O espinho do ouriço : verdade e valor em Ronald Dworkin

Abstract

This thesis aims to analyze central aspects of Ronald Dworkin's practical philosophy, such as his theory of interpretation, the arguments through which the author defends the objectivity of values and his theory of truth. In this sense, Dworkin's critique of metaethics, from which he develops, especially in Justice for hedgehogs, his moral epistemology and his critique of Archimedean thought in general will be reviewed. Afterwards, the theory of the author's interpretation will be exposed. At this point, the theoretical references from which we can situate his thought will be indicated, as far as possible. According to what will be exposed throughout the text, it is from an interpretive and holistic perspective that we can best understand his work. Finally, some comments on his theory of truth will be presented in an attempt to identify Dworkin's precise conception of this theme and how it relates to the philosophical tradition.