A tese da insensibilidade a fatos de G.A. Cohen: uma interpretação e crítica

Abstract

G.A. Cohen claims the conditional thesis that, if facts justify normative principles, then further normative principles explain why that justificatory relation between facts and normative principles holds. This is the Fact-Insensitivity Thesis (TFI). TFI was received in the literature in a largely negative way, both exegetically and critically. In an exegetical sense, because there is no consensus on what is the object that Cohen deals with: does it concern the entailing relationship between propositions (deductive interpretation)? Explanation by covering law (deductive-nomological interpretation)? Or is it a case of grounding relation (metanormative interpretation)? In a critical sense, because almost everyone of those who discuss it evaluates it negatively: TFI would be trivial, would incur into a infinite regress, it would be refuted by counterexamples and so on. In this dissertation, our objective is threefold: first, we intend to finish the exegetical dispute. Second, we intend to demonstrate that TFI, in one of its interpretations, resists all the criticisms and counterexamples available in the literature. Third, we offer a counterexample that refutes that strong version of TFI.