thinking, for example), but we are interested in cases it takes the form of moves; when agents assume an assumption, they do it to an audience.

Our model of analysis then differs from the one presented in Cohen (1992), according to which acceptance is a mental act. First, he distinguishes the concept of acceptance from the also relevant concept of belief,

\[ \text{[B]elief is a disposition to feel that } p, \text{ not to say, or act as if it were the case, that } p; \text{ (…)} \]
\[ \text{acceptance, in this connection, is a mental act or policy, not a speech-act (…); a person can activate two beliefs simultaneously, but cannot explicitly accept them simultaneously. (1992: 1)} \]

On the basis of this distinction between an act and a disposition to feel is, crucially, the point that ‘acceptance is voluntary and belief involuntary’. And it is a special kind of disposition, it is “a disposition to have a certain kind of mental feeling\(^{69}\), not as a disposition to perform a certain

\(^{69}\) According to this view, “If your belief varies in strength, it varies in accordance with the intensity of your feeling
kind of action” (12p.); thus, beliefs are out of the scope of voluntary acts of cognitive judgment. Cohen then observes a distinction between conditions for the rationality of belief, as a passive state, and conditions for the rationality of acceptance, as an active policy. In the first case, in the context “one is attending to issues raised, or items referred to, by the proposition that \( p \), normally to feel it true that \( p \) and false that not-\( p \), whether or not one is willing to act, speak, or reason accordingly”. To accept a proposition, though, seems to commit the agent to different reasoning features,

\[
\text{to accept that } p \text{ is to have or adopt a policy of deeming, positing, or postulating that } p -\text{i.e. of including that proposition or rule among one's premises for deciding what to do or think in a particular context, whether or not one feels it to be true that } p. \quad (\text{Cohen, 1992: 4}).
\]

This point is important here, since groups are committed to voluntary acts by means of communicative exchange. The issue regarding the possibility of group’ cognitive states will also be addressed by us, since agency seems to presuppose a mind that reasons in cognitive or practical terms.

For Cohen (1992: 4-5), you expose your policies, of mental action, to accept a proposition “by forming or reporting an intention about the foundations of your proofs, arguments, reasonings, or deliberations”.

Differently of Cohen (1992), we take acceptance as a ‘move’ or ‘act’ of practical order in the base of social agency, not as a crucial ‘voluntary act of cognitive judgment’. The value of assumptions here is primarily dialogical with important consequences, since they serve as means to communicative and practical ends of various orders. Cohen (1992: 12) considers the term ‘accept’ taken as a speech act to often “signify the speech-act of assent whereby a person may orally (or in writing) agree to the truth of a proposition whether or not this oral (or written) agreement accords with his actual state of mind”. This act of “agreement to the truth” of a

\[
\text{that } p \text{ when your disposition to feel that } p \text{ is activated” (1992:5).}
\]
proposition has to have an adequate treatment, in order to fit in a notion of rationality. Why and which kind of agents do this kind of act?

What a person accepts, like what he believes, may in practice be reflected in how he speaks or behaves. But it does not have to be. The acceptance may be tacit. Nevertheless, in the case of acceptance, though not of belief (see Gloss no. 3 above), there is an a priori conceptual requirement that what is under consideration is tied to some type of linguistic formulation even if this formulation is never uttered aloud. Premises and rules of inference have to be conceived in linguistic terms: feelings do not. (Cohen, 1992: 12)

As we understand it, acceptance is not ‘reflected’ in speech or behavior, being properly a kind of external action, of behavior, which is more or less manifest in the circumstance it is a move; it is, thus, grounded in practical reasoning purposes, but not as a ‘policy for reasoning’. Cohen (1992: 6, footnote 12) quotes Peirce’s (1934: 148) view in regard to the difference between a “‘judgment accompanied by 'a peculiar feeling or conviction' and judgment 'from which a man will act'”’. This reinforce the scenario presented so far, which implies that, at the individual level, we have rationality conditions for properly internal states and different ones for proper externalizable states. “Belief is a disposition normally to feel that things are thus-or-so, not a disposition to say that they are or to act accordingly” (Cohen, 1992: 8). It does not mean that dispositions to feel cannot be put into propositional forms and externalizable. In need to account on this difference, we claim that they have different functions. This sets the stage for what comes next.

*On levels of agency*

In order to make clear a difference between *belief* and *acceptance*, let us explore collective agency. Group decision-making necessarily involves communication. *Deciding* can refer to an

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70 Centrally, Cohen (1992) considers that, “(...) others are so averse to risk that they would never offer you odds on anything. Yet they too have beliefs. So having a disposition to speak and act as if one feels that $p$ is not a necessary condition for believing that $p$” (8p.). “Indeed to declare a 'feeling' of doubt or surprise that $p$ seems linguistically quite on a par with declaring a 'feeling' of disgust that $p$.” (12p.). “Premises and rules of inference have to be conceived in linguistic terms: feelings do not. (...) And it is also why, though animals and pre-linguistic infants can be credited with beliefs, they cannot be credited with acceptances” (id.).
individual cognitive act and to a group speech act. Thus, we can analyze a proposition proffered, assumed or attributed to an entity in the scope of communicative rationality.

It is quite reasonable to consider that rational agency patterns applied to individuals (centrally, making a doxastic decision towards \( p \), as knowing, believing, assuming \( p \) as true or false; entertaining propositions, having justification) are valid to group agents. It occurs because we can approach a group as an entity governed by the same patterns of rationality applied to humans individually, since such groups are formed and represented by individuals. Schmitt (1994: 258) illustrates this intuition in the following example:

We say that people succeed in justifying propositions to groups. An engineer might justify to a court or a lecture audience the belief that the Pinto is explosive. And in saying this, we do not mean merely that the proposition has been justified to each member of the audience, since we allow that there might be members to whom it has not been justified. The proposition has been justified to the audience. Yet, if someone justifies a proposition to a subject, it follows that the subject is justified in believing the proposition. Thus, if someone justifies a proposition to a group, it follows that the group is justified in believing the proposition. (emphasis added).

This passage expresses the assumption that individuals and groups behave similarly\(^{71}\). However, we assume here that some of these considerations of individual agency can not be used to provide an adequate framework of collective agency, since the latter is governed by specific principles, presented as follows:

1) **We can describe internal group status (recognition) and external group status (attributions).**

Concerning the first one, we assume the existence of a set of intentional relations that links individuals under the realm of an agency and allows them to qualify themselves as a specific entity in the world. Concerning the second one, we assume that we can identify institutions as collective agents and attribute acts to them. Besides, we assume that communication is required for internal and external manifestability.

\(^{71}\) An orthogonal point of dispute is that "if someone justifies a proposition to a subject, it follows that the subject is justified in believing the proposition". Either understood as a speech act or an epistemic act, justification is also depended on the hearer abilities, which qualify evidence as well.
2) A Group is an entity if it has collective roles in society (like UN, the government, and so on), not just mere existence or identity. Therefore, this proposal locates Group Agency in a practical-order dimension: epistemic goals – such as to form true or rational beliefs, to avoid false or unjustified beliefs, to acquire knowledge or justification – are subservient to practical goals, or let’s say, they are used to maximize practical goals.

3) In terms of goals, we assume the internal / external criteria. Internally, members can have epistemic targets. Groups can help members in their epistemic needs. On the other hand, groups, as a whole, usually have as their final target practical reasons or goals. Externally, it is possible to connect group’s goals with their roles in society.

4) Thus, Members of a Group accept that p is the case. The group assumes a position that p is the case because of practical reasons.

5) We can put it in the following formula: Groups assume a position that p because of X (a set of practical reasons).

It is also reasonable to consider that all the members must at least entertain that p. However, due to difficulties present in the literature, we prefer to assume that p has to be officially manifest inside the group. Once officially and mutually manifest among the members, the doxastic status can be described as follows: members believe, know or accept that p, and groups accept that p by assuming a position that p.

6) Internal group communication. The strongest group case is when the position assumed by the group is the result of a deliberation or debate that reached consensus*. Therefore, reasons and propositions under consideration can result in a group position. Moreover, it is a group position the relevant information and move in the practical arena.

7) The game of consensus*: if a Member accepts the rule of consensus*, he accepts the resulted proposition; thus, he is part of a group position even if he does not particularly believe the
resulted proposition.

8) The above mentioned implies that,

Instead of ‘he believes in what his group believes’, we have ‘he believes in what his groups accepts / assumes’, what may be equivalent to what (some of) the members of the group believe.

It seems that we are justified in asking for the reasons that led groups to accept that \( p \), since we assume they are motivated by practical reasons. A group seems to be justified in assuming the position that \( p \), if the group has good practical reasons to assume that \( p \).

9) The Members of a Group can be committed to an official position different of their particular positions or beliefs, but they are justified, precisely because there are (proper and good) practical reasons involved in assuming that position.

10) A ‘proper practical reason’ is a reason that can rationally be used to ground or account for a particular course of action of an agent. For example, at the individual level, the fact or the introspection over the proposition “I like apples” is not a proper reason to ground the decision of moving my right hand, everything else being the same. If someone asks me to vote for fruits to be bought, though, the scenario changes, since I form the intention to move my hand in order to vote for apples to be bought, on the basis that I like apples (and on the basis of other judgments, such as the assumption or belief that moving my hand is a proper way of communicating my intention; then, at the same time I vote and fulfill my goal, as Searle (2010) observes). That is to say that a reason is conditional on a context of (joint) assumptions and intentions. Let us consider now that The Pope will be in Rio at 7 am, is not, in general, a proper reason to ground a collective decision for being in Rio at 3 am, unless there is a joint commitment that grounds this move (based on what is now a reason accompanied by other judgments, such as about conditions of fulfillment, i.e. about transportation, weather conditions, etc.). It means that joint commitments, established via declarations, both “create reasons” as well as are conditions for turning assumptions into reasons. Assertions are the
type of speech act used to create commitments among individual agents, and positions are the type of speech act used to create commitments involving collective agents.

Let us make a parenthesis here. We have already claimed that an agent is guided by reasons. This seems to be a consensual point in action theory, more specifically in practical reasoning studies, being a central feature of the very notion of agency, as we can see in modern approaches (developments of the West tradition\textsuperscript{72}):

Because to act is to act for reasons, an agent cannot dissociate himself from a desire to act for reasons — not, that is, without ceasing to be an agent. (...) An action is what is produced by the operation of this desire, and so this desire amounts to the constitutive aim of action (in something like the way, Velleman thinks, that truth is the constitutive aim of belief). (Millgram, 2012(2005)\textsuperscript{73})

Is seems that any reason for action is a proper reason, and it seems harder to qualify the criteria to identify a ‘good’ reason for action:

Velleman's alternative specification of the content is (roughly again, because there is some room for variation) to know what one is doing when one acts, or to make sense to oneself when one acts (Velleman 1989). So what counts as a (good) practical reason is that which will make one's actions intelligible to one, when one performs them. (Millgram, 2012(2005))

According to this view, “desires are reasons because they (potentially) explain action, and they explain action because (it is supposed) they causally explain it.”\textsuperscript{74} For Schapiro (2001), however,

\textsuperscript{72} “We may conclude by observing that there are two modes of argument one must choose between. One might try to establish that, as a matter of metaphysical fact, actions are as this or that theory says; alternatively, one might argue that one is to (ought to, had better) produce actions which are as the theory says; that is, the top-level argumentation might be either theoretical or practical.” (Millgram, 2012(2005)). Our account here discusses the form to operate with the second in the analysis and proposal for action.


\textsuperscript{74} “(The presumption that desires or more generally motivations explain action is plausibly a legacy of a theory of practical reasoning on which desires are reasons for actions — and therefore, it is concluded, their causes — but that theory is off-limits to Velleman's project, and should not be appealed to by it, however indirectly.)” (Millgram,
“Practices specify standards and reasons, and so ‘practical reason’ turns out to be a practice status as well” (Millgram, 2012(2005)).

One relevant difference between these two views is that one account of practical rationality is psychologically-driven and the other is understood as “non-psychologistic”, since mental states and their realization or activation are not concerns of the theory. The first one may not need further clarifications, given that, intuitively, accessing reasons is accessing mental or intentional states in propositional form; the second, on the other hand, can be made clear if we consider their view that “when the king is in check, then the chess player has a reason to move it out of check; you don't look inside anyone's head, as it were, to determine that, but rather, at the constitutive rules of chess” (Millgram, 2012(2005)). This account emphasizes the external feature of a reason, not their psychological grounds. This may be appealing, for instance, for some considerations of collective agency.

It is interesting that a point of convergence is in the view that “one act for one's (sufficient or good enough or best) reasons”. For us, agents either access or are motivated by reasons that they individually take as good reasons for action, or rather collectively assume as good practical reasons to justify action. This would touch problems described in the literature.

Our main interest here is Gilbert’s proposal of joint commitment. Her theoretical focus is “group’s belief”; accordingly, this kind of belief is not necessarily motivated by any “particular’ beliefs of the ‘members of the group’, which have “little or no value to determine “group’s belief””. The proposal outlined above is used to argue that “belief” is not the proper propositional attitude when addressing group agents or representatives of groups. “Position” is rather the act related to the attitude of commitment. We argue that the key factor to decide for a position (in view of grounded actions) is the set of practical reasons considered at stake.

Note that we have the qualification “particular” related to members of groups in Gilbert’s account. This is ambiguous in terms of agency, since there are beliefs of the individual, who operates as many agents, and beliefs particularly related to a membership. This point deserves attention.
“The existence of a group view”, she argues, “is held directly to generate a personal obligation for each member of the group” (1987: 194). Gilbert holds that, for a group view to be created, “each group member must openly express a certain conditional commitment”, and then, as a result, they are “committed as a body”, “they \textit{jointly accept} a certain proposition” and “each of the individuals involved is personally obliged to act appropriately” (\textit{id.}). This makes reference to communicative agency, related to collective or group agents.

It follows that speech acts are the core of collective agency, in such a way that believing is not a required propositional attitude, nor belief a required state or disposition in the realm of group agents.

Crucially, in Gilbert’s model,

(i) A group $G$ believes that $p$ if and only if the members of $G$ \textit{jointly accept} that $p$. (ii) Members of a group $G$ jointly accept that $p$ if and only if it is common knowledge in $G$ that the individual members of $G$ have \textit{openly expressed a conditional commitment jointly to accept $p$ together with the other members of $G$} (Gilbert, 1987: 195, emphasis added).

Here, joint \textit{acceptance} is the proper collective attitude constituted by means of the communicative behavior of each member, qua member. The main problem of this proposal of \textit{plural subjects of belief}, however, is that it implies the following: “$A$ and $B$ \textit{form a plural subject of believing} that $p$ if and only if $A$ and $B$ are jointly committed to believing that $p$ as a body” (Gilbert, 1994: 249). Given the ontological nature of the process of forming a belief, outlined above, how can agents commit themselves in believing a proposition? The model seems to work better if we consider that the proper propositional attitude here is “acceptance”, and the collective states are “joint acceptance” and “joint commitment”.

The point is that the public expression of an intention to establishing a commitment of joint action, as a body, in accordance with $p$ (joint action commitment, in the form of position). This commitment does not need to have any relation to the beliefs of each member, being established at the level of public action, \textit{qua} group member (see Ferreira, 2012: 110). The relation is between speaking and acting accordingly. And the constraints involved are expectations of
coherence between assumptions and actions. We can say that a requirement of consistency among acts is both internal, inside a group, and external, ascribed to the collective agent.

If we consider Schmitt’s (1994) account, for example, in context of groups with coextensive membership, i.e. group having the same individuals as members, the situation is similar.

Suppose again that the Library Committee and the Food Committee have the same membership, but suppose now that the two committees have very different purposes. They accordingly gather different kinds of evidence and make judgments about different issues based on these different kinds of evidence. Then the Food committee may fail to be justified in believing that the library holds a million volumes, even though all members of the committee are justified in believing this proposition. This shows that the simple summative account is too weak. (Schmitt, 1994: 265; emphasis added).

This type of analysis seems not to capture relevant features of agency. If we agree on the reason why the Food committee may fail to be justified, it follows that all members, qua members, also fail to be justified. But the dispute holds in virtue of the ambiguity on the conditions of a member. In their individual commitments, they have beliefs, justification and other states not necessarily related to the group’s goals. The context-relevant states will be identified in virtue of agency features. But we can still identify that the same individual in the world entertains a set of intentional states, being necessary to make a distinction in terms of agency to make clear the relevant states at stake.

Gilbert (1987: 195), for example, adverts that “A and B jointly accept that p neither entails nor is entailed by their individually accepting that p”. As an individual, each person has their individual commitments. In the case that “People are understood jointly to accept propositions as a single body”, then this will extend the commitment to each member, qua member. As Gilbert (1987: 196) observes, “Someone may think he is being questioned in his capacity as the member of some group (...). For this reason, or some other, he may answer in that capacity”.

We explain this scenario by the observing the scope of agency at stake. Inside groups and representing groups, people act by means of speech acts, by publicly stating that p or by not stating opposition to p, thus indirectly accepting it. Moreover, Gilbert (1987: 197) points out
“group views as *negotiated*, subject, among others\textsuperscript{75}, to the usual constrains of rational negotiation. Again, we should pay attention to the nature of the agent at stake. Groups are agents of a particular type and their positions are contingent to features of this type of agency.

We assume that institutional groups, not accidental ones (such as the group of people watching channel 1 right now), hold public positions in virtue of practical reasons, or rather in the absence of practical reasons that would oppose their joint commitment that $p$.

Schmitt (1994: 266) makes a point here,

\begin{quote}
[N]ote that the account of a group’s having a reason to believe $p$ requires that the members *would properly* express openly a willingness to accept $r$ jointly as a reason to believe $p$, and not merely that they *actually do* express openly such a willingness. The reference to what members would *properly* do is needed because the reasons possessed by the group include those that are *available* within and to the group, not merely those the members *actually* jointly accept as reasons. If there is a reason $r$ that members would properly accept jointly, then $r$ counts as a reason possessed by the *group*, even if members do not openly express a willingness to accept it jointly as a reason. Of course we need some account of what it is for a joint acceptance of $r$ as a reason to be *proper*. But I will not attempt such an account here. (…) note that proper joint acceptance of a reason is not the same as the reason’s being *good*. Joint acceptance of $r$ as a reason may be proper even if the reason is bad\textsuperscript{76}.
\end{quote}

Schmitt advances a key claim without providing an account of “what it is for a joint acceptance of $r$ as a reason to be *proper*”. The requirement he posits is that previous dispositions should be counted, but then it turns to be that those dispositions should count as reasons available. Even if there are cases in which all members would previously assume what *would be* jointly accepted, and it in fact corresponds to what is jointly accepted, this is not necessarily the case. Agents may evaluate reasons differently or even may change their mind inside the group. Thus, some kind of mutually manifestation of reasons for joint acceptance seems to be both the case, in actualized

\textsuperscript{75} Such as characterological and emotional facts of the subjects in the role of members, in addition to their particular reasons or motivations for holding $p$ as a group view.

\textsuperscript{76} The claim can be read as saying that ‘proper’ and ‘good’ have different parameters of application. Agents can have many trivial but proper reasons for holding attitudes towards propositions. Agents can equally hold not trivial but equally bad reasons to justify their states. The predicate ‘good’, on the other hand, has stronger requirements of application, one of which is *being proper*.
situations, as well as required, according to a normative reading of group functioning. The transition from agents’ expectation of joint acceptance to actual joint acceptance is an important point. Thus, mutually manifestation is a requirement here. We should obviously count what agents have as evidence about what other agents have as evidence, but a disclosure, via verbal manifestation, of such evidence, qua relevant reasons, seems both the case as well as required for institutional groups to function.

In Gilberts’ words, “A group G believes that p if and only if it is common knowledge in G that the individual members of G have openly expressed their willingness to let p stand as the view of G.” (1987: 195, emphasis added). Again, we do not sustain that agents of the type of G have attitudes such as believing; they “accept positions”. That is the reason why we claim it is a joint acceptance account of the semantics-pragmatics of everyday collective position statements.

We hold that collective agents, or even members of groups or representatives, are rational in accordance with proper practical goals and modes of agency, in virtue of their collective commitments. A judge, for example, or a president of a State, may sustain different positions of their own precisely in virtue of respective commitments. The same person can attend for different roles, therefore standing for different agents.

At a group level, we say, joint acceptance is a dialectical move, in view of a practical action: group agents accept p as a position, and r as a reason to hold that position in view of external pressures.

Schmitt (1994) also observes that there are modes of justification other than epistemic; centrally, practical justification, where group justification must be addressed ‘jointly’. So, it is possible for two groups with coextensive membership to attend for different practical justification status despite “their possessing and considering the same evidence, having the same concerns, and undertaking the same decisions (...) even if all members of both committees take the same personal attitude (of approval or disapproval) to the expenditure” (1994: 266). The question is then, and he asks it, how this is so,

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77 See, for example, Dias and Silveira (forthcoming) on group deliberation, Dias, S. R.; Silveira, J. R. C. da. “Reasoning via dialogue: an illustrative analysis of deliberation”. In: Anais do DUO VII. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS.
The answer is that the two committees might have different charges and, in virtue of this, take different considerations as admissible or even available, weigh considerations differently, and use different criteria for deciding what to approve on the basis of the considerations they take into account. (267 p.; emphasis added)

The author’s conclusion is that practical justification in such cases corresponds to epistemic justification, in the sense that the same reasons that make the committee practically justified make it epistemically justified in believing it as practically justified. But, again, this implies merging agencies. Members, ideally, must be epistemically justified, but groups are not required to be. As such, a group is basically required to deliver a position, a speech act.

Consider, for instance, a committee that may or may not jointly accept r as a reason for an impeachment. Members will consider reasons, but the group will assume a position about those reasons, in view of requirements, commitments and other features of practical order. The final position will be of the group as whole, whose scope of agency is different from the one of its members. Delivering a position is the practical duty of the group, via practical reasons that are assumed jointly. A position is assumed as the best option at the table.

In view of these foundations, it seems relevant to understand cognitive patterns of agents qua members, as well as agency restrictions, in terms of possible actions in the name of institutions or made possible in virtue of resources of such institutions, thus qualifying the output as collective (by the members) or institutional (under the agency ascribed to institutions or the one they are entitled to have). Institutions have a scope of agency, and their members act on the basis of it; the institutional acts, though, are different from the acts of the members. A corporation is entitled to own goods and recruit employees, for instance. The goods of the company are separated from the goods of their members, qua members or individuals, and even when a member performs all the acts required to hire employees, the final act is ascribed to the company.

These points being addressed, we should proceed to sum up them. As Lackey (2013)⁷⁸

⁷⁸ This refers to a Jennifer Lackey’s interview by Richard Marshall. Link: [http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/on-testimony/](http://www.3ammagazine.com/3am/on-testimony/). Last visit: 12/18/2015.
observes, in a well-conducted interview about key topics in Social Epistemology, a group’s state can be considered, by a summativist account, as entirely determined by or in terms of the states of individuals “in the sense that all or some members of the group are, or would be, in that state”, reducing the phenomenon at the group level to a summative consideration of the phenomenon at the individual level. At the other extreme, we find the position that there is an emergent state at the group level, where “the group itself is the bearer of the state”, which is “over and above, or otherwise distinct from, the states of the individual members”; accounts that advocate for this perspective are known as emergentists. The main claim of this tradition is that there is a phenomenon that cannot be determined nor reduced to the sum of the parts. As we have seen, this view implies that we can properly ascribe a state to a group “even if not a single one of its members” are in that state. It is worth noting that we need to make a distinction between phenomena at level of the individual as a subject and qua member, since in the latter case agents agree to hold certain states; or, using Gilbert’s account, followed by Lackey in part, group members can be jointly committed to hold certain states.

Making use of the illustrative example of the department position, according to which, “a department agrees to put forward a candidate as the best applicant for admission to its Ph.D. program, despite the fact that not a single one of its members actually believes this is correct”, “they all think”, as members, we would say, “that this is the candidate who is most likely to be approved by the administration”. She observes that “non-summative accounts of group belief take this to be a good reason to accept that the department itself, rather than any particular individual(s), believes this proposition.” We argue once again that we cannot evaluate the proper phenomena at the group level by the same parameters that we use at the individual level, of members or individuals. We, then, may be understood to be advocating for an emergentist position when claiming such a difference. But the “emergent group’s state” we claim to exist is precisely the “group position” in view of practical goals of the collective agent as such. One could say that the group’s emergent state is the “joint commitment”, of the type of Gilbert’s, in the

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79 This position is also known as deflationary, eliminativist or reductionist account.
80 For a discussion of these views, please see List and Pettit (2011), specially the introduction.
form of a “group position”. The crucial difference is that the state we claim to exist is properly dialogical, regarding the group, and epistemic and dialogical, regarding the members; differently of Gilbert’s model, where the joint commitment is properly epistemic, via dialogical means. We hope this point will be made clear in the analysis we offer.

Members have agency inside groups and group “in fact act” by means of its members, but the action is formed, delivered by and ascribed to the collective agent. The group is independent from the members qua institution or collective agent, but it depends on the members to perform actions in the social world, even though the actions performed can only be actions of the institution, such as a parliament decision or a department memorandum or a company apology. The conditions of those acts as group acts are different of the performance by the part of their members as members. These features make both “emergentists” and “eliminativists” have points to consider. In terms of state attributions interesting to epistemological studies, Lackey (2013) signals an interesting turn, following Schmitt and Gilbert; this is due to the clear uncomfortable view that posits knowledge held by entities, as Richard Marshall says, such as banks or hospitals or churches “that we don’t normally think of as being literally capable of mental thoughts”,

Instead, I argue that a group can accept or have a public view that p, where no member of the group believes or knows that p. But this is not at all surprising, as this can happen at the individual level as well. A judge, for instance, might accept or have a professional view that a defendant is innocent, despite the fact that she believes that the defendant is guilty. (emphasis added)

‘Acceptance’ or ‘public view’ or ‘professional view’ seems to be the relevant phenomena, or central parts of it. We will need to separate the dimensions required, and our proposal attempts to do it. Whether cognitive states or acts of individuals, or rather speech acts of M and G are the relevant acts to be considered, seems to depend on criteria of agency. Lackey (2013) makes a final central point for us here: “So while I do argue that we need to shift our attention away from what speakers believe or know toward what they say, more than the mere truth of what they assert is relevant.”
Finally, we assume that identifying agency – the *individual subject S*, the *member of a group M*, and the *group G* – considering the roles involved, in the sense that *another role* implicates *another agency*, represent a central feature in *group/institution cases*, where the same individuals have different social identities and respond differently for different positions.

We end up with a problem, though: how can an agent without mind have goals, duties and commitments? We claim that goals are assigned to agents in the constitution and organization of groups via speech acts, the same being true for duties and commitments. Groups hold positions; as such, groups’ outcome is the emergence of an accepted view in the form of speech acts. This leads us to the communicative arena.

*The communicative arena*

The result of the design presented above is that we can assume that it is possible for a *member of a group* to agree with *members of a group* in terms of a set of cognitive states (that is, they can be *epistemic peers*) but do not agree with G’s *practical goals*. Therefore, epistemic peers may not be *acting peers*. When we analyze group cases, we can observe different relations of commitment regarding *S, M* and *G*: Individual (individual commitments); member of a group (collective commitments); and, as a group, a collective entity as an individual (individual-collective commitments).

As already exposed, we advocate that a *group G has a position*. In other words, a *group G* does:

1) *assume a position* that *p* (is true or false) by *assertions* that *p* is (not) the case;

2) *assume p* as the Group’s view (Schmitt, 1994);

3) *act* as if *p* is true or false.

In support of the view that a *group G does not assume a belief* as a G’s *belief* but only a *position*, let us consider the intuition behind the use of the words “belief” and “position”. The data to be

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81 We use both “S” (Subject) and “I” (Individual) to refer to individual agency.
considered is the result of a search using Google N-gram Viewer. The search considers the usage of the following expressions: “*’s belief” and “*’s position” (where “*” is a variable that returns as result the expressions used in its place in the structure).  

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Graph 1: (*’s belief)

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Graph 2: (*’s position)

Note that “belief” is mostly associated with individual agents (I), such as men, person and child. Nonetheless, the term is also used in relation to a member of a group (M), as, for example, a Christian. On the other hand, “position” is suitably related to collective agents, such as Britain, Japan and government.

This is a linguistic evidence for the intuitive hypothesis that the (common sense) concepts

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82 We have used different time period searches for conference presentations. Here, we chose to use the latest search (12/18/2015) using the period between 1900 and 2008. The database of reference is of Google books. Visual data is offered in the attachments.
of belief and position are related to different levels of agency: belief is associated with (S) and (M), and position with (G). Additionally, it can serve as an indication (or evidence) of the fact that these two words refer to different concepts, which are, by their turn, related to specific dialogic structures.

In order to act as-a-group, members of that group need to have a set of mutually manifested information. For that to happen,

1) Each member can be said to (not) accept that \( p \);
2) All the members jointly assume or reject that \( p \);
3) Members can be both committed to positions and to believe a set of propositions.

Inside a group, members can have a strong cognitive appeal or a strong practical relation to other agents (such as to be in the position of chief). By means of speech acts, a group agent can be committed to epistemic acts, but we would not sustain that groups believe that \( p \). Epistemic states have no direct function for G, since G operates by positions; they may be functional for the establishment of positions, though. A group position can make reference to the collectivity status (when all of the members face agreement) or to the singularity status (when there is a position that represents the Group but not all the members’ disposition to that position).

As we have seen, there are cases in which agents perform institutional acts by means of language use. This point is particularly important for us because agents can disagree regarding their propositional attitudes towards \( p \) and also about the action performed by means of uttering \( p \). For example, we can disagree that ‘the war is over’, and we can also disagree of my act of declaring the war over when I, the competent authority, say ‘the war is over’. In both cases, we face disagreement by means of the same linguist-act (‘the war is over’) but different speech-acts, one constative and another performative.\(^{83}\)

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\(^{83}\) This distinction between declaring state of affairs by means of declarative/indicative sentences and performing actions by means of performative structures is reviewed by Austin, Searle and others, since we can say that every time agents use language they do something, like asking questions or making a point or suggestion, or even talking itself, as Searle points out. Even though this point is central to the debate of speech acts and of the relation between language and reality, the fact that we can identify “institutional” and “collective speech acts” is relevant for our point.
Further on agency

Let us see if this basic structure is sufficient to deal with the challenges we face. An account and taxonomy of types of agency are central to the understanding of our dialogic competence, as we will now proceed to discuss.

Individual level

“Individual agents” here refers to basic natural kinds, such as human persons, and to corporations, complex social entities taken as individuals in the social world. List and Pettit (2011), for example, take corporate bodies or “group persons” to be collective agents, as opposed to individual ones; nonetheless, they assume that corporations are persons under a performative conception, as “party to a system of accepted conventions, such as a system of law, under which one contracts obligations to others, and (...) derives entitlements from the reciprocal obligations of others” (2011: 173). That is to say that these entities can be recognized as legal persons precisely because they can enter into regulative transactions, just as any social individuals. That is a social dimension, because it involves deontic powers, a kind of power that exists in relation to other agents (a parent, a citizen, a teacher are basic social kinds. We will treat these agents who have collective commitments as being in another category: Member of Groups).

More precisely, corporations, like human beings, have a double type of agency: an individual one (what is a social dimension in the case of corporations, because they survive in the social world), since corporations have an independent existence, regardless their members, and a collective one. Think about any university or political party or church. There is a history related to the entity itself (a history of actions, commitments and positions), even though the entity itself does not act without the agency of their members. A university can enter into negotiations as an

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84 “The performative conception of personhood maps the distinction between persons and non-persons onto the divide between agents who can be incorporated in a conventional system of mutual obligation and agents, such as non-human animals on the standard picture, that do not have this capacity” (List & Pettit, 2011: 173). We can read this difference as of contractual and non-contractual status.
entity in the social world, but only by the action of its members. Apart from that, an institution exists in virtue of collective commitments.

List and Pettit (2011) hold that *group persons* have different intrinsic properties compared to *human persons* (they are made of different properties), since the first ones are created and organized by individual persons and are the result of these individual persons co-reasoning and co-acting; they also claim that these agents do not have nor should have equal standing as individuals; i.e., they should be under a system of restricted rights as compared to individual persons, since they should consider the “rights or benefits of the individuals affected, members and non-members alike”. We should say that they it is required that consideration twice, internally and externally.

However, the authors hold a very demanding claim regarding the capacities these agents must have in order to count (perform) as a person: “to deserve the name of persons, on this ticker account, group agents must have all the abilities associated with the faculty of reason” (178p.). Note that group agents here stand for *corporations*. But it is not necessary to have a robust account of human faculty of reason in order to say that this requirement is too demanding with respect to corporations. For the authors, we are addressing the ability to make judgments on normative propositions and to act rationally on their basis, which presupposes “self-regulative abilities” (177p.).

Our position is much less demanding: institutions themselves are tools that have some properties in common with individuals, but they do not have a mind themselves. Using a metaphor suggested by Chris Hauser, institutional groups are considered here as a *thermometer*; that is, a tool that helps individuals to access specific types of information, and thus to perform actions on the basis of it. It does not imply that reasoning cannot be performed by means of a specific organization of individuals as a collective activity, where the goal is fulfilled by the result of the co-agency of the individuals towards that collective aim. A Group’s goal is (established by) a joint assumption: an assumption that is mutually manifested in the group. The

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85 After my presentation at the 2015 Penn-Rutgers-Princeton Social Epistemology Workshop. I also thank Luis Rosa and Edda Weigand for valuable comments on earlier drafts of this text.
faculty of reason can be related to the *Members of a Group* in a special agency relation: *as-a-group*. Think about the decision-making inside Microsoft or Twitter, or any other company; once we have an official position, we will ascribe it to the organization as a unity, the individual. Interestingly enough, we can have groupings of this kind of groups. Think about the UN, BRIC, NAFTA.

In short, we can recognize another human being as having basic human needs, as an *individual*; we can look at a human being as standing for roles inside certain contexts, as a *member of a group*, and we can look at this individual as representing or standing for a whole *group* (if Hugo votes against the veto, it means the country votes against the veto, since he stands for the country in that context). Similarly, *Harvard* can stand for an entity that is independent of any of its actual members, having a history of assumptions related to it as an individual and it can be part of a grouping of entities of its type; additionally, it can act in the social world by means of its members or other applicable agents.

Finally, it is relevant to make a methodological point. Sperber (2011) calls attention to the difference between properly addressing different levels of the phenomenon and approaching the phenomenon at different scales: only at the individual scale or at the scale of a population. He claims that “social phenomena are causal chains of mental events inside people and events in their common environment’ (71p.), or yet that “social phenomena are patterns of psychological and ecological phenomena at a population scale” (68p.), since “social processes secure content relationships [among representations or between representations and the state of affairs they represent] among the mental states and the actions of the people involved” (69p.), here either (social) individuals or groups. In such a view, we have interindividual by intraindividual socio-cognitive processes that can be broadened to mass scales. Communication, then, is a social cognitive process, involving (types of) interactions among agents and securing content relations.

Sperber’s naturalist approach of social kinds seems compatible to the performative account of agency presented in List and Pettit (2011), since both frameworks assign a cognitive process.

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86 Or, as he puts it, processes *within* individuals and *across* individuals; or, yet, *sub-personal* - making reference to a notion introduced by Dennett in 1969 - and *trans-individual* processes.
dimension to social agents, and to Searle’s account of social intentionality. Let us see if we can bring a contribution to the debate.

The individual level inside a tripartite model of human agency

Following Costa (2005), we claim that we have a cognitive tendency for communicative connection, and, following Sperber & Wilson (1986, 1995), we claim that we have a cognitive tendency for relevant content sharing. The first principle may regulate the second, given the fact that it is more basic than the second. It means that our natural inclination for communicative connection regulates our predisposition for content sharing\(^{87}\); in fact, it may involve a sophistication of this disposition for contact\(^{88}\), besides the fulfillment of our requirement of information about the environment. Regarding this requirement, information sharing can be related to other needs, such as the need of expressing feelings and thoughts, and to social ones of reward, admiration and attention. Thus, regardless cultural background and age, human agents tend to be communicatively connected to other agents, sometimes in order to appropriately share information\(^{89}\).

As we can see, we put side by side different kinds of intentional content, particularly beliefs and emotions. Note that, for List and Pettit (2011), a group person reasons as an individual but does not feel like one: “To be sure, group agents are not flesh-and-blood persons. They are pachydermic and inflexible in various ways, and lack the perceptions and emotions of human individuals (but see Helm 2008)” (176p.).

That is to say that both individual agents, human or not, have beliefs (the core epistemic attitude towards \(p\) – where ‘\(p\)’ is either a state of affairs or a proposition; for discussion, see Searle 2001), both have desires (the core practical attitude towards \(p\) – either a state of affairs or a

\(^{87}\) In certain circumstances, the externalization of specific information is the target.

\(^{88}\) To address the complexities related to the view of “pure creative contact” as opposed to information sharing. The latter is understood by some linguists as “real cases” of communication. We understand both as cases of communication, since both are output of our natural communicative tendencies, as we understand them.

\(^{89}\) In order to inform anyone (who fits certain qualifications) about a content. Sometimes, the information is (only or also) important to the interlocutor.
proposition), but only human ones have feelings or emotions (the core affective attitude towards $p$ – either a state of affairs or a proposition).

This disconnection between desires and emotions/feelings, though, is not unproblematic. To hold as List and Pettit (2011) that a robot can have a desire that the external world conforms to its heuristics (for example, when it desires the cups to be up when they are down) seems, then, a trivial broadening of the concept of desire. Moreover, we need a good story about agents who reason and desire but not feel, and this is even more imperative if we are talking about social agents. If group agents behave essentially like individual agents in terms of reasoning, epistemically and practically, so the story should explain why there is an important cognitive element missing. Human agents feel, and this is crucial for our (social) behavior. Let us now proceed to the next type of agents we are going to address: group members.

A member of a group

As a member of a group one has collective commitments. One can have (un)equal status (in terms of her role inside the group) in relation to other members, and her agency is regulated by this status-function. In order to understand these points, let us address about how we represent agency for ourselves and for others.

Humans use language to represent information in many levels: information about states of the world, about a proposition about states of the world, about a thought about a proposition about states of the world, etc. We represent not only objects, events and relations, but our own and others’ representations. And humans use language according to a common structure of interaction to make these sets of information available to other agents. The fact that humans assume roles in relation to others is of great importance here: we think of ourselves in these roles, we act by means of these roles. We get involved in decision making “as x” and we are good in communicative situations involving social actors.

As we mentioned, Searle (1995, 2010) calls attention to the linguistic mechanism of status-function that enables us to describe this cognitive feature of social life. For Searle, ‘X counts as Y
in C' [Barack Obama counts as the president of the United States] is one form of Status Function Declaration (see Searle, 2010: 19). Let us think about one aspect of it, in order to see how complex this heuristic is in cognitive terms. Take two utterances that have as content a proposition of the same type:

1) John Smith, an American citizen, declares: “I love Barack Obama”.


In (1), Barack Obama counts as the president of the United States, and in (2) Barack Obama counts as my father. In other words, in both cases the referent in the actual world is the same (i.e. they pick up the same natural kind*), but the meaning – or sense – of the proper name is not the same, since it targets different properties of the referent in the actual world. In the first case, the proper noun maps to the entity as the president (role), and in the second case to Barack Obama as the father (role*).

Humans must have a disposition to figure it out Y (the role) given C (the context*). This simple aspect of meaning points out to mappings human agents perform naturally. Each of these mappings is related to a different social entity in the actual world (the one the agent is).

Centrally, it implies that the human disposition to represent states of affairs encompasses a communicative competence that enables us not only to recognize individuals in their social roles but also to infer which role we are referring to in communication. And this aspect has further consequences for agency, communication and social cognition in general.

At a basic level, humans ascribe agency to individuals as human agents – as individuals of their own species – and these agents may follow a path to enrich the conceptual information regarding this basic knowledge or disposition to this type of knowledge (cognitive features that we can test in developmental stages). Thus, humans have as output more sophisticated concepts, such as when referring to unborns, fetuses, infants, babies, children, adolescents, adults, male, female, women, etc.

Moreover, humans have another sophisticated capacity: humans ascribe multiple roles to
each individual within contexts.

A proper noun maps to a social agency, as we just illustrated. In the same way, the meaning of a noun like “child” can map both to developmental features of humans (a set of features recognizable within human societies), as well as to social features (a set of features that may vary substantially among human societies). This basic agency recognition is of some importance: individuals can recognize others of their own species by discriminating (representing) features, and they are also able to refer to them and to identify that reference in the course of interactions.

That is, human agents (both adults and infants\(^{90}\)) not only conceptualize other agents as part of the same humankind domain, they narrow down the scope of agency. Our cognitive capacities allow us to identify agency in more restricted domains, such as: citizen, worker, father, husband, European\(^{91}\), neighbor, friend, etc.

Considering data from social cognition experiments\(^{92}\), we find the existence of a certain recognition/classification of individuals inside groups early in children, who use features of behavior and other external cues to make their judgments about the agents. They seem to recognize that animate agents are capable of goal-directed actions, whose goals and actions are restricted to certain domains of agency. This is robust knowledge\(^{93}\), and this kind of competence

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\(^{91}\) See [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/sunday-review/has-caucasian-lost-its-meaning.html?_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/sunday-review/has-caucasian-lost-its-meaning.html?_r=0).

\(^{92}\) For the concept of domain in the social cognition field, see, among others, Renee Baillargeon’ work [http://www.psychology.illinois.edu/people/rbaillar](http://www.psychology.illinois.edu/people/rbaillar).

\(^{93}\) As Spelke (2013) points out, other animals (from fish and birds to primates) seem to share with human infants, within limits, central abilities in terms of representation of objects and places. We can criticize those studies by being skeptical about their predictions over species cognition, but we cannot not ignore them. More interestingly it is the evidence of similarities regarding basic aspects of social cognition identified in animals such as birds and fishes. As Spelke states (2013:2), “Nevertheless, adults and children all over the world go beyond the limits of these core systems by means of a universal, uniquely human process. Using symbol systems, especially language, we combine the representations delivered by our early developing cognitive systems so as to form new systems of knowledge”. The concepts of social kinds, which are under some dispute in the philosophical debate (see the debate on natural and social kinds), are obviously enlarged by means of experience and brain/cognitive development, maybe directly related to linguistic knowledge (representation). According to Spelke (2013:2), “More speculatively, children may combine their knowledge of living agents and their actions with a sixth system of knowledge, focused on the social world, so as to create uniquely human systems of cooperation and moral evaluation (Spelke, 2010)”. “[....] Evidence
may be involved in the processing of proper nouns, as a further cognitive step.

The relevance of this point is related to the view that, in order for human agents to form groups, we need to have a conceptual mechanism to create, identify and maintain these entities. We human beings allocate our biological and external resources by means of such representations of ourselves and of others. As some people say, they wake up as mothers and fathers, as researchers and journalists, as politicians and writers. When we speak and argue, we speak and argue in the shoes of some role, and this is a feature to be considered by a theory about reasoning, argumentation, agency or communicative competence. This feature of our rationality is in the base of our thinking, feeling, arguing, deciding and acting.

Moreover, humans can have inner and external conflicts of goals and values, given the boundaries of such goals and values; and some goals and values are restricted to a small domain and others are general ones. This is relevant to the debate of consistency of goals, feelings, beliefs, values and actions. Ultimately, we can say that human agents have a disposition to be more than locally rational, i.e. to maximize general goals, since there is this basic or broadest type of agency. Accordingly, we have the following division:

[Basic natural world*] Human agent / Person /Animal [...]  
[Basic social world] Citizen / Father / Director [...]  

Certainly, the system of concepts we manipulate in daily communicative contact is more complex than this division implies. Different types of costs and benefits are involved, such as energy cost, emotional cost, (mental) health cost, sociability cost / cost of losing or weakening social relations, etc. It also addresses a point of dissociation between the two levels mentioned above; that is, the scope of direct responsibility given the scope of agency.

In the social world, where agency depends on institutional regulations, agents have

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is beginning to suggest, moreover, that people share a common view of the social world. When we go beyond intuition, moreover, we use the same productive cognitive capacities to extend our understanding and create systems of knowledge from formal mathematics to morality. A rich, shared nature unites us" (3p.).  

94 For the purpose of exposition, let us take as reference an ideal competent speaker, regardless differences in developmental stages and cultural backgrounds.
restrictions of goals, values, and actions inside their domain of agency; at the same time, the domain depends on the agent’s status, as we stated earlier. Contrary to the common sense, though, agent’s domain of action does not enlarge if they go up in a social hierarchy, since agents can face even more regulations. In the second scenario, the ecological one, the domain does not deal with constraints that block the effects of agent’s actions. It follows that the natural world, which is regulated biochemically and by psychological constraints, is the largest domains of action of (individual) agents. Social agency, on the other hand, is restricted by regulations inside groups.

We have more to say on that, but let us turn our attention now to collective and complex individual agents, such as groups and institutions.

Collective level

Human beings create and operate institutions, and institutions can produce particular outputs in the natural and in the social world. The fact that people act inside groups (division of labor) and as-a-group (representation) can produce sociocognitive effects (among other types) that are particular to these contexts. A deliberative process, for example, enhances or blocks cognitive abilities of members of a group. On the other hand, individuals can perform a task beyond their individual abilities by organizing themselves (cognition and actions) so as to deal with a task collectively. So, even in cases of cognitive tasks, such as to solve a math problem, individuals perform as members of a group, and their output is ascribed to the group as a whole.

And it has further implications for our communicative behavior. Consider once again our token dialogues (1-3):

1) Dan: Welcome here, Susan!
   Susan: Thank you, Dan!

2) Dan: Deirdre said that you are more than welcome here!
   Susan: Thank you, both of you. I am pleased to hear such kind words.

3) New York Times: The Foreign Minister said that the country is welcome at the table of negotiations.
   President: We want to publicly thank the Foreign Minister for his words.
Let us conceive that (1) instantiates a face to face dialogue, among natural individuals, Dan and Susan. (2) is similar but more sophisticated, since agents perform speech acts in behalf of a third agent, who is absent; that is, an individual S1 performs a linguistic act targeting another agent S2, in behalf of S3. S2 recognizes the move and replies targeting both agents, S1 and S3. Her act is rational in face of two things: At the same that that Dan is reporting an assertion, he is performing an indirect speech act of greeting. Susan recognizes both acts and she behaves accordingly, that is, she expresses her understanding of the situation by replying appropriately.

Reported speech situations can vary in complexity of agency. Agents can perform speech acts in behalf of a group or an institution, whose members can be more or less defined. In (3), we have a media vehicle (the journalist signature) reporting a speech act of an individual social agent. The agent who directly asserts, the journalist, has a social role, he doesn’t assert it (merely) as a human being, but as a representative of a vehicle, a member of a group. The agent who indirectly asserts it also acts as a representative, a member of a political board. The proposition is about a country, which is neither a natural entity nor a basic social one, being rather a collective social entity. At the same time, the president uses the first person plural “we” to talk in behalf of this abstract social entity. All these acts have a public dimension, and competent communicators understand it.

Let us also assume that “here” in (1) refers to a house, and in (2) it refers to a more abstract social entity: an institution, and it is even more abstract in (3). Even in face of all these complexities, human agents are capable of understanding such structure and performing acts of this type.

Additionally, we can easily recognize that some individuals stand for social roles in some circumstances but not in others, and that they stand for that role in relation to a physical or social boundary, and also that they have a certain status and set of commitments inside a group G and other ones inside another group, and that a status may change, and so on. We can even ascribe a position or a belief or any other state to someone as-Y and not to X herself. Let us consider these statements:
“As the I.M.F. has said, we need to focus on growth,” he said [the Italian prime minister, Matteo Renzi], referring to the International Monetary Fund. By JIM YARDLEY and JACK EWING OCT. New York Times, OCT 16, 2014.

The Italian prime minister is a basic social agent, and we competent speakers can recognize that this agent reasons and acts as-to-play his social role. All his attitudes will be evaluated by us accordingly. Similarly, the IMF is a collective entity, an institution, which is made of different “stuff”. These agents do not share all the properties biosocial agents have in their social roles. But, intuitively, we treat them in ordinary interaction with relevant similarities:

The group says that it has raised $1 million and that it plans “significant” ad buys in Iowa and Nevada”. – Trip Gabriel, New York Times, October 14, 2014.

“The private sector in Germany has the feeling the government is not doing the right things,” said Nicola Leibinger-Kammüller”. New York Times, 16, 2014.


Again, we can easily assume the existence of practical goals achieved by G’s status and by the coordination of its members. According to our approach, a member M is a category that depends on and asks for collective commitment relations (in-group relations). A group G has autonomy as an institution (just as an individual S has autonomy as a person) but it depends on a collective mechanism. Funny enough or not, there are cases such that no member likes the final product of their collective agency and cases such that a product goes against their individual beliefs, desires or feelings. Let us think about two examples.

An advertising company is hired to design a campaign for a brand. After much research, the professionals get a product that they, collectively, decide fits well with the concept of the brand but, individually, they do not consider it as a good piece of propaganda, thus manifesting it to each other. Since they do not have more time to change it or to create another advertisement that both fits the concept well and is suitable for their taste, they present what
they have so far. They do such a great job when presenting the material that the brand’s marketing director buys the idea, but she does not really like it either. Since she has no more time to finally distribute the brand’s new campaign, she agrees in having that one circulating. Not too surprisingly, when that piece gets to the public, there is a mass rejection. As far as people’s opinions go, the campaign represents something like G’s taste: the brand’s taste and the advertising company’s taste. The action is ascribed to the group, not to the members.

This reading follows because there are practical goals regarding an agent G, independently of its members, as well as a reasoning process via consensus, where public positions are byproducts of considerations about G. A ‘brand’s taste’ is the product of a set of consensus among the members of the group (via meetings or other top down or bottom up communicative contexts) regarding the manifestability of internal positions.

We can think in similar terms about a media company. The members of a board of directors meet to discuss the shows to be broadcasted during the summer. They learn through a survey that a considerable part of their audience watches a particular show. They do not consider the day of the week and the time at which the show appears as key factors for that result, rather they think that the show has properties that the audience likes. It happens that none of the members, individually, like that show and, because of that, they were all not inclined to have it in the TV program in the first place. However, in face of the scenario, they collectively decide to broadcast that show again. Given G’s goals and the calibration of the positions of the members, it was consensual that they were making the right choice.

These examples illustrate the contingencies that affect our understanding of groups and our agency inside them, such that it may override members’ attitudes as individuals. List and Pettit (2011: 192) point out three ways by which members will instantiate their agency: an indirect, a cognitive-achievement-based and a more spontaneous way. They endorse the latter, claiming that individuals respond to the automatic guidance of the group, just as pilots do, given the panel before them. For the authors, in these situations, we act based on conceptualizations (beliefs and desires) that call for expression in first-person plural terms: “desires that we do so and so, or beliefs that we can do such and such”. The explanation for the behavior, according to
their position, is that either because it is in our individual interest to act accordingly, or because we care about the group in the same way we may care about a person.

We can think of a company as a means for income, and ultimately for happiness, or a football team as a means for happiness. However, in the second case, fans are not part of that group, but part of the group of fans, which together compose a wider group of collective commitments and manifested positions (values, etc.). Individuals in fact have mental attitudes towards objects, and groups are objects, created and maintained by our cognitive dispositions and by a set of linguistic-communicative mechanisms we, as researchers, want to call attention to.

Internally, we act in-groups by means of reasoning about G’s goals and by means of positions that are manifested inside the group. Collective commitments and positions are the means of action of groups. Members of groups are social, practical agents.

Because of these features, we address collective agency as a subset of practical rationality. Groups are built to maximize practical, collective aims – we are focused on institutional groups here. Collective agents have particular roles in society, and everything related to these entities as such is related to their practical roles.

Conclusion

Thus, we hold that collective rationality regards essentially to acting rationally, since group agency is the result of a collective action (even non-linguistic acts of commitment). As an individual (S), we are able to make rational epistemic decisions towards p. As a member of a group (M), we are able to bring assumptions, discuss them and persuade others about them. As a group (G), we are able to assume positions. Clearly, G operates through positions, decision-makings and actions (on the basis of shared assumptions). Beliefs (S’s and even M’s mental states) are not functional to an agent G, unless they turn to be positions that maximize the goals shared or mutually manifest by the Members: G’s goals.

According to Searle (1995, 2010), groups are built to increase human power. We hold that
groups maximize the welfare of their members – from family members to fellows of department (social roles).

The model presented so far addresses individual and collective communicative agency, taken as part of the agents’ communicative competence. More than just a manipulation of symbols and rules of representation, our conceptual framework is equipped with a disposition to conceptualize and perform (cognitive) acts given levels of agency. That is, we have a disposition to recognize and play certain roles in relation to other agents and the environment, and it requires conceptual resources applied to communication.

It is important to say that we are not unique here. Other animals have divisions of labor and conceptualize agency in terms of role-tags; male song birds, for example, have “tutors” for the process of learning token songs (see Terleph et al., 2007). Human agents, however, use natural language, inside a dialogic framework, to express and communicate to other agents. By using this linguistic capacity, based on a creative application of operations and cognitive resources, human agents can perform sophisticated acts, maintaining a sophisticated social environment.

And communication, as pointed out in Sperber & Wilson (1986, 1995), has a crucial role of eliminating, changing and adding assumptions, which are used to regulate and legitimate acts. Communicative agency, then, seems to be a crucial topic since individuals can conceptualize and act by virtue of social identities, and they can respond for the duties of their roles. Moreover, according to this approach, communicative conflicts among individuals (I), members of groups (M), and groups of individuals (G) have a unified treatment.

Finally, we assume that agency is a central interdisciplinary topic. As we argue, communicative competence, or agency, is a complex observational object that can be explored by natural (experimental), social (theoretical-argumentative) and formal (we are committed to a computational modeling of dialogic competence) methods (see Costa 2007, Weigand 2009, among others). One fruitful methodological possibility is to build mappings between areas by means of their subtheories (objects, methodology) (Costa, 2007), just as we are doing here.
5 DISAGREEMENT: WAR AND PEACE BY WORDS - AN ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO

This is war.
I accept the peace proposal.

Introduction

We are now ready to make some assumptions on specific relations between agents’ use of language and their propositional attitudes. We have said that natural language arguments are made of propositions and are used by agents in virtue of some purpose. Since we will address particular agents and claim that agents are identified inside certain limits of performance (individually, inside groups and collectively/representatively), then we will rely on specific relations.

Even though it is quite normal for agents to have a position of doubt regarding an assumption or thesis, there are situations in which it is hard to reach agreement. In negotiations, agents dispute practical claims, since they dispute resources. This is clear in context of conflict mediation. Examples in international relations are extensive, but we will illustrate the view presented in the previous chapters with an analysis negotiation dialogues in the scope of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

We will justify our choice. We assume the centrality of dialogue both as enabling the agency of collective agents, as well as enabling understanding and conflict resolution, in the form of a peace agreement. Communicative agency is crucial since it is the main form of agents’ contact. Communicative aspects are nuclear to agency, even if they are not the only ones involved, since we have levels of political, economic, cultural/religious and social features at stake.

In the international political scenario agents claim, for instance, for a “military solution” to solve conflicts, even when assuming publically that “[o]nly a political solution will put an end to

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95 As we have already pointed out, Searle (2010) argues that some attitudes are about propositions and others about objects, such as in “I like that you are an honest person” and “I like you”.

96 Some agents argue that war is “the continuation of politics by other means”, such as Carl von Clausewitz, a military theorist.
it”\(^97\). We do not need to dispute what a “military solution” is, but is far from being consensual what a “political solution” is. In this chapter, we will claim that a political solution is obtained by means of communicative agency. First, we will evaluate the agency involved in negotiation dialogues, and then, in the next chapter, we will propose a type of dialogue and a class of agents to be involved in these negotiation dialogues.

The complexity of such scenarios can be measured by individuals, members of groups and groups operating by highly institutionalized speech acts; for instance, let us consider:

1) The Foreign Minister said that
2) The UN Secretary announced that
3) The members of the government and of the opposition will reject
4) The list of participants published\(^98\) that
5) The leader of the group has said
6) The Front has rejected the talks
7) The National Council has withdrawn in protest at the decision of the coalition to attend the talks
8) The delegation cited that
9) The forces had proposed a
10) The National Coalition threatened to leave the talks
11) The invitation to the government was made by the UN Secretary-General
12) UN diplomats tentatively proposed
13) US and Russia could not reach an agreement
14) The al-Assad government agreed that
15) The civilian and armed opposition groups in Syria accepted that
16) Various groups representing civil society justified their position
17) UN is encouraging all groups

These are few, but representative examples of the many we find on the media routinely. As we can observe, this type of political scenario is put forward by means of speech acts of members of

\(^{97}\) Eisenberg and Caplan (2010) quote Mark Tessler on the, let us say, political solution hypothesis, “Israelis and Palestinians can break with the past if they have the political will to do so...It is on the parties themselves, and not on history, that the future depends”, and they continue, “We fully agree with these remarks, which apply equally to the wider Israeli-Arab conflict as well as to other protracted disputes” (p. xv).

\(^{98}\) ‘Published’ is taken here as 'said publically in written modality'.
groups and groups. And this is central to their agency, both internally and in relation to other agents. We will focus on a representative type of dialogue inside this arena, given the type of agents and goals involved: negotiation, more specifically peace negotiation. They deserve consideration due to their practical relevance at the international level. This type of dialogue serves appropriately to our purposes of addressing communicative agency, because there are many levels of meaning negotiation involved.

We will start by the definition of negotiation itself, and then we will address some types of disagreement.

We can approach negotiation as a type of dialogue, such as Walton (1989) and Vanderveken (2013). For Walton (1989: 3), dialogue is a sequence of speech act exchanges between participants. According to this view, based on Aristotelian considerations, participants’ roles and their interests are key features to define the type of dialogue that is being conducted. And the type of dialogue is considered for the articulation of appropriate speech acts, targeting multiple or specific final goals. At an international institutional level, with scarce time for multiple agents’ interaction, we do not see a high level of freedom of communicative movement, probably because this may cause time loss and allow the establishment of an ambiguous communicative exchange. This type of dialogue is, therefore, highly institutionalized.

As Walton (1989: 7) outlines, negotiation dialogue is a type of dialogue in which “the primary goal is self-interest” and the means or the method used is “bargaining”. Centrally, unlike other types of dialogue, such as information-seeking, negotiations are not centered on commitments to the truth of propositions used by the agents (Walton, 1989: 8). Based on Walton and Krabbe’s (1995) typology of dialogue, negotiation dialogues are defined by the practical intent of the agents, where the participants’ bargain over the division of some scarce resource. “Here, each participant may be seeking to maximize his or her share of the resource, in which case the individual goals of the participants are in conflict” (McBurney et al., 2007: 96).

The main goal of negotiation dialogues is the division of resources “between competing allocations and so must deal with reconciling potentially competing interests” (McBurney et al., 2007: 98). The dialogue, thus, takes the form of a dispute. Consequently, the concessions are used
as “trade-offs that can be sacrificed for gains elsewhere” (Walton, 1989: 8).

Moreover, positions are used as “bargaining positions”. Agents are in an arena of dispute and assume the function of “adversaries”, where they “lose” or “win” at the end, via speech acts that have the status of “legal acts” or, using Searle’s terminology, “institutional acts”. In many disputes among political entities, international bodies or States, movements take the form of legal acts or military acts, where the use of force change regulations like territorial borders. Therefore, negotiations are taken as political or diplomatic efforts to solve conflicts of interest.

More specifically, peace negotiations or peace talks, also known as conflict resolution efforts, have in peace agreement their claimed final objective. In this type of dialogue, agents negotiate “peace” via negotiating resources, material or human ones. In practical terms, “peace” means cease-fires or the cessation of other military operations over civilians. At the table of negotiations, “peace” is a loose term used to “bargain” self-interests of individual and collective agents. Vanderveken (2013: 63) claims that “The type of peace talks has a special background condition: negotiators represent belligerent parties and are authorized to conclude peace”; during our illustrative analysis, we will take these two features under consideration in order to see if both apply to the case.

Since this type of dialogue usually involves interests by the part of civil society, arguments such as religious or historical ones are brought to the table in order to justify positions to the general public. In the possibility that the interests rationally determining those positions may not be clear, epistemic disagreement may emerge at some level; a negotiation of reasons is then considered. At the table of negotiation, practical disagreements are the focus and the positions are only agents’ means to achieve their specific ends. As Walton states (1989: 8),

This type of dialogue is frankly based on personal gain and makes no pretense of being neutral or objective, or of being an inquire into truth. Coalitions must be made with partners, but the objective is always self-interest in making a “good-deal”.

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99 In the sense that these interests and motivations ground or account for the positions.
Negotiating peace via negotiating resources: an analysis of communicative rationality

Let us consider that human agents have a universal disposition for dialogic contact (with a basic structure of expectations invariable among cultures) and that, as goal-direct beings, humans assume many roles related to goals at three different levels of agency. As rational agents, humans act on the basis of reasons and use language to formulate and expose those reasons, which may take the form of positions. Let us now observe how agents, acting as representatives and assuming each other as adversarial, due to conflict of interests, conduct a negotiation; the conflict of interest described remains despite high costs of human lives, relations and resources.

First, we can state two levels of disagreement, *epistemic disagreement*, or more broadly *cognitive disagreement*, and *practical disagreement*. An approach of practical rationality requires an analysis of these two levels.

At a basic level, agents ‘negotiate meaning’ in the sense they want to understand the other’s views, reasons, acts and intentions, as well they want to impose their own; in doing so, flaws of reasoning and of communication can lead them to disputes over the qualifications of a proposition. Inside groups and as representatives of group, human beings can dispute both propositions and courses of action, given self-interests; “self” is here understood at the level of the agency: ‘my group’, ‘my representation’, etc.

This leads us to the fact that, in the course of interaction, or previous to the dialogue exchange, some dialoguers want to find out if other agents are their *cognitive peers*, i.e. they “share assumptions”

\[100\] and similar epistemic attitudes towards them, as well as/or *practical peers*, i.e. when agents, even not sharing a set of reasons, have a common goal that they can maximize in that exchange.

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\[100\] That is, if they represent common sets of propositions.
It is important to say something about the possibility of agreement or disagreement over a unique proposition \( p \) or a unique set of single propositions \( \{p_1, p_2, p_3, \ldots\} \). Cappelen and Lepore, in a series of papers, advocate for a version of semantic minimalism. As they claim, their proposal intends to preserve “content stability across contexts (in order to account for inter-contextual agreement and disagreement [\ldots])”, calling “the contextually insensitive content the ‘minimal content’” (Cappelen and Lepore, 2015: 4).

Some related versions of this claim can be found in the literature. “We argued that minimal contents are truth-evaluable. We don’t tell you much about their truth conditions, other than the disquotational specification (“Alex is smart” is true just in case Alex is smart’, etc.).” They criticize, for example, the view according to which there are propositional skeletons or fragments, due to the fact that “propositional skeletons say nothing about the world and so are not worth storing or remembering”. For Cappelen and Lepore, shared content “is supposed to be information remembered, stored, and transferred across contexts” (2015: 4).

We hold that agents in negotiation agree over the possible meanings at the table, thus representing a common set of propositions. Let us think about a real example here. Consider the well-known expression “two state solution”; each term of the expression is at the Israeli-Palestinian table of negotiation, for possible interpretations. These interpretations assume the status of positions at the table of negotiations. The expression “two” is meant to mean either ‘at least two’ or ‘exactly two’ and entail or strongly imply ‘not one’ and ‘not three’. “State” means either a ‘political self-governing entity’ or simply a ‘political entity’, and finally ‘solution’ mean either ‘dealing with the problem’ or ‘solving the problem’, depending on the agent who utters
the proposition, which represents a party in the dispute.

Agreeing that ‘We agree that the two state solution is the only possible solution’, implies agreeing about these possible meanings. We can then say that these possible meanings represent the “shared content” or the minimum truth-evaluable content. This view is no without problem, since this may require a relativist truth account, but at least it accounts on the possible meanings (composing a set of possible single propositions) at the table of negotiation, which represent the content agreed or disagreed. Another key point here is the possibility of conveying plural meanings, not only a single meaning. At this point, speech act pluralism, as proposed by Cappelen and Lepore, may have a contribution. According to this account,

1) When you utter a sentence, S, in a context, C, you don’t just say one thing (e.g., the semantic content of S in C). You say a potential infinity of propositions.
2) The set of propositions you say by uttering S in C can vary between contexts of interpretation: relative to one interpreter, you might have said that p, but not so relative to another interpreter. (Cappelen and Lepore, 2015: 5)

This account challenges the view that “in uttering a sentence you succeed in saying one proposition (or maybe two (e.g. the diagonal and the horizontal proposition)).” According to a relevance theory account over speaker-meaning or “beyond speaker meaning”, the content under dispute refers to a pragmatic content activated by agents, due to the evidence and background assumptions. There is, they would argue, an array of strongly implicated content. The speaker intends the other agent to activate only the implicated content “that may turn out to be relevant to his actions” (see Sperber and Wilson, 2015: 131-132). Given the need to postulate a stable content that does not depend on ad hoc intention-recognition, negotiators clarify some meaning indeterminacies during the dialogue and agree over the meaning at stake when that proposition is under dispute. At the end of the day, the pragmatic meaning turns out to be ‘agreed shared meaning’.

In the context of disagreement, more precisely political disagreement, agents need to
agree over meanings, since dialogic moves have direct impact over the division of resources. The speech acts made by the agents, inside a common structure, will affect the course of action to be pursued. Another real illustrative example is the one regarding the text of the United Nations resolution 242. The meaning under dispute relates to the following passage,

The Security Council affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict (...).[^101]

The interpretations of the word “territories” here may mean “all territories” or “some territories”. Due to this conflict of interpretation, the agents involved have not stopped the dispute over the borders.

Note that disagreement may appear explicit in the dialogue or explicit in negotiations. Disagreement between rational communicators, even when involving cognitive struggles by any part, are mainly epistemic or practical, as already stated; however, it can be purely communicative, at the level of “meaning negotiation”, when under dispute are not ideologies or actions, but the expression of them under a certain linguistic structure. The failure in this level of agreement may cause or be caused by a failure in the level of linguistic (terminological or conceptual) understanding. This may occur between agents of the same group:

There are more exotic meaning facts as well. For example, some disputes or alleged disputes are merely verbal or “only semantic,” unlike substantive disagreements over fact. X and Y do not disagree about what actually happened; they dispute only over whether what happened counts as a “so-and-so.” Onlookers say, “Oh, they’re just talking past each other.” (Lycan, 2008: 66).

Given the previous discussion, we can say that agents only access ‘what happened’ via the agreement over propositional content conveyed by declarations and other indirect speech acts. The ‘semantic dispute’ is much more central than we may assume. The centrality of it is due to

the fact that their agency depends on agreed meaning and action. Therefore, a dispute over facts goes through a dispute over meanings.

In our analysis, we will focus on epistemic and practical disagreements involved in meaning negotiation, i.e. when under dispute is an understanding over facts of the matter or courses of action put forward by speech acts.

Since we admit that reasons, epistemic or practical, ground actions, then the acquaintance of those reasons is required in order for the agents, inside or outside the dialogue, understand a course of action.

This kind of dispute centrally involves members of groups (M). To establish a resolution process, we need to pass through communicative-acts, changing cognitive and practical environments.

Let us now consider an illustration of the previous account by means of a negotiation dialogue that composes the set of “peace talks” of a long-term series of conflicts in the Middle East. Until recently, it was known as “the” Middle East conflict by the media, given its influence on the political scenario and on the faith of millions of lives. These are self-proclaimed “peace negotiations” targeting peace agreements.

We can say here that scholars are well-served of primary sources, given the quantity of leaked materials on the media in the last years. The dialogues we will use in order to illustrate the framework comprise a set of real dialogic exchanges involving agents of different sides of the conflict. More precisely, it comprises two negotiation dialogues leaked by Al Jazeera English. One of the dialogues will be the central source of data, and the other will be used to provide background information, since they are steps of the same negotiations process.

In order to contextualize these assumptions and evaluate them in the context of communicative agency, it is crucial to state a historical line of dialogic actions involved. Next section, then, provides a perspective of this line. We must say that this process involves many agents, agreements, resolutions, positions, meetings; thus, being a complex set.
We opt to provide a background of the beginning of the main conflict, once it grounds the sub-conflicts among the agents. Historians and internationalists who study those negotiations efforts in view of describing and explaining this well-known “failure of diplomacy” assume that “One way to tackle assessments of contemporary peacemaking efforts is to situate them within the extended historical continuum of Arab-Israeli diplomacy” (Eisenberg and Caplan, 2010: xlii). This section, then, aims at drawing a historical background that we can use to pointing reasons, commitments, institutions that take part in the dialogues in order to understand agents’ motivations. They may indicate “contrasting versions of what ‘really happened’”.

The conflict at issue is known by many names and involves many groups, regional and international ones. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict can be understood as either a long-term conflict, or rather as a set of conflicts, including the Arab-Israeli Conflict, and it is considered one of the most complex disputes in politics, for its territorial and ethnic dimension, besides international impact, multi-actors’ involvement, religious background and duration. On the public media, it is constantly conveyed the idea that this conflict is unsolvable, that peace is far away from being a reality in the area, at the cost of human lives and increasing circumstantial hate (due to conflict of interests). There are many publications on the topic, where the facts of the

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102 Eisenberg and Caplan (2010), in the second edition of the book, focus on “Arab-Israeli peace”, calling attention to “efforts to resolve the Arab-Israel and Israeli-Palestinian conflicts”, as well as to “idiosyncrasies of negotiating along each Arab-Israeli track” and to “the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since the [O}slo Accords of 1993” (p. xiii). The “Arab-Israeli Conflict” can be referred as a phase of the main, long-term conflict (see, for example, Gelvin, 2014: ix), or rather to the main conflict itself (see, for example, Eisenberg and Caplan, 2010). There is also reference to the “Arab-Israeli War”. Gelvin (2014), like Caplan (2009), called the main event “the Israel-Palestine conflict”. Considering recent literature, in general the main conflict’s name starts with the land or the ethnical identification of ‘Israel’ and ‘the Israeli’; Bunton’s (2013) book, on the other hand, is called “The Palestinian-Israeli Conflict”. This is by itself a good starting point to think about terminological differences over roughly the same identifiable historical events.

103 In their preface, Eisenberg and Caplan (2010) state, “We continue to believe that Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli peace are possible, but the intervening year have taught us to be even more sensitive to the historical depth of the conflict, the immensity of the challenge facing those who would resolve it, and the unpredictable and even unfathomable pain that the enemies of peace are prepare to inflict upon others. We write with sobering certainty that more bloodshed and crisis lie ahead, and we make few if any predictions, for at last two reasons: a sense of caution given the volatility of the region, and our desire for readers to bring their own instincts and experiences to their reading and to draw their own conclusion accordingly” (p. xiv).
matter are often challenged by the parts directly involved in the conflict. Since the dispute\textsuperscript{104} embraces components of different types, it is often described as a “multilayered dispute” (Eisenberg and Caplan, 2010: xxii).

The historical background we provide will be divided by issues, in order to fit our theoretical purposes and to clarify the further proposal of conflict mediation we bring. Our intent is not to outline a complete panorama of events, since there are many episodes that deserve reference and that will be omitted. Crucially, we want to present key agents involved, some manifest conflicts of interests and some reasons in the form of positions. These episodes and relations compose the background of contextual information we would like to refer in order to ground further claims. For that aim, we will divide the historical continuum into 6 parts: land; mandates, states and borders; disputes and wars; religious arguments; key agents, and finally a chronology of the peace talks, which may offer a satisfactory panorama to the reader.

\textit{Historical remarks}

Resources and refugees: land for peace

According to Bunton (2013), besides the many facets of the 120-year conflict, the most “pressing and tangible” one was the issue of sharing the land. The territorial dispute is over the region of Palestine, which includes the contemporary State of Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Gelvin, 2014: 1\textsuperscript{105}). The region is surrounded by Arab states, namely: Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Jordan, and by the Sinai Peninsula and the Mediterranean Sea\textsuperscript{106}; the territory is small in extension, from the eastern Mediterranean shore to the Jordan River (El-Hasan, 2010). Eisenberg

\textsuperscript{104} For the authors, this characterizes “The contemporary conflict between Jews and Arabs in the Middle East” (p. xxii).

\textsuperscript{105} This data makes reference to the third edition, the one we will make use in this work.

\textsuperscript{106} Gelvin (2014: 1) remarks that even these simple assertions are under dispute, since, for example, the Jewish group ‘Revisionist Zionists’ and the Palestinian organization ‘The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine’ claims that Palestine includes also the territory of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. As the author observes, that is why the later group’s slogan is “The road to Jerusalem begins in Amman”.

and Caplan (2010: xxii) observe that the contemporary struggle over that piece of land can be track to the early 1880’s.

There is an “ahistorical notion of the conflict as an ancient and religious one”, where it is a “modern territorial contest: two nations, one land”, Bunton (2013) argues. Accordingly, resolving the conflict is a matter of drawing borders (p. xii).

Israel has occupied the region of Palestine since 1948, by the end of the British Mandate and by the event of 1948 War; at the time, “750,000 Palestinians, over half the indigenous population, fled or were expelled”, numbers published by the UN. At each new conflict, these numbers increase. The situation constitutes the problem of refugees, which relates to the land dispute, since the Palestinian families claim their return to the region. Their claim over the land can be seen a twofold claim: as a claim for “the right to return” (refugees) and as a claim for the right to a self-governing state, starting as attempts to create a sovereign state over most or all the land, and then turning into claims for the United Nations (UN) pre-1967 borders.

In 1947, the United Nations proposed the partitioning of Palestine into two independent States, one Palestinian Arab and the other Jewish, with Jerusalem internationalized (General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947). One of the two States envisaged in the partition plan proclaimed its independence as Israel and in the 1948 war it expanded to occupy 77 per cent of the territory of Palestine. (UN on The Question of Palestine)

In the 1967 war, Israel occupied the remaining territory of Palestine, until then under Jordanian and Egyptian control. The war brought a second exodus of Palestinians, estimated at more than half a million. (DPR study: The Origins and Evolution of the Palestine Problem: 1917-1988) (UN on The Question of Palestine)

108 “General Assembly resolution 194 of 11 December 1948 states that: ‘...The refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.’”. Source: https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/UNISPAL.NSF/iss.htm?OpenForm, Last visit: 20/12/2015.
Mandates, states and borders

After World War I, from around 1920 to 1948, Palestine was under the British Mandate. Many Israeli families moved to the region during that period, and the Zionist movement (nationalist Jews) claimed their right to the land. Bunton (2013: xiii) observes that the British government aligned to the Zionist movement during the World War I. Given the Palestinians refusal of the United Nations partition plan and due the multiple interests over the land, by the end of the mandate a war stated in the territory, the 1948 War. In that war, Jewish groups, Palestinian groups and Arab States in the area fought for their right to sovereignty over that land.

As we can attest, the conflict over resources was more than a conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. The agents interested in the land were Jews (nationalists and Jewish families living in Palestine) and Arabs (from the Arab countries neighboring Palestine, Palestinians nationalists and the Palestinian families living in Palestine, the Palestinians). Territorial claims, then, can also be identified as claims of “nationalism”, more specifically, Jewish and Palestinian nationalisms. Nationalism is a notion related to the one of State. Under dispute, it is two states’ recognition: The State of Israel, declared in 1948, and the State of the Palestine, not yet fully recognized. On 15 November 1988, the Palestinian Declaration of Independence proclaimed the establishment of the State of Palestine, but only on 29 November 2012 the United Nations General Assembly approved the “de facto recognition of the sovereign state of Palestine” (the membership of Israel in the United Nations starts on 11 May 1949\textsuperscript{111}). By 138 votes, the UN General Assembly approved the status of Palestine as a “Non-Member Observer State” in the UN, against the votes of Israel, United States, Canada, Czech Republic, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Panama and Palau (UN.org)\textsuperscript{112}.

Bunton (2013: xii) focuses on the “successive attempts to establish independent states that satisfy the claims of both Jewish and Palestinian nationalism to the same territorial space”.

\textsuperscript{111} Please, see: \url{http://www.un.org/Depts/dpi/palestine/ch2.pdf}. Last visit: 12/20/2015.
Another point we call attention to, besides ownership and recognition, is the one about control over the land. As Eisenberg and Caplan (2010: xviii) write, “there have been many efforts (…) to resolve the persistent conflict for control over Palestine/Israel”; for one side, that is “the Land of Israel (Eretz Yisrael\textsuperscript{113})”, and for the other “Palestine (Filastin)”. According to El-Hasan (2010: 37), “Palestine” ethnologically means “the land of the Philistines”, whose tribes, as assumed by historians, settled in the land of Canaan around 1250 BC, establishing 5 kingdoms: Gaza, Ashkelon, Ashdod, Gath, and Ekron.

By the event of declaration of the State of Israel, the conflict got the shape of a conflict among States, the State of Israel and Arab States. This has effect over the international diplomacy. Moreover, we can understand the conflict as “over tangible issues such as borders, resources, and territory lost and won in the cycle of wars between them” (Eisenberg and Caplan, 2010: xxii). We cannot forget, however, that the conflicts involve more than territory and resources; they involve human lives.

Disputes and wars

There were many disputes since the beginning of the declared conflict: conflicts between Palestinian inhabitants and British forces, among Arab groups, and between Arab-Palestinians and Israeli-Palestinians. There is a list of agents and interests involved in the disputes and controlling them.

We will mention here the 1948 war and the 1967 war, since they led to the following disputes. According to Bunton (2013: xix), “Zionist leaders pragmatically build support for the idea of partition on strategic reasons, not religious ones”, since “they accepted a state that included neither Jerusalem, which was meant to be internationalized, nor the hill lands of their forefathers (known in the Bible as Judea and Samaria) which were annexed by Jordan’s King Abdullah”. Moreover, over dispute were coastal and valley areas. As could be predicted, the boundaries

\textsuperscript{113} As designated by the first Jewish Settlers (El-Hasan, 2010: 37). Jewish Settlers in Palestine from 1880’s until 1948 are sometimes referred as “Yishuv”, which means ‘settlement’ in Hebrew (ibid).
established in 1947 were rejected by Palestinian Arabs (see Bunton, 2013: xiii-xiv) and a war emerged as soon as the British military forces withdraw the area.

With the all-out war between the two communities in 1948, which was joined by the neighboring Arab States, Jerusalem was placed at the heart of the conflict. The Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement of 1949 formalized the de facto division of the City into the eastern sector, including the Old City, controlled by Jordan, and the western sector, or the new City controlled by the new State of Israel. The 1967 war, which resulted in the occupation by Israel of East Jerusalem, reopened the debate over the two competing claims. Israel, which annexed East Jerusalem in 1980, considers that "Jerusalem, whole and united, is the capital of Israel", and wants the City to "remain forever under Israel's sovereignty".114

Religious arguments

The reference to the piece of land over dispute is found in ancient and sacred texts. This is used as reasons by both parties, and also by Christians, to dispute the right over such territory. Even though it is the same piece of land, the territory is known by different references, according to the religious text115 that is guiding the claim. Is it “the hill of Jerusalem on which the city of David was built”? Is it “the heavenly city or kingdom of heaven”? Is it “the land of future promise or return from exile”? Different groups and subgroups dispute the rightness of such claims and many revisions are still claimed by them.

The religious status involves three religions claiming each to have ‘the greatest affinity and attachment to the place’ as well as being ‘rightfully entitled to rule over it’. By the Muslims side, Palestine is an object of emotional affiliation, since those who follow Islam consider Jerusalem as

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115 Torah or Pentateuch often alludes to the five books of the Old Testament, in a recognized historical common source of Christian and Jewish sacred instructions. The Quran is the central reference for the Muslims.
their third holiest city, after Mecca and Medina\textsuperscript{116,117}. By the Jewish side, as stated by Eisenberg and Caplan (2010: xxii-xxiv), “Zion (\textit{Tsiyon}) is the biblical Hebrew reference for Jerusalem and its environs, including the ‘Land of Israel’ as promised by God to the Jewish people according to the Hebrew Bible (Old Testament)”. Consequently, Zionism\textsuperscript{118} refers to an ideology\textsuperscript{119} that holds that the Jews, as a nation, have in that land their ancestral homeland, thus having the right to a sovereign nation-state over it (p. xxiv). For Bunton (2013: xiii), “Zionism’s geographic definition of a homeland has been problematic, pragmatic and fluid”. According to Eisenberg and Caplan (2010: xxiv), \textit{Eretz Yisrael/Tsiyon} is related to a “2,000-year-old dream of returning to the biblical land of their ancestors”. This would be the reason that led Jews to move to Ottoman Palestine at the end of the 19\textsuperscript{th} century. As presented by Bunton (2013: xiii), the World Zionist Organization met in Basel (Switzerland) in 1897, where its leaders “identified Palestine as their land in which to build a Jewish national home and secure for Jews their own state”. As we can anticipate, this scenario of assertions provided reasons for and objects

\textsuperscript{116} “The roots of its religious significance lie in the fact that it was the first \textit{Qibla} for Muslims, the place which Muhammad SAW himself and his followers faced to pray, the direction being changed to Mecca a year and a half later. Muslims also derive their significance of the place from its association with Prophet Muhammad SAW’s accession to heaven, the miraculous nocturnal journey he made from earth to the skies which included a stop in Jerusalem. The Dome of Rock is known to be the site from where Muhammad SAW ascended. The religious significance of the city of Jerusalem was also highlighted during the rules of Umayyad and Abbasid; the first Umayyad caliph Mu’awiyah decided Jerusalem as the capital of caliphate and not Damascus. The successive Muslim rules, up to Mamelukes and Ottomans, considered Jerusalem to be equally significant and the city enjoyed the status equal to that of Mecca and Medina.” (http://www.palestinefacts.org/pf_early_palestine_jerusalem.php. Last visit: 19/12/2015). We recommend a visit on the web page in order to attest the debate among the representations of the facts. According to Wikipedia the term “SAW” follows after uttering the name of Muhammed, making reference to the expression “May Allāh honor him and grant him peace”: (صلى الله عليه وسلم - S.A.W., SAAW, or SAAS). Alternatively, we can find “p.b.u.h.”, which means “peace be upon him”. Last visit: 19/12/2015.

\textsuperscript{117} UN states, “Jerusalem (Al-Quds in Arabic, Jerushalayim in Hebrew) is the site of the Western (Wailing) Wall, the Church of the Holy Sepulcher and the Passion of Crucifixion; and the Al-Aqṣa Mosque, the first kibla and third holiest sanctuary of Islam. The City has been the object of conflicting claims by Jews and Palestinian Arabs, both peoples consider it the embodiment of their national essence and right to self-determination”. Source: https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/UNISPALNFS/iss.htm?OpenForm. Last visit: 19/12/2015.

\textsuperscript{118} According to the authors (2010: xxiv), this doctrine developed in Europe in the 1880’s. They state that the proposal of a Jewish state was a solution proposed by Jewish intellectuals after anti-Jewish persecutions and a scenario of latent anti-Semitism.

\textsuperscript{119} It is referred as a political ideology. “I regard Zionism as a –perhaps the– prototypical nineteenth-century nationalism movement” (Gelvin, 2014: x).
of dispute.

In short, the historical argument of precedence is used by both sides. For El-Hasan (2010: 37), the Jewish argument can be summed up as “We were here for time immemorial” meaning you [Arab Palestinians] are new comers (even though you were already living in the land before the 20th century Jewish settlements). The counterargument by the other part is that the [Arab] Palestinians “Canaanite ancestors settled the land in 1250 BC, long before the Jewish tribes led by Joshua invaded the interior of the land (...) (according to the Bible)” (El-Hasan, 2010: 37). By the end of the 19th century, he states, “the notion of a Palestine entity was as yet non-existent” (ibid), since the political entity is brought to existence by the British Mandate.

England, UN, US, key agents

England has a central role in the dispute due to its military and political presence in the region since the end of World War I until 1948. After them, the UN body was, and still is, the international entity with a central role in the dispute and in its mediation. The United Nations, an International Organization, was founded in 1945, following the instable scenario of international politics after World War II. The UN, via its General Assembly120, Councils (the Security Council121, the Human Rights Council122123), Permanent Observers124125, the UN Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (considered “the sole UN body exclusively devoted to Question of Palestine126), the Division for Palestinian Rights127 (in charge of developing and

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120 Please, see: https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/ga.htm?OpenForm.
123 For the complete list of the UN agents, please see: https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/UNISPAL.NSF/sys.htm?OpenForm. Last visit: 12/20/2015.
124 Please, see: http://palestineun.org/.
125 Please, read the welcome message: http://palestineun.org/mission-team/ambassador/welcome-message/.
127 Please, see: http://www.un.org/undpa/palestinianrights.
maintaining The United Nations Information System on the Question of Palestine - UNISPAL\(^\text{128}\), the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator\(^\text{129}\) for the Middle East Peace Process\(^\text{130}\) (UNSCO)\(^\text{131}\), the Secretary-General\(^\text{132}\) and especially via Resolutions\(^\text{133}\), is a central agent in the history of the conflict, since it was crucial for putting forward a partition plan in 1947, by which the State of Israel and the State of Palestine were represented. Today, it refers to the institution whose work on the issue “encompasses diplomacy, maintenance of peace, human rights, assistance, international law, public information, research”\(^\text{134}\). Taking a look at the roles and responsibilities of so many agents involved (the ones we made a point of listing), it seems that their agency is not only primarily but almost entirely communicative: by means of speech and communicative acts.

Additionally, as we have seen, the neighboring Arab countries have their part in the dispute, given that Egypt, Syria, Jordan and forces of Iraq took part in the 1948 war, disputing territory and bargaining land. As a result, parts of the territory at issue until today were attached to these Arab countries, which was the pivot of further sub conflicts between them and the State of Israel. The Palestinian-Israeli War was only one part of an Arab-Israel set of conflicts of tangible interests.

\(^{128}\) Please, see: https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/about.htm?OpenForm.

\(^{129}\) “Mr. Nickolay Mladenov of Bulgaria was appointed by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as his Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and his Personal Representative to the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the Palestinian Authority in February 2015. In this capacity, Mr. Mladenov will be the Envoy of the Secretary-General to the Quartet.” Source: http://www.unsco.org/sc.asp. Last visit: 12/22/2015.

\(^{130}\) Please, see: http://www.unsco.org/Default.asp.

\(^{131}\) “The UN works for the creation of an independent State of Palestine living side-by-side in peace with the State of Israel, and a just, lasting and comprehensive resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions and international law”. Source: http://www.unsco.org/Default.asp. Last visit: 12/20/2015.


\(^{133}\) To access the material, please see: http://www.unsco.org/kscr.asp.

The United States, by their turn, represent another key agent in the history of the conflicts, since they have a central participation in the United Nations positions and are considered the strongest ally of Israel:

There's a depth and richness of this relationship that is expressed every day.... we have an enduring bond of values, interests, beginning with security and the way that we share both information and other things to help the common defense of our common interests... -Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu. (AICE webpage135)

But not only nations and organizations are part of it. Russia and US, as national entities, UN as an international organism, and EU, as a multinational political entity, formed in 2002 The Quartet on the Middle East136, making reference to a diplomatic agent involved in the peace process in the role of mediator.

By the Palestinian side, their political representation will centrally be the PLO and PA.

PLO – The Palestine Liberation Organization is the official organization representing Palestine/Palestinians in the negotiations and other political affairs.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was established in 1964 and has been the embodiment of the Palestinian national movement. It is a broad national front, or an umbrella organization, comprised of numerous organizations of the resistance movement, political parties, popular organizations, and independent personalities and figures from all sectors of life. The Arab Summit in 1974 recognized the PLO as the “sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people” and since then the PLO has represented Palestine at the United Nations, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (NAM), the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and in many other fora. In addition to its broad national and political goals, the PLO has dealt with numerous tasks with regard to the life of the Palestinian people (...). As such, the PLO is more than a national liberation movement striving to achieve the national goals of the Palestinian people, including the independence of the State of Palestine with

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135 ‘AICE’ refers to The American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, ‘established in 1993 as a nonprofit and nonpartisan organization to strengthen the U.S.-Israel relationship by emphasizing the fundamentals of the alliance — the values our nations share’. Please, see: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/about/index.shtml. Last visit: 12/23/2015.
136 Please, see last news: https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/47d4e277b48d9d3685256ddc00612265/053a5fa1401fb61e85257f1f00542b76?OpenDocument.
East Jerusalem as its capital. (Page of the Permanent Observer Mission of the State of Palestine to the UN NY\(^{137}\))

NAD\(^{138}\) – The Negotiation Affairs Department is the technical branch of PLO in charge of negotiations; they mainly provide legal advice for the Palestinian side\(^{139}\). In 2010, NAD announces\(^{140}\) their “institutionally merge” with NSU (the Negotiations Support Unit).

The PLO Negotiations Affairs Department (NAD) was established in 1994 in Gaza in order to follow up on the implementation of the Interim Agreement signed between Israel and the PLO. Until mid 2003 the NAD was headed by President Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), then Secretary-General of the PLO Executive Committee. After President Abbas was selected by the Palestinian Legislative Council in April 2003 to become the first Palestinian Prime Minister, Dr. Saeb Erekat, former Minister for Local Government and Chief Palestinian Negotiator was nominated as Head of the NAD by the PLO.

The NAD office in Gaza is composed of units responsible for Israeli affairs, Israel’s violations of signed agreements, Israel’s colonization (illegal settlement policies), and Palestinian refugees. The Ramallah office is responsible for following up on the Interim Agreements and preparing Palestinian positions for the Permanent Status talks with Israel. (Official website\(^{141}\))

PNA or simply PA - The Palestinian National Authority was founded in 1994 with the status of a five-year interim self-government body in view of a progressive autonomy of the Palestinian government. Officially, it represents the government of the State of Palestine\(^{142}\).

The Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was established in 1994 as an outcome of the Oslo peace process as the elected government. The PNA was established as a five year interim body to see over Palestinian affairs in the Occupied Territories. The PNA was created by and has historically been associated with, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), with whom Israel negotiated the Oslo Accords. However the PNA should not be confused with the PLO who continues to enjoy international recognition.


\(^{139}\) In order to read their stated goals, please see: [http://www.nad-plo.org/etemplate.php?id=182](http://www.nad-plo.org/etemplate.php?id=182).


\(^{142}\) On the status of Palestine at the UN, please see: [http://palestineun.org/status-of-palestine-at-the-united-nations/](http://palestineun.org/status-of-palestine-at-the-united-nations/).
as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, representing them at the United Nations and abroad. The PLO was established in 1964. (The official home page of Mission of Palestine in Denmark) 143

Fatah – A national political party representing the majority of PLO.

Hamas – A national political party.

These parties are rivals in internal conflicts144:

Fatah spokesman Osama Qawassmeh urged Hamas to halt its “secret talks” with Israel, saying this was a dangerous transgression of the higher national interests of the Palestinians.

Qawassmeh claimed that Hamas was negotiating with Israel over political issues, first and foremost the establishment of a separate Palestinian state in the Gaza Strip. Hamas responded to the allegations by denouncing Abbas as a “liar and slanderer.” His claims were aimed at creating confusion in the Palestinian arena, Hamas spokesman Fawzi Barhoum said. (The Jerusalem Post, 05/19/2015)145

There are other subgroups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine:

The Front says that the solution to the internal Palestinian crisis lies in the application of the Cairo agreement in 2005, not to reproduce the failed experiment itself under the name of ‘dialogue between Fateh and Hamas’ or ‘Palestinian reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas’! Why? Because this agreement came from a dialogue in which all national and Islamic forces participated and signed on in Egypt. This also emerged in a political initiative known as the Prisoners Document, which came from inside the prisons and was signed by all the forces, and blessed by the leaders of the prisoners’ movement. From here, the Front sees that this agreement is a fit beginning to restore national unity despite our reservations on some of its provisions.146

As observed by Bunton (2013), the conflict has a cyclical nature, where historical junctures, or the same arguments, are used both for advancing towards a potential resolution and motivating further conflicts.

143 Please, see: http://palestine.dk/palestine/government/.

144 And the internal conflict has already a relative long chronology; please, see recent events: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/09/west-bank-security-chaos-camps-palestinian-authority.html#.


136
Having accomplished the first part of the historical line of claims grounding the dispute, let us turn to a chronology of the peace talks.

Peace talks

In order to have access to a chronology of peace negotiation efforts, journalistic reports will be mentioned, since we can look after a communicative panorama, our focus here. *BBC News*, which is considered “the world’s largest broadcast news organization”\(^ {147} \), has published a historical line of the diplomatic dialogic events\(^ {148} \). Due to its reach, it is one of the main sources of dialogic actions, and consequently political ones, thus being also a crucial actor on the scenario. Through media’s speech and communicative acts, we can have access to an intentional (world of assumptions and propositional attitudes towards them) and practical (of many dimensions, as we have discussed) scenario, which is propagated:

**BBC News Line\(^ {149} \):**

1) UN Security Council Resolution 242, 1967
2) Camp David Accords, 1978\(^ {150} \) / The Camp David framework for the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel\(^ {151} \).
4) Oslo Agreement, 1993/ see also The Declaration of Principles signed by Israel and the PLO in 1993 (DOP)\(^ {152} \)
5) Camp David, 2000\(^ {153} \)
6) Taba, 2001
7) Arab Peace Initiative, 2002

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\(^ {150} \) Please, see: [http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/accords.phtml](http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/campdavid/accords.phtml).


\(^ {153} \) Please, see: [http://avalon.law.yale.edu/21st_century/mid028.asp](http://avalon.law.yale.edu/21st_century/mid028.asp). Last visit: 12/21/2015.
8) Roadmap, 2003  
9) Geneva Accord, 2003  
10) Annapolis, 2007  
11) Washington, 2010

We add here:

1) Cairo Agreement / Gaza–Jericho Agreement  
2) PLO End of Claims Non-Paper, 2010  
3) PLO Negotiations Office Media Brief, 2011  
4) See also: 30 September 2015, Letters sent to Secretary-General: 14 Sep, 17 Dec.

After this contextual background and considering the previous theoretical points, we will analyze a real episode of dialogue, of the type of negotiation, involving representatives of both sides. Our descriptive and explanatory account focus on dialogue agency. As we will see, both sides are represented by political groups, and the scenario is internationally considered a “peace process failure”, despite the agency of so many expert political agents. Centrally, we intend to show that the agency involved is not adequate for the role of “peace agents”, given that their agency is circumscribed to their goals. Consequently, an alternative process has to be considered for the needs at stake. We will offer such alternative in the next and final chapter.

154 Please, see: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2989783.stm. Last visit: 12/21/2015.  
155 Please, see: http://www.geneva-accord.org/mainmenu/english. Last visit: 12/21/2015.  
157 Please, see PLO Claims Resolution at: http://www.nad-plo.org/etemplate.php?id=139&more=1#.  
158 Please, see: http://www.nad-plo.org/userfiles/file/Non-Peper/End%20of%20Claims%20Non-Paper%202010.pdf.  
159 Please, see: http://www.nad-plo.org/userfiles/file/media%20brief/ICJ%20Anniversary%20-%20%E2%80%9CINJUSTICE%20CAN%20BE%20DISMANTLED%E2%80%9D.pdf.  
161 Please, see: http://palestineun.org/#sthash.prSwYyu.dpuf.  
162 Please, see: http://palestineun.org/category/mission-documents/identical-letters/.  
At a peace table: an analysis

In my 2010 book, *Il n’y aura pas d’Etat Palestinien* (There will be no Palestinian State\(^{164}\)), I concluded: “The peace process is a spectacle, a farce, played to the detriment of Palestinian reconciliation, at the cost of the bloodshed in Gaza.” Ziyad Clot

As discussed in the previous chapters, there are many levels of agency, and therefore of meaning interpretation. Accordingly, there is a connection between *assumptions* (as shared content or mutually manifest content) and speech acts inside a dialogic structure.

At the most basic level of the human cognitive agency, human individuals process the linguistic input inside this set of assumptions, the cognitive context or environment. This cognitive context embraces all information available to the individual, some are entertained by them, some are stored in their memory, and some others the individual is capable of deriving during interaction. Bio cognitive mechanisms, then, must work over mental states—representations and metarepresentations—via computational rules and a conceptual structure that enables agents to recognize each other inside categories.

Therefore, beliefs, feelings, desires, motivations and other intentional states interact with commitments and joint commitments, created by specific uses of language in the context of we-intentionality. By the manipulation of such states, relations among agents are created; relations among member of a group, between members of groups, between groups. We, as agents, entertain a set of assumptions characterized as our beliefs or positions. We then go to another level of interpretation. We recognize that, during interaction, humans, as agents, are goal-driven entities and must interpret the agency at stake, since this interpretation regulates cost-benefits calculations and direct evidence interpretation.

Let us illustrate this view considering a case. As we mentioned earlier, the negotiation dialogue under analysis is part of a material leaked by Al Jazeera English, a media company from Qatar. The project is called ‘The Palestine Papers’\(^{165}\) and is composed by more than 1,600 internal

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\(^{164}\) We can think of another title: ‘There will be no peace’, considering the background information available, where a self-governing state is both authorized and required.

\(^{165}\) Please, see: [http://www.aljazeera.com/palestinepapers/2011/01/201112214310263628.html](http://www.aljazeera.com/palestinepapers/2011/01/201112214310263628.html).
e high-level confidential documents related to the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations from 1999 to 2010, involving the PA/PLO, Israel and the USA.

In order to set the stage for the meeting minute, let us consider some key points. One of the sources of the confidential material is a technical staff who took part in the negotiation process by the side of Palestine\textsuperscript{166}. Ziyad Clot is a Palestinian descent lawyer involved in 2008 Annapolis negotiations between Israel and the PA. As stated by Ziyad Clot on The Guardian, on 14 May 2011\textsuperscript{167}, “By December 2008, instead of the establishment of a state in Palestine, I witnessed on TV the killing of more than 1,400 Palestinians in Gaza by the Israeli army”. This exemplifies the fact that instead of fulfilling the main condition for peace (claimed by one side), or the international law demand (claimed by the UN), or the implementation of agreements (bilateral and trilateral claims), other courses of action were decided and performed by the agents involved. Regarding the whole process, his position is that,

The “peace negotiations” were a deceptive farce whereby biased terms were unilaterally imposed by (…) Far from enabling a negotiated and fair end to the conflict, the pursuit of the Oslo process deepened (…) segregationist policies and justified the tightening of the security control imposed on the Palestinian population (…).

He mentions the contingent of agents directly affected by the conflicts, the ones said to be represented at the table of negotiations,

Far from maintaining a national cohesion, the process I participated in, albeit briefly, was instrumental in creating and aggravating divisions among Palestinians (…) these negotiations excluded for the most part the great majority of the Palestinian people: the seven million Palestinian refugees. My experience over those 11 months in Ramallah confirmed that the PLO, given its structure, was not in a position to represent all Palestinian rights and interests.

\textsuperscript{166} “My own experience with the "peace process" started in Ramallah, in January 2008, after I was recruited as an adviser for the negotiation support unit (NSU) of the PLO, specifically in charge of the Palestinian refugee file. That was a few weeks after a goal had been set at the Annapolis conference: the creation of the Palestinian state by the end of 2008. Only 11 months into my job, in November of that year, I resigned.” Source: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may/14/blew-the-whistle-about-palestine?CMP=twt_g.

\textsuperscript{167} Source: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may/14/blew-the-whistle-about-palestine?CMP=twt_g.
Not in the position of negotiator, he claims,

Tragically, the Palestinians were left uninformed of the fate of their individual and collective rights in the negotiations, and their divided political leaderships were not held accountable for their decisions or inaction.

These positions were expressed by an agent directly involved in the process. However, this is evidence of what other agents, out of “the peace process”, point out: the failure of the “peace talks”. Given the centrality of what is called “peace accords”, “peace building”, “peace efforts”, etc., we will consider the communicative agency involved.

“What is being said/agreed?”, “how and by whom?” and “at which level is the disagreement?” The “who” part aims at understanding the goals involved and by which type of agency. The “how” part is aimed at understanding the means, the communicative devices involved, and the effectiveness of the process, considering the existence of a cost-benefit calculation. Given the type of dialogue, the focus is not the “truth” over the statements at the table. We are interested in the bargain arena, assuming that at stake are “peace and its means”.

Meanwhile, we need to express the difficulty to interpret this history of negotiation dialogues since they involve a huge set of assumptions. Simple expressions such as “Two states for two people” or “land for peace” may convey more implicit content as it appears at first sight. These expressions represent positions at the table of negotiation, at which agreements, joint commitments, are bargaining chips. Consequently, each term of these expressions has its meaning under dispute. Which people? Only Palestinians? What do you mean by Palestinians? Since it involves allocation of resources, each term at the bargain table must be well-accorded. Decision-making depends on this, as we said.

Again, the use of the expression (content of a position) “two states for two people” implies “exactly two” and also “not one [state solution]” and “not three [state solution]”. That is the intended meaning to be bargained by the parties.

Let us move to the analysis of the negotiation dialogue, part of the 2005 Arab-Israeli peace talks. These reports represent two successive episodes of negotiation, and were chosen due to their centrality in the period of a government transition; the central one transcribes a follow up
meeting between negotiation leaders of both sides. It is a representative piece that can be used to ground points made so far and ones to be made.

Dialogue source/format: Meeting notes; primary source; secretive, documented top-level decision making in diplomacy and policymaking

Negotiation episode: Another preparatory meeting for the one between President Abbas and Prime Minister Sharon

Date of the document: February 14, 2005

Main goal assumed: Israeli-Palestinian peace process bargain

Description offered by Aljazeera:

These are minutes from a preparatory meeting, days after Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of 2005. It also includes a proposed draft written by the Israelis for ‘Israeli-Palestinian understanding’, which lists Israel’s topics for negotiation.

Agents: Group agents (PLO, PA, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Middle East and Peace Process Division, Israel, Palestine, Israelis, Palestinians), Members of groups (two or more of the same group) and representatives of groups (aforementioned)

Agents description

1. **Palestine: Group**

   Dr. Saeb Erekat (SE): Head of the delegation and senior representative of Group1 - Palestinian Authority's chief negotiator.

   Mohamad Dahlan (MD): Member of the delegation and representative of Group1.

   Habib Hazzan: Draftsman member of the delegation and representative of Group1.

Subgroup1 of Group1: PLO – Saeb Erekat is in the role of the main PLO negotiator.

Subgroup1 of Subgroup1 of Group1: NSU – Saeb Erekat is in the role of the head of NSU.

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168 The full dialogues under consideration follow attached.
Subgroup_2 of Subgroup_1 of Group_1: Fatah – Saeb Erekat is recognized as a member and a representative of Fatah. Mohamad Dahlan is also a member of Fatah, as a former leader of Fatah in Gaza.

2. Israel: Group_2

Dov Wiesglass (DW): Head of the delegation and senior representative of Group_2. He is also recognized as Ariel Sharon's senior adviser.\(^{171}\)

Amos Gilad (AG): Member of the delegation and representative of Group_2.

Shalom Tourgman: Draftsman member of the delegation and representative of Group_2.

Subgroup_1 of Group_2: Military – Amos Gilad is an Israeli Major General.

Subgroup_1 of Subgroup_1 of Group_2: Israel Defense Forces (IDF) – Amos Gilad represents Political-Military Affairs at the Ministry of Defense.

Mediator or moderator: None, bilateral dialogue.

Language of contact: English – the language used by both sides in negotiations.\(^{172}\)

**Presumed external interactional context:** In the context of a summit as “a meeting of heads of state or government, usually with considerable media exposure, tight security, and a prearranged agenda,”\(^{173}\) this negotiation is probably the first negotiation meeting after the summit\(^{174}\) held in Sharm el-Sheikh on February 8, 2005. There was a meeting days before the summit to agree over the terms and conditions, as stated by the Palestinian representatives “We can not go to summit before we agree this”, “there will be no negations in Sharm El Shiegel all has to be agreed before


\(^{173}\) Source: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Summit_(meeting)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Summit_(meeting)).

Given that this previous meeting happened at Crown Plaza Hotel in Tel Aviv on 03 February 2005, from 4:00 PM to 7:30 PM, the follow up meeting may have been held in similar circumstances.

There is the same number of delegation members in each delegation, Israel (3) and Palestine (3). Two of each team appears in the reported statements. The others two, one of each team, Habib Hazzan (Palestine/NSU), Shalom Tourgman (Israel), must be the officials in charge of drawing up the verbatim transcripts of the meeting. The material available is from the NSU office.

Events of the extrasituational context: The summit meeting held in Sharm el-Sheikh, a city in Sinai Peninsula was the first direct negotiation meeting between Abbas and Sharon, in the presence of President Mubarak from Egypt and King Abdullah II from Jordan.

It was decided that all Palestinians would stop all acts of violence against all Israelis, and Israel would cease all its military activity against all Palestinians. (AICE web page)

Expectations published on the media

“Analysts said there had been false dawns in the Middle East peace process before, but it was hoped that today's summit might in future be seen as a historic turning point.”

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176 This method is due to some requirements made by parties in the negotiations: “After the breakdown of the Camp David talks, which Clinton and Israeli leaders blamed on Yasser Arafat and a lack of technical Palestinian preparation, Palestinian leaders went to great lengths to ensure that the fullest records and supporting documents were drawn up for later talks. Among NSU staff, the Arab-American lawyer Zeinah Salahi drew up many of the meeting records, while others were made by the French-Palestinian lawyer Ziyad Clot, author of a book about the negotiations, Il n'y aura pas d'Etat Palestinien (There will be no Palestinian state).” Source: [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/23/story-behind-leaked-palestine-papers](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/23/story-behind-leaked-palestine-papers).
179 “Today's meeting was the first high-level direct negotiation between the two sides since the start of the intifada in September 2000, during which time more than 4,500 people have been killed.”
180 It followed the death of the Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat and the election of Abbas. It aimed at stopping the wave of four-year violent attacks and counter attacks from both sides known, episode known as ‘Al-Aqsa Intifada’.
182 Please, see: [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/feb/08/israel4](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/feb/08/israel4). All the following quotes refer to this report.
Prospects published on the media

“The prospect of more meetings was raised with one Israeli official, Gideon Meir, revealing that Mr. Sharon had invited Mr. Abbas to visit him at his ranch in southern Israel. A Palestinian official said the meeting would take place soon.”

Joint commitments published on the media

“Sharon and Abbas agree ceasefire.”

“[T]he two leaders said they were committed to a truce and seizing the best opportunity in years to secure peace.”

“Mr. Abbas: ‘We have agreed on halting all violent actions against Palestinians and Israelis, wherever they are.’”

“Mr. Sharon made a similar statement, saying that the two men had agreed that Israel ‘will cease all its military activity against all Palestinians everywhere’.”

“The Palestinian militant group Hamas tempered hopes by saying it would not be bound by the ceasefire but did not pledge to immediately break it, saying it would monitor developments. Sami Abu Zuhri, a Hamas spokesman in the Gaza Strip, said the group would sit down with Mr. Abbas when he returns to ‘declare our position.’”

“Mr. Abbas and Mr. Sharon said that, in the future, a Palestinian state would exist alongside Israel.”

“Mr. Sharon said hundreds of Palestinian prisoners would be released, and added that he was committed to his plans to withdrawal from the Gaza Strip.”

“Mr. Abbas said: ‘It is about time the Palestinians get a free and independent state ... it is about time our people have their peace and live their lives normally like every other country.’”

“Referring to Sharm el-Sheik's nickname - the city of peace - he added: ‘A new opportunity for peace is born today in the city of peace ... let's pledge to protect it’.”

“Speaking directly to the Palestinian people, Mr. Sharon said: ‘I assure you that we have a genuine intention to respect your rights to live independently and in dignity.’”

“Mr. Abbas said he expected the ceasefire pledges to pave the way for resumption of talks on so-called ‘final status’ issues such as borders, refugees and Jerusalem's status.”
“A number of joint committees will be established and both leaders said future negotiations would be under the aegis of the 2002 road map peace plan, which is backed by the US, Russia, the UK, the EU and the UN but has been stalled.”

Considering this background, let us turn now to the February 14 2005 negotiation dialogue.

SEmemberGroup1: I was informed today of the proceedings of the commanders level meeting for handover of Jericho. There is a major problem since the Army is rejecting the agreements we reached in this forum and refuses to lift the checkpoints.

The Army is rejecting the removal of the DCO checkpoint on Route 90 and the cement roadblock on the Northern exit of Jericho on Route 90. They agreed to remove Aim Dyok checkpoint but they however want to erect a new checkpoint 900 meters away which will change nothing.

For the purpose of exposition, we will target levels of description and explanation, from linguistic acts to communicative or even diplomatic acts. Considering a goal-driven dialogic exchange, we will focus on moves by the part of the speaker, who has goals to be achieved, as well as on the other agents’ reactions, in the form of replies and follow ups, based on agents’ interpretation of the acts in the dialogue. The groups are assumed to be rivals in the negotiation, i.e. they dispute resources, thus having opposite practical goals; however, they take part on the same cooperative dialogic efforts, in order to reach agreement over content at the end of the dialogue. In the flow of these cooperative dialogic acts, cognitive disagreement over assumptions may emerge as a result of the practical disagreement. Accordingly, we will first illustrate one possible intentional formation of a course of dialogic action, and then describe a chain of acts put forward/agreed/represented by the agents.

Hence, we assume action-reaction as the basic unit of dialogic action, following Weigand (2010). By means of moves, negotiators are “moving toward the fulfillment of a collective conversational goal (Walton 1998, 30)” (Macagno and Walton, 2013: 206), in this case an agreement. Moreover, we consider along with Rauen (2014) that human cognition is guided by a goal or conclusion such that the emergence of premises for interpretation, or grounding the
choice of actions, corresponds to the most relevant hypotheses in the context of a goal and its subgoals. Human agents, thus, formulate hypotheses that best fit their goals \textit{qua} agents. Let us illustrate this process considering the scenario abovementioned.

\textit{Goal-driven dialogic action description:}

Abductive reasoning is assumed to regulate agents’ choices over courses of interpretation and action, passing by the following steps:

\textbf{1\textsuperscript{st} stage: Designing the (internal) goal:}  
An individual \(i\) [qua agent of a certain type] designs a goal \(Q\) at the time \(t_1\).

Given the type of dialogue under consideration, we assume that a whole sequence of goals is previously entertained by the agents. Macagno and Walton (2013: 206) emphasize the relation between agents’ goal and agents’ roles to define the type of the dialogue, as a set of prototypical dialectical contexts. We also assume it the other way around, that the roles define the agency and consequently the goals involved in an interaction.

In our proposal we consider a trichotomy of basic agency-types that instantiate agency-tokens. Given expectations about these agents-type, as well as assumptions about token agents, negotiators may consider adequate types of acts, propositions, sentences, and word choices. It seems to be a top-down process, from goals to the means, if we consider that the practical goals or “the global purpose of the dialogue” are guiding the actions. “[T]he global goal of the dialogue determines the local goal of the interlocutors’ specific moves made as speech acts, like asking a question or putting forward an argument (Macagno 2008)” (Macagno and Walton, 2013: 206).

In this context, epistemic agency, provides adequate means to fulfill those goals, in such a way that epistemic goals are relevant subgoals, since agents need to have adequate means. That is, the agents involved have previously deliberated about the goals and the means in order to achieve the goals. The agenda they bring is then a result of both, inner group deliberation and
intergroup deliberation. Consequently, the agenda is composed by positions, and the speech act-types are declarations and reports (statements).

Here we can either assume a chain of goals or a hierarchy of subgoals in order to achieve one major dialogic goal:

2° stage: Formulating at least one ante-factual abductive hypothesis to achieve goal \( Q \):

The individual \( i \) [qua agent of a certain type] abducts an ante-factual hypothesis \( H_o \) to achieve the goal \( Q \) at the time \( t_2 \).

Note that there are restrictions over dialogic action candidates due to expectations over highly-institutionalized negotiation dialogues, in the form of protocols (common ground assumptions, joint commitments, etc.). As a result, those restrictions may affect the hypotheses to be activated. We can assume that each linguistic act contributes to a move in the dialogue. In view of that, the agents stop acting linguistically when they think their goal was achieved. The communicative or higher-order goals will be achieved only if the target effects are obtained—and the agents will rely on evidence provided in the sequence of the dialogue.

In Rauen’s proposal (2014), the regulation operating over the formulation of hypotheses is imposed by a principle of probability (i.e. the antecedent action is admitted as at least probably sufficient to achieve the consequent state) as well as by a principle of relevance (assuming a cognitive direction of lowest processing cost faced with the fixed effect projected by the consequent state \( Q \)). Moreover, the decision-making over multiple hypotheses involves the additional assumption that this is “the best plausible” act “to achieve the consequent state \( Q \).”\(^{183}\) Therefore, we may have the following chain of intentional states,

\[ Q, I, as \ the \ leading \ negotiator \ and \ representative \ of \ the \ group \ (G) \ accompanied \ by \ two \ members \ (M) \ of \ G \ [we], \ want \ to \ negotiate \ our \ peace \ agreement \ requirements, \ address \ some \ violations \ of \ joint \ commitments, \]

\(^{183}\) In his paper, Rauen illustrates the emergency of “at least one ante-factual abductive hypothesis”. We can think of a scenario in which the agent creates or put into discussion many hypotheses, such that they choose the best one given restrictions. Centrally, we should consider those restrictions imposed during dialogic situation.
accommodate the other part’s objections and finally agree on future joint actions to be subject to final approval by the part of Abbas and Sharon in the next meeting;

(Internal [shared] Goals\textsuperscript{184})

2. P – Q If we perform a set of\textsuperscript{185} speech acts by means of a set of linguistic-acts composed by a set of vocabulary choices, then we will achieve our goals (G’s goals represented by M’s goals);

(ante-factual hypothesis formation)

3. P I design we performing this set of speech acts by means of a set of linguistic-acts composed by a set of vocabulary choices;

(Internal Subgoal)

4. O – P If we perform some members of this set of speech acts by means of a set of linguistic-acts composed by a set of vocabulary choices, then we will perform the intended acts;

(ante-factual hypothesis formation)

5. O I design we performing members of this set; (Internal Subgoal)

6. M We perform members of this set; (Action)

7. O’ Members of this set are performed; (External Subgoal O Achievement)

8. P’ We perform a set of speech acts by means of a set of linguistic-acts composed by a set of vocabulary choices; (External Subgoal P Achievement)

9. Q’ We negotiate our peace agreement requirements, address some violations of joint commitments, accommodate the other part’s objections and finally agree on future joint actions.

(External Goal Q Achievement)

Or more schematically, as suggested by Rauen\textsuperscript{186}:

\begin{align*}
\text{[1]} & \quad \text{Q} \quad \text{Negotiating a deal, G;} \quad \text{Practical Goal} \\
\text{[2]} & \quad \text{P – Q} \quad \text{If we present proposals of joint commitments, then we will negotiate a deal;} \\
\text{[3]} & \quad \text{P} \quad \text{Presenting proposals of joint commitments;} \quad \text{Practical Intention} \\
\text{[4]} & \quad \text{O – P} \quad \text{If we inform the other G, then we will present proposals of joint commitments;} \\
\text{[5]} & \quad \text{O} \quad \text{Informing proposals of joint commitments, G;} \quad \text{Informative Intention}
\end{align*}

\textsuperscript{184} Let us remember that \textit{internal goals} are “mental representations of desired states” projected on the future, and \textit{external goals} are “states of the environment” or effects that represent goals achievements, as a result of the action. Given that we assume a picture of we-intentionality, we maintain the “internal goal” terminology. This refers to individuals’ cognition “\textit{qua} members of a group G”. G’s goals are conveyed by institutional positions, which represent joint commitments by the part of the members of G. This is implied by their membership, since acceptance of their goals is a requirement of membership, as we have previously discussed.

\textsuperscript{185} We do not know how precise the individual objects of these sets are. The agents may precise which speech acts are necessary, which linguistic acts (utterances) are required and which terms must appear or not appear. This is left open here given insufficient evidence by our part.

\textsuperscript{186} In his evaluation of this work. This is an adaptation of his suggestions.
If we communicate, then we will inform the other G about proposals of joint commitments;

Communicating proposals of joint commitments; Communicative Intention

G communicates proposals of joint commitments;

G informs the other G about proposals of joint commitments;

G presents proposals of joint commitments;

G negotiates a deal.

Let us assume the agent has as main target the above mentioned general goals. The agent, then, chooses among the options available, which were also previously entertained, given the predictability of the interaction. As Searle (2010) argues, between forming intentions, choosing a course of action, starting the performance of the act and completing it, there are many gaps. Taking this into consideration, let us observe the chain of linguistic acts that were the chosen ones, at the stage of action implementation:

(1) Linguistic act$_1$ - I was informed today of the proceedings of the commanders$^{11}$ level meeting for handover of Jericho.$^{187}$

(2) Linguistic act$_2$ - There is a major problem since the Army is rejecting the agreements we reached in this forum and refuses to lift the checkpoints.

(3) Linguistic act$_3$ - The Army is rejecting the removal of the DCO checkpoint on Route 90 and the cement roadblock on the Northern exit of Jericho on Route 90.

(4) Linguistic act$_4$ - They agreed to remove Aim Dyok checkpoint but they however want to erect a new checkpoint 900 meters away which will change nothing.

Let us contextualize these acts inside a more specific chain of intentional states, as suggested by Rauen$^{188}$:

Q Negotiating a deal, G; Practical Goal

If we highlight violations, then we will negotiate a deal;

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$^{188}$ In his evaluation of this work. This is an adaptation of his suggestions.
[3] P Highlighting violations of joint commitments; Practical Intention 1
[4] O – P If we highlight check points issues, then we will highlight violations;
[5] O Highlighting violations of check points on Route 90; Practical Intention 2
[6] N – O If we inform problems with the removal of check points, then we will highlight violations;
[7] N Informing problems with the removal of check points; Informative Intention
[8] M – N If we communicate problems with the removal of check points, then we will inform problems with the removal of check points;
[9] M Communicating problems with the removal of check points; Communicative Intention
[10] M’ I, as a M, communicate problems with the removal of check points;
[11] N’ I, as a M, inform problems with the removal of check points;
[12] O’ I, as a M, highlight problems with the removal of check points;
[13] P’ I, as a M, highlight violations of joint commitments;
[14] Q’ G negotiates a deal.

Given that, the negotiator who listens to this set of acts may represent the internal moves as the following: By means of (1), the representative of the group 1 introduces a topic by mentioning an event, in indication of its importance to the negotiation. By means of (2), the agent declares that there is a problem, a ‘major’ one, followed by the declaration of its reasons. By means of (3), the agent reports or informs facts. By means of (4), the agent continues the exposition and declares that the agents’ intentions are in conflict with past commitments.

This negotiator may consider that, since the content of the declarations are related to the agent’s concerns as a member of the opposite group mentioned, but with common goals as negotiators and with previous joint commitments, he then needs to react appropriately to this move. The best hypothesis he formulates then is that the speaker is requesting him to explain the practical moves in contradiction with joint commitments or to agree in solving the problem, or both.

We should not forget that the same dialogic move can have many interpretations; even if assumptions about the type of dialogue constrains the options, considering, for example, that an agent may be ‘putting forth an intention or goal in a negotiation’ and not simply reporting a fact (even though both can be done by means the same speech act or even the same linguistic act;
see Macagno and Walton, 2013). (1) illustrates this aspect of communication.

As a consequence of the consideration of some of these assumptions, the agent chooses a course of reaction, in this case the following:

\[ \text{AGmemberGroup2}: \text{There is a meeting today at 10:00 PM between Mofaz and the Chief of Staff and the Jordan valley commander. I will participate in this meeting and we will discuss this. It is my understanding of the agreements reached in this forum that the checkpoints and road blocks will be lifted. I do not know what happened but we will try to sort it out tonight.} \]

This dialogic move is the chosen reaction to the previous action, based on an inferential relevance-oriented calculation, constrained by general expectations or ‘presumptions’ (see, for example, Levinson, 2000). We adopt the view that there are general dialogic expectations, some innate, some cultural-driven, some situational-driven, in addition to linguistic-driven expectations regarding the use of language. However, regulating these expectations, I assume innate rational cognitive principles. By a relevance-theoretic perspective, though, “the intended import of a communicative act is not inferred on the basis of general maxims or principles, but on the basis of a presumption of the relevance of that specific act, which is communicated by the act itself without being part of its interpretation” (Sperber and Wilson, 2015: 141).

Having as evidence the agent’s reaction, let us analyze the hypotheses the agent may have constructed.

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189 A specific action may be presumed to be associated with a specific intention (Macagno and Walton, 2013), whose metarepresentation guides and is guided by a cost-benefit calculation. For Macagno and Walton (2013), agents can breach some presumptions, because they presume that the hearer will rely on a higher-level of presumptions.

190 Such as the principle of relevance: roughly, that agent’s cognition is guided both by the maximization of relevance (cognitive) and a presumption of relevance by the part of an agents’ stimuli (communicative), considering a direction of less cognitive cost and greater cognitive benefit (Sperber and Wilson, 1986, 1995). The principle of coherence: roughly, that agents expect consistency among agents’ acts, as well as human plausible reasoning mental models (Collins, 1978a, 1978b; Polya, 1968; Rauen, 2014).
(5) Linguistic act\textsubscript{5} - **There is a meeting today** at 10:00 PM between Mofaz and the Chief of Staff and the Jordan valley commander.

(6) Linguistic act\textsubscript{6} - I will **participate** in this meeting and we **will discuss this**.

(7) Linguistic act\textsubscript{7} - It is my **understanding** of the agreements reached in this forum that the checkpoints and road blocks will be lifted. I do not know what happened **but we will try to sort it out tonight**.

It seems that the agent understood not only the **request for action** but also the **request for explanation**. The reaction starts by what is probably considered the most relevant of the requests, the request for action.

Note that, since the agent cannot be committed to the **assertion that** \( p \), he performs another act with a different illocutionary force \( F: F(p) \),

It is my understanding of the agreements reached in this forum that (**the checkpoints and road blocks will be lifted**).

This may be used to mitigate a possible wrong move by the part of G\textsubscript{2}, which would imply the confirmation of a commitment violation. The agent, then, states that he does not ‘**know what happened but**’ they ‘**will try to sort it out tonight**’. This is evidence of collective agency and shared intentionality, where AG acts \( qua \) M, representing G. The agent does not dispute the truth of the propositions put forward by SE. At the same time, he mitigates a further claim for action: ‘we will **try** to sort it out tonight’.

Consequently, the agent who listens to the flow of linguistic moves constructs hypotheses about them as part of a dialogic, negotiation tactic. Each part of the move may equally pass through abductive calculation. For instance, the coordinating conjunction ‘and’ can be used to express different relations, such as aggregation or conjoining of objects, like in (5) and (7), and of events, like in (6). Besides interpreting internal elements of the move, it is required to interpret each move as a whole, in order to represent higher order dialogic objects, such as diplomatic
tactics. The chosen acts, by the part of the negotiators, are the following:

\[ \text{DWmemberGroup2: This is my understating too. But now it is at the Minister's level and he knows and is informed what we agreed here. Hopefully it will be sorted out.} \]

‘This is my understating too’, in this chain of acts means there is no dispute of meaning regarding the propositions declared. ‘My’ here refers to ‘a Member of G\textsubscript{2}’. It is a follow up act. ‘Now’ refers to the period of time of the current negotiations. ‘The Minister’ refers to the chief member and representative of G\textsubscript{2}. ‘But now it is at the Minister's level’ is evidence of constraints of practical agency, given the hierarchy imposing power of decision-making. ‘He knows’ means the Minister is informed about the facts. At the same time, this move reinforces DW’ and the other members’ performance of informing the Minister, since they are the group members in charge of it. ‘Hopefully’ mitigates the commitment, since it changes the illocutionary force: \textit{Hopefully (p)}. Again, they imply they are not in a position to assert \textit{p}. This leave the chain of commitments open once again, since the decision-making ‘is at the Minister’s level’ and consequently depends on \textit{the objectives of G\textsubscript{2} as viewed by this representative of G}\textsuperscript{191}.

As Atkinson \textit{et al.} (2013: 109) states, “As the dialogues proceed, agents become committed both to objective facts and to the subjective positions as to the criteria they will use to determine acceptability”. Here we can clearly see “the precise commitments agents enter into” by using these speech acts.

\[ \text{[NOTE: THERE WAS NOT COMMITMENT TO REMOVE ALL CHECKPOINTS BUT THE ISSUE WAS KEPT FOR REVIEW AT ISRAELI INTERNAL CYCLES.]} \]

\textsuperscript{191} As part of a supposed declaration by the part of a speaker of the PNA in Europe. Source: \url{https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israeli_disengagement_from_Gaza#Fatah.E2.80.93Hamas_conflict}, “As Leila Shahid, speaker of the PNA in Europe declared, the sole fact of carrying out the plan unilaterally already showed that the plan was only thought of according to the objectives of Israel as viewed by Sharon”
This note was probably written by the Palestinian in charge of the transcripts. It implies that a commitment was at stake, but not exactly the one assumed at that negotiation table. This is a contributing fact and possibly a hidden declaration intending to be directed at his group.

\textbf{MDmemberGroup1}: The fugitives and deportees committee was also informed that there are 6 deportees with "blood on their hands" that will not be allowed to come back. This is again contradicting all the agreements we reached so far.

This reaction is composed by the performance of a \textit{declaration}, which serves for the indirect speech act of \textit{informing}, the content of which conveys states of affairs that are not in accordance with the agents’ expectations, due to previous joint commitments by the form of agreements among subgroups of $G_1$ and $G_2$. By means of the word choice ‘again’ an additional claim of agreement violations by the part of $G_2$ is put forward. Considering a requirement store, as a set of mutually manifest requirements, this would add one more element to it. This move also advances towards the possible final goal of the dialogue, in view of the fact that all of them want a good deal (due to groups’ internal commitments).

\textbf{DWmemberGroup2}: I agree. We agreed that all deportees return. Some might be included in the fugitives arrangements but they can return to their home towns.

This reaction expresses the agent’s agreement over (the \textit{declaration} of) the existence of contradiction of agreements reached so far. Since it is necessary to establish a clear common ground, the agent \textit{states} ‘We agreed that all deportees return”, as the previous move implied. What comes next may add more commitments to a commitment store. ‘Some’ quantifies over ‘deportees’ and the word choice ‘might’ express the type of mitigation by modality, the one the agent chooses or is able to be committed with. ‘Fugitives arrangements’ implies the existence of previous joint commitments regarding fugitives, and the linguistic act ‘but they can return to their
home towns’ is used to inform the existence of some sort of flexibility over the restrictions they impose. ‘They’ refer to Palestinians in the condition of ‘fugitives’, representing members of a subgroup of G₁.

\textit{AGmemberGroup2: This is my understanding as well. I will communicate with the committees members.}

This move is a follow up speech act by a member of the same subgroup of G₂. The agent expresses his commitment to the acceptance of the declarations of the member of his group. He, then, commitments himself to a future course of action, a communicative one. As long as we can identify, there is no assertion of stronger commitments to attend the requirements under considerations at the table.

\textit{DWmemberGroup2: What we want to discuss today is reactivating the committees and structure them. We want immediate action.}

This subsequent act by the part of a member of the same group changes the course of the negotiation dialogue. The agent externalizes a specific goal by the part of his group of negotiators, as opposed to the proposed goals of the other side of the table. The first speech act mitigates the second, though,

\begin{align*}
\text{What we want to discuss today is (x)} \\
\text{We want (immediate action)}
\end{align*}

Together, they imply that today discussing is a means or a subgoal to achieve final goals. The whole move represents a requirement of joint action that must be accepted or not. Like the others, it is an ‘objective move’ – in the sense of ‘epistemically objective’ proposed by Searle,
referring to the fact that all the agents involved can evaluate the act as being or not the case (instead of being dependent on any particular value judgment over facts).

From what follows in the transcriptions, the other group accepted the proposed course of action. The following structure is present in the transcripts:

After short discussion the following committees were agreed.

1. Higher Liaison C.: Sharon - Abbas
   a. Steering and Monitoring c.: Weisglass - Erekat
      i. Higher Security C. Mofaz - Dahlan ?
      1. Fugitives and Deportees C.
      2. Handover Coordination C.
      3. Intelligence Cooperation C.
      4. Police Cooperation C.
   
      ii. Prisoners C.: Israeli Side: Livni, Ezzra, Nazeh, Ben Elyezer
          Palestinian Side: Abe El Razek, Kadora Faris, Karake, Hazzan.
          iii. Civil Affairs Committee (CAC) Mishleb - Tarifi

The Israelis then suggested the following committees and the following names to head the Israeli side on them (All ministers):

    iv. Trade and Economics - Olmert
    v. Labor - Olmert
    vi. Incitement - Shalom
    vii. People to People - Shalom
    viii. Regional Development and other Civil Issues - Peres
    ix. Law Enforcement - Livni
    x. Legal Corporation - Livni
    xi. Health- Naveh
    xii. Agriculture - Katz
    xiii. Telecom - Itzik
    xiv. Water and Environment - Ben Eleyezer

We would like to point out here the order of presentation of the committees, since they are means for ‘peace achievement’ and consequent improvement of the quality of humans’ lives in
the region. The committees whose names imply a goal of approaching people’ issues are: Civil Affairs Committee (CAC), People to People, Regional Development and other Civil Issues, Water and Environment. Security seems to be the central concern, given both the order and the high-command staff recruited. These may be related to the major goals of the groups or subgroups involved.

The dialogue continues as follows:

**SEmemberGroup1**: *We do not want to form anymore committees before the tangibles of Sharm El Shiekh summit are felt. Prisoners release, redeployment etc. We also need to form our new government before we name members of committees. After government is formed you will have an answer on all the suggested committees not agreed in Sharm.*

The move of the member of G₁ is a reaction to the one put forward by the member of G₂. ‘We do not want (p), where p here stands for to form anymore committees. Considering that the formation of committees was declared to be a central practical (sub)goal of one side, this move implies a change in the diplomatic arena. This move is a refusal of the joint action proposal just made. This seems to be explained by the practical disagreement. Members of Group₁ presented requirements that the other group did not want to fulfill, i.e. prisoners release, redeployment etc. On the other hand, members of G₂ made a request for a course of action that the other side does not want to pursue, without having their own previous requested being attended.

**Atkinson et al., 2013: 112**

At this point, the major goal of a deal is at stake. The member of G₁ then, presents relevant internal needs that would justify the refusal of the proposed course of action, ‘We also need to form our new government before we name members of committees’—here we have different sets of definite descriptions pointed by ‘we’—Finally the agent puts forward a commitment to a future
position on the matter (‘you will have an answer’).

**We**Palestinians

That is, after the fulfillment of a practical goal [government formation] then the members would deliver an ‘answer on all the suggested committees not agreed in Sharm [by the negotiators]’.

**DW**memberGroup2: We need procedure, phone numbers coordinator or point of contact for each committee. We will not allow you to slow down the peace process.

This move deserves attention, given its relevance to the negotiation and its implication for the agency involved in the peace process.

[1] **We**membersofGroup2 need procedure.

[2] The procedure was required by us before.

[3] **We**membersofGroup2 need procedure in the form of phone numbers, coordinator or point of contact for each committee.

[4] **We**membersofGroup2 will not allow you membersofGroup2 to slow down the peace process.

Move number [4] implies that members of G2 assume that members of G1 want to slow down the peace process. However, this move contradicts the strong expectation that G1 and its subgroups are the most interested ones in being fully engaged in hurrying up the peace process, and not in slowing it down. This move only makes sense if any subgroup of G1 has divergent goals of the ones (self) ascribed to G1. Moreover, given the structure of the dialogue, where a follow up by a member of the same group would be expected, and given the fact the indication of the speaker
is duplicated, we think it may be an annotation mistake (there is another case in the transcript). At least, this is our hypothesis, given the extrasituational information that DW was (said to be) publically committed to slowing down the peace process\textsuperscript{192}. This is a central evidence of the agent’s goals and commitments in the negotiation process.

\textit{DWmemberGroup2: Once security responsibility is handed over in Ramallah the prime minister wants to visit Abu Mazen in Ramallah. Next meeting should take place in Ramallah.}

DW is here committed to an indirect speech act. The agent speaks on behalf of another agent of the same group, higher in the hierarchy, saying that, conditioned to some changes in environment (final goals), the Prime Minister wants to visit Mahmoud Abbas (“Abu Mazen”) in the place in which security responsibility is handed over. The act can be potentially interpreted as a request, due to the dialogue constraints applied so far.

\textit{SEmemberGroup1: On behalf of our President and PM I say that we welcome him in Ramallah.}

SE interprets the indirect speech act and reacts. Given his reaction, we can construct the hypothesis that SE interpreted the previous move as a request for invitation:

\textit{[On behalf of our President and PM] I declare that (we welcome him in Ramallah).}

\textsuperscript{192} “The significance of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace process,’ Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s senior adviser Dov Weisglass has told Haaretz.” Ari Shavit Oct 06, 2004 12:00 AM on: \url{http://www.haaretz.com/top-pm-aide-gaza-plan-aims-to-freeze-the-peace-process-1.136686}. “‘And when you freeze that process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, and you prevent a discussion on the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem. Effectively, this whole package called the Palestinian state, with all that it entails, has been removed indefinitely from our agenda. And all this with authority and permission. All with a presidential blessing and the ratification of both houses of Congress.’” read more: \url{http://www.haaretz.com/top-pm-aide-gaza-plan-aims-to-freeze-the-peace-process-1.136686}. 
The ‘welcoming’ move does not commit these agents in having any individual’s positive feelings towards the agent in question, since these are not relevant states at this negotiation table. Probably this move targets ‘no confrontation’, being directed towards less cost or greater benefit.

*DWmemberGroup2: Regional economic development will mainly focus on Gaza since it is a worldwide effort.*

*As far as the health committee is concerned. The Prime Minister gave direct instructions to facilitate treatment in Israel for all Palestinian needing it especially for children.*

At this point, the negotiation goes back to the topic of ‘committees’. ‘Regional economic development’ refers to a committee. It ‘will mainly focus on Gaza since it is a worldwide effort’. This *declaration* makes clear that the practical act under consideration is politically motivated. ‘As far as the health committee is concerned’ has the role of restricting the agency. ‘The Prime Minister gave direct instructions’ is evidence of the hierarchy they should obey as members of G and that he speaks on behalf of another agent, in charge of the decision-making. The word choice ‘to facilitate’ entails ‘to make it possible or easier for something to happen’ and implies ‘the states of the matter are difficult ones; additionally, this claim is weaker than if the word choice was ‘to provide’.

The reasoning calculations here involve considerations about the people’s agency in the situation. There is an appreciation of the following cyclical process:

1. **Internal group agreement (joint commitments) considering internal negotiation and hierarchy.**

2. **Representatives’ negotiation (they report [1] and establish new joint commitments) considering external negotiation and powers of decision-making for action.**

3. **Internal group agreement (they report [2] and establish new joint commitments)**
considering both internal and external negotiation and powers of decision-making for action.

The point is that, in [3], the agents in charge, of high command, may not consider [2], violating joint commitments accorded with the representatives. Since the high command is not directly committed, only indirectly, these violations may be represented as having low cost.

SEmemberGroup1: Another issue is the weapons, cars etc. taken from the PA Police in 2002 - Defensive Shield.

SE, then, reacts by introducing a new topic for negotiation. ‘Another issue [to be discussed here]’ ‘is the weapons, cars, etc. taken from the PA Police in 2002 – [in occasion of the Operation] Defensive Shield’193.

This move changes the current course of negotiation by adding another set of demands. It implies the following chain:

[1] This issue is a problem for us.
[2] We expect you to solve the problem.
[3] Solving the problem is finding the weapons, cars etc.
[4] There are agents who have the capacity to find them.
[5] You represent agents who have the capacity to find them.
[6] We ask you to talk to these agents to find them.
[7] You can agree to find them, since this is our request in this negotiation.

AG memberGroup2: We cannot find them. Most were destroyed in the battle field.

AG understands the chain of intentional states conveyed by the act but he negates step [4], and consequently, further steps. He chooses to justify his position (requirements negation) in virtue of claiming the objects under consideration were already destroyed.

SEmemberGroup1: Tirawi? I urge you to find a solution.

The member of G₁ continues to ask about agreed commitments. This behavior may be grounded in the following chain (Tawfiq Tirawi refers to the Chief of the PA General Intelligence service - GIS):

[1] The shared goal as negotiators is sealing a deal.
[2] I am in the position to make demands by the part of G₁ and its subgroups.
[3] It was the groups’ joint commitment to attend our request about Tirawi.

[We bring data from the previous meeting to contextualize the relevant previous step of the negotiation:

(Dov Wiesglass (DW): We know the Palestinians are spending efforts but we are shivering because of the summit. Palestinians have to act strongly and visibly to stop acts of terror. Sooner or later something will happen and our ability to give up things [is?] a function of PA achievements on security. We just came from a 4 [h]our meeting of the Israeli cabinet which was very stormy and the cabinet has decided the following:

6. Tawfik Tirawi and Rasheed Abu Shbak - lifting all transportation limitations on them but

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Tirawi can not head a security organization dealing of facing Israel.)

[...]

SE: That is why there is a committee established at the summit according to all agreements we had in the past. You changes[*] your position on Tirawi, he must be able to head a PA security body and deal with Israel.)

[4] Your group did not attend our request made in the table of negotiations.

[5] I then URGE you to find a solution, since weaker requests were not attended.

*DW*memberGroup2: We are still looking into it, the answer so far is no.

The reaction of DW is then made by means of a statement regarding current state of affairs: ‘We are still looking into it’. ‘We’, here, may refer to members of a subgroup or of G2. ‘The answer [of G2] [to you request] so far is no’ is used as a direct answer\(^{196}\) to the request, given the appropriate reply was a matter of yes/no answer.

*SE*memberGroup1: Qassam Barghouti? You told us here that he was to be released, we got back to our people and told them and you retracted.

This move by SE also conveys a chain of assumptions and is composed by many sub external goals:

[1] [I, as M, ask about the case of] Qassam Barghouti\(^ {197}\).

[2] You [as M] told us [in the previous meeting] that he was to be released, as a group position.

\(^{196}\) For more about ‘non-answers’ in political dialogues, please see Berlin (2007).

[In [2], the agent refers to point 5 of the list presented by DW in the previous meeting,

5 Prisoners: We responded to PA request 900 prisoners + 2 from a list of 6 personally submitted by Abu Mazen (Qassam Barghouti, Abed El Nasser Abu Aziz)]

[3] Since you stated that, we then assumed that it was the case, for the group as a whole, that Barghouti was to be released.

[4] We, therefore, assumed you would act accordingly.

[5] Then we got back to our people and [then we] told them so.

[6] Since we stated that as negotiators, they assumed that Barghouti was to be released.

[7] They assumed that it was a deal.

[8] Therefore, they assumed you would act accordingly.


[10] Therefore, they will assume that someone lied about the fact.

[11] Since WE represent them here and as a group of negotiators, we will have to explain to them what happened to break this chain of joint commitments.

[12] Since YOU did not act accordingly, changing your position, you will have to explain what happened to break this chain of joint commitments.

“[O]nce a certain point is reached in discussion”, Gilbert (1987: 192) argues, “a given view is established as the group view. It remains the group view, ceteris paribus, even if everyone subsequently comes to have a different opinion personally”. We can say that in negotiations, as a given view is established as a commitment, it should or is expected to remain as a joint commitment. This point of the negotiations illustrates these natural expectations.

DWmemberGroup2: All 500 prisoners, first batch, will be released Monday morning, at 6:00 AM. We already instructed military. You must take care of the media coverage.
This move is not an adequate reaction to the previous action, since the previous move is a request for answer, as well as a request for explanation. The moves in not an answer, nor an explanation. By means of this non-answer move, the agent changes the course of the negotiation dialogue. The move is composed by an information about future courses of action (“All 500 prisoners, first batch, will be released Monday morning, at 6:00 AM”), about past courses of action (“We already instructed military”) and a request for action by the part of the subgroups of G1 (“You must take care of the media coverage”).

**SEmemberGroup1: What about Barghouti?**

Given that SE understood the previous speech acts as not attending his request for an answer, the agent asks it again, now in a clearer manner.

**DWmemberGroup2: Bring his case, as the first case of the prisoners committee. We, the team here, made mistake and we are sorry for it, we told you he is going to be released but he is not. This should be the first case at the committee. We already talked to Zippi Livni about it. He is not sentenced or convicted yet.**

The first speech act that composes this reaction does not qualify itself as an appropriate answer, since it is not informative enough, given the request was a direct request for information not a direct request for an action. The next speech acts, however, compose an adequate answer, as follows:

1. \(\text{We}_{\text{membersG2}}\) made a mistake and \(\text{we}_{\text{membersG2}}\) are very sorry for [having made a mistake].
2. \(\text{We}_{\text{membersG2}}\) told \(\text{you}_{\text{membersG1}}\) he\(\text{prisoner}\) was going to be released but he\(\text{prisoner}\) is not [going to be released].
[3] [Since you_{\text{membersG}1} expected that we_{\text{membersG}2} would act accordingly, and we did not, we will have to do something about it.]

[4] [Then, Barghouti’s case] should be the first case at the committee [for evaluation, since they have the final power to decision-making, that we do not have.]

[5] We_{\text{membersG}2} already talked to Zippi Livni\textsuperscript{198} about [Barghouti’s case, since she_{\text{membersG}2} has the status of decision-maker].

[6] [We_{\text{membersG}2} will do that because] He_{\text{prisoner}} is not sentenced or convicted yet. Additionally, ‘yet’ adds the information that he could be sentenced or convicted in the future.

\textit{SE_{\text{memberGroup1}}: But that is not what we agreed, you are retracing. Same old tactics that don’t help us.}

Once again, the point of conflict in the negotiation is agreements’ violation. SE’s reaction is put forward by means of a statement about the negotiation situation:

[1] [You_{\text{membersG}2} can do what you_{\text{membersG}2} are telling you_{\text{membersG}2} will do] But this [act] is not what we_{\text{negotiators}} agreed.

[2] [Consequently] You_{\text{G}2} are retracting.

[3] [This retraction composes the] Same old tactics that don’t help us_{\text{G}1}.

\textit{MD_{\text{memberGroup1}}: This is personal request, personal embarrassment to me.}

This reaction is a follow up by the other member of the team of negotiators representing G\textsubscript{1}.

\textsuperscript{198} Tzipi Livni, Minister of Justice of Israel 2005-6. Please, see: \texttt{http://www.britannica.com/biography/Tzipi-Livni}. 

[1] [l_{\text{memberG}_1} \text{ declare that}] \text{ [Barghouti’s case] is personal request.}

[2] [l_{\text{memberG}_1} \text{ declare that}] \text{ [Barghouti’s case] is personal embarrassment to me}_{\text{individual}}.

[3] [This is my}_{\text{individual}} \text{ problem as someone who gave his word.]}

[4] [As l_{\text{memberG}_1} \text{ gave my word to my people}_{\text{G}_1} \text{ that this would be met and that was not met, it became embarrassing to me both as a person and a member of G}_1.]}

Gilbert (1987: 192) observes that “personally” (or as here, “personal”) would have the role of a distinctive qualifier in the saying; “perhaps in implied contrast with ‘as a person representing this group’, or ‘in my capacity as a member of this group”. Here there is room for the manifestability of a moral obligation by the part of the individual agent.

The chain of commitments could be stated in the following lines:

[1] \text{We}_{\text{negotiators}} \text{ agreed on that during negotiation.}

[2] \text{We}_{\text{groups}} \text{ manifested a common position on that.}

[3] Thus, we were jointly committed to that.

As we have discussed, once this point is reached in the negotiation, consequent positions and commitments are established “as the parties’ commitments”. Consequently, group members \textit{qua members} are obliged to sustain [the position] that $p$.

\textit{DW}_{\text{memberGroup}_2}: \text{We will convey this and consider it.}

This move by the part of DW is expected to provide a reply to the claims about the situation. The chosen move is the following:

[1] \text{We}_{\text{memberG}_2} \text{ will convey this [negotiation situation regarding the Barghouti’s case] and [We}_{G_2} \text{ will} \text{ consider it [Barghouti’s case].}
**SEmemberGroup1: Saadat and Shoubaki?**

The move that follows fulfills the attempt to continue negotiating of the agenda, the one supposed in the beginning of our analysis of this negotiation dialogue. The agents go case-by-case on the previous arrangements, in order to check the status of the negotiation.

[1] [What about] Saadat\(^{199}\) and Shoubaki?

**DWmemberGroup2: No change in their situation. Reject to discuss.**

This reaction by the part of DW by conveys of an expected move, composed by an indirect answer:

[1] No change in their prisoners’ situation [as prisoners].

The agent, then, adds another act to the chain:

[1] [We\(\text{membersG2}\)] Reject to discuss.

This act communicates that these agents do not want to put the issue under negotiation anymore, putting it out of consideration.

One explanation for this move is the consideration that an observed situation grounds that position – this is the contingent aspect of group positions, here regulated by self-interests. In view of the fact that the situation remains, *ceteris paribus*, the position remains. Therefore, this would explain the refusal to discussion; since relevant information was not added in the negotiation table, they had no reason to consider the issue.

\(^{199}\) He may be making reference to Ahmad Sa’adat, “the imprisoned General Secretary of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Palestinian national political leader”. He is still in prison. Please, see: [http://freeahmadsaadat.org/](http://freeahmadsaadat.org/).
SEmemberGroup1: What about second wave of CBMs?

SE proceeds in his course of action as an agent of the type characterized. He accepts the other party’s position without any negotiation movement:

[1] What about second wave of CBMs?  

DWmemberGroup2: CAC will discuss it. Leave it to the professionals.

DW replies in a similar manner to his previous move of the same type:

[1] CAC [Civil Affairs Committee] will discuss it [this case].

He once again adds a move in addition to the one directly required. It is an indirect speech act of explanation by the form of a directive:

[2] [YoumembersG1] Leave [this case] to the professionals.

SEmemberGroup1: Airport?

Again, SE is concerned in fulling his aims as an agent of a particular type, considering collective commitments. The agent, thus, continues his inquire:

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200 “Confidence building measures (CBMs) or confidence and security building measures are actions taken to reduce fear of attack by both (or more) parties in a situation of tension with or without physical conflict.” Source: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confidence_and_security-building_measures](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confidence_and_security-building_measures).

201 According to Searle’s (1975) classification, directives are speech acts used by agents intending the world to fit the agent’s desires, by asking the hearer to follow a course of action.
[1] [What about] Airport?

**DWmemberGroup2: Same position, later.**

DW understands the requirement of an answer, and reacts by using the same type of reply, an indirect answer:

[1] [We membersG2 have the] Same position, [this will be discussed] later.

**SEmemberGroup1: Alenbi Bridge, PA Policemen on Bridge.**

SE continues in his inquire by means of an indirect question:

[1] [What about] Alenbi Bridge, PA Policemen on Bridge[?]

**DW memberGroup2: Why not?**

DW reacts to the indirect question by means of an indirect answer. The reply is vague enough to not represent a commitment to a positive reply, as well as is informative enough to not be taken or as a non-answer or to a negative reply.

**AGmemberGroup2: Yes, we are considering it, it worked well in the past.**

This move represents a follow up reply of a member of the same group.

[1] Yes, we[membersG2] are considering [this case].
Even though this move contains a direct answer, it is not introducing a final decision, but rather an evidence of consideration. This means the case has the status of an issue under evaluation according to the agent’s goals.

[2] [This manner] worked well [for us] in the past.

Given the agent’s self-inserts, and assuming that it worked well in the past, he then implies that this manner may work well in the future. Moreover, this move adds the information that the agents are involved in a step-by-step process.

[...]

*MDmemberGroup1:* The problem is that since Sharm El Shiekh nothing happened on the ground. People did not feel any change. Give instructions to open Salah El Din Road in Gaza.

We now have a turning point in the negotiation, considering the ‘problem’ previously stated (please, refer to the text in footnote). At that point, both sides seem to align interests. That is, the representatives of subgroups give evidence of converging in some goals, given their common agency as negotiators. Moreover, this set of negotiations represent common efforts towards decision-making, what means practical change in peoples’ lives. Due to these joint commitments, the negotiation teams converge their agency. The problem now regards to the scope of desires of Group1:

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202 *MD:* Another problem. Fugitives not in cities under our control. The committee is asking us to take weapons from them. How can we do this now? I have an idea. Fugitives committee members from PA side will go to the cities and meet the fugitives. It will appoint two of them or others to be in charge of them all and take over their weapons and then tell them to be in low profile and to respect ceasefire. Those who respect ceasefire are covered. When we get cities, we will have their weapons under our custody.

*AG:* It does not sound reasonable to collect weapons in cities not under your control. We will check your suggestions and maybe approve this method.
The problem [of ours] is that since Sharm El Shiekh nothing happened on the ground.

People did not feel any change.

Thus, we should do something, or people will not believe we are in fact working to change their situation.

Then, you should, for instance] Give instructions to open Salah El Din Road in Gaza.

**AG**memberGroup2: We will, give us some time to get organized.

Given these joint commitments, the reaction is a positive one:

[We will pursue this course of action], [you give us some time to get organized.

In this situation, the commitment to action is understood as a group commitment. This obligation, as we have seen earlier, may ground higher-order obligations, such as legal obligation, collateralized debt obligation, contractual obligation. A communicative commitment at the table of negotiation is a strong commitment. Even this fact, however, does not block agents to violate joint commitments. The practical cost does not seem to override the practical benefit of such violations, given that they are not criminalized by any organism (even though there are many involved, as we have seen), and, even when they are criminalized, there is no punishment adequate to the type of agency involved.

**MD** memberGroup1: I do not think we will have another meeting until things move on the ground. No more committees.
Here, the agent re-states the members’ position. He uses his agency to declare (the lack of) courses of action, by means of a mitigation of a stronger claim, observed by word choices:

1. \(\text{member}_{G1}\) do not think \(\text{we}_{\text{negotiators}}\) will have another meeting until things move on the ground.

2. [Our group position is that there will be] No more committees.

This is a practical move by means of a dialogic move. Based on the previous ponderation, an agent may want to make sure the others will in fact act according to joint commitments grounded in dialogic acts. The fact that a hierarchy of agency exists—such that commitments may be violated and positions changed by agents higher in the structure—can be considered as a reason for not fully grounding expectations on negotiators’ statements and declarations. An individual agent may ground their claims in their beliefs and desires; collective agents, though, seem to ground their claims, their positions, on practical reasons. Those practical reasons are evaluated by members of groups and representatives; members may have beliefs, but those beliefs turn to be positions assumed inside the group, since they represent a collective body. An audience does not expect that a member will publicly states something that contradicts their group’s view. When it happens, explanations are required. A claim made on behalf of a group represents a group position. A claim made by a member may be said to be not representative of a group, unless the member is entitled to speak by the group. Even when the agent is entitled, some violations may happen, as we have attested.

At that point, we make some remarks on Gilbert’s (1987: 193-4) account:

Once a group believes that \(p\), then, ceteris paribus, group members are personally obliged not to deny that \(p\) or to say things that presuppose the denial of \(p\) in their ensuing interactions with each other. If someone does say something which implies that \(p\) is not the case, this person should give some sort of explanation, or qualify the statement saying something like: ‘In my own view, \(p\) is not the case’.

As we have discussed, we should change “once a group believes that \(p\)” for “once a group states, claims, declares, assumes, has a position that \(p\)”, and add “qua members” at the end of “each
other”. By this reading, the same would work externally to the group, given the same expectations towards group agency, where members of groups are expected to sustain group positions. And they are expected to do so because they have good practical reasons. Again, a claim is a speech act and a move in a dialogue, in this case by the part of a representative. Since the representative represents group positions, any move he makes seems to be grounded on practical reasons.

[...]²⁰³

*MDmemberGroup1: Sharon gave us Gaza, a dry bone and brought the whole world to him.*

Close to the end of the negotiation, MD makes an expected move, a statement echoing a view spread in the international media:

[1] Sharon gave us\textsubscript{G1} Gaza, a dry bone and brought the whole world to his\textsubscript{leaderG2}.

Sharon’s decision to withdraw the settlements in Gaza made room for manifestations of support, considering it an act in favor of a final peace agreement.

*DWmemberGroup2: All Gaza is a dry bone.*

The following move is a comment in reply to the other agent’s comment:

[1] All [not only the part you\textsubscript{G1} now have] Gaza is a dry bone.

²⁰³ *MDmemberGroup1: Another thing we must discuss is the limitations on Gazan’s between the age of 16 to 35 to leave Gaza through Rafah crossing point.*

*DWmemberGroup2: Why are they restricted?*

*AGmemberGroup2: This is the age they are recruited by terror organizations abroad and trained. There is a security reason for this. But we have solved this, there is a new easier arrangement announced soon.*
Considering the predication over the portion of Gaza that was at issue by MD’s comment, DW expressed the same opinion about the part they control. This comment mitigates the content of the complaint about Sharon’s political decision, since the criticism is said to apply to the whole land, not only the parts under negotiation.

MD memberGroup1: Worse, but we have to enjoy it right?

The final comment, which closes the dialogue, is one in reply to the previous reply:

[1] [The situation is] Worse, but we [all parts involved? have to enjoy it [the situation] right?

Since this final comment has the dialogic function of closing the dialogue, we could have expected the use of protocol formulas or of any other expedient common to this type of dialogue. However, this kind of behavior gives room to internal political concern, since the parties seem not only to operate in common grounds but to share common views that they were not expected to share.

As stated by the editors Seumas Milne and Ian Black (2011) on The Guardian, Palestinian records “significantly reveal large gaps between the private and stated positions of Palestinian and, in fewer cases, Israeli leaders”\(^\text{204}\). The group states this in conjunction with a proposition remembering that “the Palestinian documents were made and held confidentially, rather than for overt or public use”. Many concerns about the goals involved are brought to the light, once the common stipulated goals are always far from being achieved:

The role of the NSU in the negotiations has caused tensions among West Bank-based Palestinian leaders and officials, and widespread resentment about the salaries paid to its most senior managers, notably Adam Smith International’s Andrew Kuhn, who stepped down from running the unit last year. (Milne and Ian Black, Jan 24 2011)

The editors claim that the negotiations “have increasingly been seen to have failed”, in a context

where “the Ramallah-based PA leadership has come to be regarded by many Palestinians as illegitimate or unrepresentative”, having resulted in evasion of members of NSU staff. Grounding the dissatisfaction in the organization, we find “the scale and nature of concessions made in the talks”.

Finally, we do not see any final movement towards resolution given that one of the core principles in the negotiations by the Palestinian side is that ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’.

As stated on the Le Monde Diplomatique, “Nobody seems to know or care about the fate of the Palestinians”205 and “Yet nobody says a word. The mirage of peace has blinded us to international law, UN resolutions or the goal of a Palestinian state”. We can clearly see back and forth movements and many starting points and turning points. For some Palestinian popular leaders, such as Khaled Barakat, “Those who were involved in signing the Oslo agreement must apologize to the Palestinian people and submit themselves to appear before a Palestinian court under popular Palestinian control”206. For him, the negotiators and the other political staff, “This Palestinian class [...] was always looking to secure its interests and capital [...]”; Barakat argues that,

They have failed to build national institutions or democracy, failed to achieve the so-called Palestinian state through negotiations, failed to establish a national resistant Palestinian economy, and failed to achieve a bare minimum of unity of the Palestinian people and their political forces inside and outside Palestine – alongside an unprecedented fiasco in the fields of culture and education. And above all of this, these forces have sabotaged real national and popular achievements [...].

In view of the common goals and the limitations of the negotiators’ agency, it is comprehensible to question this long process of peace negotiation, which is far from delivering a peace agreement. As we see, political representatives fail in achieving the minimal conditions for peace. In fact, it is a step by step process that involves dialogues between representatives of groups and

205 http://mondediplo.com/2006/02/03sharon.
subgroups. They need to agree over positions and act accordingly, but this is not an easy request given the structure involved. UN, under the current mode, also fails to achieve their goals on the matter. The popular alternative, on the other hand, is based on an armed resistance. Moreover, the public opinion is not aware of the set of dialogic commitments and agency involved (points we tried to explore in some detail here), since the acquaintance of this requires the understanding of the whole process. The level of the current diplomacy complexity is high; there are many agents involved in the diplomatic scenario, besides information in the form of laws, maps, agreements, speeches, positions, etc. Understandably, the general public seem just to be blind to the whole package. This is evidence that the peace process requires other agents’ involvement, the ones who call people’s attention to the key steps, the ones who have the potential to sensitize people from all the sides, not only specific groups, towards a common goal. If you open related UN pages right now, you will find evidence of the urgency of the matter.

Conclusion

We assumed that a common dialogic basis allows agents to communicate to each other, and that a rational design of cognitive and practical aims explains the scenario we presented.

We made an analysis of an entire negotiation dialogue in order to explore the scenario of negotiation is its key aspects, according to our approach. We had the opportunity to illustrate our theoretical account on communicative agency, especially in the case of negotiation, a central type of dialogue. Regarding the illustrative case, a peace agreement was not yet reached on the region. We are, thus, pessimist about different results being reached by the same means, by means of the same structure of negotiation.

Therefore, we will present an alternative scenario. A proposal of negotiation or conflict mediation that brings other elements to the scene. We will claim that our cognitive dispositions can be used in favor of better outputs for the parts involved. Our aim here is a proposal, given the constraints of our agency.

So far, we have explored a descriptive framework embracing central aspects of communicative agency. That is, we were concerned with an account of agents in the scope of
communication, with an operational notion of rationality for that scope, with an account of acts of varies levels which are directly related to meaning, focusing on relations in the scope of we-intentionality. ‘Negotiation’ here stands for a type of dialogue, which has ‘peace talks’ (declared conflict or war to be solved) as a sub-type. As individuals, as members or as representatives, humans make use of their dialogic skills, as a set of innate dispositions and expectations that enable them to use language for communication.

Our last point is the first point we made in Chapter 1, about a competence to engage in communicative contact. We all seem to share a competence that enables us to perform and interpret dialogic acts. Not only a brain and physiological mechanisms functioning properly are necessary, it is also required to be equipped with a conceptual structure that enables human agents to recognize patterns of dialogues, situations and agents.

Dialogic contact is a universal problem, since people need to negotiate meanings and goals. The disposition for dialogic contact does not guarantee its success, given other features of communicative agency. One of the elements of declared conflicts, especially involving many groups and subgroups, is that they are expected to be solved by means of a negotiation process, which must reach a peace agreement, ultimately a speech act. The “Israeli-Palestine conflict” is emblematic in this respect, given the conflicts’ duration and the number of failed attempts at dialogue and via dialogue.

It seems to follow that dialogue is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for agreement in situations of conflicts of such type. People’s suffer seem not to be in the real-concern agenda. Moreover, the piece of negotiation dialogues we used to illustrate our claims is just a part of the continuum of the current negotiations efforts\textsuperscript{207}\textsuperscript{208}\textsuperscript{209}.

\textsuperscript{207} Please, see: http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2003/Pages/Meeting%20Between%20PM%20Ariel%20Sharon%20and%20Palestinian%20PM.aspx.
\textsuperscript{208} Please, see: http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/17716735/palestinian-authority-delegation-visits-washington.
\textsuperscript{209} Attached, it is a proposal that was intend to object of a subsequent meeting between the two leaders and related committees’ meetings. What calls our attention is the order of presentations of the points and the focus on “fugitives’ arrangements”.

\textsuperscript{179}
6 THE EXPRESSIVE DIALOGUE AS A FORM OF MEDIATION: A PROPOSAL

Some people believe in God, I believe in music, you know? And some people pray, I turn up the radio. Music is everything to me. That’s all I can say.

_Testimony of a fan in the music video Close to the Edge_,
_by the band 30 Seconds to Mars_

*Introduction*

People easily understand the requirement of food to surviving, but do not see as easily the appeal of music or any other cultural type for human life, since it seems not directly linked to surviving. But people usually forget that cognitive states can also positively affect or cause injury to organisms and that states of mind are also states of the body – but more complex to identify and to describe. We even have a field of study called ‘mental health’, given the complexity and the particulars of this level of the organism's state. Moreover, what humans eat causes changes in the body at a certain level, as well as the information we consume via others senses causes changes in our body at another level.

Let us consider now that human agents disagree about concepts, about their proper expression in natural language, about practical reasons and goals, but they do not disagree about feelings in the same proportion. And, like the previous ones, they unite or separate agents. Let us explain: Feelings or emotions have no propositional value so that they are not said to be true or false. The existence or absence of the actual state will determine whether the proposition is felicitous or not, given the sincerity in correspondence of what one feels and what one communicates about what one feels. Then, people may disagree over the sincerity of others in describing or expressing their feelings in certain situations. People may even disagree about the “proper feeling” (attitude) regarding an object or a proposition, so that they may disagree about hating and loving a certain object or state of affairs. An interesting fact in this scenario, though, is the capacity of some agents in eliciting those states in other agents, motivating them for action, affecting their states of mind and courses of action. Moreover, art, especially music, may elicit good feelings in human agents, enabling groups to synchronize states of mind. This is a very
important feature.

In the last chapter, we explored the view that human agents have goals related to the scope of their agency, and that they use their means to maximize these goals. Inside this framework, communicative conflicts arise between individual and collective agents, conflicts that seem to be hard to resolve. We argue that the resolution involves components of the human communicative device.

We focused our efforts here to account on the natural language device that enables agents to perform acts of the type of speech and communicative acts. As negotiators, agents use proper types of acts in order to fulfill their goals in the negotiation. However, given the scope of their agency, related to groups, and consequently their interests, they hardly achieve the goals they seem to be entitled to pursue for those directly affected by their decision-making. It seems, then, that there are serious limitations of agency. By a certain point of view, either a specific type of dialogue is required to fulfill a goal of the type of “peace agreement”, ultimately a speech act, or agents with certain special qualities, in order to perform the proper acts that achieve the goal.

The reasons that ground the acts of political negotiators are in large political and economic ones, since they have joint commitments to groups (proper of their type of agency). Their agency, therefore, is motivated by these joint commitments, even though they claim to represent larger groups and their respective interests. We can then ask which type of agency can be related to the interest of large groups, in such a way to filter local interests.

What follows is motivated by the proposal of Soares (2015, among others), who claims that artists are peacemakers by excellence. He proposes a project based on the premise that these agents are the only ones capable of conducting the peace process around the globe, despite local conflicts of interest, and other barriers.

Our contribution here is to present a possible line of description and explanation of this claim and to give it the form of a proposal of conflict mediation, focusing on features of the type of agency involved. For that aim, we are going to address features of a type of dialogue we call “expressive”. Let us start by basic points about communication.

One of the greatest demands in communication is the requirement of focus of attention
by the part of the agents who take part in the exchange. This is almost as demanding as inferring courses of action and intentions. The latter centrally involves two rational steps: computation of representational states and metarepresentational effort. The former centrally involves motivation. The relevance theory framework, for instance, comprises the claim that

More generally, what makes information seem interesting or important is the fact that it can be productively processed; the more ‘important’ or ‘interesting’ the information, the greater will be the contextual effects, the more efficient the processing, and hence the greater the relevance (Wilson, 1998: xxx).

Putting in this words, the predicate ‘relevant’ is used in a commonsensical picture of human input processing: humans tend to decode data as fast as they perceive them and consciously pay attention to what is—observer-dependent—‘interesting’ in a spontaneous manner. Sometimes, the content of the speech is of interest, but it may be the case that properties of the speaker are responsible for calling the audience’s attention.

Then, we may ask, what sort of things appeals people in general to be focused on some stimuli? One of the most obvious answers is: Art/artists.

Are artists the ones who mediate the contact between people and their art or is art that mediates the contact between artists and their audience? It seems to work both ways. We can describe a type of contact, of communicative connection, such that art, artists and audience’s joint action form a unity that is central to type of deep connection involved. People may get in contact with a piece of art without the physical presence of the artist, or rather by means of it.

The predicate “artistic” here is being used in a broad sense. The agent who calls attention of huge audiences by means of their work or charisma is considered an artist, given the appeal and admiration he or she elicits by producing relevant inputs for the establishment of a deep connection. Steven Pinker, for example, is sometimes presented as “the rock star of science”, being evidence of this type of phenomena outside the scope of the common typology of fine arts

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210 Some research programs, especially involving gestalt psychology, focus on the effect of semiotic qualities of, for example, visual, auditory, olfactory stimuli for human cognition.
(usually eleven). We often call this kind of agents “personalities”, “celebrities”, “leaders”, “a success/phenomenon”. These agents can be either individuals, members of groups or groups.

*The Expressive Dialogue*

Even if humans make use of aesthetic forms to basically distract themselves, art is only understood as such when it reaches an audience, when there is the perception of the artistic expression by a public, who must “admire it”, “contemplate it”. It would be strange that this relationship among men was not linked to a tendency to connection, in the same way we assume language as being. The artistic forms are plural, they were present in ancient civilizations, and they evolve concurrently with the evolution of cultures; moreover, more than arbitrary signs, they represent means of connection between people set apart in time, space, culture, age group, economic class. When people are together because of an artistic piece, they represent a single group, the audience.

At the same time, cause and effect, art and artists have an extremely strong appeal of connection to their audience. I call the dialogue between artists and their audience *expressive*, since it is triggered by and focusing on pure expression. This type of dialogue has key particular features.

Like other types of dialogue, it is *asymmetric and mediated*. It is asymmetric once it is from few people (artists) to many people (their appreciators). The artist’s art functions as language of contact, thus resulting in a linguistic mediation. Again, it is a special kind of language involved, it is not like natural language\(^{211}\) – though, it can involve natural language. Art is an extremely powerful means of connection, and the connection itself is a strong one. The most extraordinary case is music. It has a unique potential of contact among the dialoguers.

Some images, body movements, sounds involve elements that are neither compositional nor symbolic (see, for example Metz, 2004\(^{212}\), in the case of cinema; as Metz observes, images evoke a natural open set of meaningful relations). As we will explore, the media can be someone’s own body, whose movements are the language of contact. For McLuhan (1964: 23), the content of a medium is always another medium; it is the medium that shapes and controls the proportion and shape of human actions and associations.

Therefore, this kind of contact is twice universal: it is found all over the times and places and it crosses cultural boundaries. Daniel Barenboim calls it a universal language, and he is one of those who claim\(^{213}\) it can be used as a means to unite people. The dialoguers once connected are inclined to follow the dialogic game established. Speakers of these languages, as leading communicators, are able to create a deep emotional connection, called by social intelligence theorists ‘synchrony’.

The mechanism of connection: the power (of influence) over people

We will assume artistic expression and communication as processes instantiated by acts inside a dialogic format. We can address expression as the use of language centered on the individual agent, or rather we can address it by focusing on the precise connection the agent establishes with others, considering interaction or contact as the main target. According to authors such as Costa (2005), we have an interactive structure in the basis of dialogic intercourses; the level of content is set in this framework of interaction. Assuming this premise, we can state that interaction is one additional element to compute in dialogues: besides beliefs, assumptions, commitments, positions, agreements, the dialogic contact or interaction adds information to the process. That is, agents in interaction can obtain connection as a benefit of the dialogic exchange, in stronger or weaker degrees. We can address it as a possible effect of interaction.

\(^{212}\) The date refers to a Brazilian collection composed by papers translated by Jean-Claude Bernardet.

\(^{213}\) See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mWdDOobONqg.
A key type of connection is the one obtained by means of art. Artistic communication prioritizes the aesthetic effects for connection, as some artists say\(^{214}\). It is clear in this scenario that the principle of non-trivial connectivity would be more basic than (and would be connected to) the principle of relevance. This connection is a type of dialogue. In this dialogue, the communicators’ main goal is to connect with other cognitions, to establish contact\(^{215}\); in these dialogues, expression and connection go together.

The strength of this type of connection is remarkable, since it is emotionally charged\(^{216}\). Let us pay attention to a set of performances: (1)\(^{217}\), (2)\(^{218}\), (3)\(^{219}\) and (4)\(^{220}\). The artists and songs involved are linked to different ideological tendencies. Even when we entertain this information and may even not agree with their ideologies, the art is still appealing, transposing the ideological barrier. As we can attest by these examples, their language is a potent instrument of contact among people.

In this type of dialogue, the audience’s feedbacks will be equally emotional. Gestures, facial expressions, linguistic expressions, weeping, as we can observe: (5)\(^{221}\), (6)\(^{222}\) and (7)\(^{223}\).

\(^{214}\) See, for instance: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lGmbmUhxEts](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lGmbmUhxEts).

\(^{215}\) The dialogue musician-audience via music videos can be explored at the level of artist-art-audience communicative exchanges, for example. Music videos have been produced by the need of this spread relationship, putting artists in a contact with a growing audience and breaking the boundaries of space and time. In the digital age, it has been resized. Music videos appear not only as a tool to publicize the work of an artist, but to establish an ongoing dialogue between artists and their audience, in a **strong and permanent** relationship. The same thing happens with other arts. As the conductor Michael Tilson Thomas says, “people could now hear music all the time”. He addresses\(^{215}\) Cultural Revolution in terms of democratization of music and the way technology had an impact on how to create, play and communicate music, balancing it to the instinctive side involved. Here we call the attention to the connection effect: the sharing of connections in large scale between the artist and the audience. The dialogue can be decomposed isomorphically as any other type of dialogue, as a chain of languages, like in the case of cinema, which encompasses verbal, imagetic, musical, audible and other signic expressions (see Dias, 2010).

\(^{216}\) Examples: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bg8EQdcud7Q&list=RDNm4Yl3aYsQ&index=3](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bg8EQdcud7Q&list=RDNm4Yl3aYsQ&index=3), [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1tm1rqlgoyc](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1tm1rqlgoyc) and [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRnty9X9uo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WRnty9X9uo).

\(^{217}\) Link: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iMmjqfBfQhA](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iMmjqfBfQhA).

\(^{218}\) Link: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UeKmtyzWvY](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6UeKmtyzWvY).

\(^{219}\) Link: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RiGOfdz3Gw](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RiGOfdz3Gw).

\(^{220}\) Link: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGqGV_dEZAE](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGqGV_dEZAE).

\(^{221}\) Link: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0UoGMdf7lek](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0UoGMdf7lek).

\(^{222}\) Link: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HOMgDbcA84A](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HOMgDbcA84A).

\(^{223}\) Link: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VOS6H-KJLh0](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VOS6H-KJLh0).
In this kind of meeting, people feel-together. They act-together as a whole, as a group. How can we explain the effect of it to our rationality? Pinker (1997: 534) famously stated:

But if music confers no survival advantage, where does it come from and why does it work? I suspect that music is auditory cheesecake, an exquisite confection crafted to tickle the sensitive spots of at least six of our mental faculties.

It is outstanding that Steven Pinker addressed Bono’s speech in terms of linguistic emotional triggers but did not mention this mechanism of social contact.

_Potential application_224

After we get the dimension of conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and consider the “peace efforts” by means of negotiation dialogues between political agents, we tend to think that it represents an unsolvable problem in diplomacy. From our point of view, though, we have other means to solve the problem.

Artists must be central in the peace efforts. That is, we need to replace the main agents of negotiation. In peace negotiations, the point must be reaching a peace agreement, which is difficult, especially in the case illustrated. Political negotiators, unfortunately, aim at political and economic agreements. On the other hand, artists have the best qualifications for the position. They fulfill important conditions for the first steps, since they can be accepted as representatives of the common welfare, not of smaller interests such as specific issues to be agreed at opportune moments. Artists are agents in society that effectively interpret peoples’ feelings, act on them and are admired by the general public.

Again, in expressive dialogues, people share emotional states. They are emotionally connected. They are in the same side. They raise the same flag. They feel part of something together – and this kind of dialogue starts very early225 in the course of individuals’ lives.

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224 This is an extended version of my paper presented at WIP 2012.
225 Link: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gE9r1LkRCV0](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gE9r1LkRCV0)
An anecdotal example: I heard a girl, about 4 or less, to be so emotionally involved with a football stadium – we were passing by bus, she called their parents, another child, told everyone she would like to play football in that stadium.
Barenboim and Said (2004) explore the potentially of music to connect rival parties. Daniel Barenboim claims\textsuperscript{226} that music has the potentiality to make us forget some things and create others. “When we are talking about music. We are talking about our reaction to music”, he says. In addition, as a musician, he testifies that even in places that there is no culture of music, people listen to the music at the same way (focused), revealing its natural appeal. Consequently, those who speak this language also have a natural communicative appeal.

As advocated in the VI Dialogue under Occupation Conference (2012), we can use a specific dialogic strategy as a form of conflict mediation. By the use of the Expressive Dialogue (Dias, 2011), the one between artists and their audience, we can establish a channel of contact among not only conflicting parts, but involving agents all over the globe.

Artists, by means of their appeal, override religious, political, ethnical, group boundaries, uniting people around them\textsuperscript{227}. The communicative asymmetry is beneficial in this case, it is desired. This type of dialogue can mediate conflicts, I repeat, given that in can bring people together, can sensitize people around a cause, can influence peoples’ mental states, and consequently decision-making. It is a possibility, if we consider its universal communicative-cognitive appeal, involving \textit{primal empathy}, \textit{synchrony} (or coordination) and \textit{attunement}\textsuperscript{228}.

Even if we consider the phenomenon of huge audiences attending artistic and sportive or political events as purely a phenomenon of mass media, we should consider the cognitive patterns underlying it. We can think of the descriptions of the ancient Greek theatrical plays in public space, or of the appeal of the \textit{Sophists’} discourses, or remember the Roman \textit{panem et circenses}, a Latin metaphor that has lived for centuries pointing out the positive effect of entertainment over people. If we think about entertainment as a mere distraction, we can simply follow many arguments that give special importance to our tendency to low effort. Even though this cognitive claim seems to be correct, it does not offer sufficient conditions to explain the

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226 Source: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mWdDOobONqg.

227 A local example in Brazil can be checked here: http://www.foxsports.com.br/videos/276500035897-torcedores-de-inter-e-gremio-prestam-homenagens-a-fernandao.

228 \textit{Primal empathy} means ‘feeling with others’; \textit{attunement} means ‘listening with full receptivity’ (Goleman, 2006).
behavior. What, then, is behind the fact that people have a need to get connected to art/artists? We can think of many arguments regarding “cultural conditioning”, but we are interested in the social mind that makes the behavior possible and in some of its effects, which can be used to conflict mediation. Certainly, we can see this kind of behavior related to group agency, but it is also related to individual agency.

In the case of music, we are great interpreters, even though not all of us are speakers. In the case of arts involving image, corporal movements, sounds, they also have a strong appeal. These languages are essentially non-symbolic (the relation between the material part and the conceptual counterpart is not highly conventionalized) and non-compositional (or not fine-grained compositional (we can identify patterns linked to styles, for example). Understanding aspects of the mechanism makes the process clear.

Conclusion

In the last chapter, we focused on an illustrative analysis of conflict/disagreement by a dialogic perspective. We assumed that individual and collective agents can be analyzed in view of different levels of rationality attributions, and that we can identify common patterns of agency via linguistic, speech and communicative acts. In contexts of negotiation, a solution is expected to emerge through dialogues, considering that they lead to the necessary decision-making. Contrary to that general expectation, though, there are conflicts that remain unsolved, as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for instance. Maybe a possible contribution of our research is precisely a move towards the understanding of elements of our communicative agency.

Given agency limitations in peace efforts, we call attention to other elements to be involved. Artists with status of chief mediators can call people’s attention to the negotiation events. Angelina Jolie, Shakira, Bono Vox and others perform part of this role, but they do not have the decision-making power required, since they are inside a traditional political structure, where the technical political agents have the central role in negotiations. The point we made is that these parties are mainly representing their self-interests, thus not been apt for the task.
Our approach to the conflict ascribes rational-interest explanations for the protagonists’ actions and decisions (…). Arabs and Israeli leaders are primarily motivated to advance what they perceive to be their short- or long-term personal, community, and/or national interests. (Eisenberg and Caplan, 2010: xii)

Artists, on the other hand, work on people’s emotional needs, creating complicity, appreciation and a deep connection with them. Artists interpret peoples’ demands; they are sensitive to people’s yearnings; they have free pass within people. Their charisma gives them international carte blanche.

Moreover, they act with means that reach us all as human agents. Humans get all sensitized as equals. It goes directly to the core of our most basic agency. People are led by their feelings, more than to some of their needs. Given that artists make the audience feels well, these people like them, admire them and, consequently, listen to them.

Human agents have motivation to organize commissions, fan teams, pages, caravans, even an international mourning when these people die.

Even if these agents are not prepared for such a task of representatives, of chief negotiators, in the current scenario I am not aware of any better alternative. They can defend general interests and agendas, given their agency. The politicians, the professionals, are closer to group interests, to step-by-step negotiations. They cannot broaden the scope of their agency. It is quite impractical, in fact, due to practical constraints, to their joint commitments.

Moreover, we are in the scope of human agency, considering our biological, cognitive endowment; as we have been discussing, reasons, goals and emotions interact in that realm. What sensitize people through the action of others is considered art and is potentially effective as a connecting tool. And now comes one of the most incredible things. Members of groups, representatives of groups, everyone is reached in the same way as a human being. In their social roles, agents are involved with their commitments and goals, emotions are not crucial there, unless we are talking about basic relationships such as romantic partners, family and neighbors, or artists, whose job is to arouse emotions by means of their art to sell it, to propagate it. Humans are all the same kind of agent before art. It evokes emotions on us by means of the same mechanism, by means of the art or the agents’ charisma.
In short, people pay attention to them, listen to them and are led by them. We can use this connection to reach peace agreements, since they can lead international dialogues.

Fortunately, we can already see some actions in this direction: FARC invited the Colombian Miss Universe to assist in their peace negotiation\(^{229}\). Additionally, Pope Francisco \(^{230}\) invited many world recognized football players to play “\textit{Partita per la Pace}” in Italy:

Pope Francisco is using sports and especially football to unite the world and to transmit values from the players to the people. The Pope is hoping that the people along with the players will carry a single interfaith for peace, education and hope for everyone. (Youssef Khalifa, \url{http://www.totalbarca.com/}, August 8, 2014)\(^{231}\)

The importance of these leaders for peacemaking is evident, given that they can bring together political leaders and other important groups worldwide\(^{232}\), but this should be an international move. Agents may not change their beliefs easily and by ruling, but we can operate over other components of the human mind towards agreement.

As stated in Dias (2013b, 2013c), art does not solve conflicts, it is a medium of contact, it gives rise to a unique environment. Artists are, therefore, the greatest negotiators, since they are skilled regarding the connection between humans. They have the appeal to reach immediate consensus.

\(^{229}\) Please, see: \url{http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/07/havana-farc-invites-miss-universe-negotiation-peace-deal-colombia}.


\(^{232}\) See, for example: \url{http://g1.globo.com/jornal-hoje/videos/t/edicoes/v/mundo-se-despede-de-nelson-mandela/3009430/}. Nelson Mandela, his art was his illustrative rhetorical career. His example was extended to the ears of the world.
CONCLUSION

The hypothesis that human agents are endowed with a linguistic competence in connection with a communicative competence seems to better explain the evidence about infant’s behavior. Data suggest that children exhibit a dialogic behavior at about the same age range. Children somehow know that a question implies a desire of answer on the part of the speaker, that the addressee is entitled to reply when addressed by someone and that there are turn-takings, for example. Regardless of cultural background, there is a basic framework of interaction that enables us to put these expectations into operation. Thus, a linguistic competence must interact with a communicative competence. This would explain the generality of the phenomenon. We also have assumed a typology of agency that is implicit in the literature. This aims to describe features of social agency, which must have its basis in the structure of our cognition.

Such commitments can be used for agents to create institutions, and these institutions can be used as means in order to create other commitments. These institutions once created, may itself exist independently of any member who funded it or who constitute it; we can think about a university or a political party or religion. That’s why we can say that an institution is an agent with both individual and collective commitments. This is central to the study of our communicative competence given that humans use this sophisticated conceptual structure when re-cognizing and communicating to each other in daily life or in complex settings, such as in intercultural dialogues.

Centrally, we are competent to act as three types of agents: S, M and G. As individuals (S), we are able to make epistemic decisions towards $p$. As members of a group (M), we are able to bring reasons (regarding $p$) to the group, talk about them and persuade others about them. As a group (G), we are socially entitled to assume positions such as to represent other people’s judgments towards $p$. That’s why beliefs (mental states of S and M) are not functional to an agent G, unless they turn to be positions that maximize G’s goals.

The ability of forming such concepts and manipulating them in communication needs to be anchored in a cognitive disposition, or in a set of dispositions (inference-making, linguistic
competence, theory of mind, etc.). Additionally, these social facts are made possible by means of speech acts, as Searle advocates. Linguistic structures seem to have key dialogical and social roles. This observation allocates Linguistics in the Social Epistemology debate we have addressed in this work.

Moreover, the concept of dialogue can have a *theoretical application* for the analysis of meaning, dealing with: (i) sensitivity to linguistic and extra-linguistic context (ad hoc concepts); (ii) chain of inferences; (iii) individual, interpersonal and collective intentionality, and (iv) inferences from extralinguistic information. In addition, it allows you to treat agency levels: individual, group members and groups (what is known as “communicative identity”). Similarly, the *practical application* of this proposal is associated to: (i) conflict analysis and mediation towards peace agreements; (ii) negotiations and deliberations.

At the end of the day, we presented some tools to approach pragmatic knowledge as a separate module and thus to help a methodological delineation of the discipline. By an interdisciplinary design, the study is guided by questions that characterize the formal, natural and communicative agenda in Linguistics, Cognitive Sciences and Philosophy. This is possible since communicative rationality enables us to approach it as a domain of practical rationality that involves biosocial aspects: cognitive benefits (such as revision of assumptions, epistemic vigilance) and practical benefits (such as group formation and maintenance). Such levels are viewed as interdependent.

The central assumptions underlying this research are: (i) dialogue as a universal behavior; (ii) our dialogic behavior as a by-product of our extremely sophisticated inferential ability, a more general mechanism; (iii) our practical arena embraces the formation of collective agency; (iv) collective agency is based on communicative agency and (vi) both individual and collective agencies are centrally affected by expressive dialogues. Moreover, it focuses on a model of human communicative rationality that includes a dialogical proposal to be applied in conflict mediation scenarios.

Regarding the main theme *dialogue*, our contribution is to explore it by means of levels of analysis in order to observe that many disciplines can contribute to the description and
explanation of this kind of object: from neuro-linguistic and logical approaches to sociological approaches, and even from phonemic to discursive units. Therefore, we urge for more interdisciplinary efforts in this direction. The Metatheory of Interfaces guides our attempt to design interfaces (among areas) by means of construction intrafaces (among concepts and theoretical models). More specifically, we claim that the sciences of language can contribute for pressing topics such as political international conflicts. Assuming that dialogue is a universal process composed by a set of central properties, especially by a rich inferential mechanism, enables us to better understand one scope of human agency. Each section of this ongoing work represents a perspective in this direction.

It is worth noting that every claim in terms of a communicative ability, competence or communicative-in-performance is under dispute inside many theoretical trends. Each of these terms makes reference to a theoretical goal and to a methodological choice. We are aware of such disputes and we have aimed at exploring some of their core ideas for our own purposes here. This debate is supposed to contribute to the pragmatic studies, given the centrality of the concepts of ‘agency’ and ‘dialogue’ and of their regulatory conditions (there is a branch called pragma-dialectics focusing argumentation practice). Moreover, it has a potential application to the area of peace talks or peace negotiations, terms used to refer to the process of dialogue between representative actors of interests of collective agents whose aim is reaching peace agreement in view of a consequent implementation. These agents’ decision-making has key practical consequences for their lives and for the lives of many other human beings. The agents selected to this function need, then, to be adequate for the role, which requires social abilities or skills for a consequent general appeal among the parts. This research, then, represents an inferential linguistic approach of the dialogic mechanism from a biosocial perspective, accounting on two related levels: cognitive and practical. In the first level, it focuses on a set of mind-brain tendencies/patterns; and, in the second level, it focuses on the relevance of practical pressures.

By presenting another scenario in chapter 6, we called attention to another set of elements involved in a rational communicative exchange between agents of a special type, a scenario inside which cognition is directed towards emotional states - cognitive benefits. We
aimed at illustrating our conceptual framework, especially the point of group agency via group position and joint commitment. In negotiations, this is even more clear and critical, since the dispute over positions is at stake and must be subject to agreement among the parties. We attempted to explore and illustrate cases such that a person says something on behalf of institutions, groups or subgroups. As Gilbert (1987) states, “A variety of motivations could lie behind her saying something she disbelieved or about which she had no current opinion of her own”, and I aimed at exploring some of these motivations in a political scenario of collective agents. A weak point of the work may have been the absence of a rigorous methodology of analysis. This is due to the emphasis on the explanatory goal by illustrating the framework proposed.

The goal was precisely to link these steps in order to get a wider picture of human communicative rationality, towards a theoretical framework. By this mapping, we can support the assumption that it is the linguistic-communicative behavior, and not language itself, that is the window into human nature.

To conclude, we can summarize the points of each chapter as follows: (1) As human dialogic agents, we have a linguistic knowledge related to a communicative competence, (2) this linguistic knowledge is expressed in a universal dialogic basis, (3) when we communicate, we act on mental states and courses of action of other agents, (4) when we act, we act in three different levels of agency, (5) qua agents, we have cognitive and practical goals, what may cause disagreement, (6) there is a type of dialogue that enables a deep connection among people, given properties of the agents involved. Thus, we can/should use it for conflict mediation efforts.
REFERENCES


ATTACHMENTS
Replaced "*'s belief" with "*'s belief" to match how we processed the books.
Replaced *’s position with *’s position to match how we processed the books.
PREPARATORY MEETING FOR PRESIDENT ABBAS MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER SHARON
FEBRUARY 14, 2005
MEETING NOTES

Attendees:

Palestine: Dr. Saeb Erekat, Mohamad Dahlan, Habib Hazzan.
Israel: Dov Wiesglass, Amos Gilad, Shalom Tourgman.

SE: I was informed today of the proceedings of the commanders level meeting for handover of Jericho. There is a major problem since the Army is rejecting the agreements we reached in this forum and refuses to lift the checkpoints.

The Army is rejecting the removal of the DCO checkpoint on Route 90 and the cement roadblock on the Northern exit of Jericho on Route 90. They agreed to remove Aim Dyok checkpoint but they however want to erect a new checkpoint 900 meters away which will change nothing.

AG: There is a meeting today at 10:00 PM between Mofaz and the Chief of Staff and the Jordan valley commander. I will participate in this meeting and we will discuss this. It is my understanding of the agreements reached in this forum that the checkpoints and road blocks will be lifted. I do not know what happened but we will try to sort it out tonight.

DW: This is my understating too. But now it is at the Minister’s level and he knows and is informed what we agreed here. Hopefully it will be sorted out.

*Note: there was not commitment to remove all checkpoints but the issue was kept for review at Israeli internal cycles.*

MD: The fugitives and deportees committee was also informed that there are 6 deportees with “blood on their hands” that will not be allowed to come back. This is again contradicting all the agreements we reached so far.

DW: I agree. We agreed that all deportees return. Some might be included in the fugitives arrangements but they can return to their home towns.

AG: This is my understanding as well. I will communicate with the committees members.

DW: What we want to discuss today is reactivating the committees and structure them. We want immediate action.
After short discussion the following committees were agreed.

1. **Higher Liaison C.:** Sharon – Abbas
   
a. **Steering and Monitoring C.:** Weisglass – Erekat
   
i. **Higher Security C.** Mofaz – Dahlan
   1. **Fugitives and Deportees C.**
   2. **Handover Coordination C.**
   3. **Intelligence Cooperation C.**
   4. **Police Cooperation C.**

   ii. **Prisoners C.:** Israeli Side: Livni, Ezzra, Nazeh, Ben Eleyezer
       Palestinian Side: Abe El Razek, Kadora Faris, Karake, Hazzan.

   iii. **Civil Affairs Committee (CAC) Mishleb - Tarifi**

   The Israelis then suggested the following committees and the following names to head the Israeli side on them (All ministers):

   iv. **Trade & Economics – Olmert**
   v. **Labor – Olmert**
   vi. **Incitement - Shalom**
   vii. **People to People – Shalom**
   viii. **Regional Development and other Civil Issues – Peres**
   ix. **Law Enforcement – Livni**
   x. **Legal Corporation – Livni**
   xi. **Health - Naveh**
   xii. **Agriculture – Katz**
   xiii. **Telecom – Itzik**
   xiv. **Water & Environment - Ben Eleyezer**

**SE:** We do not want to form anymore committees before the tangibles of Sharm El Shiekh summit are felt. Prisoners release, redeployment etc. We also need to form our new government before we name members of committees. After government is formed you will have an answer on all the suggested committees not agreed in Sharm.

**DW:** We need procedure, phone numbers coordinator or point of contact for each committee. *We will not allow you to slow down the peace process.*

**DW:** Once security responsibility is handed over in Ramallah the prime minister wants to visit Abu Mazen in Ramallah. Next meeting should take place in Ramallah.

**SE:** on behalf of our President and PM I say that we welcome him in Ramallah.
DW: Regional economic development will mainly focus on Gaza since it is a worldwide effort.

As far as the health committee is concerned. The Prime Minister gave direct instructions to facilitate treatment in Israel for all Palestinian needing it especially for children.

SE: Another issue is the weapons, cars etc taken from the PA Police in 2002 – Defensive Shield

AG: We can not find them. Most were destroyed in the battle field.

SE: Tirawi? I urge you to find a solution.

DW: We are still looking into it, the answer so far is no.

SE: Qassam Barghouti? You told us here that he was to be released, we got back to our people and told them and you retracted.

DW: All 500 prisoners, first batch, will be released Monday morning, at 6:00 AM. We already instructed military. You must take care of the media coverage.

SE: What about Barghouti?

DW: Bring his case, as the first case of the prisoners committee. We, the team here, made mistake and we are sorry for it, we told you he is going to be released but he is not. This should be the first case at the committee. We already talked to Zippi Livni about it. He is not sentenced or convicted yet.

SE: But that is not what we agreed, you are retracing. Same old tactics that don’t help us.

MD: This is personal request, personal embarrassment to me.

DW: We will convey this and consider it.

SE: Saadat and Shoubaki?

DW: No change in their situation. Reject to discuss.

SE: What about second wave of CBMs?

DW: CAC will discuss it. Leave it to the professionals.

SE: Airport?

DW: Same position, later.
SE: Alenbi Bridge, PA Policemen on Bridge.

DW: Why not?

AG: Yes we are considering it, it worked well in the past.

MD: Another problem. Fugitives not in cities under our control. The committee is asking us to take weapons from them. How can we do this now? I have an idea. Fugitives committee members from PA side will go to the cities and meet the fugitives. It will apint two of them or others to be in charge of them all and take over their weapons and then tell them to be in low profile and to respect ceasefire. Those who respect ceasefire are covered. When we get cities, we will have their weapons under our custody.

AG: It does not sound reasonable to collect weapons in cities not under your control. We will check your suggestions and maybe approve this method.

MD: The problem is that since Sharm El Shiekh nothing happened on the ground. People did not feel any change. Give instructions to open Salah El Din Road in Gaza.

AG: We will, give us some time to get organized.

MD: I do not think we will have another meeting until things move on the ground. No more committees.

MD: Another thing we must discuss is the limitations on Gazan’s between the age of 16 to 35 to leave Gaza through Rafah crossing point.

DW: Why are they restricted?

AG: This is the age they are recruited by terror organizations abroad and trained. There is a security reason for this. But we have solved this, there is a new easier arrangement announced soon.

MD: Sharon gave us Gaza, a dry bone and brought the whole world to him.

DW: All Gaza is a dry bone

MD: Worse, but we have to enjoy it right?
A proposed last draft for Israeli Palestinian understanding
(Subject to final approval)

**A complete cessation of violence and hostilities:** All Palestinians will stop all acts of violence and hostilities against all Israelis everywhere.

The Palestinian Authority will reiterate its commitments to take all necessary steps to insure cessation of all acts of violent activities and to take active steps to prevent them, inter alia: cessation of all weapon production, cessation of any rockets launching and production, cessation of weapon smuggling, exploring of tunnels and ceasing all activities in the tunnels, arrest those who will resort to violence and implementing the “chain of prevention”.

Parallely, Israel will cease all its military activities against all Palestinians anywhere, including: those fugitives and deportees that will be part of the arrangements specified below, targeted killings, arrests, demolition of houses, deportation. Security coordination between the two sides will be resumed to manage crisis and act jointly against those imminent threats that can be dealt with in this manner.

**Transfer of security responsibilities over Palestinian areas:** Israeli will transfer security responsibilities over five Palestinian cities and its XXX surroundings (Jericho, Bethlehem, Qalqilia, Tulkarm and Ramallah) including lifting roadblocks in those areas. The transfer of security responsibilities will be done gradually. All other relevant details, including that handover of security responsibility of the remaining Palestinians cities and their surroundings, will be concluded by the joint security committee.

**Fugitive’s arrangement:** Israel will provide a list of fugitives and the joint committee will agree on effective date for starting this arrangement. In the effective date, their weapon will be under the control and custody of the PA, and the fugitives will undertake to stop any involvement in any violent activities. Fugitives who live in Palestinian areas under the PA security control will be supervised and controlled by the PA within the area limits. Fugitives who will stay in areas that have not been yet handed over to Palestinian security responsibility, will be controlled and supervised in a manner which will be agreed in a joint fugitives committee.

As long as this arrangement is implemented Israel will commit not to harm those fugitives and deportees(?), regardless of their past actions.

**Improving the Humanitarian conditions for the Palestinians population:** Israel will take all necessary steps to ease the Humanitarian conditions of the Palestinian population, including improvement of mobility and removing of closures and roadblocks.

**Release of prisoners:** Israel will release 900 Palestinian security prisoners. It will be done in two phases, the immediate release of 500 prisoners and the release of additional 400 prisoners following Palestinian security activities. Both sides agree to form a joint ministerial committee to deal with the issue of Palestinian prisoners in order to agree on new arrangements, including new parameters for the release of Palestinian prisoners.
A proposed last draft for Israeli Palestinian understanding
(Subject to final approval)

The committee will submit its recommendations for the next meeting between the two leaders, with the aim for releasing the next group of prisoners agreed by two parties, following the next meeting of the two leaders.

Deportees from the nativity church in Bet Lehem: will be included within the fugitives’ arrangement. Other deportees

Sea port and Airport: construction of the sea pot in Gaza will resume. Reconstruction of the Airport will be considered in a later stage.
PREPARATORY MEETING FOR PRESIDENT ABBAS MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER SHARON
FEBRUARY 3, 2005
MEETING NOTES

Attendees:

Palestine: Dr. Saeb Erekat, Dr. Hassan Abu Libdeh, Mohamad Dahlan, Habib Hazzan
Israel: Dov Wiesglass, Amos Gilad, Shalom Tourman, Asaf Shariv.

Dov Wiesglass (DW): We know the Palestinians are spending efforts but we are shivering because of the summit. Palestinians have to act strongly and visibly to stop acts of terror. Sooner or later something will happen and our ability to give up things I a function of PA achievements on security.

We just came from a 4 our meeting of the Israeli cabinet which was very stormy and the cabinet has decided the following:

1. Mutual cessation of violence. Palestinians will stop acts of terror against Israelis anywhere and the PA will take all actions necessary to stop such acts including collection of weapons, action against weapon production, action against Kassam rockets, action against weapon smuggling through tunnels and all chain of prevention necessary. Israeli commits not to performs arrests, demolish houses, deport or do anything other than required immediate action against clear danger of ticking bombs where such actions will be approved only by the Israeli Minister of Defense or the Chief of Staff.

2. Israel will handover security responsibility in Jericho and then gradually in other four cities (Ramallah, Bethlehem, Tulkarm and Qalqylia) when the Israeli security forces are convinced that the Palestinian security forces are able to assume control over them.

3. Fugitives: the Army and the PA will agree a list of fugitives. As of an effective date all these fugitives will handover weapon to the PA and undertake to stop acts of terrorism against Israelis. The fugitives can be in areas handed over to Palestinian security forces responsibility ad may return to their home towns once these towns were handed over to Palestinian security forces responsibility. As long as they oblige to these conditions Israel undertakes not to harm or kill them regardless of terrorist past.

4. Steps to change atmosphere: removal of roadblocks, ending closure and allowing freedom on transportation. Details agreed jointly and steps taken gradually.

5. Prisoners: We responded to PA request 900 prisoners + 2 from a list of 6 personally submitted by Abu Mazen (Qassam Barghouti, Abed El Nasser Abu Aziz)

6. Tawfik Tirawi & Rasheed Abu Shbak – lifting all transportation limitations on them but Tirawi can not head a security organization dealing of facing Israel.
7. Bethlehem church deportees can go back.

8. Work on harbor can immediately start but airport reconsidered in the future.

Hassan Abu Libdeh (HAL): These were already declared in the media so you are telling us what you decided or are we here to discuss and agree on things.

Saeb Erekat (SE): Cessation of violence mutual agreed but we can not accept the “Ticking Bombs” we can not leave it to the IDF and we can not authorize killing of Palestinians. Instead of unilateral we make it bilateral, joint crisis management and damage control.

DW: Mofaz and Yaallon know that anything that can be transferred to PA to handle will be transferred to PA. We prefer you do it. But the “last resort” must be in our hands.

Amos Gilad (AG): If it is a matter of 30 minutes we can not rely on the PA.

DW: This is in Mofaz hands. Work out a procedure with Mofaz about when to tell Palestinians, when to talk to Dahlan and when to act alone when there is no chance for anyone but the IDF to act.

SE: Let’s leave this aside for now and conclude that we do not agree yet on “Ticking Bombs”.

DW: Jericho first then other four cities gradually.

AG: The plan is to remove the two checkpoints for Jericho.

Mohamad Dahlan (MD): We did not accept to start with Jericho. The army is not there in the first place and there are only two checkpoints. Jericho alone would be a joke. I propose and we are able to take Jericho & Bethlehem now. I propose then two more, and then Ramallah and the handover complete for the five cities in to weeks.

DW: One day after the fuss and smoke of the summit Mofaz and Dahlan sit and meet together and agree timetable. We can in the summit declare package of 5 cities and say that a gradual withdrawal will take place at later stage according to a schedule agreed by the two sides. We take out the phrase “when the Israeli security forces are convinced that the Palestinian security forces are able to assume control over them” and replace it by “according to criteria agreed between the two sides”.

HAL: We want the summit to be successful but we need to agree all parameters earlier.

MD: Nablus Jenin and Hebron should be also handed over. We agree it is too early so we form a committee to coordinate and work out procedure and timetable for them. I do not see what is wrong with two, two and Ramallah and then committee for the rest. Jericho alone is a joke.

DW: If you can agree this with Mofaz before summit it is OK with me. The text I propose:
Negotiations Support Unit

“Israel will handover security responsibility in the following five cities: Ramallah, Jericho, Bethlehem, Tulkarm and Qalqylia. The cities will be handed over gradually according to modalities and timetable agreed between the parties”.

SE: The only thing I can agree to is what Dahlan suggested and not this open ended paragraph. It is very vague.

MD: We can not go to summit before we agree this.

DW: We want to release these agreements today.

HAL: there will be no negations in Sharm El Shiekh all has to be agreed before summit.

HAL: There are 356 fugitives on a list given to us. The concept is “town arrest” in towns handed over to PA they can stay in these towns. When their home town is handed over to the PA then they can move there as well.

DW: “The parties work together a list of fugitives handed to PA and on effective date these fugitives can surrender arms to the PA, retire and discontinue any terrorist activity. Fugitives that wish to live in cities handed over to PA security authority can move to these cities an stay within city limits and can return to their home town once they are transferred to PA security control. They must be under PA supervision. Those who live in a city not handed over to PA security responsibility will live in a designated area and the modalities of supervision will be agreed by committee.

MD: Not a designated area but rather “modalities of supervision” as long as modalities are followed they are protected.

DW: I agree. As long as modalities are followed no targeted killings, arrests and Israel undertakes not to take any measure against fugitives covered by this agreement. What about fugitives that do not agree to these arrangement and not following modalities? We want something to say that we are able to work against them.

MD: it is understood.

SE: But you can not include an explicit text on that.

DW: But then they are covered by general cease fire.

Habib Hazzan: The solution is dependent on where you place this statement.

DW: True, after the general cease fire paragraph we will say “parallel to this Israel will discontinue al actions against fugitives covered by the fugitives arrangements including targeted killings, arrests etc... “ then at a later stage we will details what we agreed above regarding fugitive arrangements.

SE: The general ceasefire issue “Palestinians undertake to stop violence against Israelis any where”. And we can not accept the ticking bombs.
HH: for ticking bombs I suggest: “Security coordination will be resumed to try to act jointly whenever possible against imminent threats of harm to Israelis or Palestinians whenever such threat to the peace process occurs”. Nothing more giving “licensee to kill”.

SE: That is the only text reasonable and acceptable to us.

Prisoners issue is detailed above.

DW: Bibi threatened to resign over this. If we are so lucky to coordinate the Gaza disengagement then many other prisoners are released and the criteria will change. Even the “blood on hands” problem.

MD: As if nothing changed. Your way of thinking is outdated and traditional, This criteria is unilateral, you decide, you release and we come here like pupil to hear a lecture. As if Arafat is still in Muqata and as if there were no elections of a man that called to stop the armed Intifada. You are killing Abu Mazen. Last time you killed him together with Arafat this time you are killing him alone.

Even if Abu Mazen agrees to this, I do not work in the PA, I will come out against this and against Abu Mazen and Abu Ala’a. You are back at the same old stories.

You sat on the same table with Hizbullah. You negotiated with them and sat at the same table and you do not want to give us names and discuss with us but dictate names to us. What do you think you did to Abu Mazen then? Can he settle now for less than a committee to coordinate names.

We want the 360 prisoners or so, I am submitting list of names, of prisoners from before Oslo. They were imprisoned before Oslo and they are mostly Fatah. You speak with their leader but not with them? Most of them are old people and sick. You released Abu Sukar last time, there is a precedent.

Give Abu Mazen something you did not give Arafat. OK, so Arafat was for you many bad things as you kept claiming and what about Abu Mazen? This agreement will weaken Abu Mazen. We do not want you to release only the taxi driver and the worker that entered Israel with no permit and someone with few days left for sentence. This is ridiculous.

Why tie prisoner release to disengagement? What is the connection? We are hearing this for the first time and it is a reversal of positions.

DW: I will go back to Prime Minister and explain what Dahalan said. But consider this just a beginning more will come in the future.

SE: Our position joint committee to coordinate names and pre-Oslo prisoners. 200 of quality better than 900 car thieves.

DW: We can not workout modalities for further release before summit.

SE: That is why there is a committee established at the summit according to all agreements we had in the past. You changes your position on Tirawi, he must be able to head a PA security body and deal with Israel.
I urge you to carry our message about the prisoners and other disagreements to your Prime Minister and we have four days before the summit. We are ready to meet 24 hours a day and get to an agreement but we must agree all details before the summit. Please come back to us with an answer.

Meeting concluded.
4:00 PM to 7:30 PM
Crown Plaza Hotel in Tel Aviv
February 3, 2005.