Desacordo racional: o debate epistemológico

Abstract

This essay is about the contemporary epistemological debate over the problem of rational disagreement. The problem consists in questioning the possibility of rational disagreement between individuals, considered epistemic peers, who, after sharing the relevant evidence, come to incompatible conclusions. Disagreements of this kind abound in contexts such as political, moral, scientific, philosophical, religious, ordinary, etc. The current debate about rational disagreement has divided philosophers into two distinct positions, namely, conformists and nonconformists. According to conformists, in the face of a disagreement with an epistemic peer the rational attitude that we should adopt is to considerably revise our initial position, and in some cases even adopt the attitude of withholding. Nonconformists, conversely, argue that in many cases it is possible to reasonably maintain the initial position even in the presence of an epistemic peer that is holding the opposite claim. In this sense, the main motivation of nonconformists is to avoid the local skepticism advocated by conformists. The present work aims to advance a study on the nature and epistemic significance of the problem of rational disagreement, analyzing the argumentation involved in positions for and against rational disagreement and exposing the presuppositions and thesis on which the argumentation rests. From this, we consider the contemporary issue specifically in the context of science. During periods of controversy, scientists exhibit considerable disagreements. To the extent that such cases present the conditions to invoke the contemporary debate about disagreement, we analyze the plausibility of the conformist verdict, specifically, in the scientific context.