Probabilidade e Bayesianismo na teoria epistêmica de Richard Swinburne

Abstract

This work aims to explore the main aspects of Richard Swinburne’s theory of probability and objective Bayesianism. In the first chapter, we present and evaluate some basic assumptions of Swinburne’s theory, especially the relations between the concepts of belief and probability and his defense of doxastic contrastivism. In the intermediate chapter, we provide the axioms and definitions of the formal machinery of probability and then we examine more carefully different kinds of probability and its use in the context of dispute between internalism and externalism. In the last chapter, we analyze Swinburne’s Bayesianism and his criteria of logical probability. The a priori criterion of simplicity is the most important in his version of Bayesianism. In the final part, we discuss some problems and objections to his theory and to Bayesianism in general. The problem of old evidence remains the main challenge to the Bayesian confirmation theory. Furthermore, we conclude that the criterion of simplicity is unsuccessful in achieving Swinburne’s purposes.