

PUCRS

ESCOLA DE HUMANIDADES  
PROGRAMA DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS  
DOUTORADO EM CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS

GUSTAVO MATIUZZI DE SOUZA

**LOCAL PERCEPTIONS ON THE NEW AGENDA FOR COOPERATION AND BORDER  
DEVELOPMENT IN THE BRAZILIAN-URUGUAYAN CROSS-BORDER REGION**

Porto Alegre

2018

PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO - *STRICTO SENSU*



Pontifícia Universidade Católica  
do Rio Grande do Sul

**PONTIFICAL CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL  
UNIVERSITY OF LIÈGE**

**GUSTAVO MATIUZZI DE SOUZA**

**LOCAL PERCEPTIONS ON THE NEW AGENDA FOR COOPERATION AND  
BORDER DEVELOPMENT IN THE BRAZILIAN-URUGUAYAN CROSS-  
BORDER REGION**

Porto Alegre

2018

GUSTAVO MATIUZZI DE SOUZA

**LOCAL PERCEPTIONS ON THE NEW AGENDA FOR COOPERATION AND  
BORDER DEVELOPMENT IN THE BRAZILIAN-URUGUAYAN CROSS-  
BORDER REGION**

*Dissertation presented as a partial requirement to obtain Doctoral Degree from the Social Sciences Graduate Program of the School of Humanities of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul and to obtain, under cotutelle and double diploma agreement, Doctoral Degree from the Doctoral Collegiate of the University of Liège.*

Co-advisor: Dr. Emil Albert Sobottka, Professor (PUCRS)

Co-advisor: Dr. Sebastian Santander, Professor (University of Liège)

Porto Alegre

2018

## Ficha Catalográfica

S729L Souza, Gustavo Matiuzzi de

Local perceptions on the New Agenda for Cooperation and Border Development in the Brazilian-Uruguayan cross-border region / Gustavo Matiuzzi de Souza . – 2018.

282 f.

Tese (Doutorado) – Programa de Pós-Graduação em Ciências Sociais, PUCRS.

Orientador: Prof. Dr. Emil Albert Sobottka.

Co-orientador: Prof. Dr. Sebastian Santander.

1. Nova Agenda. 2. Região transfronteiriça brasileiro-uruguaia. 3. Atores Locais. 4. Percepções. 5. Refletivismo e Construtivismo. I. Sobottka, Emil Albert. II. Santander, Sebastian. III. Título.

GUSTAVO MATIUZZI DE SOUZA

**LOCAL PERCEPTIONS ON THE NEW AGENDA FOR COOPERATION AND  
BORDER DEVELOPMENT IN THE BRAZILIAN-URUGUAYAN CROSS-  
BORDER REGION**

*Dissertation presented as requirement to obtain Doctoral Degree from the Social Sciences Graduate Program of the School of Humanities of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul and from the Doctoral Collegiate of the University of Liège.*

Approved on: 27 of April 2018.

**EXAMINATION BOARD:**

Dr. Emil Albert Sobottka (co-advisor) - PUCRS

Dr. Sebastian Santander (co-advisor) - University of Liège

Dr. Rafael Machado Madeira - PUCRS

Dr. Pierre Verjans - University of Liège

Dr. Maria Izabel Mallmann – PUCRS

Dr. Aldomar Arnaldo Rückert - UFRGS

Dr. Erica Simone Almeida Resende – ESG

Porto Alegre  
2018

*To the One who revealed Himself  
in between pages and thoughts in  
a long and lonesome journey toward  
true knowledge and wisdom.  
To Him be all the glory.*

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

‘Much study is wearisome to the flesh’, advised the wise man. Indeed, it is. In a lengthy process such as learning the inconspicuous ways of research, no manuals nor lectures can prepare one for the expedition towards the laborious paths of sleepless nights, interminable readings, and countless revisions. Now, one should be careful not to be misguided by the idea of self-sufficiency. If one believes to be able to venture along this knowledge path unaccompanied, one is mistaken. I need to express my gratitude to the people who have contributed to make this doctoral period feasible (and bearable).

In face of the competitive environment of the academy, people do not always cooperate. I was blessed to be able to name several people, who looked beyond their own interests, helping me achieve the best of my skills. *Maria Izabel Mallmann*, my first advisor, opened doors, believed in me, and fought for me since the beginning. I will be always grateful for your insights, availability, trustworthiness, and straightforward way of thinking. Your competence is notorious as well as is your expertise. Having given me one of my first Social Sciences lectures, it is an interesting feeling to observe the end of this phase. Thank you very much. *Sebastian Santander*, from University of Liège, who co-advised me and led the way during my research in Belgium. Your professionalism and your ability to provide the best atmosphere for a truly autonomous work, albeit guided, will be always a goal to reach. Thank you for your support that went beyond the academic dominion. *Emil Sobottka*, my second advisor from PUCRS. You did not have time or opportunity to do much. Nevertheless, your serenity to make decisions is something worth learning in such turbulent times. Thank you. *My colleagues* from Porto Alegre and Liège, from doctoral and post-doctoral groups, who gave me many advices and support with my questions on bureaucratic matters. Thank you for the insights, laughs, and coffees. I must also acknowledge the role of *administrative personnel* in their work on the heavy paperwork from two universities and two national legislations. Finally, the preponderant role of CAPES, for allowing me to concentrate exclusively on this research with the doctoral scholarship (not without the hardships of low-income reality, I must say).

I cannot avoid the redundancy of thanking my *family*. *My Redhead Flower* has ‘lived’ my doctorate in the most comprehensive sense. To share myself with a computer was not always easy, despite your understanding reactions. Your presence made this

journey a little less lonely. Your interest on my work made it seem more stimulating and significant. May this be only one more barrier we surpass together. What the next seven years hold only God can tell. It will be surely amazing and beautiful. I love you with all I am. *My parents and sister* are the experts in providing tangible and intangible support. They are entirely responsible for the godly words and directions, jokes and laughs, lengthy conversations (even from afar), and material assistance (thanks, dad!). Your selflessness and humbleness of Jesus are traits I long to achieve every day. Having our paths crossed in the same place again would be more than joy for me. I love the three of you forever.

Finally, there is no life truly lived without *friends*. I was given the pleasure of calling them my siblings in Christ. The role you played in keeping me progressing is beyond measure. By becoming the place where life is manifested, together we are more. Barbecues and parties, prayers, and meetings all served to join us as one. Thank you. And to the ones that even cared to transcribe endless interviews, thank you very much. Stress levels were contained within acceptable parameters. To friends not so close, you know who you are as well as I do. Your prayers and words reached me as your own arms. God willing, we will meet anytime soon. Thank you. My friend above all, Jesus, You are the reason for all my efforts. I will not grow tired of living for You. Thank you for being the way, the truth, and the life, in this world of perdition, uncertainty, and demise. My gratitude will never be enough.



## ABSTRACT

This thesis identifies local actors' perceptions on the operationalization of the New Agenda for Cooperation and Border Development (New Agenda) in the Brazilian-Uruguayan cross-border region (Bucbr), emphasizing the relationship between formal (state) and informal (non-state) actors and processes. After fifteen years, local actors' engagement in New Agenda's projects, and compliance with its agreements and frameworks were extremely low. If the New Agenda should be considered a response to local demands, why was/is there such low engagement and compliance of local actors with its projects and agreements? To answer this question, this thesis draws from International Relations theories a plural, reflectivist and constructivist approach that enables the employment of 'perception' as a relevant analytical variable. The use of interviews and the application of an electronic survey are the main primary sources. Bibliographical research and official statistics are applied for contextual data. Historical analysis is employed for comprehending the relationship between state and non-state actors in the social construction of the Bucbr. This thesis finds that compliance and engagement have little to do with a border culture of informality and illegality. They are related more to a New Agenda's deficient institutionality and the perpetuation of ignorance toward the social reality of the Bucbr and the demands of local actors. The issues of engagement and compliance of local actors with the New Agenda is intimately linked with the unsatisfactory state offer of institutionality capable to turn the Bucbr into a legal and normative space in which the region could implement, autonomously, local development strategies for its cross-border populations. Such an institutionality would potentially change the way formal and informal actors relate. Moreover, the deeply rooted trans-local *modus agendi* of the region is likely to be either cause for resistance of any project that attempts to control or change it or the basis of novel cooperative regimes.

**Key words:** New Agenda; Brazilian-Uruguayan Cross-Border Region; Local Actors; Perceptions; Reflectivism and Constructivism.

## RESUMO

A presente tese identifica as percepções dos atores locais sobre a operacionalização da Nova Agenda para Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Fronteiriço (Nova Agenda) na região transfronteiriça brasileira-uruguaia (Rtbu), enfatizando a relação entre atores e processos formais (estatais) e informais (não-estatais). Após quinze anos, o envolvimento dos atores locais nos projetos da Nova Agenda e o cumprimento de seus acordos e *frameworks* foram extremamente baixos. Se a Nova Agenda deve ser considerada uma resposta às demandas locais, por que houve baixos envolvimento e conformidade dos atores locais com seus projetos e acordos? Para responder a essa pergunta, esta tese extrai das teorias das Relações Internacionais uma abordagem plural, reflexiva e construtivista que permite o emprego de “percepção” como variável analítica relevante. O uso de entrevistas e a aplicação de pesquisa eletrônica são as principais fontes primárias. Pesquisas bibliográficas e estatísticas oficiais são aplicadas na elaboração de dados contextuais. A análise histórica é empregada para compreender a relação entre atores estatais e não estatais na construção social da Rtbu. Esta tese conclui que os problemas de cumprimento e engajamento têm pouco a ver com uma cultura fronteiriça de informalidade e ilegalidade. Estão mais relacionados com a deficiência da Nova Agenda e a perpetuação da ignorância em relação à realidade social da Rtbu e às demandas dos atores locais. As questões de engajamento e conformidade dos atores locais com a Nova Agenda estão intimamente ligadas à insatisfatória oferta estatal de institucionalidade capaz de transformar a Rtbu em um espaço legal e normativo em que a região pudesse implementar, de forma autônoma, estratégias de desenvolvimento local para as suas populações transfronteiriças. Essa institucionalidade poderia mudar a maneira como os atores formais e informais se relacionam. Além disso, o *modus agendi* trans-local, profundamente enraizado na região, é susceptível tanto de ser causa para a resistência a qualquer projeto que tente controlá-lo ou alterá-lo, quanto de servir como base para novos regimes de cooperação.

**Palavras-chave:** Nova Agenda; Região Transfronteiriça Brasileiro-Uruguia; Atores Locais; Percepções; Refletivismo e Construtivismo.

## RÉSUMÉ

Cette thèse identifie les perceptions des acteurs locaux sur la mise en œuvre du Nouveau programme de coopération et de développement frontalier (NPCDF) dans la région frontalière du Brésil-Uruguay (Rfbu), soulignant la relation entre les acteurs et les processus formels (état) et informel (non étatique). Après quinze ans, l'engagement des acteurs locaux envers des projets du NPCDF et la conformité aux accords et cadres ont été extrêmement faibles. Si le NPCDF doit être considéré comme une réponse aux demandes locales, pourquoi y a-t-il eu peu de participation et de conformité des acteurs locaux à ses projets et accords ? Pour répondre à cette question, cette thèse extrait dans les théories des relations internationales une approche pluriel, réflexive et constructiviste qui permet l'utilisation de la « perception » comme une variable d'analyse pertinente. L'utilisation d'interviews et l'application d'un questionnaire électronique sont les principales sources primaires. La recherche bibliographique et les statistiques officielles sont appliquées à la préparation des données contextuelles. L'analyse historique est utilisée pour comprendre la relation entre les acteurs étatiques et non étatiques dans la construction sociale de la Rfbu. Cette thèse conclut que les problèmes de conformité et d'engagement ont peu à voir avec une culture frontalière d'informalité et d'illégalité. Ils sont davantage liés à la déficience du NPCDF et à la perpétuation de l'ignorance par rapport à la réalité sociale de la Rfbu et aux exigences des acteurs locaux. L'engagement et la conformité des acteurs locaux au NPCDF sont étroitement liés à l'insatisfaisante fourniture des institutions capables de transformer la Rfbu dans un espace juridique et normatif dans lequel la région pourrait mettre en œuvre, de manière autonome, les stratégies de développement local pour leurs populations transfrontalières. Cette institutionnalité pourrait changer la façon dont les acteurs formels et informels interagissent. En outre, le *modus agendi* trans-local, qui est profondément enraciné dans la région, est susceptible d'être une cause de résistance à tout projet qui tente de le contrôler ou de le modifier, ou de servir de base à de nouveaux programmes de coopération.

**Mots-clés :** Nouveau programme (NPCDF) ; Région transfrontalière du Brésil-Uruguay ; Acteurs Locaux ; Perceptions ; Réflexivisme et Constructivisme.

## RESUMEN

La presente tesis identifica las percepciones de los actores locales sobre la operacionalización de la Nueva Agenda para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Fronterizo (Nueva Agenda) en la región transfronteriza brasileña-uruguaya (Rtbu), enfatizando la relación entre actores y procesos formales (estatales) e informales (no-estatales). Después de quince años, la participación de los actores locales en los proyectos de la Nueva Agenda y el cumplimiento de sus acuerdos y *frameworks* fueron extremadamente bajos. Si la Nueva Agenda debe ser considerada una respuesta a las demandas locales, ¿por qué hubo poca participación y conformidad de los actores locales con sus proyectos y acuerdos? Para responder a esta pregunta, esta tesis extrae de las teorías de las Relaciones Internacionales un enfoque plural, reflexivo y constructivista que permite el empleo de “percepción” como variable analítica relevante. El uso de entrevistas y la aplicación de cuestionario electrónico son las principales fuentes primarias. Las investigaciones bibliográficas y estadísticas oficiales se aplican en la elaboración de datos contextuales. El análisis histórico se emplea para comprender la relación entre actores estatales y no estatales en la construcción social de la Rtbu. Esta tesis concluye que los problemas de cumplimiento y compromiso tienen poco que ver con una cultura fronteriza de informalidad e ilegalidad. Están más relacionados con la deficiencia de la Nueva Agenda y la perpetuación de la ignorancia con relación a la realidad social de la Rtbu y a las demandas de los actores locales. Las cuestiones de compromiso y conformidad de los actores locales con la Nueva Agenda están íntimamente ligadas a la insatisfactoria oferta estatal de institucionalidad capaz de transformar la Rtbu en un espacio legal y normativo en que la región pudiera implementar, de forma autónoma, estrategias de desarrollo local para sus poblaciones transfronterizas. Esta institucionalidad podría cambiar la forma en que los actores formales e informales se relacionan. Además, el *modus agendi* trans-local, profundamente arraigado en la región, es susceptible tanto de ser causa para la resistencia a cualquier proyecto que intente controlarlo o alterarlo, como de servir como base para nuevos regímenes de cooperación.

**Palabras clave:** Nueva Agenda; Región Transfronteriza Brasileño-Uruguaya; Actores Locales; Percepciones; Reflectivismo y Constructivismo.

## **LIST OF DIAGRAMS**

Diagram 1 Current core organisms of the New Agenda .....	142
--	-----

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 Hierarchy of perceptions according to constructivism.....	78
Figure 2 The Pampas ecosystem .....	101
Figure 3 Border demarcations between Brazilian state of RS and Uruguay .....	110
Figure 4 Documents issuing based on the Border and Mercosur Agreements.....	146
Figure 5 New Agenda's projects according to implementation status (2002-2013)....	156
Figure 6 Actors' participation in New Agenda's projects implementation (2000-2013) .....	158
Figure 7 Chuí-Chuy and Aceguá-Aceguá cross-border urban configurations .....	183
Figure 8 Local perceptions on official meetings of the New Agenda.....	218
Figure 9 Local actors' perceptions on the main problems of the New Agenda.....	219
Figure 10 Local actors' perceptions on normatization by the NA.....	229
Figure 11 Perceptions on the influence of local politics in the New Agenda .....	234

## LIST OF MAPS

Map 1 The Brazilian-Uruguayan cross-border region.....	34
Map 2 The La Plata River East Basin in the 18th Century.....	105
Map 3 Towns listed in the revised Border Agreement (2008) and the 20 Km strip ....	138
Map 4 The Bucbr.....	171
Map 5 S. Livramento-Rivera cross-border urban configuration .....	181
Map 6 Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión-Monte Caseros triple border area .....	186
Map 7 Road network integration at border areas of Mercosur.....	194

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Classification of respondents by UC .....	42
Table 2 Categories of perceptions on the New Agenda .....	44
Table 3 Pre-New Agenda institutional space for border issues and local participation	134
Table 4 Brazilian-Uruguayan cross-border urban complexes and spatial articulation.	171
Table 5 Emancipation year of UCs' municipalities.....	173
Table 6 Population of UCs by municipality .....	174
Table 7 GDP per capita in the Bucbr (in thousands of USD) .....	175
Table 8 HDI distribution in the Bucbr (2010) .....	176
Table 9 Typology of cross-border interactions of UCs (2017) .....	179
Table 10 State control in UCs' area (2017).....	193
Table 11 Indicators of structural perceptions .....	212
Table 12 Frequency of PSP and NSP by UC .....	213
Table 13 Indicators of culture perceptions .....	225
Table 14 Frequency of PCP and NCP by UC.....	226
Table 15 Local actors' perceptions of mutual need.....	237



## LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

A-A	Aceguá-Aceguá cross-border urban complex
ALADI	Latin American Integration Association
ANCAP	Uruguayan National Fuel, Alcohols and Portland Administration
APC	Agreement on Police Cooperation in the Investigation, Prevention, and Control of Criminal Acts
AR	Argentina
ASSE	Uruguayan Health Service National Administration
B-B	Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión cross-border urban complex
BC	Border Committees
BCA	Brazilian Cooperation Agency
BCBIM	Binational Committee of Border Intendents and Mayors
BHBAB	Border Health Binational Advisory Board
BHCSLR	Binational Health Committee of Santana do Livramento-Rivera
BIMO	Brazilian Border Integrated Management Office
BR	Brazil
Bucbr	Brazilian-Uruguayan Cross-Border Region
C-C	Chuí-Chuy cross-border urban complex
CAIF	Uruguayan Center for Comprehensive Care in Early Childhood and Family
CBR	Cross-Border Region
CETP-UTU	Board of Professional Technical Education - Labor University of Uruguay
CMC	Common Market Council of Mercosur
CML	Commission for the Mirim Lagoon
CORSAN	Sanitation Company Riograndense

CREMERS	Regional Medical Council of the State of Rio Grande do Sul
CUT	Complejo urbano transfronterizo (Cross-border urban complex)
EEC	European Economic Community
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
ENAFRON	Security for Borders National Strategy of Brazil
FEPAM	Foundation for Environmental Protection of Rio Grande do Sul
FOCEM	Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund
GCC	General Commission of Coordination
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HDI	Human Development Index
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
HLG	High-Level Group
HLM	High-Level Meeting
IASO	International Affairs Special Office of Rio Grande do Sul
IBGE	Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
IFSul	Instituto Federal do Sul (Southern Federal Institute)
INE	National Institute of Statistics of Uruguay
IPE	International Political Economy
IR	International Relations
J-R	Jaguarião-Rio Branco cross-border urban complex
Km	Kilometer
LAFTA	Latin American Free Trade Association
MCPC	Mechanism of Consultation and Political Concertation
MERCOSUR	Southern Common Market

MIDES	Ministry of Social Development of Uruguay
MNI	Ministry of National Integration
MRE	Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations
MREU	Uruguayan Ministry of Foreign Relations
NA	New Agenda for Cooperation and Border Development
NACDF	Nueva Agenda de Cooperación y Desarrollo Fronterizo
NCP	Negative Cultural Perceptions
NEROI	International Relations and Organizations Study Nucleus
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NR	New Regionalism
NRA	New Regionalism Approaches
NSP	Negative Structural Perceptions
OSE	State Sanitary Works of Uruguay
OTU	Territory Observatory of Uruguay
PAHO-WHO	Pan-American Health Organization-World Health Organization
PCDIBS Strip	Permanent Commission on Development and Integration of the Border
PCP	Positive Cultural Perceptions
PDFF	Brazilian Border Strip Development Promotion Program
PDU	Portuguese Dialects of Uruguay
PEIBF	Program for Border Intercultural Bilingual Schools
PSP	Positive Structural Perceptions
PUCRS	Pontifical Catholic University of do Rio Grande do Sul
Q-A	Quaraí-Artigas cross-border urban complex
QRC	Quaraí River Commission
RBA	Region Building Approach

RI	Relações internacionais
SEDAI	International Affairs Special Office of Rio Grande do Sul
Sefaz-RS	Department of Finance of Rio Grande do Sul
SELA	Latin American System
S-R	Santana do Livramento-Rivera cross-border urban complex
TMN	Transborder Movement of NGOs
UC	Cross-border urban complex
UFPel	Pelotas Federal University
USA	United States of America
USD	US Dollars
UY	Uruguay
WG	Work Group
WOA	World Order Approach
WWII	World War II

*Of making many books there is no end.*  
(Ecclesiastes XII, 12)

## **IN LIEU OF A PREFACE: THE QUEST FOR A RESEARCH PROBLEM**

When the challenge of studying Brazil-Uruguay cross-border relations presented itself in the beginning of 2014 due to interesting advances of bilateral relations in the scope of the ‘New Agenda for Cooperation and Border Development’ (hereafter ‘New Agenda’), it seemed logical trying to understand the engenderment of agreements and formal structures created with the sole purpose of fostering the so-called ‘border integration’. The journey on the paths of doctoral research initiated with the employment of institutionalist perspectives focused on policies developed by national frameworks. The initial plan was to discover the relevance of Brazil-Uruguay bilateral relations for the Brazilian project of international insertion, given its condition of having much advantage in some areas, but also many vulnerabilities (GUIMARÃES, 2005), which influenced its capacity as a regional leader or as a paymaster of regional cooperation and integration (MALAMUD, 2013). The evidence revealed that Brazil fostered regionalism in two fronts: one multilateral, used to promote regional stability and political articulation; and other, bilateral, consistent with the Brazilian capacities of paying the costs of regional cooperation. Within statist plans, the New Agenda demonstrated the commitment of Brazil and Uruguay to implement concrete projects capable of changing the daily life of local populations (AVEIRO, 2006; PUCCI, 2010)

The undeniable political capital gain from the rapprochement of these two countries and the impact that development policies could have had for local populations seemed not sufficient for explaining Brazilian interest in such a bold and costly venture. Considering the intricate relationship between formal projects of regional cooperation and local cross-border cooperation (RHI-SAUSI and COLETTI, 2010; ODDONE, 2014), the political enterprise of creating cross-border local development policies with Uruguay was not likely to succeed. Nevertheless, what if Brazil (a nation rapidly growing, and with global ambitions at the time) aimed for the creation of a regional model of border relations for Mercosur from the experience with Uruguay? And what was the outcome of the bilateral and regional settlements concerning the cross-border region? It did not materialize according to Brazilian plans. Lengthy political negotiations, lack of

consensus, and absence of coordination failed to create transnational spaces, emphasizing the need of restructuring the Mercosurian framework (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, 2016).

The analysis on institutions (Mercosur, Brazilian and Uruguayan states), their capabilities, and the formal processes of policymaking had not offered hitherto a *problematique* worthy of seizing much attention, let alone writing a thesis. The institutionalist approaches of the mentioned researches have failed to consider the notorious fragilities of institutional frameworks common to South American countries and regional bodies as an *a priori* reality, pointing out to the same obstacles of formal structures of governance as fundamental difficulties that *should* be resolved. The normativity of the embedded rationalism present in such approaches contributed to the conclusion that the problem was structural. This suggested that the employed institutionalist analyses could not acknowledge the contextual reality of the regional phenomena in the continent.

To be more familiarized with other approaches, during the first doctoral year, I took the task of comparing the capabilities of social-constructivist theories with applications of the existent institutionalist, rationalist theories of regionalism in understanding historical and present conditions of social reality, especially Latin American regionalism and cross-border realities. The institutionalist notion of ‘integration demand and offer’ emphasized the failure of Mercosur and other Latin American regionalist projects (MATTLI, 1999; BOUZAS and SOLTZ, 2001). On the other hand, the idea of an encompassing construction process of integration, involving actors, their ideas, objectives, and methods seemed to be more attentive to regional contextualization (DABÈNE, 2009), being more suitable for Mercosurian sub-regions. Thus, it was important to advance this investigation towards trying to comprehend some underlying, or even concealed ideas and/or relations within the bilateral or regional spheres of the case studied. This led this quest toward identifying the role of politico-ideological synergies within the functioning of Mercosur, written in co-authorship, (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA; CULPI, 2016) as well as the effects of the ‘progressive’ agenda for border integration (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, 2015b). Both works, nonetheless, led to similar conclusions and dilemmas. Despite partially explaining some contextual capacities and limitations of the institutional framework of Mercosur and of Brazil-Uruguay bilateral relations, neither politico-ideological synergies nor progressive

agendas were conceptualizations capable of clarifying how formal South American regional environment affected informal regionalism within cross-border regions.

A more audacious shift was needed. Being able to get in contact, in previous opportunities, with Fredrik Söderbaum and with his theorization on regionalism in Southern Africa (SÖDERBAUM, 2004) while living in Gothenburg during the mid-2000s, an idea that could potentially focus the research *semel pro semper* unfolded: if one is willing to understand the inherent interactions of an intricate, dynamic process such as regionalism, one should look at the so-called ‘social construction process’ of a region, its ‘becoming’. Among many of the characteristics of the so-called new regionalism, the participation of local actors in some regionalist processes, the involvement of subnational governments, and the softening of international borders followed the increase of transnational relations, that is, economic, cultural, and political transnational exchanges at the local level (POSTEL-VINAY, 1996). The ‘trans-local’ activity of such interactions can be considered the basis on which international regionalism connects to (classic) national regionalism. Trans-localism (that is, local actors’ interactions beyond international borders) represented a significant ‘space for action’ beyond the infra-national/transnational connection of this regionalist wave (POSTEL-VINAY, 2001 [1998]) and nowadays. Hence, studying regionalism meant also understanding some trans-local relations/ideas within or even beyond formal regional bodies.

The reality within the Brazilian-Uruguayan cross-border region (Bucbr<sup>1</sup>) could, in this perspective, give me data to understand not only the building process of the region *per se*, but also hints on the construction of the bigger ‘Mercosurian region’, considering that the former is within the latter. Since the research was conducted primarily in Brazil and Uruguay, I decided to scrutinize the theoretical debate on whether to use the concept of ‘regional integration’ (predominantly applied in Latin America) or ‘regionalism’ for understanding the complex relational web of interactions at the border studied. The necessity of profound theoretical and empirical analysis to apply concepts and terms in scientific language required more attention to the use of such definitions (GOERTZ, 2006). On the one hand, ‘regional integration’ should be understood within neofunctionalist theories and assumptions, as they can be considered ‘virtual synonyms’

---

<sup>1</sup> The denomination ‘Bucbr’ does not work as a theoretical and conceptual construction that attempts to deal with the geopolitical game or the socioeconomic interactions within this area, but as a simple way to economize space, avoid tiring repetitions, and simplify reading.

(ROSAMOND, 2000, p. 50), and therefore should be studied in those terms. On the other hand, 'regionalism' refers to the phase and theories regarding the advance of multidimensionality of regional phenomena, such as informal coalitions (SÖDERBAUM; SHAW, 2003). The final decision fell on the choosing of regionalism as key concept, as well as a constructivist and reflectivist conceptual framework to better grasp the informal reality at the border and its relationship with 'higher', formal levels of governance.

From a fieldwork trip to the Bucbr to Aceguá-Aceguá and Santana do Livramento-Rivera, the informal dynamics on which local relations are based revealed to be central in understanding local realities and some of the limitations of the New Agenda (and of Mercosur, for that matter). *It was evident that the construction process of a region had microregional foundations constituted by non-state interactions.* Keating (2000) refers to the influence of paradiplomatic actors (such as border municipalities) being limited to the margins of the state. The role of Mercosur, understood as a 'policy environment', is key in this process (HOCKING, 1999), but the weakness of local entities, and the nations' primary objective of control and sovereignty, already attested in the mid-1990s (VALENCIANO, 1996), could still be a relevant matter. From this reasoning, a question emerged: If informal (non-state or simply personal-level) interactions were the basis of the region-building process, how was the quality of institutional framework for the paradiplomatic action of bordering towns in Mercosur and in the New Agenda? Focusing on the local context of the towns, the evidence indicated that state responses to social and economic demands of the Bucbr strongly restricted foreign policy of twin-towns concomitant to promoting conditions for communicating their demands (DE SOUZA, 2017). In other words, State neglected social reality at the border, but fostered a hollow structure that did (and does) not offer actual tools for bordering localities to alter the path from poverty and exclusion to social and economic development.

Understanding trans-local interactions (that is, local and transnational at the same time) within the Bucbr could thus impart on the concreteness of social reality at the border, on empirical regionalism. It could also uncover local, non-state relations that function within the region. More: it could reveal the processes whereby interactions 'produce' a region, something all my previous studies and contributions (either 'pure' institutionalist or with 'sociological awareness') were not able to demonstrate. It was decided to pursue this research looking at the *de facto* regionalisms, at the informal (non-state) realities of cross-border communities through the analysis of local perceptions on



the New Agenda. From this perspective (that is, 'from below'), it can be possible to unveil another facet of regionalism within and beyond the New Agenda and the intergovernmental structure on which it was engendered. The ontological and epistemological foundations for a research problem had been finally laid.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>INTRODUCTION.....</b>	<b>29</b>
1 PRESENTING THE THESIS.....	29
2 THE BRAZILIAN-URUGUAYAN CROSS-BORDER REGION AND THE NEW AGENDA.....	35
3 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS, AND FIELDWORK DESCRIPTION IN THE STUDY OF PERCEPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL REGIONALISM RESEARCH.....	38
4 THE IMPORTANCE OF PERCEPTIONS AND THE NEW AGENDA: A RESEARCH JUSTIFICATION ....	45
5 THE SCHOLARSHIP ON THE NEW AGENDA .....	46
<b>CHAPTER 1 – REGIONALISMS AND CROSS-BORDER REGIONS IN IR THEORY 55</b>	
1.1 INTERRELATED CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS WITHIN INTERNATIONAL REGIONALISM (AND BEYOND).....	57
1.2 EARLY REGIONALISM AND THE FORMATION OF NATION-STATES .....	61
1.3 OLD REGIONALISM: PREVALENCE OF RATIONALISM AND FORMALISM.....	63
1.3.1 Neorealism .....	66
1.3.2 Liberal institutionalism .....	68
1.3.3 Economic integration theory .....	73
1.4 NEW REGIONALISM AND THE RISE OF CONSTRUCTIVIST AND REFLECTIVIST THEORIES: INFORMAL INTERACTIONS IN THE SPOTLIGHT .....	74
1.4.1 Social constructivism: perceptions in the spotlight.....	76
1.4.2 Coxian critical theories.....	80
1.4.3 Post-structuralism and post-modernism.....	82
1.4.4 New Regionalism Approaches (NRA).....	83
1.4.5 Some critiques to new regionalism theory .....	86
1.5 COMPARATIVE REGIONALISM AND THEORETICAL PLURALISM .....	86
1.5.1 Border, cross-border regions, and perceptions: a constructivist and reflectivist conceptual framework .....	87
1.5.2 (Cross-border) regions and regionalisms .....	90
1.6 NORMS, PERCEPTIONS, AND CROSS-BORDER REGIONS: THE NEW AGENDA AND MICRO-REGIONALIST DYNAMICS .....	92
1.6.1 Cross-border urban complexes as privileged spaces: contextual variables for the study of perceptions .....	95
1.7 FINAL REMARKS ON REGIONALISM THEORY AND THE NEW AGENDA.....	97
<b>CHAPTER 2 – THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN-URUGUAYAN CROSS-BORDER REGION.....</b>	<b>100</b>
2.1 COLONIALISM AND THE SEARCH FOR (MICRO) REGIONAL AUTONOMY IN THE EASTERN PLATINE REGION (1620-1777).....	102
2.2 SECURITARIANISM OF STATE-BUILDING AND PERIPHERAL LOCALISM OF THE BUCBR (1777-1909) .....	109
2.3 ACTIVE INFORMAL INTERACTIONS, LATENT FORMAL RELATIONS: INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE BUCBR (1909-1975) .....	115
2.4 SOUTHERN CONE RELATIONS TOWARD COOPERATION: IGNORING CROSS-BORDER REGIONS? (1975-2002).....	121
2.5 FINAL REMARKS ON THE HISTORY OF AN UNEVEN RELATIONSHIP.....	127

<b>CHAPTER 3 – CREATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE NEW AGENDA</b>	<b>131</b>
3.1 CONVERGING RELATIONS LEADING TO THE NEW AGENDA .....	131
3.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL DNA OF THE NEW AGENDA AND ITS LEGACY TO BORDER ISSUES AND ACTORS .....	132
3.3 THE NEW AGENDA FOR COOPERATION AND BORDER DEVELOPMENT .....	137
3.4 MAIN AGREEMENTS AND PROJECTS OF THE NEW AGENDA (2002-2017).....	144
3.4.1 Residence .....	144
3.4.2 Health and sanitation .....	148
3.4.3 Education.....	150
3.4.4 Security .....	152
3.4.5 Culture.....	154
3.5 CHALLENGES TO THE NEW AGENDA.....	154
3.5.1 Discrepant national administrative frameworks: Brazilian federalism, Uruguayan centralism and public policies .....	159
3.5.2 Brazilian and Uruguayan national programs at/about the border.....	164
3.6 FINAL REMARKS ON THE NEW AGENDA’S INSTITUTIONALITY.....	166
<b>CHAPTER 4 – LOCAL CONTEXTS OF THE BUCBR VIS-À-VIS THE NEW AGENDA</b>	<b>170</b>
4.1 POPULATION DATA AND SOCIOECONOMIC INDICES.....	173
4.2 SHARING OF THE SAME ENVIRONMENT .....	176
4.3 LOCAL INTERACTIONS .....	178
4.3.1 Similar interactional realities, distinct spaces and priorities .....	180
4.3.2 Trans-border cultural homogeneity .....	190
4.4 SPATIAL CONFIGURATIONS.....	192
4.5 ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE .....	196
4.6 LOCAL, INSTITUTIONALIZED COOPERATION.....	201
4.7 FINAL REMARKS ON THE LOCAL CONTEXTS OF THE BUCBR AND ITS UCs .....	205
<b>CHAPTER 5 – LOCAL PERCEPTIONS ON THE NEW AGENDA: BEHIND LOW ENGAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE RATES.....</b>	<b>209</b>
5.1 STRUCTURAL EXPLANATION AND LOCAL ACTORS’ PERCEPTIONS .....	210
5.2 CULTURAL EXPLANATION AND LOCAL ACTORS’ PERCEPTIONS .....	223
5.3 THE POLITICAL ISSUE.....	233
5.4 PERCEPTION OF MUTUAL NEED .....	236
5.5 FINAL REMARKS ON LOCAL PERCEPTIONS ON THE NEW AGENDA .....	238
<b>CONCLUSIONS .....</b>	<b>240</b>
<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>249</b>
<b>APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW SCRIPT.....</b>	<b>277</b>
<b>APPENDIX B – ELECTRONIC QUESTIONNAIRE (PORTUGUESE VERSION) .....</b>	<b>278</b>
<b>APPENDIX C – DATASETS AND RAW TABLES.....</b>	<b>282</b>

*La integración fronteriza, más allá de tener una concreción bilateralmente o en el marco de los esquemas de integración subregional, debe ser reconocida como una política de integración regional de América Latina y el Caribe.*  
(SELA, 2012, p. 69)

## INTRODUCTION

### 1 Presenting the thesis

Nearly the entire scholarship of the incipient literature dedicated to the extensive study of the Brazilian-Uruguayan New Agenda for Cooperation and Border Development (hereafter New Agenda) (SANTOS; SANTOS, 2005; AVEIRO, 2006; NAVARRETE, 2006; PUCCI, 2010; RÓTULO; DAMIANI, 2010; RÓTULO, 2012; LEMOS, 2013; RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014; CLEMENTE; MALLMANN, 2017; MALLMANN; CLEMENTE, 2017), understood as a means to foster international regionalism, recognize the promotion of cross-border cooperation through a complex bilateral endeavor to be a response to local demands, ending a historical period of neglect and oblivion toward this cross-border region. Nevertheless, they also identify numerous difficulties on its operationalization processes, which resulted in the lack of practical outcomes. The literature underlines three main reasons for this, **(1)** specificities of local dynamics or culture; **(2)** complications of public policies implementation systems in an international environment; and **(3)** infrastructure limitations of local municipalities and departments.

After 15 years since the signature of the so-called 'Border Agreement' that originated the New Agenda, the evidence of the problems concerning the operationalization processes of this norm-making bilateral relationship is clear, especially regarding the participation of local actors. The comprehensive analysis of Rótulo *et al.* (2014) on the capacities of the New Agenda institutionalities from 2002 to 2012 (its most prolific period) demonstrates that only 33% of actors within the Brazilian municipal level have participated in projects in the scope of the bilateral plan. This number decreases to 31% concerning actors within the Uruguayan departmental level. Local civil society actors and unions have had respectively 7% and 6% of participation in projects. The Uruguayan local level presented staggering 2% of engagement in the discussion, creation, and/or operationalization of the New Agenda projects (Section 3.5). In other words, local participation or *engagement* have been scarce. The lack of continuity in projects' execution processes have also been problematic. Aveiro (2006), Pucci (2010), Rótulo; Damiani (2010), Rótulo (2012), and Rótulo *et al.* (2014) show an elevated number of

cases of forgotten projects, agreements, and even overlooked official representative bodies, specially at the local level. This means that, even when local actors participated in operationalizing projects, a substantial number of them was simply abandoned along the way. As demonstrated by the same authors, it was likewise not uncommon the non-compliance or simply the non-employment of a range of bilateral agreements, particularly in the accords regulating the utilization of Uruguayan doctors in Brazilian territory and on the work, study, and residence permit for border populations<sup>2</sup>. Another identified obstacle to the operationalization of the New Agenda's projects and agreements is the high degree of informality and illegality to the extent that activities operating apart from the rule of law could be considered a 'common trait' in this cross-border region (MAZZEI, 2002; MACHADO, 2005; HOFFMANN *et al.*, 2008; PUCCI, 2010; ALVAREZ; SALLA, 2013; MAZZEI, 2013; DORFMAN *et al.*, 2014).

Although the scholarship considers the New Agenda a state response to the historical obliviousness of the Bucbr, local actors seemed to have embraced neither its policies nor the bilateral framework created by Brazil and Uruguay into their daily practices, which leads to the raising of the following question:

- *If the New Agenda is a response to local demands, why was/is there such low engagement and compliance of local actors with its projects and agreements?*

A careful analysis of the scholarship permits the identification of two basic, deep-rooted explanations that deal, in different degrees and perspectives, with the problem of low engagement in and compliance with New Agenda's projects and agreements by local actors. **(1)** The *structural explanation* identifies the lack of work, human, and financial capacities hindering local level governments and other actors to profit from or engage on the new cooperative framework. Such a perspective can be found in Rótulo and Damiani (2010), Rótulo (2012), and Rótulo *et al.* (2014) and is corroborated by sectorial analyses on health (GUIMARÃES; GIOVANELLA, 2005; SILVA; SILVA, 2009; BONTEMPO, 2012; SCHERMA; OLIVEIRA, 2014) and education (BEHARES, 2010; OLVERA; VIERA, 2015). Here, institutional factors are also key for understanding the difficulties of furthering cooperation and development in the Bucbr. **(2)** The *cultural explanation*

---

<sup>2</sup> **(A)** *Engagement* is here defined as 'being involved with' or 'participating in'. It refers to the practical participation of local actors in the making of projects within the new Agenda. **(B)** *Compliance* refers to the practice of 'following rules or regulations' established by the norms derived from bilateral agreements of the New Agenda.

refers to the historical development of a ‘border culture’ or custom that would be opposite to a law-abiding behavior and would diffuse the limit between legal and illegal, which would require surveillance and control by the state and national governments. This approach is key in the elementary work by Pucci (2010) and is shared by some experts studying other dynamics of this cross-border region (MACHADO, 2000; BETANCOR, 2008; DORFMAN *et al.*, 2014; ALMEIDA, 2015). Such detailed and meticulous approaches centered their analyses either on the role of the State or the governmental contours of the Brazilian-Uruguayan bilateral efforts concerning their shared border.

Based on such discussions and perspectives, this thesis works with two hypotheses (and their respective counter-hypotheses), understood to be plausible answers to the research problem:

- **Hypothesis 1:** The lack of institutional and infrastructural resources diminishes the capacity of local actors to engage and comply (or to maintain engagement and compliance) with the implementation of projects and on the operationalization of agreements.
- **Counter-hypothesis 1:** The lack of institutional and infrastructural resources does not decrease the capacity of engagement and compliance, but local actors would prefer to continue applying techniques of trans-local interaction and cross-border cooperation through informality and illegality.
- **Hypothesis 2:** There are no specific advantages for local actors to engage with the New Agenda, despite what scholars affirm, which would indicate that the New Agenda is not a response to local demands, but an agenda *about* (not *for*) the border.
- **Counter-hypothesis 2:** There are clear advantages in implementing projects and operationalizing agreements of the New Agenda to local actors, but the ‘border culture’ hinders the application of such complicated accords.

This thesis aims at examining the processes of the New Agenda from a bottom-up perspective, that is, from the viewpoint of local-level actors. It focuses specifically on the region denominated Brazilian-Uruguayan Cross-Border Region (hereafter Bucbr), understood as the set of six cross-border urban complexes distributed along the borderline (known in most texts as ‘twin-towns’), in the span of the last fifteen years. The object of this investigation is Brazilian and Uruguayan (key) local actors’ perceptions on the operationalization processes of the New Agenda. To answer the question, *this thesis seeks*

*to identify Bucbr local actors' perceptions on the operationalization of the New Agenda.* To accomplish this objective, it aims **(1)** at comprehending the historical development of the relationship between state, normative, regulatory processes, actors, and institutions operating in and deciding about the Bucbr, and local socio-political dynamics and actors in the region. **(2)** It seeks to analyze the political relations among actors and institutions involved in, as well as the administrative structures regarding the Bucbr, all of which led to the creation and later operationalization of the New Agenda. **(3)** It aims at exploring local contexts of political, economic, and social relations within each of the six cross-border complexes of the Bucbr. The guiding thread for the completion of such objectives is the understanding of the New Agenda as a means to further regionalism through bilateral cooperation. This study is not about the local responses to the application of public policies in a cross-border social environment, but about local perceptions on the employment of a regional strategy at the local level of two national structures.

The theoretical and conceptual aspects that concern this question are developed from the standpoint of the International Relations (IR), understood as a pluralistic subfield of the Social Sciences. The relative autonomous sub-subfield of International Regionalism or International Political Economy (IPE) is the place from which this investigation departs. To follow the path opened by the mentioned inquiry, this thesis tackles positions between distinct IR theoretical perspectives and draws other elements and viewpoints from History, Sociology, Political Geography, and Human Geography, applying them into a historical analysis of International Regionalism theory. This work also applies the comparative regionalism framework under a reflectivist and constructivist approach. The framework of comparative regionalism acknowledges the consolidation of regions as a primary means to deal with global affairs. It also focuses on the interactions of state and non-state actors in a multilevel perspective. The reflectivist and constructivist standpoint was inspired by ideas from constructivist, critical and post-modern theories, in which material and ideational factor intertwine, making possible the use of *perception* as a relevant analytical element. Some of its foundations were designed by Björn Hettne, from the University of Gothenburg, during the emergence of the period denominated 'new regionalism', and was much developed particularly by Fredrik Söderbaum, from whose ideas this thesis draws a great part. *The first chapter* of this thesis focuses on the historical development of regionalism scholarship concerning each theory's comprehension of both formal and informal dynamics, of border, and of the building process of a (cross-border)



region, including the place of perceptions within each theoretical approach (or the lack thereof). The development of constructivist and reflectivist scholarship is detailed and later discussed within the choice of the study object.

Following the development of a conceptual framework under the chosen theoretical approach is the historical analysis on the relationship between bilateral (sometimes trilateral) regulatory processes concerning the border of Brazil and Uruguay and the implications on local socio-political dynamics within the Bucbr. Such a historical chronology dates back to the last centuries of the colonial period in South America until most recent times, which in the case of this research is mid-2017. Historical contextualization is key for covering the origins of the relationship between local, informal actors and governmental, normative, formal processes – a nexus introjected in the perceptions of actors involved. For this purpose, this thesis draws from extensive bibliography on the (micro and macro) regional history of the Bucbr, on South American regional relations (especially intra-Southern Cone relations), and on Brazilian and Uruguayan foreign policy developments. *Chapter 2* presents the historical reconstitution on the relationship between bilateral regulatory processes concerning the border of Brazil and Uruguay and the implications on local socio-political dynamics within the construction of a Bucbr. It lays the relational foundation on which perceptions of local actors are built and on which Brazil and Uruguay constructed their bilateral relationship.

The last fifteen years of the New Agenda, its (non)working institutionalities, its agreements, projects, and actors involved, as well as the national frameworks encompassed in this intricate bilateral agenda about the Bucbr is examined in *Chapter 3*. A more detailed account on the creation and operationalization of the New Agenda is developed in this part of the thesis. Here, structural and cultural elements intertwine in a complex set of institutions, ideas, and interests. The institutional limitations of the New Agenda are thus studied in the light of both explanations, serving as pillars for the socio-political and economic realities experienced by local actors.

As perceptions are deeply rooted in the personal experience of local actors, their ideas and values, identities and interests – all built within the scope of their social interactions, *Chapter 4* presents a more nuanced, detailed context of local realities of the six cross-border urban complexes of the Bucbr. The study of a panorama of local, informal, cross-border relations (the so-called trans-local interactions) helps on identifying the local conditions (and actors) that were met by the policymakers of the

New Agenda. The transformations or stagnations of such conditions are valuable data on the local experiences under the New Agenda and of probable perceptions of local actors.

The *fifth and last chapter* analyzes perceptions of local actors of the Brazilian-Uruguayan cross-border region regarding the operationalization of the New Agenda within the multiple socio-political and economic contexts of the region. Perceptions are analyzed according to the two explanations (structural and cultural) on the reasons for low engagement and low compliance of local actors. Here, structural and cultural accounts are visible in local actors' interpretations of the fifteen years of this bilateral agenda.

**Map 1 The Brazilian-Uruguayan cross-border region**



Source: the author (2017).

## 2 The Brazilian-Uruguayan cross-border region and the New Agenda

The Eastern Republic of Uruguay and the Federative Republic of Brazil share a 1067-kilometer-long international border, from the Chuí stream to the Quaraí river mouth into Uruguay river. From this, 320 kilometers constitute a ‘dry border’. The remaining part is delineated by rivers, streams, or lagoons. The main physical-geographic characteristic of this international border is the absence of important landforms impeding or hindering the free circulation of people (RÓTULO; DAMIANI, 2010). But *what is the Bucbr? Map 1* (previous page) shows the demarcated area (Bucbr) based on three elements that can define the politico-geographical delimitation of this cross-border region. **(1) Socio-historical factors:** the area in which one can attest the historical development of intense cross-border interactions among local urban and rural populations; **(2) Political factors:** the area on which Brazil and Uruguay focused to cooperate in and legislate about (and later create the New Agenda); **(3) (Macro) regional factors:** the area in which one can identify the highest levels of current infrastructural interconnection, such as roads, bridges, squares, and powerlines between Brazil and Uruguay (and Argentina).

Regarding socio-historical factors, several authors (PEDRÓN, 1970; SCHRODER *et al.*, 2006; KÜHN, 2007; MACHADO *et al.*, 2009; PUCCI, 2010; RODRÍGUEZ, 2010) describe a series of villages and towns to be central in the dynamics within the so-called Platine region, particularly in the formation of the current borderline between Brazil and Uruguay. Among them, six small and medium-sized binational ‘cross-border urban complexes’ (hereafter UCs) positioned along the borderline had stood out. UCs are partially integrated neighboring towns founded in both sides of the international border (DILLA, 2008; 2015). As years passed, Quaraí (BR) – Artigas (UY); Santana do Livramento (BR) – Rivera (UY); Aceguá (BR) – Aceguá (UY); Barra do Quaraí (BR) – Bella Unión (UY); Jaguarão (BR) – Rio Branco (UY); and Chuí (BR) – Chuy (UY) developed *sui generis* informal cooperation strategies, building up complementary local economic systems and a set of daily social interactive practices (MAZZEI, 2013)<sup>3</sup>.

---

<sup>3</sup> The literature often uses alternatively the term ‘twin-towns’. This term is a designation given by the national governments of Brazil (BR) and Uruguay (UY) to urban complexes developed on both sides of the border (BÜHRING, 2015). The Brazilian Ministry of National Integration (MNI), through Ministerial Order n. 125 (21/03/2014), defined twin-towns: “*os municípios*

Considering political factors, the definition of such complexes as important hubs to implement public policies and create cooperative strategies within the ‘Border Strip’ Brazilian Program (MINISTÉRIO DA INTEGRAÇÃO, 2009; NEVES *et al.*, 2016), and the definition of those towns as target for the creation of a model of juridical regulation that could serve as an archetypal configuration for all the internal borders of Mercosur, which functioned within a range of 20 kilometers from the borderline (SANTOS; SANTOS, 2005; AVEIRO, 2006; PUCCI, 2010) delineated important geographical and political limits<sup>4</sup>. The referred UCs, in all their similarities and discrepancies, both as complexes and as neighboring towns, have had many alterations in their political environment insofar dozens of binational agreements and regional discussions could directly affect the functioning dynamics at the local level. The accords have aimed at the UCs as the main *loci* for social and economic development policies, dealing with issues related to health, sanitation, police, residence, study, labor, and other areas, according to local demands. This had stimulated debates among social groups and exchanges of ideas at the local level, and not rarely, in concertation with other spheres of national and subnational governments from both countries, as well as of Mercosur representatives. Moreover, the engendering process of this set of accords has been followed by changes within the Uruguayan governance framework, triggering a process of decentralization of decision-making and of political administration (CLEMENTE; NÍLSON, 2012). In the same period, Brazil focused its social and economic development program toward some of the demands from bordering communities, emphasizing a ‘positive agenda’ for cross-border regions as part of a Brazilian strategy of international insertion within the perspective of South American cooperation (GADELHA; COSTA, 2007; MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, 2015a).

The regional factors analysis on infrastructural interconnections in the context of the Southern Cone trade exchange places the Brazilian-Uruguayan complexes at the core

---

*cortados pela linha de fronteira, seja essa seca ou fluvial, articulada ou não por obra de infraestrutura, que apresentem grande potencial de integração econômica e cultural, podendo ou não apresentar uma conurbação ou semi-conurbação com uma localidade do país vizinho, assim como manifestações "condensadas" dos problemas característicos da fronteira, que aí adquirem maior densidade, com efeitos diretos sobre o desenvolvimento regional e a cidadania”* (Art. 1). They cannot have population inferior to 2000 inhabitants (Art. 2) (MINISTÉRIO DA INTEGRAÇÃO, 2014, p. 45).

<sup>4</sup> As displayed on *Map 1*, the 20-Km limit was not applied in the circumscription of the Bucru due to the surpassing key interactions occurring under the local logics of cross-border regionalism. See Chapter, 3, Section 3.5 and Chapter 4 for more details.

of what Braga *et al.* (2016) denominate transnational urban systems of Mercosurian road networks. The authors explain: “Spreading from Salto, it [the urban network] encompasses the most part of Uruguay/Brazil borderland attesting its porosity, intensive interchanges and conurbation processes that enhances the urban network importance in structuring and controlling cross-border flows” (BRAGA *et al.*, 2016, p. 116). This turns the idea of the economic irrelevance of border regions *vis-à-vis* Mercosur upside-down insofar it considers not the local socio-economic indices to determine the importance and participation of border regions within both domestic and regional spheres, but the position in which UCs are for the development of such enterprises. This idea is corroborated by the last decade’s centrality of the Bucbr in national and international cooperation strategies of Brazil and Uruguay (and by other strategies of creating cross-border regions, particularly between Argentina and Brazil).

It has been fifteen years since the signature of the New Agenda for Cooperation and Border Development, in 2002, which placed the Brazilian-Uruguayan cross-border region in the spotlight as an important space for the engenderment of bilateral and regional settlements and is considered a milestone in institutionalized border relations in the South American continent. The period of 2003-2017 proved to be extremely fruitful regarding the progress of bilateral agreements between Brazil and Uruguay, being marked by the emergence of what Santos and Santos (2005) called a new paradigm of cross-border relations in Mercosur. The Brazilian-Uruguayan border and the Bucbr became central objects of negotiation toward the advancement of bilateral relations, as it did the interactions happening in local level. It is important to note, however, the effort needed to not romanticize cooperative processes in cross-border regions, as commonly and mistakenly done in the end of the 1990s by Social Sciences scholars. As highlighted by Grimson and Vila (2002, p. 75) in their analysis on conflictive circumstances in South American and US-Mexico borders, “in the midst of a regional integration process that was supposed to make borders disappear, the characteristics of the national frontiers continue to be redefined through this tension among border populations, and between them and the national state”. A myriad of actors, institutions, ideas, and interests coexist in a multiescalar cooperative process, which can sometimes either deter or escalate conflict, locally, domestically, and internationally. As emphasized by Söderbaum (2004; 2013), the formation of a region is uneven; it can be made and unmade as actors

interrelate. The study of (micro) regionalism in the Bucbr is thus the empirical observation of such processes.

### **3 Theoretical and methodological remarks, and fieldwork description in the study of perceptions in international regionalism research**

The reasons for choosing a reflectivist and constructivist approach within IR theoretical landscape are numerous. While constructivism sustains the notion of a continuous (de)construction of a region based on the *institutions, actors, and ideas* triad (RIGGIROZZI, 2012), reflectivism conceives interests of actors from their ideas, beliefs, interactions, identities, and contexts. It enables the employment of ‘perception’ as a relevant variable in IR. It understands regionalism as a multifaceted phenomenon involving interests of both state and non-state actors that, by interacting to one another, construct regional reality (SÖDERBAUM, 2004; 2013). It acknowledges regionalist dynamics through different scales of social reality (*e.g.* the study of a cross-border region under a ‘bigger’, bilateral or regional scenario), reducing the gap between the macro and micro levels of the regionalist phenomenon (SÖDERBAUM, 2005). It recognizes the importance of past experiences (history) in the building process of a region (DABÈNE, 2009). Lastly, it provides detachment from the rationalist approaches and their tendency towards formalism (SÖDERBAUM, 2016) (*i.e.* focus on state institutions) – which has been the main theoretical inclination in the study of the New Agenda.

*Why study perceptions?* Social constructivism emphasizes the importance of both normative and material frameworks in the formation of mutual relations among agents and structures insofar both shape international behavior (BUENO, 2009). Norms can be defined as “a result of common practice among states” (GUROWITZ, 1999, p. 417), which can indicate that cooperative practices among two states has norm-making capacities. The political and ideological convergence of Brazil and Uruguay (RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014) that begot the creation of the New Agenda can thus be considered a normatization process since this bilateral framework for public policies’ construction produced an incredible amount of regulation on daily practices of border populations. By coordinating actions through chancelleries, the cited scholarship believes that the New Agenda also engendered a political environment privileging local negotiation and operationalization of projects, which would likewise set a standard for local cooperation

practices. Norms can also be understood, from the perspective of social practices, “as shared (thus social) understandings of standards for behavior”, as defined by Klotz (1995, p. 14). The ‘border culture’ on which Pucci (2010) focuses his explanation on the roots of operationalization issues of the New Agenda can be understood as ‘local standards’ that do not always concur to existing laws, regulations, or to international political environments, but to practices that refer to a trans-local logic. Hence, the New Agenda operationalization processes have evinced the conflict between state normatization and local practices. As a dynamic process that entails continuous multiescalar negotiation and is based on ‘umbrella agreements’ (general framework of intentions), the New Agenda has specialized in creating what Burgemeestre *et al.* (2014) refer to as ‘open norms’: general guidelines that require constant translation into concrete rules or constraints, and continual interpretation and evaluation of the implementation in a certain context, to assure that locals will comply/follow/change behavior because of them.

Assuming that the New Agenda’s operationalization issues and the low engagement of local actors are not related to material limitations (as it was overlooked by Pucci [2010]), the proper functioning of the bilateral engenderment thus would have presented two corollaries: **(1)** a (micro) social context that would have enforced local actors to do according to the ‘new’ norms (GEZELIUS, 2002), which seems not to be the case (in consonance with the cited literature); or **(2)** a degree of acceptability of such norms, based on different perceptions (or intersubjective interpretations) on the norms and/or on the normative system that is being produced (New Agenda). Such perceptions become visible on daily practices and on discourse (BJÖRKDAHL, 2002). If the problem of engagement and participation lies in material or infrastructural constraints, local actors’ perceptions will be inclined to criticize the set of policies and the functioning processes using such arguments. If they are based on the local inability to engage or comply with such open-norms, it is expected that local actors will ground their perceptions more on local *modus operandi* and contexts and less on structural or formal dynamics of the New Agenda.

Geography instructs that ‘scale’ is a central element for representing reality (RACINE *et al.*, 1980) – an analytical artifice that makes ‘the real’ discernible and outlines the empirical field and analytical possibilities of research (CASTRO, 2000). Considering that the New Agenda involved a myriad of actors from the local, national, international, and regional levels, this thesis acknowledges the multiescalar character of

the bilateral plan, as recognized by Lemos and Rückert (2015 p. 162): “A *multiescalaridade da Nova Agenda para Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Fronteiriço se acentua por se tratar de uma política relativa à fronteira, elemento no qual confluem com maior intensidade atores das escalas internacional, nacional e local*”. Hence the importance of emphasizing the local contexts from which numerous demands depart and accentuate the interconnections of national, international, and (macro) regional scales.

As demonstrated in Section 2 of this Introduction, the New Agenda alone does not constitute the Bucbr, neither do state actors involved in such a formalized framework, even though it is a key (*de jure*) process in the region’s formation process. This requires looking at the micro-relations that constitute the *de facto* regionalist dynamics, understood here as trans-local social interactions within cross-border urban complexes. The formal-informal distinction becomes key in this research insofar it can reveal a myriad of actors and processes within and beyond institutional frameworks. In the context of international regionalism, a formal interaction is any interaction between states happening within their institutional structure, which follows a predetermined process toward envisaged cooperation or integration (and it is led by an ideology or agenda). An informal interaction is either a problem-solving interaction that extrapolates (or is independent of) statist institutional structures, or a spontaneous interaction of non-state actors without any prearranged objectives (also named *de facto* regionalism or regionalization) (DE LOMBAERDE *et al.*, 2010). Formal regionalism concerns state cooperative/integrative relations based on official agenda; informal regionalism relates to problem-solving or spontaneous interactions among non-state actors occurring in response to, despite of, or beyond formal regional processes.

The sub-field of IPE is lacking in understanding local or micro dynamics involving international regionalism as well as a more nuanced analysis on cross-border regions. Even more so considering the *ensemble* of IR theory. To study local, social dynamics of the Bucbr in its entirety is not, however, a feasible enterprise. For this reason, this thesis focuses on perceptions of local actors as a primary variable and understands both local and bilateral contexts as secondary, contextual data. Berger and Luckmann (1966) and Searle (1995) highlight that people construct social reality through the transformation of the material world and through the understanding and perceptions of it. The empirical reality of international regionalism thus can be analyzed through the



perceptions that such actors have on the operationalization process of the New Agenda in their local reality.

Based on constructivist and reflectivist ontological assumptions, *perception is here defined as a socially intersubjective structure comprising beliefs and ideas, which in turn beget identities and interests that ground peoples' interpretations of reality*. How people understand and interpret social facts is an intersubjective process, which means that all interests, ideas, identities, and beliefs within perception can be understood only in an ever-changing relational context and not isolated from social context and material settings. A hierarchy of perception is found on Adler (1997) and Collin (1997): social reality – that is, relationships and the knowledge in which they occur – is the basis to one's beliefs and ideas about the world. Such ideas and beliefs form one's identities and interests, which constitutes one's interpretations of such a reality (see Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1).

*Semi-structured interviews with key actors of all the six cross-border urban complexes* as the main methodological procedure for identifying perceptions are, thus, organized in three sections of questions. The first part explores the context in which respondents are found: who they are, what they do and how they do it, and what is their relation to the cross-border urban complex and to the New Agenda operationalization processes. The second section focuses on respondents' perceptions *vis-à-vis* the New Agenda. The third part asks about the trans-local interactions within the UC. Respondents were firstly located through official channels (local governments' and local organizations' websites or phone directories, as well as minutes/documents of cross-border meetings organized by local governments/New Agenda). Two other concomitant recruitment strategies were put in motion: scholars working on the theme of Brazilian-Uruguayan border relations indicated potential subjects; respondents nominated potential informants. The latter, known as 'snowball sampling' (or 'chain referral sampling'), was key in identifying actors engendering horizontal, trans-local interactions within UCs (given the informal, tacit, and personal nature of such intercommunications)<sup>5</sup>. In the

---

<sup>5</sup> Disadvantages of snowball sampling are known to be: (1) the lack of control over the sampling method; (2) problems with the representativeness of the sample; and (3) sample bias, due to the tendency by the subject of nominating people with a high degree of acquaintanceship (BIERNACKI; WALDORF, 1981) To diminish the impact of such problems, respondents were asked to give names of people who agreed with them and people who opposed their positions on the themes asked. Also, the monitoring of data was constant in the entirety of fieldwork, assuring that respondents were relevant subjects for the objectives of this thesis. In addition, the non-

second phase of this research, respondents were given a questionnaire to answer. A dual-mode strategy (E-mail and telephone) and a follow-up process achieved a 51.5% response rate (33 respondents from a total of 64 subjects).

As shown in *Table 1*, subjects were organized in four categories: **(1) Local society actors** refer to social organizations (labor unions or associations); **(2) Local government actors** are municipal or departmental administration officers, at Executive or Legislative spheres; **(3) National government actors** are representatives of Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Brazil and Uruguay; **(4) Decentralized national government actors** refer to the officials working within the Ministry of Social Development of Uruguay (MIDES), which employs a dispersed organogram within the departments facing the Brazilian territory, attending both Uruguayans and Brazilians in their need to integrate to the border communities. Fieldwork has been developed in three trips to the Bucbr. The first fieldtrip took place in May 2015 under exploratory purposes, aiming at acknowledging social reality at the border and verifying previous research assumptions. The second and third trips to the Bucbr occurred in February and March 2017 and comprised all six cross-border urban complexes of the Bucbr. Interviews and non-participatory observations took place based on the conceptual framework and research problems discussed hitherto.

**Table 1 Classification of respondents by UC<sup>6</sup>**

Type of actor	B-B	Q-A	S-R	A-A	J-R	C-C	Total	%
Local society	4	1	8	0	5	1	19	29.7
Local government	7	5	5	6	6	5	34	53.1
National government	0	1	1	1	0	1	4	6.2
Decentralized national gov.	0	2	3	0	1	1	7	10.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>Percentage</b>	<b>17%</b>	<b>14%</b>	<b>27%</b>	<b>11%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>12%</b>	<b>100%</b>	

Source: the author (2017).

exclusive use of this method compensates the lack of control. Lastly, the constructivist account on snowball sampling considers it to be more than mere instrumental means, but also an important procedure that “entails knowledge *in and of itself*. Snowball sampling [...] is *essentially social* because it both uses and activates existing [organic] social networks.” (NOY, 2008, p. 332).

<sup>6</sup> The cross-border urban complexes (UCs) of the Bucbr are encoded in this table as follows: Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión (B-B); Quaraí-Artigas (Q-A); Santana do Livramento-Rivera (S-R); Aceguá-Aceguá (A-A); Jaguarão-Rio Branco (J-R); and Chuí-Chuy (C-C).

*Table 1* (previous page) also presents the classification of respondents by UC, and the distribution by the four categories of types of actors. From all the 64 subjects interviewed, 39 (61%) are Brazilian representatives and 25 (39%) are Uruguayan actors. Being aware of such deficit of Uruguayan subjects, this research also relied on previous interviews carried on by the International Relations and Organizations Study Nucleus (NEROI, in Portuguese) at PUCRS under the supervision of Maria Izabel Mallmann, who applied semi-structured interviews to ten other Uruguayan local representatives in 2013 and 2014. The concentration on representatives of local actors (82.8%) is noticeably related to the objective of knowing *local* actors' perceptions. The deep roots in the border territory by the MIDES also justifies the 10.9% of respondents of decentralized national government actors. The 6.2% of national government actors were interviewed to examine the (past and current) governmental views on the New Agenda *vis-à-vis* the existent literature. It is important to acknowledge that representatives of local government actors, in the context of the urban centers within the Bucbr, normally develop another career (particularly related to commerce or health services). They are not solely professional politicians, or at least they maintain close connections to other occupations. During interviews, such actors tended to use both positions to bring examples about the themes under discussion. The *ediles* (Uruguayan department councilors) are professionals who perform a *pro bono*, part-time legislature, not being entitled to stipend or any financial resources, which requires the continuation of their professions. In the cases of Aceguá-Aceguá and Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión, where municipal administration is still incipient, politics *als Beruf* is likewise in embryonic state.

The difficulty to find local actors aware of the Brazilian-Uruguayan New Agenda was both a procedure issue and a significant data to take into consideration. People did not know about the New Agenda or simply disregarded it in their daily activities. As interviews were executed, however, it was clear that most local subjects in fact knew about and worked in/on the New Agenda without naming it so, but sometimes embracing it as part of Mercosurian policies. This indicated that the pulverized character of the bilateral agenda made local actors perceive it to be either as isolated attempts of fostering localized cross-border interactions or as short-term coordinated actions in the scope of Mercosur (and not as a continuous, large-scale promotion of bilateral agreements for the deepening of formal cooperation and for border region development).

*Table 2* refers to the second section of the interviews concerning the identification of perceptions on operationalization processes of the New Agenda. Perceptions are categorized under the positive-negative dichotomy and divided by structural factors and cultural elements. To support the data extracted from these categories during interviews, this thesis also applies an electronic questionnaire (Appendix B) with subjects chosen. Its purpose is to make comparisons available, supporting (or not) the hypotheses raised and giving clarity to points requiring further explanations. The electronic questionnaire was built to contrast both hypotheses, clarifying levels of acceptance to one or the other premise, or neither. Due to time and funding-related issues, not all interviewees answered the questionnaire, and not all the questionnaire respondents were interviewed, in which case both instruments are complementary to each other. Given the sensitive nature of the theme, respondents were concerned with having their identities revealed. This research thus applied a total confidential approach, providing respondents to speak freely about the (non)working process of governmental structures.

**Table 2 Categories of perceptions on the New Agenda**

	POSITIVE PERCEPTIONS	NEGATIVE PERCEPTIONS
STRUCTURAL EXPLANATION	1. Proper local infrastructure;	5. Inappropriate local infrastructure;
	2. Advances in formal cooperation;	6. Problems in formal cooperation;
	3. Proper functioning of governmental structures;	7. Malfunctioning of governmental structures;
	4. Productive vertical relations.	8. Unproductive vertical relations.
CULTURAL EXPLANATION	9. Proper demand incorporation;	11. Unfitting demand incorporation;
	10. Beneficial normatization.	12. Disadvantageous normatization.

Source: the author (2017).

As previously mentioned, social constructivism clarifies that perceptions do not float in the air but are part of the building dynamics of social reality, in which actors and institutions operate, based on beliefs, ideas, identities, and interests they have on and within the material reality. Hence, social, political, and economic contexts of key actors are important data for understanding perceptions. Such contextual, secondary data is

searched in two fronts: the application of (1) *non-participatory, general observation* (as well as *bibliographic research*), focusing on qualitative variables, as developed by Dilla (2015) – sharing of the same environment (geographical proximity); spatial configurations (local intersection roles); primary social relations between populations (crossings, exchanges, and sharing); economic interdependence (economic interpenetration of one city to the other); mutual need perception (the perception of beneficial, necessary relationship to the neighbor); and local institutionalized cooperation (established arrangements among local governments); and (2) the use of *official economic and social data*, focusing on local or micro-regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP); Human Development Index (HDI), Population, and other indicators.

#### **4 The importance of perceptions and the New Agenda: a research justification**

The relevance of this research lies in theoretical ground and in *praxis*. Previous works focusing on the New Agenda have applied diversified theories from Political Science, International Relations, and Geography. They all have, however, applied an institutionalist (or formalist) approach, which despite its obvious analytical strengths, tends to formalize explanations to social phenomena, leaving many informal aspects of international regionalism out of the picture. The application of a bottom-up approach rooted in the scholarship of Comparative Regionalism in a constructivist and reflectivist conceptual framework gives the possibility of a comprehensive analysis on the New Agenda from the viewpoint of non-state actors. The focus on the trans-local context and on perceptions of key actors is also capable of bringing the border into the center of the analysis.

The social ontology of constructivism and reflectivism holds that institutions, actors, and ideas intertwine in the building and consolidation of a region (RIGGIROZZI, 2012). In this approach, regions can be formal and/or informal social constructions with spatial dimensionality (Chapter 1, Section 1.1). Considering the Bucbr as an informal sub-region within Mercosur, for instance, can be important for understanding some informal dynamics of the regional organism. This research, then, can serve as basis for future investigation on the relationship between state dynamics and non-state processes within the Mercosurian (formalized and institutionalized) region. It can also serve as indicator of the level of ‘regionness’ in Mercosur, insofar the approach applied here

considers that both formal and informal regions and interactions are encompassed within regionness in such a way regionness can be understood as a level of merging of formal and informal. Hence, understanding the informal dynamics of a region makes possible, for further research, to shed light on the obstacles and capabilities of the formal framework.

Concerning *praxis*, this research can provide data for sound policymaking by ‘giving voice to local actors away from the *fora* of the New Agenda. Difficulties in listening to such local demands are apparent. This thesis can shed light upon part of this reality. Although the intention is not to map local networks or to fully apprehend socio-political contexts in cross-border urban complexes of the Bucbr, this thesis can provide a snapshot of reality by focusing on perceptions on the New Agenda within local contexts. If this thesis will be used for acknowledging one bit of intricate local perceptions on policymaking, this author will be humbly satisfied.

## **5 The scholarship on the New Agenda**

The still embryonic literature on the New Agenda is distributed among many of the Social Sciences, from Political Science to Geography, History, and Sociology, being somewhat concentrated on the subfield of International Relations. Only a few texts, however, analyze this bilateral endeavor as a unitary project embracing many sectors of social and economic development (SANTOS; SANTOS, 2005; AVEIRO, 2006; NAVARRETE, 2006; PUCCI, 2010; RÓTULO; DAMIANI, 2010; RÓTULO, 2012; LEMOS, 2013; RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014; CLEMENTE; MALLMANN, 2017). Most works, however, investigate certain aspects or sectors of this bilateral set of agreements, narrowing their analyses to short timeframes or to historical examinations of its formal processes (STEINKE, 2007; BETANCOR, 2008; DE LIMA; MOREIRA, 2009; SILVA; SILVA, 2009; BEHARES, 2010; BENTANCOR, 2010; CLEMENTE, 2010; RODRÍGUEZ, 2010; SILVA, 2011; BONTEMPO, 2012; BONTEMPO; NOGUEIRA, 2012; BOÉSSIO *et al.*, 2012; CLEMENTE; NÍLSON, 2012; LUCENA, 2012; LEMOS; RÜCKERT, 2014; SCHERMA; OLIVEIRA, 2014; ALMEIDA, 2015; BÜHRING, 2015; DORFMAN, 2015; SAN MARTIN; SCHMIDT, 2015; SPANIOL, 2015; STRUMINSKI, 2015b; TAKS; CHABALGOITY, 2015; COMUNELLO, 2016; DINIS; SILVA, 2016;

MESQUITA; GABRIEL, 2016), which indicates the intricacy of this regionalist project and the considerable amount of work and time needed to investigate it.

Without providing an exhaustive bibliographic survey, this section aims at analyzing the works addressing the New Agenda as a comprehensive set of bilateral agreements and projects (SANTOS; SANTOS, 2005; AVEIRO, 2006; NAVARRETE, 2006; PUCCI, 2010; RÓTULO; DAMIANI, 2010; RÓTULO, 2012; LEMOS, 2013; RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014; CLEMENTE; MALLMANN, 2017) and the explanations they can provide to the problem of low engagement and compliance of local actors. It begins with the *incontournable*, in-depth, and basilar book on the New Agenda, *O Estatuto da Fronteira Brasil-Uruguaí*, by Adriano Silva Pucci (2010). Pucci (2010) develops a meticulous analysis on the governmental contours of the Brazilian-Uruguayan bilateral relations that engendered national norms regarding border issues. His radiography of this norm-making process is based on rich historiography, extensive documentation, and careful fieldwork, giving full account on the *institutional* dynamics of the bilateral relations concerning the border areas. It also comprehends some implications for Mercosur, for the advancement of regional cooperation, and for citizenship of local populations. According to the author, the Bucbr is a space where both governments do not foster cooperation. They attempt to catch up to it. With the New Agenda, Brazilian and Uruguayan governments would try to not only organize the preexistent integration at the referred border, but to offer a *quid pro quo* to the penurious, underdeveloped local populations: citizenship (understood as the classic set of rights and duties but changing in its nature)<sup>7</sup>. The attempt to create a border statute, Pucci (2010, p. 194) infers, is the recognition that local, border demands should come before the ‘big subjects’ of regional cooperation, which would highlight the Bucbr’s nature as ‘laboratory’ for Mercosurian regionalism (SCHULTZ, 2009)<sup>8</sup>. The author then identifies many *hindrances in the path toward formalized cooperation, precisely the localist and informal cross-border practices*. A historically built ‘border culture’ would misread bilateral agreements and their operationalization, a situation that would require perpetual surveillance by the state,

---

<sup>7</sup> Pucci (2010) defines the ‘active citizenship’ to be the type of citizenship demanded by border populations, which would reclaim the acknowledgment by the state of the special conditions to exercise it, and the integration of national public policies. The border citizenship, the author claims, would require the accommodation of the needs of minorities, matters of territoriality and functionality that together could provide quality of life, toward a true Mercosurian citizenship.

<sup>8</sup> In this sense, it is interesting to reflect upon the answers this thesis enquiring reveals *vis-à-vis* the corollaries for Mercosur and its micro-regionalisms.

which should permanently work to promote discussion, operationalize regulation, and mobilize locals able to channel demands in the international sphere.

The focus restricted to state dynamics and statist norm-making capacities and limitations of this top-down approach, however, can produce some analytical discrepancies. It is not clear why the local culture would hamper New Agenda's operations, given it should be considered a response to local needs. The problem of compliance in Pucci (2010) lies thus in the deviant culture of the border citizen, who is always attempting to escape through alternative paths of illegality and/or informality. If one believes, however, that citizenship (a basic concept in his analysis) is indeed being rescaled to communities of other (non-national) scales, reterritorialized to the extent of questioning the role of territorial sovereignty and political loyalty, and reoriented towards other forms of political community (PURCELL, 2003), fostering an active, 'border citizenship' should not require, at first, state surveillance and control. It should require tools to facilitate residents' access to health, housing, education, and many other social goods. It should facilitate, to paraphrase Purcell (2003), the *right to the cross-border urban complexes* (UCs), to the global city. Hence, citizenship should not involve a proficient reading of bilateral agreements, but unrestricted access to services within the UCs. If local populations of the Bucbr are experiencing difficulties to adapt to the New Agenda, or if the border culture is obstructing its operationalization, the state is not responding to the immediate demands of such populations. On the contrary. Thus, the skillful analysis by Pucci (2010) seems to be exclusively concentrated on the governments' capabilities and deficiencies in advancing *their own agenda* of regional cooperation at the Bucbr, which in this case is done, in part, bilaterally. The lack of engagement by local actors could thus be understood under such terms. The 'cultural explanation' developed in the end of his study is a result of an analysis on the implementation of yet another state plan *about* the border (and not *for* the border). As his historical analysis demonstrates, the Bucbr is a *de facto* integrated space (but not *de jure*). This trans-local activity propelled state actions as to control and punish the marginalized practices of local populations throughout history. After 15 years, the continuous appetite to regulate and control seems to be again the case in the operationalization process of the New Agenda.

The early and succinct analysis of Santos and Santos (2005) acknowledges local specificities of the Bucbr and understands that a virtuous cycle of responding to local



demands and adapting to issues emerging from such a response is a necessary condition in the 'negotiation' towards a more integrated border in the juridical and social senses. The state should thus recognize the integrative reality of the Bucbr and create circumstances favouring social development of local populations. In other words, such a cycle would assure the constant and renewed engagement of local actors and could facilitate their acceptance of new laws and regulations, raising the level of compliance in the Bucbr. This positive feedback system could become, the authors state, a new paradigm of border relations. The idea of constant negotiation as enabler of further institutionalization of cross-border cooperation as the main character of the institutionality of the New Agenda is key in this bottom-up analysis. If the feedback system worked, the New Agenda would become a paradigm shift in border relations and in the promotion of regionalism within Mercosur.

Two Master theses on the topic are also noteworthy, given their originality and attempt to give full account on the New Agenda. The seminal research of Aveiro (2006) develops a detailed top-down approach focusing on the role of the state in the context of globalization, within which the border and cross-border interactions are affected by state actions and by regionalization dynamics. Presented as an insufficient albeit promising bilateral effort to create solutions to daily-life issues of the locals, the New Agenda was in its first years of implementation. Her analysis, however, already identifies difficulties in the *operationalization and acceptability* of many of its bilateral policies, especially the process that culminated in the issuing of the *Documento de Fronteira* (a residence, study, and work permit for populations within a radius of 20 kilometers from the borderline) as a relevant formal procedure and an enabler of citizen rights<sup>9</sup>. The lack of compliance by local actors is evident in Aveiro's (2006) work. Probable causes for this remained however obscure. The spatial analysis of Lemos (2013) focuses on identifying the territorial repercussions of the New Agenda, bringing thought-provoking elements from Political and Human Geography to the study of border relations. His work understands globalization as the driving force (1) for the emergence of Mercosur and its model of open regionalism; (2) for the decentralization reform of Brazilian and

---

<sup>9</sup> The Border Document was the capstone of a problem that started in Chuí, in 2002. Illegal Uruguayans living in Brazilian territory within Chuí municipality were evicted from their houses and expelled back to Uruguay, in an action that generated political discomfort and a bilateral crisis. National authorities worked to end the crisis and find a permanent solution to the matter (INTERVIEW #53, 2017, oral information).

Uruguayan states; and **(3)** for the rise of trade and cultural interchange in the Bucbr. The New Agenda is considered primarily a state response to local demands. The role of national actors in the furthering of social development is thus key in the institutionalization process of the New Agenda. Nevertheless, Lemos (2013) refers to a bottom-up movement of demand channeling, emphasizing local interest to foster cooperation. Despite recognizing institutional deficiencies in the operationalization of the New Agenda, local engagement is considered to be one of the main sources of this new type of bilateral engenderment. The New Agenda is thus pictured as a means to reach out to local demands and desires. The author acknowledges, however, the trans-local activities of cooperation as occurring only in the 1980s with the creation of the Border Committees, ignoring the already established and intensive cross-border interactions prior to that date. The reality of historical trans-local interactions, although acknowledged at some point of his analysis, served only as a background for the state's adaptation to such a persisting feature of the social and political environment of the Bucbr. This multiescalar approach to the New Agenda, although acknowledging local realities within the Bucbr, favors a formalist explanation to the bilateral arrangements, which this work seeks to avoid.

By basing their analysis on globalization, both authors capably explain some of the changes within state structures that allowed a novel approach to international border and to border populations. Nevertheless, the centrality of globalization as the key analytical concept to explain the driving forces acting at the border tends to disregard the historical relevance of the relationship between formal, state actors and structures and informal, local interactions of the Bucbr prior to what the authors call globalization (or at least diminish its importance), which ignores both structural and cultural explanations and benefits a more academic approach to the issue<sup>10</sup>. But as all works have identified, the persisting difficulties on operationalizing the New Agenda suggest that micro-regional history also plays a vital role in explaining such an intricate political and social process, offering more appropriate context. This thesis can fill such a historical gap related to the New Agenda, and by doing so, aggregate to their analyses as well as to

---

<sup>10</sup> The role of globalization in shaping the dynamics of border regions in the Southern Cone, particularly with the creation of the Mercosur is here acknowledged. For a more detailed analysis see Chapter 2, Section 2.4.

Pucci's (2010) investigation to, finally, shed light on the problems of engagement and compliance.

The comprehensive work of Rótulo and Damiani (2010) understands the New Agenda as an attempt of Brazilian and Uruguayan governments to channel all the demands from the Bucbr into a single institutionality to increase efficiency, trying to avoid the institutional mistakes of past policies. In their view, both governments had decided to manage border issues with more organic governance structures. Their conclusions are straightforward: the lack of institutional resources, at the national levels, and the lack of work, human, and financial capacities, at the local levels, remained an issue. Instability and low efficiency undermined the new institutionality as did the dependence on political (and ideological) congruence – always in jeopardy during elections. Local engagement is low due to such limitations. The 'structural explanation' of Rótulo and Damiani (2010) is similar to the ones by Naverrete (2006) and Rótulo (2012). Naverrete (2006) identifies difficulties in articulating sectorial actions, in monitoring implemented policies, and in coordinating the *modi operandi* of national structures. Probable causes for such complications remain unclear in her analysis, with a tendency towards a macro-political approach to structural problems. The study by Rótulo (2012) shares a corresponding analytical structure with Rótulo and Damiani (2010). Both serve as a basis for the in-depth assessment of the New Agenda, understood as a public policies and projects program by Rótulo *et al.* (2014). These three detailed articles investigate the New Agenda in terms of implementation efficiency from the viewpoint of its institutional framework and its operationalization process under the concept of governance. With access to a rich database containing information on 103 projects, Rótulo *et al.* (2014) focus on the lack of a functioning institutional system and of accountability mechanisms required to facilitate multilevel governance – a necessity within the institutional design of the New Agenda – to interpret the positive and negative aspects and results of the Brazilian-Uruguayan bilateral program. Despite the obvious structural problems of the New Agenda, the authors acknowledge the role of political ideology in influencing the identified problems of compliance and engagement. However, they only create a fuzzy conception of right and left ideologies and describe the distribution of parties in local governments to verify their assumptions.

The skillful chapter by Clemente and Mallmann (2017), however, sets a positive tone to the matters. They consider the creation of the New Agenda a combination of three

factors: strengthening of national integration, priority to development policies, and decentralization processes. Integrative dynamics and the minor degree of institutionality of Mercosur favored Brazilian-Uruguayan bilateral cooperation. Innovative means for discussing and negotiating aspects of cooperation and development policies were then created. From such fora, a myriad of accords was designed and signed. Their work emphasizes the role of government actors and local actors, particularly of non-governmental organizations. As in Aveiro (2006) and Lemos (2013), local engagement in issues discussed was the origin of the New Agenda. The authors recognize the importance of the New Agenda as an advocate of a common identity between the neighboring countries for facilitating collaboration and negotiation, and a significant contribution to regional integration, insofar it fostered the discussion of border issues in the regional arena and expanded the democratic participation in integrative processes. In this sense, the border culture could be considered a facilitator of bilateral cooperation due to its historical constructed, shared, local identity. Structural matters are not the focus of their analysis, but the authors consider New Agenda's institutionalities to create a positive regional environment<sup>11</sup>. The outcome of the bilateral plan (in terms of projects' completion) is never put in question, which resonates with the optimistic character of this macro-analysis.

The New Agenda is a process through which multiple actors bargain for their interests. State actors in the Bucbr have historically tried to control and regulate local interactions. Local actors' low engagement and compliance with the New Agenda seem to indicate that they do not accept such restrictions. Either in all its deficiencies and obstacles, as highlighted by Naverrete (2006), Rótulo and Damiani (2010), Rótulo (2012), and Rótulo *et al.* (2014), or its capacities and merits, as emphasized by Clemente and Mallmann (2017) and mentioned by Aveiro (2006) and Lemos (2013), the New Agenda

---

<sup>11</sup> Politically, however, such mentioned enterprises did little to the progression of formal regionalism. The concomitant political negotiations involving cross-border policies within Mercosur of the last decade and a lustrum, which includes the creation of the Border Integration Ad Hoc Group in, 2002, and the Border Integration Work Group, in 2008, demonstrate the (unsuccessful) attempt to advance analogous development agendas for all members of the regional mechanism as well as the priority of such matters to chancelleries of Mercosurian Parties (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, 2016). It is also important to stress the constant sharing of institutionality, physical structure, and knowledge between the New Agenda and Mercosur, with the amalgamation of many negotiations and discussions among high-level officials and decision-makers within both institutionalities. This fact indicates the regional program of the New Agenda and corroborates with this thesis's premise on the bilateral plan as a regionalism project.

requires a deep look into its local level, at which this complex negotiation process needs to function (but has/is not). The relevance of local actors' perceptions, in this context, lies in their capacity to shed light upon some ideas about this regulatory process, revealing underlying interpretations built within and beyond the New Agenda operationalization process, and possibly indicating the reasons for the low level of compliance and engagement of local actors beyond state relations.

*It is the theory which decides what we can observe*  
(Albert Einstein, 1926)

## CHAPTER 1 – REGIONALISMS AND CROSS-BORDER REGIONS IN IR THEORY

How do theories of international regionalism perceive formal (state) and informal (non-state) dynamics in the construction process of a (cross-border) region? How do they acknowledge the border/borderline in such a process? And which theories can provide a conceptual framework to study actors' perceptions on the New Agenda's operationalization processes? Such questions are the starting point to answer the *problematique* built in the introductory section. This chapter will exhaustively analyze theories of International Regionalism, or International Political Economy (IPE), considering their position on border, on the formal-informal nexus, and more specifically, on their analytical tools to acknowledge 'perceptions' as a relevant variable.

International regionalism is here divided in four distinct historical and epistemological phases: (1) early regionalism, (2) old regionalism, (3) new regionalism, and (4) comparative regionalism. History plays a leading role in this chapter, as it enables the organization of the scientific production on international regionalism *vis-à-vis* past experiences concerning regionalist phenomena. Regionalism theories will also be analyzed by their ontological differences, under the rationalist-reflectivist divide. This theoretical dichotomy will help one understand the antagonisms of the bigger picture within scientific enquire of regionalism. Although different schools of thought are organized within the mentioned phases and under the cited ontological divide, it is acknowledged here the non-linearity of scientific practice as well as of social reality. The construction of human knowledge is disordered as it is the development of science and its diverse fields of study. Social sciences tend to be chaotic in their evolution, in a process in which one can gain or even lose knowledge, depending on the paths taken in the attempts to advance the understanding of the social phenomena (ABBOTT, 2001). International Relations (IR), understood as a subfield of social sciences, is not a deviation of this pattern. The study of the highly complex and chaotic human interactions within and on international/global structures is composed of a myriad of theories that differ in ontological premises, epistemologies, methodologies, and conclusions. 'Theories', understood in a broad sense, embrace polarized views of both theory and science, from the hard, Popperian notion of "causal argument of universal, trans-historical validity [...], which can be tested through the falsification of a series of hypothesis" to "a rather loose

sense of abstract reflection” (WIENER; DIEZ, 2009, p. 3). After decades of constructed knowledge and within such an intricate international reality, studying regionalism while having as the main ‘scene’ a cross-border region (a region *trans*-national in nature) requires more than the simple operationalization of a method or the choice of a theory, it entails a truly pluralistic approach<sup>12</sup>. A “prior openness to pluralism” (RENGGER, 2015, p. 35) is thus an essential condition to create a conceptual framework that enables the dialogue between contrasting approaches and among different subfields of social sciences, as well as goes beyond discussions inherent to the theories of regionalism. In this thesis, a conceptual framework is understood as an “*ensemble de définitions et concepts [...] qui permet la pensée et les méthodes de la recherche, sans présenter pour autant un ensemble homogène expliquant les causes et les effets des phénomènes sociaux analysés*” (SAURUGGER, 2010, p. 18).

Even though disorder is intrinsic to the relational scientific process, one needs to run from the pitfalls of confusion and ambiguity common to pluralistic approaches. The question of how to study theories of regionalism within the IR framework properly can be answered by simultaneously approaching three factors inherent to the formation and development of IR as a field of study, namely: “the analysis of change in international reality; of the guiding paradigm; and of advance in social sciences” (BARBÉ, 1989, p. 175-176). History should be seen as an analytical and methodological tool<sup>13</sup> insofar it allows the understanding of the development of regionalist dynamics and borders ‘in time and space’, and the correlation of such socio-historical processes to the evolution of scientific analysis within IR scholarship. There seems to be necessary thus to arrange the variety of theories of regionalism in an understandable, clear way and to analyze them within the historical context of both international relations and the field of IR. A widely-accepted system to differentiate all the theories produced within IR is the dichotomy ‘rationalist’ *versus* ‘reflectivist’ (or ‘alternative’) theories. Within the context of this study, the *rationalist theories of regionalism* relate to: **(i)** neorealism; **(ii)** liberal institutionalism; and **(iii)** economic integration theory. **(iv)** *Social constructivism* tries to bridge rationalist with *reflectivist theories of regionalism* (also known as ‘alternative

---

<sup>12</sup> ‘A truly pluralistic approach’ for this research should be understood as the ‘methodological pluralism’ of reflexivity, which through its transfactual monism sees science as a mindful arrangement of empirical reality. See in detail in Jackson (2011).

<sup>13</sup> See a most interesting way to apply history to understand theory of regionalism, from which this thesis partly draws, in Söderbaum (2016).



approaches’), which refer to the highly-diversified group of: (v) critical theory; (vi) post-structuralism and post-modernism; and (vii) new regionalism approaches (SÖDERBAUM, 2004; SMITH; OWENS, 2005; SÖDERBAUM, 2016).

The main difference between the two clusters is that rationalist theories place their ontological foundation on ‘rational choice’ and consider actors’ interests, ideas, and identities as given, that is *a priori*. Conversely, reflectivists and constructivists concentrate their attention on the dynamics during which innumerable inter-subjective practices between actors produce different interests, ideas, and identities within the process of social interaction, *id est*, while they are “on the making” (SÖDERBAUM, 2004, p. 15). Another major difference is the tendency toward formalism and institutional frameworks as the focus of rationalist theories, while reflectivists lean toward informal types of regionalism. As any other concept or classification, this categorization is not whatsoever unambiguous or rigid. There is a long discussion on whether social constructivism constitutes a ‘middle-ground’ within IR theory or whether it can provide a truly dialogical environment in social sciences (ADLER, 1997; LAPID, 2003; GUZZINI; LEANDER, 2006; HAMATI-ATAYA, 2013). Also, the vastly diversified and overlapping (and sometimes mutually exclusive) approaches set within the reflectivist group tend to have in common only the denial for the core beliefs of rationalist theories (SMITH; OWENS, 2005), which could weaken such relation. The rationalist-reflectivist dichotomy, however, enables an understanding of the border and of perceptions and other non-material elements not only within IR scholarship, but also within the historical process of the construction of the border as a social construct in international relations and therefore fits the purpose of this research.

### **1.1 Interrelated concepts and definitions within international regionalism (and beyond)**

Concepts and definitions are not univocal. “Definitions of regions, regionalism and regionalization have long presented difficulties to scholars. The terms are not fixed, and have been subject to multiple interpretations” (FAWCETT, 2005, p. 23). In the history or IR theory, the understanding of what constituted a region differed alongside the interpretation of what was a region and how it could be formed. This happened as historical and political contexts changed into various organizational forms and different

world orders (SÖDERBAUM, 2016): The recognition of ‘region’ and therefore regionalism tended to differ also in etymological terms, as Van Langenhove (2011, p. 1) emphasizes: “The word ‘region’ derives from the Latin verb *rego*, which means ‘to steer’. So the original meaning of *regio* was linked to governance and not to delimitating space by border. Later it became associated with *regere*, to direct or rule. Today the concept is polysemous [...]”. The multiple meanings of regionalism thus can only be understood within their contextual history of both world societies and science, which are an intertwined construction. Two different analytical dimensions compose the myriad of studies on regions: the physical dimension and the functional dimension. The physical dimension refers to “territorial, military, and economic spaces controlled primarily by states” (VÄYRYNEN, 2003, p. 27). The functional dimension is “defined by nonterritorial factors such as culture and the market that are often the purview of non-state actors” (VÄYRYNEN, 2003, p. 27). A region is here considered by its capacity of superposing and overlapping both dimensions. State actors operate in the logic of territoriality whereas non-state actors act on a functional mindset. Hence, cross-border region is a space where both dimensions are at work.

Among multiple (un)definitions of the concept of regionalism in IR scholarship, the term *regionalism* refers to “the body of ideas, values, and policies that are aimed at creating a region” (SÖDERBAUM, 2016, p. 3) *as well as* to the processes of cooperation, integration, and cohesion at the regional level (which the literature often denominates *regionalization/micro-regionalism*). This means that regionalism is not only about state projects or regional organizations, but also about the dynamic development of relationships and interactions within, beyond, or despite formal (state) agendas and institutions. Drinking from the sources of comparative regionalism, both in theory and in practice (Section 1.5), this research acknowledges the necessity of analyzing the *relationship* of formal and informal regionalisms and of state non-state actors, not understood as simple binary conceptualizations, but in their diverse governance settings that create a multilayered and multidimensional phenomenon (SÖDERBAUM, 2016). The concomitant existence of bottom-up and top-down political processes is also acknowledged. *Top-down* initiatives are state-led, formalized relations with varied objectives that can involve either cooperation with (building processes) or separation from (dismantling processes) the bordering country. *Bottom-up* processes are informal (non-state) interactions that usually construe as local demands for better economic and

social conditions, which can request the involvement of microregional counterparts, but not necessarily so. Both movements constitute the process of region-building and influence each other in diverse ways. Whereas state-led enterprises tend to have great weight on the decision-making process of local politicians, they have limited effect on cross-border informal interactions. On the other hand, bottom-up dynamics generally do not impact on the decision-making processes of national and regional settlements, and occur not only within, but despite or beyond decisions from central governments.

In a context with low degree of formal integration, other forms of regionalism play a role in furthering interests through cooperation. Söderbaum (2004) refers to a *shadow regionalism*, which is intimately connected to informal market activities based on the use of boundary disparities (called in this thesis ‘border condition’ [Chapter 4, Introduction]) and the exploitation of economic and political differences between national frameworks. Such shadow activities, acknowledged as an important feature of African regionalism, are fed from state apparatus, fueled by corruption, and usually protected by power positions.

[S]hadow regionalism is dependent on the lack of transparency of the state, as well as the flexibility and adaptation of the informal market activities. It is by nature informal, fluid and [...] also detrimental because it is built upon rent-seeking and the pursuit of personal economic interests [...]. The expansion of shadow regionalism is tied to state decay and states’ declining financial capacities and territorial control (SÖDERBAUM, 2004, p. 104-105).

Smuggling networks in the Bucr are good examples of shadow regionalism (DORFMAN, 2009). Even though Brazilian and Uruguayan states do have better control over their territories, the flourishing of informal activities within regional settings remains a reality in the region due to insufficient action by the state as provider of basic services. Nevertheless, the presence of statespersons in use of power positions for their own profit *through regional networks* seemed not to be common among South-American nations as well as the failing of states, as in some African experiences. Rather, a *silent or trans-local regionalism* seems to be ‘the’ main operative mode of regionalist dynamics in the continent. This type of regionalism is the outcome of an increase of transnational flows without regional regulation (SANTANDER, 2017). “*Ce phénomène de flux et d’échanges informels représente une réalité souvent négligée mais qui participe, néanmoins, au développement de régionalismes africains et latino-américains*” (SANTANDER, 2017,

p. 9). Such silent flows are one of the pillars of local economies in the Bucbr, built within (but not limited to) regionalist processes, involving subnational (particularly local) governments, and manipulating the softening of international borders

In this context, local actors at border regions have been promoting economic, cultural, and political transnational exchanges at the local level, known as *trans-local interactions* (POSTEL-VINAY, 1996). Thus, *trans-localism* (local actors' interactions across international borders) is a substantial space for action (POSTEL-VINAY, 2001 [1998]). Studying regionalism also requires understanding such trans-local relations, ideas, and values within and beyond formal regional bodies which are embedded in the contextual social reality of local actors. Some actors in the Bucbr are, however, representative of local governments, they are subnational units with little or no power to engage in official relations across borders. Their paradiplomatic action tends to follow the logics of trans-local relations. *Paradiplomacy* refers to the political action by entities that are not states, or regional/international organizations, and that function in the shades of the traditional international system, with differences in objectives, strategies, and *modus operandi vis-à-vis* the so called traditional diplomacy (KEATING 2000).

The term 'border' is also complex in its definitional varieties. Anderson and O'dowd (1999, p. 594) remind that the concept of border can refer to either "external state boundaries, [...] the legal lines separating different jurisdictions; or to a 'frontier area' of variable width on either side of the legal line; or simply to a broad 'zone of transition' between different societies and centers of power".

[F]ar from merely existing as political state-led creations, state borders are complex and dynamic multiscalar (*sic passim*) entities that have different symbolic and material forms maintained by a multiplicity of bordering processes and practices. Borders are territorial in nature, but increasingly understood as multi-perspectival and complex assemblages [...]. Far from mere static manifestations of state power and territoriality, borders are multiscalar social constructions, part of the political, discursive, symbolic, and material orders that reflect the transformation of space into territory by various social groups and actors, and not only by the state (LAINE, 2016, p. 466).

Laine's definition of border as a multiscalar construction allows examining it as not only a state fixture, but as a space used by local actors to their own benefit, which fits the purpose of exploring the context of local, informal interactions within the Bucbr. The very first certainty one can have when studying the building dynamics of a cross-border

region is the *undeniable existence of an international border* (or borders, in plural, depending on the case). Notwithstanding being a vital component of the international, IR theory has tended to neglect international borders as a germane and essential analytical element within the theoretical body of old regionalism, with the subsequent phase demanding the first steps to be taken by IR scholars<sup>14</sup>. In fact, borders can still be considered a “blind spot” in IR theory (VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, 2009, p. 4-5). This is related to the “widely held belief that every border and borderland should be seen as unique” (VAN HOUTUM, 2000, p. 58) and thus could not be generalized into theoretical explanations. IR tended to understand international border as being “material features – part of the fixtures and fittings of the international system” (WILLIAMS, 2003, p. 27) and, for this reason, they are considered antagonistic and problematic in nature. The study of regionalism, although developed moderately apart of the theoretical core of IR (or at least considered as a relatively autonomous subfield), also demonstrated similar disregard to the role of borders within the regionalist processes, particularly during the first three decades of theorizing on (almost exclusively) European integration and their explanations on why and how to achieve and maintain peace after the end of the Second World War<sup>15</sup>. As Cold War reduced pace, however, socio-political reality revealed to be more intricate whilst a different world order started to mold regionalism, spreading beyond Europe toward all continents in different forms and projects. From this point on, borders can be seen as a social construct, as its role and relevance clearly changed with the slight suppression of barriers due to either advance of technology or implementation of political projects occurring in many scales (PERKMANN; SUM, 2002; SÖDERBAUM, 2003; 2016).

## **1.2 Early regionalism and the formation of nation-states**

In *early regionalism*, ‘exchange systems’ existed based mainly on relations of symbolic affinity. Interactions to the outside world were confined to migratory and trade

---

<sup>14</sup> See, for example, the works by Badie (1995) and Badie and Smouts (1992) on the crisis of the nation-State and the organization models that surpass state territoriality.

<sup>15</sup> IR and political science scholars focusing on European integration have started scrutinizing the concept/realities of border after the old regionalism phase. Usually concentrated in certain sectors of regionalist dynamics, such works researched on the legitimation of European political order (WEERTS, 2004), cross-border governance (KRAMSCH and HOOPER, 2004), wage and employment in border regions (NIEBUHR, 2005), the EU impact on border conflicts (DIEZ, STETTER, ALBERT, 2006), and other aspects related to European borders and regionalism.

flows, not influencing greatly the ordinary life in community. Natural landscapes played a significant role on keeping societies restricted within geographical barriers, like mountains or big rivers. More powerful societies managed to reach long territories and were able to interact to innumerable communities and peoples, forming different alliances, kingdoms or confederations (SÖDERBAUM, 2016). Early Regionalism was then limited by the so-called ‘physical border’ and the capacity of a community to transpose such limits of nature. The notion of a continental federal union goes back to the fourteenth century, as statesmen and scholars drafted different strategies for association among European States. A more detailed plan was designed by the French Duke of Sully, in the sixteenth century, as well as by many humanists of the time (HEATER, 1992). Within the consolidation of Nation-States in Europe (and the advance of technology), the idea of a European unity also emerged, as if the strengthening of the State should necessarily run through some sort of community, a type of regionalism (BRUNETEAU, 2000). At the same time, European borders were being designed and redesigned (and (re) negotiated) by politicians, geographers, and historians, who attempted to establish the dominium of their monarchs/governments/peoples, by using cartographic technology. The institution of the Spanish-Dutch treaty of Westphalia (1648) helped not only establish the international borders for England, France, Spain, the Dutch-land, Poland, the German principalities, Muscovy, Turkey, and Sweden (*i.e.* cartographic and geographic work), but also mark a new period of nation-state construct (*i.e.* structural, norm-making process) (BRUNET-JAILLY, 2005).

The colonial political structure also had significant impact on the shaping of ideas of regionalism for both Europe and the so-called periphery, especially in the struggle for political and administrative freedom of the colonies (SÖDERBAUM, 2016, p. 18). In the case of Latin America<sup>16</sup>, even before the end of the wars for independence, unionist political ideas took place, as intellectuals and policymakers advocated the unity of the just born nations (MACE, 1988). The statist Cecilio del Valle for instance promoted a proto (Hispanic) Latin American confederation and contributed to the formation of a Latin American thought on the international insertion of *centroamericanos* (VALLE; MATHEU, 1930). Simón Bolívar, known by the alias of *Libertador* for having played a leading role in the fight for independence from the Spanish Empire, sought regional unity

---

<sup>16</sup> Here used as the areas under (mainly) Portuguese and Spanish rule in the Americas, comprised by Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean, and South America.

to ensure the newly conquered independence. Defending his ideas of Pan-Americanism at the Congress of Angostura (1819) and at the Congress of Panama (1826), Bolívar envisaged the creation of common military able to defuse regional conflicts and to reduce Latin American countries' vulnerability toward external parties (MACE, 1988). The confederation plan also contemplated the idea of diminishing internal vulnerabilities of Latin American nations, such as the propensity for territorial fragmentation and the heterogenous development of labor institutions inherited from the colonial period. Such socioeconomic factors had become an 'atomization factor', structural determinants begetting highly condensed societies with little or no relationship with their neighbors (DE LA REZA, 2000). Although never successfully established due to the advancement of nationalism and territorial disputes, the early ideas on the uniting of Latin America "anticipated the arguments about the benefits of cooperation for weaker states in a competitive international system" (FAWCETT, 2012, p. 16). Territorial disputes were one of the main setbacks to the progression of the Latin American unionism. The newly formed Latin American nations struggled for delineating the borders between themselves and kept the idea of uniting at a secondary status. Brazil and Uruguay also experienced conflict due to territorial disputes, at both national and local levels. It was only in 1909 that both central governments resolved the most serious wrangles in the delineation of the border – although some litigation remains (latent, but alive) (see Chapter 2).

### **1.3 Old regionalism: prevalence of rationalism and formalism**

*Old regionalism* was marked by the interwar period (1920-1938), which served as a catalyst for the idea of a European union as new plans for integration were outlined (BRUNETEAU, 2000). The categorization and delineation of the modern borderlines created a profound delimitation of space and territory in Europe (and beyond) (NEWMAN, 2006). 'Outside' and 'inside' started to make more sense in the process of rebuilding and helped instituting the fundamental authority of the State within its territory (RUDOLPH, 2005, p. 4). The subsequent naturalization of border served as a basis for the coupling ideas of territorial integrity and national sovereignty, which started to be reinforced after the Second World War. (International) border thus rapidly became the 'limit of sovereignty' (PRESCOTT, 1987, p. 1). The calamitous experience of nationalism that led to WWII made theorists of regionalism see international regionalism as a means to achieve peace (or avoid war) in a torn-apart continent. Bipolarity, Cold

War, and post-colonialism (particularly in Africa, but also in Asia) set the background of the contextual world order.

The ambition of the European regionalist experience was to surpass the Nation-State, whereas in Latin America (and other developing regions) international regionalism was focused on economic development and nation-building. In Europe, from the mid-1940s onwards, a series of cooperation agreements took place until the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951, which later (1957) developed into the European Economic Community (EEC). In Latin America, the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) fostered discussions on the advantages of regionalism, resulting in the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in 1960. Old regionalism was thus centered, at first, on the political experience towards regional integration within Europe, and slowly started looking at other regionalist experiences around the world, always focusing on state-led regionalism through regional organizations (SÖDERBAUM, 2016).

*The formalism of these theories resulted in a limited analytical scope, centered on the top-down components of integration: state projects or agendas, regional agreements, institution-building, and decision-making of political leaders. Research was concerned in the study of power, interest, interdependence, and the merging of economies. Although the focus on regional organizations allowed a variety of comparisons and explanations about the reasons why and how countries assembled, the lenses of old regionalism theories were restricted within the formal boundaries of institutional designs. Any other non-institutional factors were ‘out of the equation’. The focus on tangible elements within formal (state) relations was at the core of old regionalism theories. The scholarship on the New Agenda followed such principles. The failure of the bilateral engenderment between Brazil and Uruguay (when recognized) is invariably understood within its institutional contours and the material capacities of the two nations. Informal actors only play a secondary part in such analyses, as actors in need of conforming according to statist guidelines or frameworks.*

Rationalist paradigm occupied the center of social scientific explanations to how the joining of national states in this period in Europe and in Latin America, as well as in other continents, took place. Pedro Emanuel Mendes (2012) elaborates:

*O racionalismo é um paradigma de paradigmas. Ou seja, é uma abordagem metateórica global que acolhe vários paradigmas que neste*



*caso, e ao contrário do construtivismo, são paradigmas teóricos substantivos solidificados e dominantes, designadamente o neorealismo e o neoliberalismo. Neste sentido, nas RI [Relações Internacionais] o racionalismo deriva das várias aplicações da abordagem da rational choice às questões das RI. Esta abordagem racionalista tem a sua origem na tradição da teoria da microeconomia de Alfred Marshall e abrange os mais recentes desenvolvimentos da teoria dos jogos, bem como a visão positivista e instrumental da explicação da política externa dos estados em termos de goal-seeking behaviour. Deste modo, e de forma sintética, as abordagens racionalistas sobre as RI resultam de uma premissa teórica elementar, segundo a qual o comportamento dos atores nas RI é apreendido através da sua explicação intencional, cuja estrutura básica se pode definir através da fórmula: «Desire + Belief = Action» (MENDES, 2012, p. 108).*

Neorealism and liberalism are paradigms within the greater paradigm of rationalism. Both served as foundations for specific theorizations/explanations on developments of European integration and other experiences. The theories and approaches of federalism, (neo)functionalism, and intergovernmentalism were primarily concerned on studying how to maintain peace whilst nation-state continued reinforcing its position in the world. The concomitant consolidation of the international political system strengthened the notions of uniform sovereignty among states, of internal qualification to rule within domestic jurisdiction, and of territorial conservation of existent borders (ELDEN, 2006). The old regionalism period was marked, on the one hand, by the emergence of regional settlements that attempt to provide political stability (peace) and economic gains; on the other hand, by the fortification of the nation-state by means of ‘elevating’ the separation and control function of international borders.

*La conception contemporaine traditionnelle de la frontière est celle d'une aire définie négativement par rapport à l'Etat voisin et non par rapport à ses propres qualités. Il s'agit d'une zone de séparation, d'une limite bureaucratique-administrative affirmant la souveraineté d'un Etat sur un espace particulier. L'idée est que la séparation de deux régions juxtaposées entraîne une dissymétrie de situation de part et d'autre. L'effet de séparation n'empêche pas un effet de rente, ce qui permet de penser la frontière comme étant « semi-ouverte ». Cette fonction de différenciation contribue également à forger le caractère sacré de la limite, essentielle à l'identité même de l'Etat nation (LELOUP; STOFFEL, 2001, p. 73-74).*

The idea of ‘separation’ was used to protect state sovereignty. The notion of ‘control’ implied that the state could select the fluxes of people, wealth or whatever was

considered to build up peace or development; in some cases, regional agreements. Although outwardly contradictory, the ideas of regionalism and international border were not only conceived within the same political and historical contexts but also became complementary conceptions.

### 1.3.1 Neorealism

Realism (and its later neo versions) dominated the scene of IR theory from its foundation to at least the end of the 1980s. Keohane (1986, p. 7) lists three key-assumptions of classical realism form the basis of what was later developed as neorealism: “(1) states [...] are key units of action; (2) they seek power, either as an end in itself or as a means to other ends; and (3) they behave in ways that are, by and large, rational and therefore comprehensible to outsiders in rational terms”. Neorealism comprehends some aspects of regionalist territoriality *as long as regionalism is state-led* and focused on military-political issues. It emphasizes formal processes of regionalism to the analytical disadvantage of informal dynamics generated by non-governmental organizations or civil society. Another conflict between neorealism and regionalism is in the latter’s understanding on the dominance of the regional level to the detriment of the system level (BUZAN and WÆVER, 2003). Apart from intergovernmentalist theory and regional security complex theory, neorealism does not regard regionalism as a central element within international politics, but only as a circumstantial strategy toward economic and political gains *vis-à-vis* the (re)distribution of power and welfare within the international system. Such a resource is particularly important for countries in weaker or developing positions, particularly in economic terms (GILPIN; GILPIN, 1987).

*Intergovernmentalism* primarily regards “a series of bargains between heads of governments of the leading states in a region” (MATTLI, 1999, p. 28). National interests take up the scene and are important variables in the game of politics (HOFFMANN, 1964). Its contemporary version, mainly developed by Moravcsik (1991; 1998), defines that the construction of integration is led by stronger states, considering that they have greater bargaining power (including that of veto), as well as greater capacity to pay the costs arising from that process. Sovereignty, exchanged for certain advantages, is constantly protected, which can be seen by the actors’ preference in building intergovernmental bodies (as opposed to supranational institutions) and by the requirement of unanimous acquiescence between members to any question relating to the

loss of state authority. Not surprisingly, this theory overstates formal processes over informal practices. The nature of the institutionality of Mercosur and historical analyses of Mercosurian parties' foreign policies tend to favor such a perspective in Latin American scholarship (the collective publications by Resende and Mallmann (2013) and Briceño Ruiz (2011) are important examples) – as well as neo-functionalism (Section 1.3.2). Adding a liberal perspective, in which the domestic sphere has a prominent place in the shaping of national preferences in a two-level game by demanding cooperation and some sort of regional economic interdependence administration, *liberal intergovernmentalism* emerged as one of the main theories in the study of European Union and other regional organizations. “Regions and regionalism may occur as a means for state survival and under certain circumstances, for instance, when the distribution of power is opening up for cooperation, for geopolitical reasons, or through the politics of alliance formation” (SÖDERBAUM, 2004, p. 18). International border (and its separation and control attributes) is reinforced due to the emphasis given on national interests and the protection of the state. *Informal regionalist dynamics become part of the equation as a demand generator*, a constant pressure on central governments to deal with issues related to cooperation or integration. Regarding the New Agenda, such an approach is clear in Santos and Santos (2005), Aveiro (2006), Naverrete (2006), Pucci (2010), Rótulo and Damiani (2010), Rótulo (2012), Rótulo *et al.* (2014), and Clemente and Mallmann (2017).

Buzan's (1991) *regional security complex* theory emphasizes the importance of the regional level in international relations, innovating original neorealist assumptions. With the objective of re-conceptualizing security after the Cold War, Buzan (1991, p. 190) defined region as “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolved apart from one another”. Although contributing to developments of IR theory, Buzan's approach understood states as the only entities within international relations capable of developing interests and interacting (and therefore, ignoring other actors' interests in the international arena, such as local players). A region, in his account, could only be ‘formed’ by states and according to their necessity in terms of protection of their own existence, overlooking the building of the state as a social structure as any other unit in the world system. The opening of a border, for instance, would be considered only if a nation could not deal with it on its own, and therefore border continued to be an accessory

of sovereignty. This conception of region (and of border) disregards informal relationships and semi-autonomous practices beyond the state, which are central dynamics in the study of cross-border regions. The focus on the creation of institutional regions ends up ignoring other types of social survival, commonly observed in the Brazilian-Uruguayan cross-border region (Bucbr).

### **1.3.2 Liberal institutionalism**

Liberal institutionalism investigates regions ‘from within’, that is, from the internal dynamics that construct such a region (usually embodied by regional organizations). As suggested by its name, it emphasizes regions’ institutional and liberal features. Despite significant variances, this cluster “share[s] some common traits, such as actor rationalism (although all frameworks are not ‘pure’ rational choice theories), pluralist assumptions, a similar liberal view of the state, and the regulating influence of institutional frameworks” (SÖDERBAUM, 2004, p. 20). The idea of interdependence, much developed by Keohane and Nye (1977) is one of the primary features of liberal institutionalism (and economic theories), as well as the focus on regional organizations. Federalism, functionalism, neofunctionalism and neoliberal institutionalism are the main theories that deal with the phenomenon of international regionalism.

*Federalism* was one of the most prominent ideas among European politicians (and later academics) as “the answer to Europe’s post-war destiny” (BURGESS, 2009, p. 31). It must be conceived as a developed and highly heterogeneous political ideology. Among many relevant political issues, Europe wondered what the causes of the World Wars were and how peace could be maintained. Being a very malleable concept, federalism is of difficult definition, meaning many things to many people. Nevertheless, for the first time featured as a political project that transcended the configuration of a state, the idea of European federalism had one convergent certainty: the model of nation-state that prevailed until then was a clear enemy of peace. Based on the North American history (LEVI, 2009), the prominent Italian federalist Altiero Spinelli (1972, p. 68) articulated: “national states have lost their proper rights since they cannot guarantee the political and economic safety of their citizens. [...] European union should be brought about by the European populations, [...] by directly electing a European constituent assembly”. A new institutional structure was, therefore, required, preferably a constitutional settlement, in which political authority would be diffused into two (or more) levels of government

(ROSAMOND, 2000). European integration was understood in the sense of an association of parts that were previously separated to establish a new entity through a federal constitution. Integration was based on the formation of an aggregation of states that would share its governance in a communitarian power (PENTLAND, 1973). The conservation of the dividing role of international border within the federalist approach becomes clear insofar the (international) border becomes essential in the delimitation of two coordinated governing systems: federal and local (or national) (TAYLOR, 1993). The border also plays a significant role distinguishing regional jurisdictions and separating competencies of local policies and practices.

*Functionalism* aimed at theorizing on “the conditions for ending human conflict” (ROSAMOND, 2000, p. 32). David Mitrany (1966), in his famous book, *A Working Peace System*, created the basis for the thriving neofunctionalist theory developed years later. Functionalism sought to point out the essential functions of systems capable of establishing a lasting peace. World (and European) politics should focus on obtaining welfare and not on maintaining power. To this end, Mitrany (1966) developed a strictly technocrat vision of governance, in which the state was unable to promote peace. As a system, the nation-state was inflexible and producer of harmful dogmas, particularly when the goal was to meet human needs. It was thus necessary to ignore some territorial conventions of sovereignty. The functionalist objective was to create international or transnational institutions, implemented through the transfer of loyalties of the nation-State to the new institutional body, generating reduction of conflict (ROSAMOND, 2000). Since there was a need to escape the territorial logic and embrace the functional logic in the international system, (a federal) regionalism would simply reproduce the logic of the inter-state system, particularly for those states which were not part of the integration process. A European union as imagined by the federalists would be ‘nationalistic’, a centralized system, “closed, exclusive, [and] competitive” (MITRANY, 1965, p. 145). It would eventually promote a contentious system of regional sovereignties, which was not the intended goal of functionalism. Focusing exclusively on issues less controversial and with the ability to generate interdependent relational encounters between Nations, functionalism ignored the existence of the border and its place in international politics, as it did not play a strategic role in the development of a lasting peace. Reflection of the key idea that function precedes form, that is, that the institution to be created is the result of its soon-to-be-played role as an organization (SAURUGGER, 2010), the border (an

‘echo’ and a tool of the State) remained in the background, as it was believed it would take other forms in the new institution to be established. The role of separation and differentiation of the border should be set aside for the offering of pragmatic, rational, and strategic areas to increase an interdependent system. Within a ‘new’ inter or transnational functionalist system, it is like there was no border, without, however, erasing it, just excluding it from the negotiations toward cooperation. It is a way to prevent border from disturbing functional cooperation between the parties to subvert the territoriality of a system unable to generate well-being to humanity.

A much more robust version of the functionalist approach, *neofunctionalism* developed complex theories to deal with the issue of European integration. Ernst Haas, its greatest exponent, defined (at first) ‘regional integration’ as a “process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center” (HAAS, 1958, p. 16). Leon Lindberg (1963, p. 6), in turn, defined integration as a process in which (once independent) nations sought “to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision-making process to new central organs”. In short, the creation of new regional institutions was the most effective form of conflict resolution (SÖDERBAUM, 2016). The ‘cartography’ of the integration process start by integrating via ‘low politics’, in strategic economic sectors; secondly, by creating a supranational authority that could lead the process; thirdly, the integration of some sectors would bring in ‘functional pressures’ for further integration in correlated areas; subsequently, social interests would direct their loyalties to the new (regional) authority to satisfy their material interests; next, greater economic integration would lead to greater institutionalization and more regulation; finally, it is created a system of lasting peace (ROSAMOND, 2000). The only way social that interests could drive the neofunctionalist integration project was (exclusively) through political elites and having the state as a central player (HAAS, 1958; LINDBERG, 1963; HAAS, 1967) (such an emphasis aimed at counterbalancing the spontaneity of previous functionalist assumptions). This understanding is found on Rótulo *et al.* (2014), who emphasize the role of ideological convergence of central governments in the creation of the New Agenda.

The state could not, by itself, endorse their own interests and objectives, and hence the creation of a new form of institutionalization without the rancidity of nationalism. The border, in this context, was a limitation to state action, to the extent that the inability of

the political elites in meeting the conditions necessary for using its integrative potential would eventually disable the state (OBYDENKOVA, 2006). The border has thus a twofold role in integration. On the one hand, negative territoriality and the power game in which the state is the greatest obstacle to peace make the border ‘the’ institution that must be transposed through the supply of common functions among the peoples ‘separated’ by it (MATIUZZI De Souza, 2017). Local, informal dynamics at the border could hinder integrationist pressures if not dealt with accordingly by political elites. On the other hand, regional integration in neofunctionalism becomes nothing but “*un intento de reconstruir las erosionadas fronteras nacionales a un nivel más elevado*” (MALAMUD, 2011, p. 219), that is, a way to ‘enlarge’ state borders to a new political stature, expanding its dividing capabilities. It is interesting to reflect on the extra attention given by national authorities to the Bucbr in the last fifteen years, which had not resulted in the lowering of barriers for local actors and trans-local activities (the citizenship agreements being an exception to the rule [Section 3.4.1]), but in the raising of awareness regarding the existence of such institutional walls.

The concept of *spillover*, key in the process of transferring loyalties towards more integration, is the driving force of the functional economic integration. It is also the functional process of expansion and deepening of integration; the expansive logic of sectorial integration; or simply an integrative overflow (HAAS, 1958). Spillover implies such a profound interdependency that it would be impossible to ‘disintegrate’ such a functional system, being more integration the only way out of problems or crises (NIEMANN; SCHMITTER, 2009). At the regional level, spillover is a social force that crosses international borders; that extrapolates, through integrative relations, the functional attribution of division originally given to them. At the local level, however, the mechanism of spillover does not always mean more integration. In the context of cross-border regions, sectorial overflowing dynamics can produce negative developments, given that, within integrative processes, the fences of separation are slowly taken down and the differences of domestic regulations between the parties, previously neglected, become more evident. National policies and regulations become object of international scrutiny, particularly on their effects in the ‘other side’ of the international border. This affects policies on domestic economy, work, education, trade, environment etc. This phenomenon, called ‘cross-border spillover’, is one of the greatest tensions toward the deepening of integrative processes (LAWRENCE, 1996) and demonstrates the

ambiguous outcomes of spillover at local level, particularly in cross-border regions. The encounter of the two national frameworks during the progression of the New Agenda was among the key issues for the deepening of the bilateral plan about the Bucbr. Naverrete (2006), Rótulo and Damiani (2010), Rótulo (2012), and Rótulo *et al.* (2014) describe many difficulties for the integration of administrative national systems that could further cooperation. Most of these institutional obstacles remain, despite the New Agenda (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5).

*Neoliberal institutionalism* has become the most relevant liberal theory in the study of international regionalism, understood as a problem-solving process. Region and regionalism are defined either in terms of geographical proximity of states, or as national governments' policy convergence. Regionalism, as a result of diplomatic agenda, is better understood as an "outgrowth of government policies" (MANSFIELD; MILNER, 1997, p. 3), engendered in a two-level game, whereas interest groups (economic or political actors) make their demands on a national level through bottom-up relations to their government<sup>17</sup>. It focuses on studying the formation and development of different regional institutions concerned with trade, financial and security relations, which cannot deepen without certain market factors, with special attention to concentration of trade flows, to firms' interests on expansion over international border, and to welfare (MANSFIELD; MILNER, 1999; MATTLI, 1999). A key actor of this process, the state would play the role of the intermediary of interests at intergovernmental and supranational organizations. The focus given exclusively on regional organizations (in how they widen and deepen) as the starting point for comprehending the global phenomenon of regionalism (FAWCETT; HURRELL, 1995; HURRELL, 1995; 2007) constitutes an important bias of liberalist approaches (SÖDERBAUM, 2004). Moreover, considering the European experience as the optimal case oversimplifies other organizations as well as puts distance from the obvious regional differences regarding political and economic dynamics, and structural capacities. Organizations vary deeply in degrees of institutionalization, in (expressed or hidden) interests, and in states' capacity of managing integration demands. Comparing such diverse organizations using institutionalist assumptions hazards a misrepresentation of multifaceted regionalism.

---

<sup>17</sup> The seminal article by Putnam (1988) on the logic of diplomacy-domestic politics relationship is clear in that regard.



### 1.3.3 Economic integration theory

Bella Balassa's (1961) seminal work, *The Theory of Economic Integration*, was the first to acknowledge the dualist reality *process/state* of (economic) regional integration. Focusing on the effects of integration on trade, his work defined a linear progression toward deeper integration, stimulated by the abolishing of discrimination between economic units. As a process, economic integration should follow specific stages (called integration degrees): preferential trade area, free trade area, customs union, common market, economic and monetary union, and complete economic integration (BALASSA, 1961). His economic theory focuses uniquely on the production of welfare resulting from economic interactions and identifies gains and costs of integration in terms of trade and production of wealth. Despite its parsimony and narrow approach, this theory gained influence among academics and policymakers, especially the ones trying to solve the puzzle of the South's insertion into global economy during the 1980s-1990s (SÖDERBAUM, 2016). *Open regionalism* theory, one of the most common approaches to international regionalism in the mentioned period (especially for developing regions), can be delineated by the "attempt to link [...] economic interdependency [...] to liberalization and deregulation" (JILBERTO; HOGENBOOM, 1996, p. 3), with the objective of improving international competitiveness through the opening of a regional scale market. The regional aspect of such a theory is only grasped in the light of industrialization promotion, tariffs cuts, and other economic aspects, whereas the political and institutional dynamics needed to achieve such coordination of policies are never part of the equation. Without looking at the region-building process, the political effects of abolishing barriers and any interest other than economic-related, all of which can shape regionalism, are taken for granted. Such a theory was largely used to explain the foundation of Mercosur (JILBERTO; HOGENBOOM, 1996; BOUZAS; SOLTZ, 2001; PHILLIPS, 2003). The New Agenda, however, was created to tackle the social issues of informal work and residence in the Bucbr. Policymakers did not envisage, at first, any economic-related deregulatory policy (AVEIRO, 2006; LEMOS, 2013; PUCCI, 2010; Chapter 3, Sections 3.3 and 3.4), although a positive economic impact of the such plans was roughly expected. The New Agenda did not decrease commercial or financial barriers and maintained all protective regulations concerning economic activities in the Bucbr, despite the historical demand by local actors. This experience reflects what Riggiorozzi and Tussie (2012) identify as the main characteristic of the post-hegemonic regionalism

period, in which social and political concertation occupied the center of regionalist agenda in Latin America to the detriment of economic and financial arrangements.

#### **1.4 New regionalism and the rise of constructivist and reflectivist theories: informal interactions in the spotlight**

The wave of *new regionalism* (NR) was developed during the late 1980s, at the end of the Cold War. Söderbaum (2003) and De Lombaerde and Garay (2008) sustain the idea that, compared to the previous (old) wave of regionalism, new regionalism showed to be a more spontaneous process, in which, despite the leading role of the state, other actors were gaining relevance. The struggle of nation-state in dealing with more intricate forms of political and economic interdependence brought about the necessity of reorganizing the functioning of state and its relations within a global (and globalizing) system. According to the authors, this new phase showed to have a more open character. New regionalism's objectives were more multidimensional and comprehensive, as a much larger range of non-state actors had become active, in various levels of the global system. The economic, political, technological, and cultural globalization processes, as well as the anti-globalization movements, have positioned new regionalism as a set of intermediate alternatives of policies, analyses, and practices between the global and the local, making it a type of subsystem in permanent interaction with the various levels of international relations. New regionalism would become "a way to overcome the contradiction between [...] the obsolete nation-state approach and immature or predatory globalization" (SÖDERBAUM, 2004, p. 32).

Mario Telò (2007) regards the multidimensional nature of new regionalism. He acknowledges the role of globalization and regionalism in strengthening interdependence and reducing the walls of the state to the free flow of goods and wealth. The author recognizes that both domestic and systemic factors are causes and features in this new wave of regionalist movements, evincing the profoundly political nature of this phenomenon. Diverging from Söderbaum (2003), who emphasized the multipolarity of world politics under a sociological umbrella, the declining power of the US, and the propensities to decentralize and globalize the economic and political world systems combined with the rise of multiple forms of regionalist processes (understood in terms of regional organizations) delineated the post-hegemonic character of this new phase,

develops Telò (2007) in an institutionalist perspective. The prevalence of state action and the focus on regional institutions in this framework, however, places informal dynamics into a demand-making function, whereas formal relations toward regionalism seek stability through the provision of goods once subtracted by globalization.

The multiplicity of actors, forms, processes, and institutions of this new wave led to inevitable heterogeneity of both regionalist experiences and theories of regionalism that sought to understand a phenomenon much more comprehensive than those witnessed in previous waves (the main theories are analyzed in this section). Such a context opened a “new intellectual space for scholars to challenge existing theories of international politics” (BARNETT, 2005, p. 258), which favored the emergence of social constructivism and of reflectivist theories within IR. Such ‘new’ traditions derived primarily from sociological theorizations and were developed in response to rationalist explanations on international relations that were, at that moment, struggling to apprehend changes within the world’s political and societal structures. The rise of other actors in the global political scene also had impact on the perception of border, as it became a relevant space for transnational governance in smaller scales (particularly with the ‘emergence’ of micro-regions and cross-border regions). Understood also under the forces of globalization, scholars started perceiving a change in the role of the border, as it seemed to slowly become less significant within the context of rapid spread of global economic fluxes, and of the advance of informational and transportation technologies. A positive conception of border was originated within its own (local) qualities. In this sense, the emergence of regions of smaller scales allowed such local perceptions to be apprehended within new regionalism theories. As affirmed by Leloup and Stoffel (2001):

*L’espace frontalier, traditionnellement vu comme un lieu de choc ou de différenciation entre deux systèmes, est dorénavant appréhendé comme une aire de transition entre des dynamiques infra-nationales et nationales voisines. Il joue donc un rôle dans l’insertion de chaque zone frontalière à son propre marché national et à celui du pays voisin, ainsi qu’à l’intégration entre les deux Etats frontaliers (LELOUP; STOFFEL, 2001, p. 75).*

The border becomes a ‘space of transition’ also between regional and global systems, as regionalization and globalization processes take place in this very same space of political and social action. The border is perceived, thus, as a point of contact, understood as a zone, area, or space. Considering that the border became a relevant

component in the analyses of transnational dynamics, it ceases to be considered simply a peripheral line to start being understood within its articulation and communication functions: a space of integration, regionalization, and influence (RATTI; SCHULER, 2013). It is in this context that cross-border regions come into scene as articulative spaces.

#### **1.4.1 Social constructivism: perceptions in the spotlight<sup>18</sup>**

The period of new regionalism witnessed the emergence of social constructivism as the main contender of the mainstream rationalist, positivist theories. Constructivism should be understood, firstly, as a socio-ontological approach. In philosophical sense, ontology is the study of the general attributes of an object. The constructivist ontology focuses on the universal characteristics of (international) social reality (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, 2014). The term ‘constructivism’ was coined by Nicholas Onuf (1989), who emphasizes *the role of norms as the means through which humans interact*. Constructivism concentrates its analyses on “how the world hangs together, how normative structures construct the identities and interests of actors, and how actors are rule following” (BARNETT, 2005, p. 264), which makes it a social theory on the relationship between agents and structures. The premise of a ‘social construction of reality’ is based on two tenets: “[1] individuals are produced and created by their cultural environment [...]. [2] Knowledge, that is, symbols, rules, concepts, categories, and meanings, shapes how individuals construct and interpret their world” (BARNETT, 2005, p. 259).

Constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world. Constructivism shows that even our most enduring institutions are based on collective understandings; that they are reified structures that were once upon a time conceived *ex nihilo* by human consciousness; and that these understandings were subsequently diffused and consolidated until they were taken for granted. Moreover, *constructivists believe that the human capacity for reflection or learning has its greatest impact on the manner in which individuals and social actors attach meaning to the material world and cognitively frame the world they know, experience and understand. Thus collective understandings provide people with reasons why things are as they are and indications as to how they should use their material abilities and power* (ADLER, 1997, p. 322, emphasis by the author).

---


<sup>18</sup> The discussions and reasonings introduced in this part continue in Sections 1.5 and 1.6 of this chapter.

Interests and ideas, and consequently demands, cannot be assumed *a priori*. They are the result of *experience*. If the experience of local actors differs from the ones of national actors, for instance, they will present distinct perceptions on the same organization, institution, norm, plan, or agenda. If the local culture at the Bucbr presents a *sui generis* interpretation about the (non-) working process of the New Agenda, it is possible to understand better the causes of the lack of engagement in and/or compliance with this bilateral plan about the cross-border region. In addition, constructivists argue that beliefs and ideas cause change in the world. Collin (1997, p. 16) states that “beliefs about social reality are likely to influence social reality in a way in which it matters little whether those beliefs are true or not”, which means that these intersubjective elements contain the potential to make a policy work or not. For example: the idea or belief that the New Agenda could bring a non-desirable stiffness to local lifestyle by promoting regulation in the Bucbr could potentially impact the functioning of the bilateral plan, which needed strong engagement by local actors. After 15 years, New Agenda’s low engagement and low compliance rates are evident. There is a need to verify if this has to do more with infrastructure limitations or to specific interpretations of local actors.

But how to study collective understandings? Thomas Berger and Peter Luckmann (1966) and later John Searle (1995) along with Adler (1997) and Collin (1997), state that the constant interaction between social agents construct and reconstruct social reality. Social interactions ‘build’ people whereas people construct social reality through the transformation of the material world and through the understanding and perceptions of it. Ideas, beliefs, identities and interests are important components in the formation of social norms, but they cannot exist outside of social interactions. The building dynamics of social reality are thus neither objective (exogenous or exterior to the human consciousness) nor subjective (existing only in an individual’s mind), they are intersubjective (RISSE, 2009). For this reason, social constructivism is situated in the ‘middle ground’ between the individualism of reflectivist approaches and the structuralism of rationalist theories (ADLER, 1997). *Figure 1* (next page) shows the hierarchical set of perceptions, according to social constructivism (ADLER, 1997; COLLIN, 1997). Based on such ontological assumptions, *perception is here defined as an ideational structure comprising beliefs and ideas, which in turn beget identities and interests that ground peoples’ interpretations of reality*. How people understand and interpret social facts is an intersubjective process, which means that all interests, ideas,

identities, and beliefs within perception can be understood only in an ever-changing relational context and not isolated from social context and material settings.

**Figure 1 Hierarchy of perceptions according to constructivism**



Source: the author, based on Adler, 1997; Collin, 1997.

Alexander Wendt (1992; 1999) applied these assumptions into the analysis of the international arena, criticizing Waltzian realism and reaffirming the centrality of the state in international relations. Wendt explained how rationalism could not embrace the changes within the structure of international relations by the fact that it considers identities and interests as pre-given. Another problem of the rationalist studies of regionalism was that the sociology of international community was lost “in the economics of international cooperation developed by realists and rationalists” (WENDT, 1994, p. 394). To really comprehend the formation of demands, one must study the context in which actors are located. Such a context is the *social space* on which one lays foundations about the way one interprets reality. This social space cannot be, thus, reduced to a set of agreements and regulations created by state actors. It must be defined under a larger set of elements that constitute one’s reality.

The constructivist work of Alexander B. Murphy (1991) on defining ‘region’ is a struggle to bring the relevance of the spatial analysis into the study of regionalism. He considers multiple dimensions of a region, such as its nature, scale, and ideological frameworks, all of which are socially significant. Regions should be understood, first and foremost, as socially constructed entities. In Murphy’s terms,

the nature, extent and character of the regions examined in our empirical studies must become a part of our conceptualization of the social processes that take place in those regions. This in turn requires a social theory in which regional settings are not treated simply as abstractions or as a priori spatial givens, but instead are seen as the results of social processes that reflect and shape particular ideas about how the world is or should be organized (MURPHY, 1991, p. 24).

Constructivist theories opened important doors to alternative approaches by taking ‘pre-given’ regions (such as understanding them as mere regional organizations) out of the theoretical picture and by bringing a normative account of social reality. Likewise, the relevance given to intersubjective elements of human interactions, such as, beliefs, ideas, identities, and interests (what this thesis calls perceptions), lessened the influence of institutionalist analyses, and presented a new way of understanding international regionalism. This approach enables one to acknowledge the existence of regions without or beyond formal organizations. The historical interactions and the semi-autonomous character of micro-regional dynamics of the Bucbr has given this area intersubjective foundations of a region.

A great contribution of constructivism to the understanding of border was to take away the simplistic character of its separation function. The focus given on regional organizations by many rationalists entailed the notion of organizational homogeneity, of ‘bloc’ (see, for instance, Haas (1958), Haas and Rowe (1973), Sánchez (1999) and Almeida (2001)). Such an idea presupposed, among others, the inexistence of barriers once integrationist processes achieved their ‘full’ potential and objectives, especially in the case of the European Union. The implementation of the Schengen Area, for instance, would mean simply the extinction of borders, the result of giving away sovereignty privileges by states (recent developments in regional organizations worldwide indicate otherwise). In this view, borders would mean, again, only part of the statist structure. Constructivists, on the other hand, grasped the border also as an intricate social construction, a much more complex, dubious, and dynamic entity that is a result of a myriad of social interactions and intersubjective perceptions. This is where the definition of border (Section 1.1) by Laine (2016) is better understood:

Far from mere static manifestations of state power and territoriality, borders are multiscalar (*sic*) social constructions, part of the political, discursive, symbolic, and material orders that reflect the transformation

of space into territory by various social groups and actors, and not only by the state (LAINE, 2016, p. 466).

Even in a context of great state power and centrality, one cannot understand both the regionalist phenomena and the border as simply consequences of national decisions, bilateral agreements, or regional settings. To point out at regionalism as only an ‘international’ social fact (where only *nations* construct relations in the regional arena) ceases to serve as an accurate definition of the regional reality. Rather, both regionalism and the border must be seen as multiple aftermaths of local, subnational, national, bilateral and regional interactions, all of which coexist and co-interact in diverse levels. It is, thus, possible to refer to a formal regionalism (as state-driven processes) and informal regionalism (as non-state, spontaneous interactions). New paths are open, regarding the analysis about the border. This perspective allows one to observe that both informal and formal regionalisms affect the perceptions on border and *vice-versa*, which gives new relevance to cross-border regions, as privileged spaces in the comprehension of such intricate construction within IR theory. The basis to study the perceptions of local actors in a cross-border region are set.

#### **1.4.2 Coxian critical theories**

The Critical Theory of Robert Cox (according to Leysens (2008) erroneously related to the School of Frankfurt) is ‘critical’ in three aspects: (1) “it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about”; (2) it “is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than in separate parts”; (3) it “is theory of history in the sense of being concerned [...] with a continuing process of historical change” (COX, 1981, p. 129). This approach to theory and to societal and structural change is a response to rationalist theories (or ‘problem-solving theories’), which took the world and its political structure as given. Coxian theory draws from an expanded Gramscian idea of ‘hegemony’ to delineate an understanding of world order and (international) societal changes within it (COX, 1983).

Cox’s historicism and interpretation of the world order is the foundation of the *World Order Approach* (WOA). Three works give WOA a full perspective. *Regionalism and World Order*, by Gamble and Payne (1996), develops the approach to regionalism within the ever-changing world order by differentiating the core and the peripheries



within the international system, and reflecting on the role of the (global or regional) hegemon in it; *Subregionalism and World Order* by Hook and Kearns (1999) focuses on the regional projects undertaken by 'weaker states' (i.e. peripheral). They are sub-regional projects under a socio-spatial perception; *Microregionalism and World Order*, by Breslin and Hook (2002), analyzes the 'lowest level' of cooperation, that is local, which interplays with the other two (or three, taking globalism into account). Such levels of regionalism do not contend to each other; they are complementary in a way that they can enforce cooperation as well as the formation of regions. The concept of Breslin and Hook's (2002) of micro-regionalism draws from the WOA's differentiation between regionalism and regionalization. The former refers to "the conscious deliberate and purposive attempts made by national states to create formal mechanisms for dealing with common transnational issues" (BRESLIN; HOOK, 2002, p. 4); the latter refers to "processes [... that] primarily emerge from the actions of non-state actors" (BRESLIN; HOOK, 2002, p. 4). particularly companies (but also non-governmental organizations).

Micro-regionalism in Coxian theory is thus centered on market actors. This can be a problem to the analysis on micro-regions in the global South, given that local market actors in those regions are weaker and depend on government to engage in cooperation. It can however be useful to understand the role of the state in promoting transnational capital within/through micro-regions. This is especially the case in places (or times) where neoliberal ideology is at the center of policymaking process. The analysis provided by WOA is better utilized from the perspective of structural economy (economic globalization) insofar it leaves aside other components of political and societal changes in the micro-region construction processes, that is, local networking, informal agreements, and other administrative relations that constitute micro-regions. Given the deficient level of economic development and the insignificant presence of market actors able to undertake trans-local or cross-border trade and the lack of economic complementarity of border communities on both sides of the border, the application of this approach to the reality of the Brazil-Uruguay cross-border region would most likely to recognize the low or inexistent micro-regionalist dynamics. In the sense it acknowledges the unevenness of regionalism within a world order, in which various elites foster international cooperation to promote their economic interests, this approach is still highly relevant.

### 1.4.3 Post-structuralism and post-modernism

The incapacity to problematize space is the main critique of post-structuralists and post-modernists towards rationalist theories of IR, which tend to understand international relations through the global and national levels divide, even when considering other levels, such as regional. Iver B. Neumann's *Region Building Approach* (RBA) (1994; 2003) is an important post-structuralist theory that challenges the classic/mainstream explanations on regionalism by defining region as an 'imagined community' typified in both territorial and functional terms. It entails a specific political project imposed on a heterogeneous geographical area. Rather than 'natural' or 'given', regions "are defined in terms of speech acts, and of other acts" (NEUMANN, 2003 p. 162); "they are talked and written into existence" (NEUMANN, 1994, p. 59). RBA aims at answering the 'to whom (is a region built)?' question, which stresses the notion that region-builders antecede regions (SÖDERBAUM, 2016, p. 57). A region-building process is thus always contentious, given the fact that several political actors with clear political projects try to disseminate their 'image of a region' (discursive action) to as many actors as possible. From this theoretical viewpoint, one can understand the Bucbr as a region built from different perceptions of what it is and what it should be. The new Agenda would be an imagination for the Bucbr, in opposition to the community as imagined by key local actors.

RBA "insists on working on the inside of the concepts which are already in circulation in the extant literatures" (NEUMANN, 2003, p. 160). This analysis identifies two conventional explanations regarding region-building processes. In one extreme end of a continuum of approaches, the 'inside-out' perspectives try to "amend wooliness of regional borders by postulating a center, a core area where the internal defining traits are *more* similar, and interaction more intense, than in the regional periphery" (NEUMANN, 2003, p. 160, highlights on the original). Analyses based on this perspective tend to stress the importance of cultural similarities and common social and historical background. In the other end of the continuum, the 'outside-in' explanations tend to "privilege the interests and interaction of the great powers relevant to the region. [... It] tends to stress systemic factors, states and geography" (NEUMANN, 1994, p. 56). Visions within this approach are inclined to be used in times of conflict or crisis. Whatever the perspective, both fail to embrace the discursive practices behind those explanations since they are part of such practices themselves. The border will always be object of such constitutive

discourses, and its roles of separation or communication will be used according to the political project of the actors involved.

The *weave-world approach*, developed by Morten Bøås, Marianne H. Marchand and Timothy Shaw (1999) understands regionalisms (in plural) as a ‘function’ of communities, companies and states. “Regionalism concerns the ideas, identities and ideologies related to a regional project. As such, regionalism is clearly a political project, but it is obviously not necessarily state-led, as states are not the only political actor around” (MARCHAND *et al.*, 1999, p. 900). There are nexuses between globalization and regionalization, which “created a whole range of diversified patterns of interactions and responses at the local, national and regional levels” (BØÅS *et al.*, 1999, p. 1062). Whatever the level, such nexuses produce winners and losers (BØÅS *et al.*, 2003). By considering such unequal effects of globalization as a starting point, the authors acknowledge that instead of ‘interdependency’, one should concede to the reality of “juxtaposition, contradictory processes and simultaneous cooperation and conflict interwoven into streams of ideas, identities and more tangible resources” (BØÅS *et al.*, 1999, p. 1062-1063), which is referred to as the ‘weave-world’. Against this background, and drawing from African contextualization, understanding the ‘real’ role of regional organizations in economies of the South requires considering also the ‘informal second economies’, that is, the actual cross-border trade flows and cooperation networks occurring ‘beneath’ the formal economic and political apparatus.

Such an approach is precise to capture regionalism where regional organizations are institutionally weak and fail to offer regional goods, and where state presence is somewhat unstable. Although state presence is robust in Latin America, and even more in the case studied, it is possible to find similarities in which the weave-world approach can be useful. For instance, to acknowledge informal cooperation in the Bucbr at the grassroots level among political leaders of cross-border urban complexes, and to understand the informal economies among small-scale traders.

#### **1.4.4 New Regionalism Approaches (NRA)**

First-developed in the mid-1990s by Björn Hettne (and re-designed mostly by Fredrik Söderbaum), the New Regionalism Approaches (NRA) contributed with an important interpretation on the relationship of (new) regionalism with the inexorability of globalization and represented a break in the way of understanding region and the process

of regional (de) construction. Regionalism is considered ‘new’ both in qualitative and normative terms, seeing that (1) it occurred in a different world order (multipolar); (2) it could be fostered by/within smaller, non-hegemonic nations; (3) had many simultaneous objectives (multidimensional); (4) it privileged political concertation (rather than economic); and (5) it contributed to the solution of real economic, political, ecological, and security crises (HETTNE, 1994; 2001). The New Agenda, understood here as a means to foster international regionalism, fits into such properties, given the fact it is promoted by non-hegemonic nations (Brazil and Uruguay), has social, political and economic objectives, and was founded under specific conditions of ideological and political congruence and seems to be dependent on such (RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014).

Drinking from constructivist and reflectivist sources, both of which focus on studying how regions are formed and built, NRA states that there is no ‘natural’ or ‘given’ regions. Rather, they are a process, “made and unmade [...] by collective human action and identity formation. [...] Regions are not structurally or exogenously given, but socially constructed by historically contingent interactions” (SÖDERBAUM, 2013, p. 11), results of an intersubjective understanding of the world. The main challenge is thus to grasp the building process of a region (its ‘becoming’), rather than analyzing flows and actions within a (pre-established) regional framework (SÖDERBAUM, 2004). NRA disentangled from the formalism of rationalist theories of regionalism by understanding it as “a heterogeneous, comprehensive, multidimensional phenomenon, taking place in several sectors, and at least potentially ‘pushed’ by a variety of state and non-state actors, both within and outside formal regional institutional arrangements” (SÖDERBAUM, 2004, p. 31). ‘Regionalization’ is understood as the empirical process (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 1998) “that leads to patterns of cooperation, integration, complementarity and convergence within a particular cross-national geographical space. It is important to distinguish formal regionalism (as ideology and program) from the process of regionalization. [...] It] implies increasing ‘regionness’” (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2000, p. 458). ‘Regionness’ is defined as “the process whereby a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active subject capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region” (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2000, p. 461). There can be distinct levels of regionness, that is, a region can be more or less of a region, insofar it is more or less capable of connect such transnational interests. NRA categorizes five different levels of regionness: *regional*

*space*, a geographic area demarcated by more or less physical barriers; *regional complex*, ever-expanding trans-local relations between human groups; *regional society*, a cultural, economic, political, or military (organized or spontaneous) society; *regional community*, the result of promotion and facilitation of social communication and convergence through an organization; and *regional institutionalized polity*, an organization with a more static framework or greater decision-making capabilities (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2000, p. 461).

NRA is a theorizing about the action of social entities in the political environment that can generate regionalization (or exactly the opposite). Since every actor interacts in a different context or level, it is necessary to place each one in the *locus* in which it operates, as well as to identify its inter-relational networks. Although Hettne states that “the idea is not to formulate a stage theory, but rather to provide a framework for comparative analysis of emerging regions” (HETTNE, 2003, p. 29), as ‘ideal types’ for regionness’ levels, the evolutionary bias of such categories is quite clear. When analyzing levels of regionness, one can identify the so-called ‘implied increase’ of regionalization, which, according to such categories, flows from informal toward more formal types of regions. The approach thus cannot grasp the dubious position of many actors or agents within the processes of regionalization. At cross-border regions, particularly in the case studied, important decision-makers within local formal institutions can also play a role within informal trans-local networks, constituting double actors in juxtaposing interests, regions, and finally ‘regionnesses’.

The study of the empirical development of regionalism (regionalization processes) in the 1990s lead NRA to study the proliferation of cross-border regions (CBR), understood as territorial entities encompassing contiguous subnational units from two or more states. CBRs showed to be primarily the result of strategic plans related to a series of macro-phenomena (end of Cold War, globalization, and states’ responses to it) that influenced the status and the role of border by increasing its permeability, and by relativizing the power position of nation-states for public governance (PERKMANN; SUM, 2002). The border – understood as a social construction – becomes a relevant *locus* of analysis, since it is the result of social interactions of actors that are established in the regional arena (states and regional bodies) and also of local actors (governments and policymakers of sub-level regions, civil society actors, companies, and others). The border thus becomes a key component of a (cross-border) region that organizes itself,

since it is operated mainly by local agents, always responding to influences occurring in macro-systems, including institutionalized (or informal) practices within the framework of regionalism (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, 2017). Hence, one can understand the border not only by its limiting feature, but also by its articulating function.

#### **1.4.5 Some critiques to new regionalism theory**

Viewed by some scholars only as a statist, elite-driven “defensive response to the economic marginalization of much of the South in the 1980s” (GRUGEL and HOUT, 1999, p. 3), there are many critiques toward the conceptualization of new regionalism, both as a *sui generis* period and as scholarship. Warleigh-Lack (2006, p. 752) finds the distinction of old and new regionalisms ‘exaggerated’. Olivier Dabène (2009, p. 9) states that “with regards to definitions, the added value of New Regionalism seems dubious. [...] The New Regionalism literature is [...] so diversified that it is impossible to find what the different theorists have in common, except precisely a fuzzy reference to New Regionalism”. Hettne (2005, p. 564), the ‘forefather’ of NR, proposed, later in his work, the ‘dissolution’ of such a term, “Since the new regionalism now has two decades behind it, this may be the time to bury this distinction and recognize the study of regionalism as a search for a moving target”. These ‘negative’ evaluations on new regionalism are nevertheless only a reflection of groundbreaking transformations in the engendering of new types of organizations and of participation of (civil) society, which, although mounting in number and in shapes, only coexisted in a secondary fashion with more centralized, formal ways of organizing a region. Also, they are a response to the comprehensiveness of approaches from different theoretical traditions and perspectives, which are “best understood as an indication of the richness of new regionalism theory” (SÖDERBAUM, 2003, p. 5).

#### **1.5 Comparative regionalism and theoretical pluralism**

The current phase of comparative regionalism is characterized by the consolidation of regions as key to the managing of global affairs (FAWN, 2009). Globalization, confirmed as an unavoidable phenomenon, joins a series of processes and events that shape and influence contemporary regionalism. For instance, war on terror, intervention in conflicts of others, recurring financial crises and overlapping of regional and interregional projects. Much more than establishing the relationship between

regionalism and globalization (which was the case of new regionalism theory), the current debate focuses on the “multifold interactions between State and non-State actors, institutions, and processes at a variety of interacting levels, that range from bilateral, regional, interregional, and global” (SÖDERBAUM, 2016, p. 32). Such a context became as multifaceted as established within international relations. Among many theoretical approaches to the so-called ‘world of regions’ (KATZENSTEIN, 2005, p. 1), it is possible to highlight the contributions of social constructivism, reflectivism, and critical theories, which share a more intricate vision on the formation of regions (ACHARYA, 2012). Such approaches are central in the consolidation of a truly epistemological pluralism, which now enables the dialogue (and not only the clash) between the various theories on this phenomenon. Söderbaum (2016, p. 73) calls this plural interchange ‘eclectic approach’. Comparative regionalism, thus, stands out as a subfield of IR insofar it lays down the foundations that support a dialogue between approaches, which enables the understanding of certain facets of regionalism (LAURSEN, 2010) previously overlooked.

### **1.5.1 Border, cross-border regions, and perceptions: a constructivist and reflectivist conceptual framework**

Understanding region as “socially constructed by historically contingent interactions” (SÖDERBAUM, 2013, p. 11) means looking at the building process of the region, its consolidation, its ‘becoming’. The becoming of a region cannot be defined as a single, straightforward process. Fredrik Söderbaum’s (2016) proposal to rethink regionalism under the comparative approach attempts to connect regions that differ either in scale, level of governance, or objectives. Jönsson *et al.* (2000) state that regions’ spatial fragmentation and heterogeneity is key in the constructivist perspective. The authors identify six types of regions: (1) geographic-ecological; (2) cultural or cognitive; (3) economic; (4) administrative; (5) political; and (6) security regions. Such typology is not rigid, as those regions may compete, overlap, or coexist with each other. Interaction between regions of different (hierarchical sets of) scales can elucidate more about the formation of regions. The core idea is that “if regions are indeed made up by actors other than states alone, and if state boundaries are becoming more fluid, then it becomes more difficult to uphold the old distinctions between macro and micro regions” (SÖDERBAUM, 2016, p. 110). In this perspective, the Bucbr is a sub-region of (trans) local scale that is simultaneously circumscribed within the La Plata river basin region, the

Brazilian and Uruguayan nations, the Southern Cone geopolitical region, the New Agenda development region, and Mercosur, just to name a few socio-political spaces. The Bucbr can also be divided by many clusters with diverse socio-political atmosphere and economic levels of integration: the ‘cross-border urban complexes’<sup>19</sup>. Cross-border urban complexes of the Bucbr can differ mainly in terms of ecological regions and in political convergence, factors that can only be perceived at the local level and by applying a bottom-up approach to the analysis.

More than the notion of fluidity applied to borders (which is not new in human/political geography, but in IR is still a concept in early development), the continuous political, economic, and social pressures under which the state is found threaten its own continuity as a unitary, solid institution, and highlight a myriad of other attributes to borders and to cross-border regions. The globalist typology for the border designed by Ratti and Schuler (2013) is quite enlightening in this regard. Borders fall into three categories: **(1)** Border of sites and sustainable locations, which is a space with ‘nodal’ infrastructure, a place of transition (not of passing); **(2)** Functional network border, which is a space that is neither global, nor national, but a set of public-private equations; and **(3)** Border of squares and cities, which is a space of organization of local life and of mediation of other spatial realities.

*La réalité des typologies décrites [...] de l'ère globaliste et des fluidités spatio-temporelles fait état de nouvelles frontières de nature fonctionnelle : on s'éloigne des cas classiques relevant de situations représentées par des espaces contigus pour aller vers une nouvelle perception des territorialités et vers des souverainetés fragmentées par*

---

<sup>19</sup> The literature normally denominates such cross-border urban complexes as ‘twin-towns’ (see Footnote 2 for the official definition by the Brazilian government). Machado (2005) refers to twin-towns as population densities cut by the borderline with propensities as much toward cooperation as toward border-related problems. In the case studied, they are small and medium-sized urban binational agglomerations along the border of Brazil and Uruguay. The term ‘twin-town’ is not used here as a concept *per se*, since it can present many ambiguities. These places are not a depiction of homogeneity between such urban areas as the term often suggests (MAZZEI, 2013). Twin-town refers here simply to the designation given by the national governments of both countries to the urban complexes existing in the border area of Brazil and Uruguay in the mid-2000s (BÜHRING, 2015). This special denomination can, however, indicate the existence of important attributes to such areas so as to be characterized as important spaces within the Bucbr. Once systemic actors (Brazilian and Uruguayan states and Mercosur) designated special status to these areas in national, bilateral and regional levels, twin-towns gained relevance within formal regionalist dynamics and hence became important subjects for the study of the phenomenon in question (DE SOUZA, 2017).



*de nouveaux espaces-frontières. [...] Si, d'une façon sectorielle et fonctionnelle, l'espace voit apparaître de nouvelles formes d'appropriation en termes de sites, de localisations, de lieux et de réseaux qui, pour finir, sont encadrés par des places et des cités à l'échelle métropolitaine des processus de globalisation, à nouveau, dans ces cas de figures, se dessine l'émergence de frontières de natures nouvelles qui tendent à dépasser celles du pouvoir des Etats-nations pour s'insérer dans le scénario fonctionnel d'une gouvernance locale-globale (RATTI; SCHULLER, 2013, p. 5).*

The border can be understood as a space with its own functional capacities and limitations, but also a space within spaces. Anderson and O'Dowd (1999), when relating the concept of border to the notion of 'area' or 'zone', highlight that the border is seen as being merged into a (cross) border region, a constituent of a region *per se*, which is beyond state and institutions, and which goes beyond formal/institutional processes. The border can even be the *raison d'être* of a cross-border region and of urban settlements, like some of the cross-border urban complexes in the Bucbr. The local and differentiated 'use' of border can institute a 'regional unity' with functional attributes. It becomes even possible to compare the (cross-border) region 'attached' to the border with other regions "at different levels of spatial or legal aggregation, provided that they have similar properties and capacities with regard to the problem studied" (VAN LANGENHOVE, 2012, p. 25). The denaturalization of border reinforces the idea that a region that is formed through (or by, or because of) it, despite not being a state, can share some features with the state. For instance, having its own logics of organization, governance, or identity construction (DE LOMBAERDE *et al.*, 2010).

The border (and the area that is 'cut' by it) can be a comparable regional unit, understood within the multifaceted global governance context, enabling the analysis of the role of border (and its cross-border region) *vis-à-vis* the structuring practices of other political units that have partial or full jurisdiction over it, be it states, regional bodies, or other sub-national units (such as neighboring municipalities), which influences on issues of governance, territory and identity (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, 2017). Understanding perceptions on a cross-border region is more than identifying ideas and beliefs, identities and interests; it is identifying key features of a region that if is not 'laboratory of Mercosur' (to use the expression by Schultz (2009) and Pucci (2010)) certainly contributes to the formation of many of the regions in which it is located. Following this reasoning, identifying perceptions on the Bucbr is also understanding the influence of

many administrative or political regions operating at the border or because of it, which includes the New Agenda.

### 1.5.2 (Cross-border) regions and regionalisms

Constructivist and reflectivist theories on the definition of region avoid the rigidity of the institutionalist and rationalist interpretations of it. Paasi (2001, p. 16) states that “Regions are not [...] independent actors; they exist and ‘become’ in social practice and discourse [...]; they are social constructs that are created in political, economic, cultural and administrative practices and discourses”. Jönsson, Tägil and Törnqvist (2000) see regions as smaller territories defined in terms of either nature, culture, functions, or administration. Murphy (1991) considers regions as a set of outcomes that express and form specific ideas on the organization of the world. Hettne and Söderbaum (2000) dismantle the notion of pre-given regions in their theory of regionness (as previously mentioned), aiming at identifying interests *after* research is done:

The region constitutes an open process, and can only be defined *post factum*. Regions are social constructions, which means that to observe and describe regionalization is also to participate in the construction of regions. Since there are no given regions, there are no given regionalist interests either; such interests and identities are shaped in the process of interaction and intersubjective understanding (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2000, p. 460)<sup>20</sup>.

Formal regions (regional organizations, sectorial regional agreements etc.) are formed/coexist/are merged with informal regions (cross-border urban complexes, geographical corridors, trans-local relations, spontaneous cultural communities etc.) in different scales and through different practices and discourses. The concept of ‘regionness’, understood as a process of consolidation and construction of a region (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2000), denotes the complex structure in which the region is embedded, emphasizing the interrelation of institutions, actors, and ideas (RIGGIROZZI, 2012). It places importance not only in the political (statist) project of a region, but also in the societal interactions that lie within and beyond that region (informal interrelations).

---

<sup>20</sup> The authors acknowledge the problem of comparing regions within such broad conceptualizations. Their suggestion to avoid the pitfalls of extreme contextualization of localism, and of empty generalizations of the globalist perspective is “to look upon a particular region in a world of regions, together constituting an emerging world order marked by regional peculiarities” (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2000, p. 461).

Regionness then can be understood as a degree of merging of formal and informal interactions and the intersubjective meaning they create of region.

The best perspective of the merging of formal and informal interactions is by having a “better account for micro-issues on the ground” (SÖDERBAUM, 2004, p. 53), loosening the sense of macro/micro dichotomy. Analyzing ‘regionness-forming elements’ of a region thereupon can entail either focusing on the whole of a geographical area constituted by a regional organization (such as Mercosur) or concentrating on a specific area within it, in which particularities make it a singular regional space. Cross-border regions (CBRs), in this regard, are not understood only as transnational territorial entities resulting from strategic plans of governments desperate to cope with the unstoppable (economic) forces of globalization (as Perkmann and Sum (2002) pointed out), but also as *subnational territorial units that can reveal the capabilities and limitations of the formal and informal regionalisms and the intrinsic intersubjective perceptions occurring in such spaces*. CBRs are, thus, privileged spaces of regionness capable of unveiling multiple dynamics of regionalism within a regional organization.

The importance of such spaces of regionness is related to the fact that social reality, as explained by Collin (1997) can only be grasped if both local and general social contexts are considered. In addition, considering that “a particular territory must, necessarily, experience increasing interaction and more frequent contact between human communities, which after living as ‘isolated’ groupings are moving towards some kind of translocal relationship” (HETTNE; SÖDERBAUM, 2000, p. 463), the historical analysis of CBRs can also reveal whether such territories either helped hinder or promote regionalism in greater regional scales. The border, in turn, must be understood as an ever-changing constituent of a region (or regions) and a product of both formal and informal practices. One should not imply dividing or articulative functions to border (as done by theorists of old and new regionalism). Rather, border must be also considered, as seen in Laine’s definition, as a multiescalar social construction “that reflect[s] the transformation of space” (Laine, 2016, p. 466). Both the Bucbr and the Brazil-Uruguay border are subjected to the same social construction processes and developments through history; they are both ‘becoming’.

## 1.6 Norms, perceptions, and cross-border regions: The New Agenda and micro-regionalist dynamics

The importance of normative (and material) frameworks in constructivist theory in the formation of mutual relations among agents and structures insofar both shape international behavior (BUENO, 2009) inclines its focus on the role of social norms within the relationship between agents and structures. Among numerous definitions, norms can be described as “standards of appropriate and legitimate behavior [...], *a result of common practice among states*” (GUROWITZ, 1999, p. 417, emphasis by the author). For example, when two or more neighboring states engage in a divergent relationship for a long time, it is not uncommon to witness a rising tension among the populations of both countries, particularly in border areas. The opposite is also true: when two or more neighboring countries build friendly relations, there is a slowly but increasing propensity towards good relations among border populations at the local level. The creation of laws based on such relationships are also of significant impact on how people would live their lives within such international political contexts. More importantly here, *cooperative practices among two states has norm-making capacities*. The political and ideological convergence of Brazil and Uruguay at the highest level of government that begot the creation of the New Agenda (RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014) can be considered thus a normatization process since this bilateral framework produced an incredible amount of regulation on daily practices of border populations. In addition, by coordinating actions through chancelleries, the New Agenda also engendered a political environment privileging local negotiation and operationalization of projects, which likewise set an international standard for local cooperation practices.

As a dynamic process that entails continuous multiscalar negotiation and is based on ‘umbrella agreements’ (general framework of intentions), the New Agenda has specialized in creating what Burgemeestre Hulstijn, and Tan (2014) refer to as *open norms*. In their study of governmental regulations on business activities, the authors define open norms as general guidelines that require constant translation into concrete rules or constraints, and continual interpretation and evaluation of the implementation in a certain context to assure that locals will comply/follow/change behavior because of them. This notion can shed light in the complexity of the New Agenda as a norm-making

institutionality, requiring more than just the creation of agreements or of formal bodies for local project design.

When legislation is relatively new or applicable to a (rapidly) changing domain, both types of agents [the regulator and the subject] may lack experience and knowledge to work with the norms. Subjects need examples of appropriate norm implementations from regulators. Regulators on the other hand need input from the field to determine fair evaluation criteria to assess norm implementation. Regulators are thus awaiting experiences from the field, and the subjects are awaiting implementation guidance and criteria. To overcome this potential deadlock situation, we need to [...] be able to accelerate both of these learning processes (BURGEMEESTRE *et al.*, 2014, p. 124)

When the New Agenda was created within the context of the signature of the ‘Border Agreement’ – allowing residents within a 20 kilometer radius from the borderline to reside, work and study in both sides of the border and creating a special status for border residents (see Chapter 3, Sections 3.3 and 3.4) – Brazilian and Uruguayan national authorities assumed that formal and informal actors (national sectorial organizations, local governments, chancelleries, local populations, NGOs, etc.) would also work to converge systems and regulations, thus promoting controlled, formalized local integration. The requirement of a ‘virtuous cycle’ for the successful operationalization of the New Agenda, although acknowledged by some scholars (SANTOS; SANTOS, 2005, AVEIRO, 2006, PUCCI, 2010) was considered to be an ‘unavoidable’ feature by national authorities, who did not visualize the institutional imperatives for the functioning of such a ground-breaking set of laws, institutional bodies, and cooperative mechanisms.

From the perspective of social practices, norms can also be understood “as *shared (thus social) understandings of standards for behavior*”, as defined by Klotz (1995, p. 14), (our emphasis). If a group of people recognize a behavior as legitimate, this conduct is socially accepted, although acknowledged as illegal. As Gezelius (2002) point out, in cases in which populations are particularly small and isolated, laws apply under different logics:

The legitimacy of law does not imply that laws are automatically obeyed regardless of their content. When law is transformed into morality, it merely becomes part of the complex and wide-ranging moral system of civil society. The law may thus be overruled by moral requirements which are perceived as more fundamental than the obligation to obey the law whenever the contents of specific laws conflict with certain moral norms of civil society. As the informal

enforcement of the law follows the principles of moral rather than legal judgement, a violation of legitimate law may be left unsanctioned when legitimate law conflicts with other moral values and thus renders moral judgement difficult. Civil society will also tend to excuse unintended violations of the law to a greater extent than the legal system (GEZELIUS, 2002, p. 313).

Although not sharing the same social features of the village in Gezelius's (2002) study, the historical origins and relative secluded development of the Brazilian-Uruguayan cross-border region (Chapter 2), particularly in its cross-border urban complexes (Chapter 4), allows a certain comparison to the approach local populations and local governments tend to render to matters of legal-illegal in the Bucbr (BETANCOR, 2008; ALMEIDA, 2015). The 'border culture' from which Pucci (2010) draws his explanation on the roots of the New Agenda operationalization issues can be understood as 'local standards' that do not always concur to existing laws, regulations, or to international political settings, but to practices that refer to a local social logic, practiced in a cross-border environment. Such local standards may enforce laws, rules, and other regulations if they concur with the local, informal, and moral values. The existence of trans-local norms within the Bucbr can thus be the explanation for the low degree of participation, engagement and compliance to the operationalization processes of the New Agenda projects and agreements. *In nuce*, the New Agenda have evinced the conflict between state normatization and trans-local practices within the Bucbr<sup>21</sup>.

Assuming that the New Agenda operationalization issues and the low engagement of local actors are not related to material limitations, but to a 'border culture' (*cultura fronteiriça/fronteriza*), the proper functioning of the bilateral engenderment would be related to the lack of celerity in the 'learning process' of local actors, as indicated by Pucci (2010). To solve such a problem, two conditions should have been met: either a micro-social context that would have enforced local actors to act according to the 'new' norms (GEZELIUS, 2002), which seems not to be the case based on descriptions and analyses of (MAZZEI, 2002; HOFFMANN *et al.*, 2008; PUCCI, 2010; MAZZEI, 2013); or a

---

<sup>21</sup> This assumption is somewhat associated with the idea by Lemos and Rückert (2015) of considering the New Agenda a means to solve the conflict between the local scale (which tends to integrate) and the national scale (which tends to understand the border in terms of separation). Its operationalization, however, has evidenced the perpetuation of such a conflict, conspicuous in the low engagement of local actors. Differently from what the authors suggest, the continuation (and not the overcoming) of the paradigm of geopolitical realism.

degree of acceptability of such norms, based on different perceptions (or intersubjective interpretations) on the norms and/or on the normative system that is being produced (*i.e.* the New Agenda) (BJÖRKDAHL, 2002). However, the lack of institutional and financial resources is also a well-known problem of the Bucbr (RÓTULO; DAMIANI, 2010; MAZZEI; DE SOUZA, 2013; RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014), in history and in current times. This condition of obliviousness to structural conditions of the Bucbr could also diminish the capacity of local governments and other actors to engage, comply, and maintain engagement and compliance on the implementation of projects and on the operationalization of New Agenda agreements. Also, it could render the Bucbr the development of *sui generis* methods to build cross-border cooperation. Identifying local actors' perceptions on the operationalization of the New Agenda is, therefore, central for a better understanding on the local conditions required to advance the New Agenda of any cross-border cooperation policy in the Bucbr and of the reasons for low engagement and compliance. If the problem of engagement lies in material or infrastructural constraints, local actors' perceptions will be inclined to criticize the set of policies and the functioning processes using arguments, examples and figures that demonstrate or privilege such a domain. If they are based on the local inability to engage or to comply with such open-norms, it is expected that local actors will ground their perceptions more on local *modus operandi* and contexts and less on structural or formal dynamics of the New Agenda.

### **1.6.1 Cross-border urban complexes as privileged spaces: contextual variables for the study of perceptions**

'Cross-border urban complexes' (*complejos urbanos transfronterizos*) are a growing urban phenomenon in Latin America. They are defined by Dilla (2015, p. 17) as "*ciudades que [yacen] en estrechas interrelaciones, a ambos lados de las líneas fronterizas*". The author elaborates on the terms chosen:

*El uso de la palabra complejo sugiere una connotación suficientemente amplia para indicar niveles diversos de interacciones y por tanto también de conformación sistémica. La palabra transfronterizo, por su parte, indica una relación que específicamente involucra a los actores locales o localizados de las comunidades en interacción. Es decir, un término flexible que pueda dar cobertura conceptual a una variedad de situaciones específicas (DILLA, 2015, p. 24-25).*

This definition is also explicated in a previous work:

*[Los] complejos urbanos transfronterizos [deben ser] entendidos como parte de las regiones y corredores – y por consiguiente como subsistemas insertos en sistemas de redes urbanas más amplias – que cumplen roles específicos de acuerdo con el tipo de región y asumen la desigualdad de la relación transfronteriza (DILLA, 2008, p. 22).*

Cross-border urban complexes are, thus, interconnected to systems ‘above’. They are an integral part of the relational tissue of economic and socio-political realities at the border *and* within bilateral and regional arenas. They do not interact only as urban networks, as Dilla (2008) originally designed the concept in his elegant analytical framework, but also as political and social entities of regional character. Given to the fact that they are cross-border in their very origin as municipalities, such complexes are part of both macro-regional and bilateral contexts and micro-regional, trans-local realities, making them a space of historical transnational interests. This justifies the use of the concept instead of ‘twin-towns’. Grasping the intersubjective linkages of ideational factors in the formation of a ‘complex’, that is, how ‘various levels of interactions and of systemic conformation’ (DILLA, 2015, p. 24) are and were socially constructed within perceptions of local actors requires comprehending the historical relationship of formal actors and institutions (understood as ‘systemic actors’ by Dilla 2015) with the informal actors of local level. As Dabène (2009, p. 10) highlights, “[a]ny social construction is a product of past experiences, successful as well as unsuccessful ones”. History, thus, plays a significant role in the contextualization of the cross-border urban complexes’ (UCs) social interactions.

Besides emphasizing the place of history for understanding the formation of a region, Dabène (2009, p. 10) reminds that “the way a region is invented cannot be detached from its ‘objective’ existence”. The objective reality in which cross-border urban complexes are found can be separated in two categories: *formal* (national administrative structures, national and bilateral policies, state, institutional capabilities and limitations) and *informal* (local socio-economic and political contexts, and other non-institutional settings). The formal objective reality of the cross-border urban complexes of the Bucbr refers to the operationalization of the New Agenda within the institutional, administrative structures of Brazil and Uruguay. The informal objective reality in which such privileged spaces of regionness exist is related to their local, socio-economic



conditions, indicated by variables developed by Dilla (2015) for the study of UCs: sharing of the same environment; spatial configurations; primary social relations between populations; economic interdependence; perceptions of mutual need; and construction of formal institutional relations, complemented with indices and rates of local or micro-regional Gross Domestic Product (GDP); Human Development Index (HDI), Population, and other indicators (Chapter 4).

### **1.7 Final remarks on regionalism theory and the New Agenda**

Looking beyond – not limited to, yet considering – formalism, that is, beyond regional organizations and state apparatus, means to be able to acknowledge local realities and the viewpoint of local actors. While reflectivism regards interests as a result of a contextually formed set of ideas and beliefs, constructivism considers the role of interests in shaping interpretations of actors and in displaying their perceptions. What is in question here is the ability to acknowledge other actors and processes outside the formal(izing) state framework, its logic, and its institutional character. Understanding engagement in and compliance with the New Agenda requires understanding the interpretations of local actors that are built within the merging of formal and informal, of state and non-state structures, norms, and social institutions. In this context, constructivist and reflectivist approaches play a key role in recognizing agency of informal actors. Individuals are here considered *agents* that socially construct the structures of reality. The subjects surveyed are not only representatives of local actors but are themselves agents within the social reality in which they exist and from which they build their beliefs, ideas, identities, interests, and interpretations – all elementary features of the socially constructed perception.

Understanding the reasons behind the low levels of local actors' engagement in and compliance with the New Agenda entails this bottom-up approach to the matter, in which such actors are not only mere subjects of social/foreign policies, but key participants in the process of building cross-border cooperation. Considering that no one cooperates without trust, and nobody trusts without the belief of having constructed a solid relationship with the other, local actors' perceptions on one another and on the (bi)national institutions/representatives/agendas are fundamental components of this

bilateral set of agreements and policies. Thus, informal (non-state) dynamics, logics, and processes play a primary role in the functioning of the New Agenda.

Since the cross-border region is a relevant space for action within regionalist dynamics (POSTEL-VINAY, 2001 [1998]), acknowledging informal dynamics of the Bucbr as contextual reality in which perceptions are constructed is key for the understanding of the process of operationalization of the New Agenda. By understanding the Bucbr as a region within many overlapping regions, formed by multiple urban *nuclei* of trans-local character (the cross-border urban complexes), the Bucbr gains the central stage of this analysis and so does its actors and local contexts. The next step forward is neither the history of the micro-region nor the history of Brazilian and Uruguayan nation-building processes and the formation of the border. Rather, it is the history of the *relationship* between state dynamics and informal processes of the socially constructed Bucbr. The next chapter will deal precisely with how the relationship between formal, state actors and relations; and informal, local dynamics occurred in the Bucbr in history until the years prior to the creation of the New Agenda. Besides the focus on state relations, it will analyze the consequences onto informal, local actors and realities.

*semo da frontera  
neim aquí neim dalí  
no es noso u suelo que pisamo  
neim a lingua que falemo*  
(Fabián Severo, 'Treis', *Noite nu Norte*, 2010)

## CHAPTER 2 – THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE BRAZILIAN- URUGUAYAN CROSS-BORDER REGION

How did the relationship between state actors and relations, and informal, local dynamics occur in the Bucbr in history? The social construction of the ‘Brazil-Uruguay cross-border region’ (hereafter Bucbr) precedes the engenderment of the New Agenda and is intrinsically a historical process, being a result of social interactions occurring in that area through time. Despite the obvious role of formal, state relations and institutions in the delineation of the border, social interactions in the region were not limited to or by institutions. The Bucbr and the border that ‘crosses’ it have been historically constructed as a region by state, society, market, and external actors, both locally and in other levels of social reality. Local culture, therefore, has been built according to such historical experiences, which are very likely to influence the current perceptions of local actors on state institutions and frameworks. With no pretension to make an exhaustive description of the history of the Bucbr, the objective of this chapter is to comprehend the relationship between state regulatory processes, actors, and institutions operating in and deciding about the Bucbr and local socio-political dynamics and actors in the region in history that can be considered basic elements for local identity and interest construction.

This chapter works with four broad historical periods that help identify different stages of such an intricate relationship embedded in the process of region-building (or region dismantling) of the Bucbr<sup>22</sup>: **(i)** Colonialism and the search for (micro) regional autonomy in the Eastern Platine region (1620-1777); **(ii)** Securitarianism of state-building, and peripheral localism of the Bucbr (1777–1909); **(iii)** Active informal interactions, latent formal relations: international political economy and the Bucbr (1909–1975), and **(iv)** Southern Cone relations toward cooperation: ignoring the Bucbr’s specificities (1975-2002).

The history of the first two periods of the Bucbr is mixed with the historical processes of the Platine Basin (the great basin of the La Plata river) and of the Pampas


---

<sup>22</sup> It is important to acknowledge the presence of human populations in the region prior to the arrival of the European nations. Archaeological findings indicate the arrival of collector and hunting communities in the Bucbr more than 15 thousand years ago. In the historical period, indigenous tribes, such as charruas, bohanes, chanás, yarós and minuanos inhabited the plains, while the guaraníes occupied the river banks to farm (STRUMINSKI, 2015a).

(Southern highland plains ecosystem), which is circumscribed roughly by the territories of the present-day Uruguay (also called ‘Banda Oriental’ or Eastern Banks), the Argentinian fields (Pampa), and the plains of the Brazilian federated state of Rio Grande do Sul (Campanha), and more specifically of the West side of the La Plata river. Reichel and Gutfreind (1996, p. 13) describe in detail the geographical disposition of the Pampas of *Figure 2* (although they call it Platine Basin):

*Se estende desde o rio Salado, ao sul de Buenos Aires, delimitando-se a noroeste pelas regiões que ficam ao norte do rio Negro (Uruguai), até o rio Jacuí (RS) ou até defrontarem-se com outras formas de organização social que se desenvolviam junto aos territórios jesuíticos e às áreas centrais de dominação portuguesa. Dois fatores naturais caracterizam fortemente a Região. O primeiro deles é a terra fértil, plana, com abundante pasto, além de açudes que favorecem a multiplicação dos rebanhos vacuns e cavalares. O outro é o rio da Prata que, ao ligar o Atlântico à zona de mineração de prata (Potosi), exerceu um papel centralizador para a Região em si, bem como foi capaz de integrá-la às outras áreas circunvizinhas.*

**Figure 2 The Pampas ecosystem**



Source: Modified version of Wikimedia Commons (2017).

Not surprisingly, the strategic status of the whole Platine region emanated, in the words of Teixeira Soares, a ‘magnetic sensibility’ to European powers (SOARES, 1973). The Pampas biome, which can be considered as a sub-region within the Platine region, should be understood as an economic, social, and cultural unit, which was more or less

fragmented during and after the colonial period. Cultural and social ties, however, remained intense and highly relevant within the local dynamics until contemporary times (REICHEL and GUTFREIND, 1996). During the first two phases of the Bucbr (1620-1909), the region, and the border that ‘crosses’ (and builds) it, are both aftermaths of various territorial unifications and disintegrations. The demarcation of its lines went back and forth, as treaties and accords between Portugal and Spain were signed and later nullified. Local populations were displaced and killed in the process. The lack of definition in the delineation of borders led social groups to perceive them not only as a territorial limit, but as a zone of perils, connections, and opportunities (REICHEL, 2006).

The solidification of nation-states as the most important political units of South American continent, particularly after the clear delimitation of (most of) the (now international) borders between them, caused the mixing of the history of the Bucbr with political and economic interrelations occurring within the geopolitical region known as the Southern Cone, circumscribed roughly by Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and Southern Brazilian territories. The last two historical periods studied in this chapter (1909-2002) comprise the international political economy developed mainly among Southern Cone countries. Their agreements and divergences affected not only the construction of the Bucbr as a micro-region *per se*, but also the type of attention central governments would dispense toward this cross-border region. In addition, the cooperative environment since the foundation of Mercosur (1991) had a profound impact on the way national authorities and local actors related, although with little actual change in local socio-political and economic relations.

## **2.1 Colonialism and the search for (micro) regional autonomy in the Eastern Platine region (1620-1777)**

Portuguese mercantilist power during the colonial period was undeniable. Based on slave work and extensive land exploitation, the economy of the colonial Brazil relied on the expansion of physical space to preserve good trade routes in and out of the territory. The occupation of the Western area beyond the limit stipulated by the Tordesilhas Treaty<sup>23</sup> and the finding of new silver mines in Portuguese lands propelled the Brazilian

---

<sup>23</sup> The words of Kantor (2007, p. 70-71) summarize the Tordesilhas Treaty, “*O Tratado de Tordesilhas, assinado em 7 de junho de 1494, dividiu o mundo em dois hemisférios, por um meridiano distante de 370 léguas das ilhas de Cabo Verde, deixando à Espanha tudo que ficasse*

domestic market in the 1600s. The abundance of wild cattle, mules, and horses in the Spanish Southern provinces, combined with the rise on the importance of leather for industry and of jerked beef (*charque*) for the feeding of slaves, made the free navigation in the La Plata river crucial for development purposes. This is the main reason that the Portuguese attempted for a long time to control at least one margin of the La Plata. From the view of statesmen, the economic development of Brazil as well as its strategic position and its defense depended on the conquering of the northern banks of the La Plata river and the total control of the Paraná and Paraguay rivers (MONIZ BANDEIRA, 1995).

The Spanish empire focused their efforts toward sound administration in the viceroyalty of Peru, where the riches of the mines were abundant. The attention of the political power was into distinct locations, leaving Buenos Aires in vulnerable position within unstable surroundings (ONETO Y VIANA, 1903; MONIZ BANDEIRA, 1995). Instead of delegating the mission of populating its territory to individuals or companies (as most colonial powers at the time), Spain preserved a high degree of centralized intervention in the management of its political limits. This model of policy caused risky circumstances: while power and resources were poured out in the heart of the Spanish Empire (*i.e.* big cities and trade routes), the greatest threats and advances made by other powers occurred at the peripheries. Spain had lost, in consequence, a great deal of territory to numerous settlers in service to other European colonial powers (DJENDEREDJIAN, 2005).

The Luso-Brazilian state project of expansion into Spanish territory took place circa 1620 with the so-called *bandeiras*<sup>24</sup>. The foundation, by Portuguese and Brazilian settlers, of Colonia de Sacramento (in today's Uruguay), in 1680, located just across the Río de La Plata, facing Buenos Aires, in the Southwest of the Banda Oriental province, illustrates the uncertain social and political environment of the Eastern Platine region. For almost a century (1680-1777), Colonia de Sacramento was conquered by Spanish troops and retaken by the Portuguese, finally remaining under Spanish administrators, under the

---

*no Ocidente, e a Portugal o que se contivesse no Oriente. O acordo estabelecia o prazo de dez meses, contados a partir da data do pacto, para que fosse demarcado o meridiano divisório. Entretanto, a linha nunca chegaria a ser fixada in situ. Sua localização nos mapas era um exercício de projeção conceptual que não levava em conta nem os aspectos físicos geográficos, nem a ocupação ameríndia do território”.*

<sup>24</sup> *Bandeiras* (or *entradas*) were expedition teams, organized by the public service and by private initiative, created with the purpose of ‘territorial penetration’, of discovering of mineral riches, of route opening, and of enslaving of indigenous people (GOES FILHO, 1991).

Treaty of Santo Ildefonso (1777)<sup>25</sup>. This period was characterized by the building of a border region *within* the Banda Oriental, a ‘bordering space’ shared by Luso-Brazilians (Brazilian-born Portuguese), *Castellanos* (Spanish-American), indigenous populations, and Jesuits. The highly-militarized fortress of Colonia de Sacramento set the tone for border relations. Nonetheless, simultaneously, being the first urban nucleus of a European power in the Eastern side of the river, the town functioned as an attraction pole, increasing its importance to the region as well as to regional trade. Its port, market, festivities, the presence of the Catholic Church, and the security it represented drew people to its surrounding areas. Whilst the Spanish *porteños* (from Buenos Aires) impeded, by military means, the exploitation of natural resources, especially *cimarrón* (wild) cattle, into the land (both to Eastern and Western sides of the La Plata), they also depended on the commerce to Colonia de Sacramento and maintained trade relations with the town. This contradictory network of interactions reveals the historical process of the formation of Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina, showing the Eastern Platine region as both a region of separation, a limit between Spanish and Portuguese empires and a space of intense relations and interdependence (PRADO, 2003). *Map 2* (next page) shows the East bank of the La Plata river in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century, with the main Portuguese and Spanish towns spread in that area in the attempt to gain definitive control over the whole of the East bank of the La Plata.

The Treaty of Santo Ildefonso arbitrated on the war that took place in the Eastern Platine region, where the Spanish king Charles III authorized a military expedition to reclaim Colonia de Sacramento and its northern lands. In conjunction with the new occupation, the creation of a new viceroyalty transferred jurisdiction over the provinces of Banda Oriental and the Río de la Plata from Lima to Buenos Aires and established changes in the Spanish administrative system (ERBIG JR, 2010). One of the ‘sporadic effusions’ of the Spanish colonial state towards the occupation of its peripheral areas was the settlements policy in the Eastern Platine region set in motion from 1777 to 1801, which coordinated the founding of *pueblos* at the limits of the Portuguese empire (DJENDEREDJIAN, 2005). The compulsory recruiting of workforce and soldiers by Brazilian central powers in Southern lands was also progressing in fast pace, particularly

---

<sup>25</sup> Before the Treaty of Santo Ildefonso, the Treaty of Madrid (1750) unfruitfully attempted to regulate the populations already established in the southern territories, partially due to non-compliance of indigenous peoples to the order of moving from the Portuguese areas to Spanish lands, which caused a great armed conflict, named the Guarani War (VIANNA, 1958).



after the Spanish invasion of the town of Rio Grande, in 1763, accelerating the militarization process of the region and obstructing the development of agriculture (KÜHN, 2007).

**Map 2 The La Plata River East Basin in the 18th Century**



Source: Prado (2015, p. 3).

It should not be any surprise that the large *majority of villages and towns founded by the Spanish and Portuguese empires in the Eastern Platine region had, primarily, a military function*, slowly changing into trade, as regional and European relations would allow. In 1737, Brazilian Chuí was founded around an outpost used to supply the Fortress of São Miguel with soldiers and provisions. In 1801, a Portuguese garrison of 260 men was left in Guarda da Lagoa e do Cerrito after the defeat of Spaniards, originating the Brazilian town of Jaguarão. In 1814, a Portuguese border guard founded Barra do Quaraí in the Westernmost point of the border. In 1816, with the intent to impede the entrance of Uruguayan militias, a Luso-Brazilian garrison camped on the Northside of the Quaraí

river, founding Quaraí. The continuous fights with paramilitaries from the Banda Oriental lead to the founding of the Camp of Imperial Carolina, in 1823, originating Santana do Livramento. The Uruguayan towns of Rio Branco (1833), Artigas (1852), Aceguá (1863), and Rivera (1867) were founded either by military guards or by decrees with the declared objective of protecting the territory (PUCCI, 2010). Bella Unión was founded in 1829, after Spaniards and Guaranís fled from the Luso-Brazilian invasions into Misiones Orientales (PEDRÓN, 1970). It would be not a surprise, thus, if such settlements were developed under a continuous suspicion over their neighbors. The unstable environment in which such populations were formed created the correspondence to a historical hawkish identity to the border peoples, particularly to the *gauchos* of the Pampas (*povo/pueblo aguerrido*).

The political function of the border and the economic importance of the Campanha and the Argentinian Pampa for cattle raising drew locals' attention more than the problematic coastline some kilometers away. The rich hydrographic network made the navigation to long inland distances possible and nurtured the fertile soil of the Eastern Platine region, pushing the concentration, albeit late, of local populations and resources (particularly Luso-Brazilians) from the shore towards the inner part of the land (DUARTE MARTINS, 2001). The Treaty of Santo Ildefonso's recognition of Santa Catarina Island and Rio Grande de São Pedro (founded in 1737, as an advanced, military post) under Portuguese sovereignty, as well as Colonia del Sacramento, Banda Oriental, and Misiones Orientales (the Eastern Missions, seven wealthy villages founded by Spanish Jesuits) under Spanish sovereignty did not hinder the attempts of Luso-Brazilians to regain some parts of the rich land, particularly those of pasture. The Eastern Missions were later reincorporated to Brazilian territory as were the town of Jaguarão and the immediate surroundings of Quareím (later, Quaraí). *Regional authorities continued quarreling over such military movements*, instigated particularly by the competition in the production of *charque* and informal trade routes. The conflicts that used only to mimic the animosities of the colonial powers presented more localized dynamics, generated particularly by economic factors (MONIZ BANDEIRA, 1995). The spatial delimitation of the Eastern Platine region did not obey natural law or diplomatic treaties given by formal juridical stances. Rather, the colonial territories in the Southern Cone were delineated under the *uti possidetis* principle, which determined the right over a land by terms of occupation and military takeover (CRUXEN, 2011). It is not difficult to imagine intense disputes

over portions of territory by small armed groups or organized militia. The systemic, formal condition of conflict between Portuguese and Spanish states created an atmosphere of local warfare, with constant change of micro-political *status-quo* and jurisdiction, generating insecurity.

Such anomic conditions of Eastern Platine relations favored the rise of *caudilhos/caudillos* – political and paramilitary leaders with influence on local politics and able to offer protection in exchange of political support and general services. The relationship between *caudilhos* and *fronteiriços/fronterizos* (inhabitants of the border areas of the Bucbr) was built beyond the employer-employee logic. It was an important aspect for political consciousness and identity construction, filling up a vacuum of power in micro-regional interactions (ÁVILA, 2011). It was to be expected that local dynamics could hardly follow the logic of central administrations. The relationship among local *caudilhos* developed even beyond the borders of the colonies. Uruguayan *caudilho* José Gervasio Artigas defended an idea of federalism in the territory of the Viceroyalty of Províncias Unidas del Río de la Plata, a type of political and economic conglomerate in which each province would have freedom to trade within the federation without taxation. This notion of autonomous coordination of provinces was in route of collision with Buenos Aires and its proposition of centralized subordination, being the source of irreconcilable divergence between Banda Oriental and the *porteños*. Aiming at the protection of commercial interests, part of Montevideo's elite unified with Buenos Aires, while artiguistas procured support with Luso-Brazilians in Rio Grande do Sul. Artigas believed that the assistance of local politicians and *caudilhos* from Brazil would gain him favor of the Portuguese Court in his struggle against the United Provinces, which did not confirm to be the case (RECKZIEGEL, 2000).

Notwithstanding the warfare atmosphere of the border region, cross-border alliances were made and unmade according to common interests and the relations between local and central authorities. The local dynamics of the cross-border region between Brazil and Banda Oriental were *sui generis* compared to those in closer distances of the corresponding centers of decision-making. A complex relational web of political parties, persons, and groups of the Eastern Platine region obeyed a logic related to common political objectives, ownership of land, security, and economic factors. It was not rare Uruguayan parties (founded and active before the establishment of Uruguay as a nation) supporting political groups of the Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul,

including separatist movements of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (FERREIRA, 2006). Also identifying the singular character of the political alliances within the Bucbr, Fábio Kühn (2007) highlights that, despite the political instability of macrolevel relations and the official ‘closing’ of the border during the constant fights between Spain and Portugal, the demographically heterogeneous communities at the moving borders of the colonial states allowed the interaction of all sorts of populations and continually articulated the communication between productive zones and consumer markets. The congruence or disagreement of macro-politics among European powers, albeit impacting micro-regional interactions, was not able to inflict immediate changes within local commitments and alliances, once they were established. The constant condition of instability and insecurity in the irregular Bucbr, allied with the absence of strong state apparatus, was giving place to a certain political autonomy.

Once interests from *caudillos* concurred with central authorities’ verdicts, the engagement of local actors was not a problem about which colonial administrations should be concerned. However, when local interests were disregarded by the empires’ representatives, local actors not only restrained support but acted against central commands. The life of Artigas (1764-1850) help illustrate this singular character of local dynamics at the cross-border region. Artigas had grown up in the Uruguayan countryside. He had a libertarian personality and easily formed and mobilized troops, participating in numerous clandestine trips and smuggling goods into Banda Oriental. On the other hand, Artigas entered the king’s horsemen militia (the Corp of Blandengues) defending the border and fighting illegal activities, including the trafficking of goods from and to the Banda Oriental territories. Artigas, however, was not the only one to have such a behavior. It was a customary practice for people working in industry or trade (PUCCI, 2010). These apparently contradictory actions followed a social rationale particular to socio-economic prevailing conditions in the Eastern Platine region.

*El contrabando se desarrolló en función de las políticas económicas implantadas por el sistema colonizador [...], pero además de aparecer como una consecuencia de dichas políticas y de las condiciones geográficas de aislamiento de ciertas zonas fronterizas, junto a la inoperancia de las leyes fiscales, aparece también como una práctica tolerada por las propias autoridades coloniales, que veían en esas irregularidades un instrumento de rectificación de sus propias políticas (BENTANCOR, 2010, p. 82).*

The formalized structure of the colonial states and how they dealt with the issues at the unstable, irregular border in the Eastern Platine region constituted exogenous conditions for a double perception of what can be considered legal or illegal and when. Pucci (2010) refers to a dichotomy between a ‘juridical law’ and a ‘social law’, present in the daily life at the border and in the life of Artigas. Such a contrast reveals, firstly, the struggle for autonomy *vis-à-vis* any central power, be it Portuguese or Spanish. Secondly, the existence of two opposing perceptions of border – one ‘formal’, by which the law should be ensured; and other, ‘informal’, by which illegalities are permitted as long as they serve for bypassing social and economic obstacles of local populations. The historical dynamics that constructed the Bucbr shows it to be a space of ambiguous practices and perceptions on the roles of the border and on the actions of governments, following local, social rules that would protect a level of autonomy within each decision.


Such a space of ambiguous practices was also a relevant space for the construction of what Hettne and Söderbaum (2000) call a ‘regional complex’, given the fact that populations of both Brazil and Uruguay increased their contact and transactions compared to the early years of colonialism. The relational ambiguity, however, hindered the increase of cooperative interactions in a constant pace. The process of regional complex formation of the Bucbr was, in this period, developed in the concomitant rapprochement and estrangement in different scales. In some occasions, central governments acted together, but local actors disputed land and riches; in other junctures, central governments diverged, while local actors joined forces. Since the beginning, the Bucbr was a space of not only ambiguous perceptions and actions, but also of ambiguous construction, being simultaneously formed and dismantled by diverging logics and interactions.

## **2.2 Securitarianism of state-building and peripheral localism of the Bucbr (1777-1909)**

The period of 1777-1822 was characterized by frustrated attempts of delineating a border between *castellanos* and Luso-Brazilians. A series of commissions were designated to demarcate the territory. The difficulty of the task was enormous due to disparities of geographical reality *vis-à-vis* the diplomatic concertation of the Treaty of Santo Ildefonso (1777). A combination of factors favoured the expansion of Brazilian territory over Spanish lands. The invasion of Napoleonic troops into the Iberian Peninsula

and the subsequent escape of the Portuguese royal family to Rio de Janeiro centralized the decision-making process in Brazil and maintained a great part of its resources for the development of the nation. A different outlook awaited the Spanish. The *criollos* (Spanish-American elite) struggled for independence, requiring the concentrated action of Spanish power towards suffocating and later negotiating the continuance of its domination over the colonies (GOLIN, 2012). The Treaty of Santo Ildefonso (1777) was also responsible for creating neutral areas in the cross-border region, called *Campos Neutrais*. Such areas were exclusion zones of which none of the empires had possession, spreading throughout the strip of land between the Mirim lagoon and the Atlantic Ocean. Its delineation started in 1784 and configured a significant statement of the Luso-Brazilian occupation in Spanish lands (ARNONI, 2013). The War of the Oranges, in 1801, between Portugal and a combination of French and Spanish armies, meant the loss of Portuguese town of Olivenza. The annexation of the Misiones Orientales by the Portuguese during the war was ratified in the Treaty of Badajós (*Badajoz*), not without enduring battles in the following years. Although Portugal had lost a town in Europe, it ‘gained’ an entire province in Brazil (LIMPO, 2001). *Figure 3* compares different border demarcations based on the Madrid (1750), Santo Ildefonso (1777), and Badajós (1801) Treaties in relation to the current Brazilian, Uruguayan, and Argentinian borders.

**Figure 3 Border demarcations between Brazilian state of RS and Uruguay**



Source: Magnoli, Oliveira and Menegotto (2001).

The scenario of spread insurgencies in Spanish empire not only facilitated the invasion of Misiones Orientales by Luso-Brazilians, in 1810, who remained in Quaraí with relatively little effort, but also accelerated the missions for protecting the borders of Brazil, and to impede the advancement of the ‘revolutionary anarchy’ that started in Buenos Aires and all over the west provinces of the La Plata river, particularly under the lead of Artigas. The Portuguese military intervention in the region, nevertheless, did not hinder the anticolonial wave. It increased the struggle of Artigas in ending the Spanish rule in Montevideo and the Portuguese interference in Banda Oriental. In 1816, insurgents declared the independence of the United Provinces of the La Plata River (Argentina), engendering the stability of the southernmost province of the Brazilian territory, then called Rio Grande de São Pedro (current Rio Grande do Sul). Rio Grande shared sympathy over the social movements of Banda Oriental and could easily be incorporated into provincial rule through local alliances. The Portuguese intervention in the Eastern Platine region (until then partially supported by *porteños* and the elites of Montevideo) culminated with the full annexation of Banda Oriental by the Brazilian Empire, in 1821, which one year later would become a sovereign entity. The Província Cisplatina, as it was called, was not, however, entirely dominated. Although Artigas had been defeated in 1820, Brazilian troops did not have control over the rural areas, especially among the lowest *strata* of the population, composed by small farmers and a myriad of indigenous populations. In four years, the support from the elites also decreased insofar Brazilian colonial extraction structure exhausted the economy of Banda Oriental, undermining the military alliances once existing with Spanish-American military commanders (MONIZ BANDEIRA, 1995).

The overlapping of the annexation of Banda Oriental and the process of nation-building in Brazil raised tensions toward a ‘new’ enemy in the region, the new Brazilian government, which was determined to maintain its rule, despite the raising interests of *porteños* in reclaiming the province and the strengthening of nationalist movements (FERREIRA, 2006). To terminate its colonial status and to acquire capital as a genuine metropolis, Brazil attempted to possess a political center within the La Plata East basin, a plan Argentina was not able to accept in its effort to regain hegemony (SCHAEFER, 1975). The period of 1811-1830 was marked by a process of (macro) regional disintegration in South America, with the detachment of Uruguay from Brazil being one of many cases (DABÈNE, 2009). In 1825, the war between the United Provinces

(Argentina) and Brazil over the territory of Banda Oriental, known as the Cisplatine War, was declared. Besides fighting for the demarcation of common borders and for the market gains of having a major seaport in their control – Montevideo –, an ideological difference helped escalate the conflict: the republicanism of the United Provinces versus Brazilian monarchism. Brazil and Buenos Aires only agreed to end the war with British mediation, in August 1828, recognizing the independence of *Provincia Oriental del Uruguay* (RODRÍGUEZ O, 1998).

The process of nation-building in Uruguay, however, was far from being peaceful or well-founded. Firstly, the conspicuous undefinition of Uruguayan limits, until then not acknowledged by its neighbors, made it a country without recognized borders (SOARES, 1973). The set of treaties in 1851, signed by Brazil and Uruguay did put the *orientales* in unequal position toward its Northern neighbor:

*El Tratado de Alianza declaraba a Brasil garante del orden interno de Uruguay, así como de su constitución, con el derecho a intervenir en los asuntos internos para imponer la paz, también estipulaba la asistencia militar y financiera del Imperio al gobierno de Uruguay. El Tratado de Límites fijaba la frontera del norte de Uruguay en el río Cuareim con renuncia a los derechos históricos sobre el territorio de Misiones cuyo límite norte había sido el río Ibicuy. Ya el Tratado de Navegación declaraba la libertad de navegación del río Uruguay para el Imperio, pero excluía a Uruguay de la navegación de la Laguna Merín y del río Yaguarón. El de Comercio fijaba una serie de exenciones arancelarias para las importaciones de origen brasileño, así como mayores facilidades para la exportación de ganado hacia Brasil. El Tratado de Extradición instituía el derecho a deportar y arrestar en a esclavos fugitivos en el territorio uruguayo (BARCELÓ, 2016, p. 109).*

Besides having uncertain borders, Uruguay had given up both its right to navigate the North-Western waters that separated the Oriental State from Brazil, and its exclusive authority over its own territory. It was instituted, in the words of Clemente (2005), a virtual protectorate, a period of subordination of Uruguayan foreign policy under the Empire of Brazil. Secondly, national political parties, sometimes endorsing (or endorsed by) Brazil, sometimes, Argentina or Paraguay, constantly fluctuated *apropos* Uruguayan diplomatic relations and support. The period of 1828-1864 was thus characterized by the constant presence of Argentina and its attempts to regain its power over the Eastern territories and the Brazilian interference in Uruguayan affairs. The rise of political turmoil in Buenos Aires raised tensions in the official relations between Argentina and Brazil.



The empire continued to defend Uruguayan independence as well as the assurance of free navigation in the Eastern Platine rivers – at this point not guaranteed with safety, particularly for its own benefit. Despite Brazilian support (but also because of it), the poorly demarcated borders of Uruguay and the Brazilian state of Rio Grande do Sul were constantly ignored by local militias connected to the *blanco* party (conservative), stealing cattle and plundering *estâncias* (rural, communal military posts to assure territorial presence), causing Brazil to intervene in assisting the opposing political party (*colorado*) to assume the presidency (VIANNA, 1958)<sup>26</sup>.

Nevertheless, the weak governmental structure of Uruguay and its combination of low population, abundance of cattle, and numerous trade routes were the perfect outlook for local exchanges in and out of its territory, specially to southern Brazilians, who owned three quarters of the public lands of Banda Oriental at that time (RECKZIEGEL, 2000). The state system created to rule over the newly formed nation did not change such a marginal atmosphere. While Argentina suppressed the power of the *caudillos*, fused political parties, and managed to create a national army by the end of the nineteenth-century, Uruguay continued with a deep divide between *colorados* from Montevideo and *blanco* ranchers from the interior, which facilitated the survival of local militias and the separation of political spheres between city and rural areas throughout the 1800s (ROCK and LÓPEZ-ALVES, 2000). Brazil strengthened the centralized structure of the empire, but did not achieve to suffocate the aspirations for autonomy in the south. Drinking from the revolutionary experience of the *orientales*, local authorities from Rio Grande do Sul searched for assistance from Uruguayans during the long and unsuccessful micro-regional

---

<sup>26</sup> The complexity of the border delineation from the beginning of colonialism to the establishment of Uruguay as an independent nation is summarized in the excerpt by (VARGAS, 2017 p. 292-293): “o território da porção oriental do rio Uruguai, a norte do Prata, esteve sujeito, grosso modo, à luz do “sistema tordesilheano”, às seguintes soberanias: i) 1494-1681: Espanha, de jure; ii) 1680-1681: Espanha, de jure, e Portugal, de facto; iii) 1681: Espanha, de jure e de facto; iv) 1681-1750: Espanha, de jure, e Portugal, de facto; v) 1750-1763: Portugal, de jure e de facto; vi) 1762-1763: Portugal, de jure, e Espanha, de facto; vii) 1763-1777: Portugal, de jure e de facto; viii) 1777-1801: Espanha, de jure e de facto; ix) 1801-1811: Espanha, de facto, mas Portugal mantém pretensões; x) 1811-1816: autodeterminação, momento em que a Banda Oriental, sob a liderança de Artigas e com a derrota dos espanhóis, se vincula ao movimento autonomista federalista das Províncias Unidas do Rio da Prata (futura Argentina); xi) 1816- - 1820: Reino Unido de Portugal, Brasil e Algarves, de facto e com pretensões de jure, quando os portugueses invocam direitos em nome da rainha consorte Carlota Joaquina, neta de Carlos III e filha de Carlos IV de Espanha, além de direitos históricos; xii) 1821-1822: Reino Unido de Portugal, Brasil e Algarves (anexação com o nome de Província Cisplatina); xiii) 1821-1828: Império do Brasil; xiv) a partir de 1828 (independência), torna-se República Oriental do Uruguai”.

uprising, denominated Farroupilha Revolution (1835-1845) (RECKZIEGEL, 2000). The real intentions of the revolt, albeit unclear for historians, was connected to an idea of integrating Rio Grande do Sul to Uruguay. To say the least, a common ground among uprisers was the necessity of turning the Southernmost Brazilian province into an autonomous region, free from taxation and from the rule of central administration (GOES FILHO, 2013).

This contributed to an increasing localism of rural politics, organized around paramilitary leaders and their influence over farms and *pueblos* in the countryside. The local economic and political networks of the Bucbr amalgamated a revolutionary sentiment among rural populations and local traders, which although ‘opportunistic’ (GOES FILHO, 2013, p. 67), reinforced the notion of a cross-border identity, reflected in the numerous alliances and commercial deals between groups of both sides of the (still uncertain) international border, engendered apart from or despite of political decisions from Rio de Janeiro (Brazilian capital then) or Montevideo. Such micro-regional coalitions – not only *based on political interests, but also on familiar bonds* – were facilitated by the historical free flow of persons across the border. Consanguinity ties were even more relevant regarding the relations among *caudillos*, which often had Brazilian and Uruguayan backgrounds, promoting “contradictory practices” (NAVARRETE, 2006, p. 6). The marginal (sometimes rebellious) state of *Sul-Rio-Grandenses vis-à-vis* the central government of Rio de Janeiro, together with the sporadic presence of the (still) weak Uruguayan political and military structure in the North of Banda Oriental, restricted the relations within the Bucbr into a peripheral condition. On the other hand, the newly formed nations of Brazil and Uruguay (and Argentina) focused on assuring territorial rule over the fields of the weakly conquered provinces, militarizing the Eastern Platine region and later the Bucbr. In addition, the constant rebellions that took place in the South of Brazil and North of Uruguay contributed for the rise of central politics toward securitarianism. In sum, *nation-building processes of Brazil and Uruguay militarized their borders but failed to control them.*

Systemic (formal) actors of South American regional relations in the Southern Cone (mainly Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay), while engendering dubious interrelations and attempting to implement strong ‘national’ presence in the Eastern Platine region, did not have the political, economic, or military power to accomplish their objectives. Given the absence of well-delineated international borders, internal disorders usually begot

external conflicts (DABÈNE, 2003). In addition, the concerns of power shifting during the period of independence and the building of states intensified violence in the cross-border region (WEISIGER, 2011). However, the ruling powers of the capitals did not want to meet any local demands for political autonomy or preferential trade. This combination of limited institutional capacities of the state with continuous bellicose interference created a vacuum of power in great extent of the region. This is consonant with what Weisiger (2011, p. 34) states about persisting conflicts, “War can beget more war by generating windows of opportunity against actors whose allies are tied up elsewhere, while state weakness generates incentives to oppose consolidation under one’s domestic opponents”. The political and social instabilities at the borders generated displaced populations, insecurity, poverty, and lawlessness, which became perfect ‘windows of opportunities’ to *caudilhos*, in the context of rapidly changing political scenarios. The institutional void, even more visible at the uncertain international borders, was filled with local actors using local logics for their own profit, enabling the (violent) peripheral localism of micro-regional interactions within the Bucbr.

### **2.3 Active informal interactions, latent formal relations: international political economy and the Bucbr (1909-1975)**

The set of treaties signed in 1851 by Uruguay and Brazil was used to attract Brazilian support to the Republica Oriental in the struggle against the Argentinian Confederation, ending with the so-called Grande Guerra (1842). However, it also meant, for Uruguay, the formal renunciation of traditional territorial claims, and the agreement of an unequal relation of its border regime with Brazil. For Uruguay, the Southern part of the international border with Brazil was dry, even though it was a fluvial coast. That is, it had no right to use and exploit the water surface and the subsoil of a greater part of Mirim/Merín lagoon and of Jaguarão/Yaguarón river. Besides giving away Uruguayan possession of the right of navigation, the agreement also stipulated ‘half a league’ of Uruguayan land in some portions of the Cebolati outfall for the exclusive, sovereign use of Brazil. In the occasion of the ratification of the treaties, in May 1852, authorities signed the approval with the formally declared expectation of further amendments. In 1877, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation attempted to rectify some points of the earlier treaty, recognizing the mutual use of the Mirim lagoon and the Jaguarão river. It was however

never ratified. Despite Brazilian authorities' awareness about the disparity of the 1851 Treaty, later attempts to alter the contract were frustrated (GROS, 1984).

In 1909, however, Uruguay had developed into a stable nation, being considered the 'Switzerland of Latin America'. The bloody disputes between *blancos* and *colorados* had ended, backing the political stability of the Southernmost federal state of Rio Grande do Sul. José Maria da Silva Paranhos<sup>27</sup> envisaged an opportunity to balance the treaty of 1851, giving concessions to Uruguay in later negotiations. In addition, an important regional factor promoted such a decision, the Argentinian movement toward full, exclusive sovereignty of the La Plata river in the model of the 1851 agreements (GOES FILHO, 2013). The treaty of Rectification of Limits established in its main resolution that Brazil would "give Uruguay the rights of sovereignty" of the waters of Mirim and Jaguarão, their margins, and the corresponding half of both streams, which would cause a revision of the Argentinian terms on the La Plata (DE LOS SANTOS, 2010), and finally re-concede free transit of merchant vessels and warships from and to the Atlantic and Uruguay (SOARES, 1973).

Since the election of Julio Herrera y Orbes, in 1890, the *blancos* had lost a great deal of power in some departments due to policies that hampered the co-participation model of governance in Uruguay, and to the declared fight against *caudilhismo*. The international border continued to be ignored, especially after the outbreak of the Federalist Revolution in 1893 that attempted to end the repressive rule of Júlio de Castilhos in Rio Grande do Sul, and the centralized government of the republic. The insurgents of Rio Grande do Sul and the *blancos* reactivated a strong network of interests, freely moving within the cross-border region and much beyond. Despite not defending the same causes, *blancos* and federalists found themselves restrained within the political structure of repression toward autonomous movements. The violent response to the revolution joined both movements together. The bordering department of Cerro Largo, controlled by *blancos*, was usually used by Brazilian rebels to smuggle firearms, to train armies, and to

---

<sup>27</sup> In 1851, Paranhos started in an emissary position as a secretary in the Special Mission to the La Plata, with which he became personally involved during his life as a diplomat. His son, Paranhos Junior (known as the Baron of Rio Branco) was responsible for profound changes in the way Brazil conducted its foreign policy, leading the diplomatic efforts toward the consolidation of the Brazilian territory and founding the principles on which the young, republican country would later base its relations with South American neighbors. In 1909, by conducting negotiations that led to the signature of the Rectification Treaty, Rio Branco concluded what his father had started (CARVALHO, 1995).

request exile (nearly 15 thousand people emigrated from Rio Grande do Sul to Uruguay [and Argentina]). Brazilian militias also possessed land in Uruguay, which facilitated their entrance in the Eastern territory. Such critical circumstances did not impede the continuation of close relationship between the Brazilian and Uruguayan chancelleries (COSTA, 2006; RECKZIEGEL, 2010).

With the end of the Federalist Revolution (1895) and the definitive defeat of the *blancos* in the ‘Peace of Aceguá’ (1904), a period of political tranquility and economic prosperity had been initiated, particularly in Uruguay. The emergence and consolidation of a democratic regime in the Eastern Republic from 1903 to 1929 set in motion several structural reforms that made Uruguay a model of democracy in the continent, which facilitated the negotiations of the 1909 Rectification Treaty. Among the reforms, industrialization, nationalization of companies, labor and civil rights, all of which culminated in the design of a new Constitution (1918) adopting universal suffrage and the creation of a new executive power, the Collegiate. Concurrently, progressive movements in Brazil did not achieve to fully establish. In 1917, social agitation was chronic and influenced by anarchist unionization. The oligarchic strata, rooted within the Executive power, desired to maintain centralized rule over Brazilian territory and to accommodate the will of working classes preferably without deep reforms. From 1922 to 1927 some spheres within the Army challenged the government (the so-called *tenentismo*), but never succeeded in the attempt to overthrow the president or to regiment rural communities in favor of the movement (DABÈNE, 2003).

Although the Brazilian-Uruguayan borderline had been resolved to that time, *nowadays* there remains two pending matters concerning its delineation:

*O Rincão de Artigas, ou Rincón de Artigas, é uma área em forma triangular de 237 km<sup>2</sup>, localizada em um ponto da fronteira próximo ao município sul-rio-grandense de Santana do Livramento. O Uruguai, alegando que um equívoco na delimitação da fronteira em 1856 teria deixado o território no lado brasileiro da fronteira, reclama por uma correção, negada pelo Brasil. A Ilha Brasileira, ou Isla Brasileña, é um território fluvial localizado na foz do rio Quaraí no rio Uruguai, na tríplice fronteira entre Brasil, Uruguai e Argentina. Está sob administração brasileira, integrando o município de Barra do Quaraí, mas tem sido reclamada pelo Uruguai desde a década de 1940, que alega ter sido incorretamente adjudicada ao Brasil na demarcação de 1862. O argumento uruguaio se funda em que a ilha se encontra no rio Uruguai, e não no rio Quaraí (Cuareim) (VARGAS, 2017, p. 299).*

The 'authoritative modernization' of the Brazilian economic and political structures generated a (domestic) political regionalism in all the distinct geographic areas of the territory. Two enduring contradictory movements co-existed: on the one hand, the economic, socio-political, and cultural homogenization (a reflex of state and national market formation, as well as of the expansion of capitalism); on the other hand, the unequal distribution of investment and capital accumulation among the regions, propelled by the tendency of the latter to concentrate in areas of greater profits and expansion. Rio Grande do Sul was among the states in which the 'peripheral oligarchy' – with less investment capacity, and clustered within the Southern region – organized itself politically to fight for liberal reforms and to run a parallel, internal, regional government in the first three decades of the 1900s (TAVARES and ROJO, 1998). Deviation from the legal state apparatus remained common at the Brazilian-Uruguayan border, which continued to absorb contraband, armed confrontations, and numerous political exiles, particularly leaders of domestic revolts fleeing either to Montevideo or Buenos Aires, where they would regroup and form new alliances and plots (RANGEL, 2000; 2005).

The processes of national integration in Brazil during the period of 1900-1930 potentialized cross-border informal relations insofar the Brazilian-Uruguayan border permitted the free flow and exchange of people, arms, intelligence, and goods. The inward orientation of Southern Brazilian insurgents did not relegate the international border and the Bucbr to a condition of obliviousness. Instead, it was used as a means of political and military strategy and of cooptation of political support. The Brazilian state, however, considered the border (and its zone of influence) problematic, given that it meant political and economic resources to cross-border organized groups capable of weakening the unifying function of the state. The Twentieth Century started with the persistence of active informal interactions across the border of Brazil and Uruguay. Central governments inherited the suspicion of all trans-local activities, but did not have the means to deal with them. This relation of distrust was the main character of the formal-informal interrelations of the first half of that century.

The crisis of the Uruguayan model of democracy and welfare in the 1950s, unable to foster economic gain, caused institutional exhaustion and social polarization, precluding political stability, which led to the use of violence and later civil-military authoritarianism (DUFRECHOU, 2015). After the populist rule of Getúlio Vargas during the Estado Novo (1930-1945), Brazil entered a (new) phase of industrialization and

economic growth fostered by the state, based on the ideology of developmentalism (*desenvolvimentismo*), particularly under the mandate of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1960). His successor, Jânio Quadros, inherited a fragile economy that, despite growing 10% a year, was highly in debt. His resignation after seven months put his vice-President, João Goulart in office. Goulart, however, did not share the trust of the Army. The military forces, driven by Goulart's inability to stabilize the economy, his tendency toward progressive measures (unionization and labor reforms), and the rising polarization between the Army and the left, orchestrated a *coup d'état*, with the help of the United States, ending the chaotic democratization process of Brazil (DABÈNE, 2003).

Diplomacy during the Vargas's period regarding the Eastern Platine region focused on conforming to the guidelines of Rio Branco: defense of regional political constancy, non-intervention in domestic affairs, and a good understanding with Argentina. Moreover, Vargas maintained the pacific negotiation of controversies, while attempting to increase regional trade. During World War II, the *varguistas* requested the USA for arms to protect the Brazilian Southern borders, particularly to Argentina, which seemed to approach the Germans in 1942-1943 (DORATIOTO, 2014). The politics of understanding between Argentina and Brazil were, however, intensified in the later years, approaching a position nearing coordination, both in political and economic terms. The quenching of Argentinian-Brazilian relations promoted the strengthening of the regional arena. Uruguay took the 'cooperation wagon', especially after being set aside as a strategic zone of influence by the two countries (CERVO, 2007, p. 165).

The subsequent period of dictatorships in the Southern Cone (Uruguay [1973-1985] and Brazil [1964-1985])<sup>28</sup> deeply changed the *ambiance* within and the role of the Bucbr for both countries. Under the doctrine of 'national security', the civil-military authoritarianisms of Brazil and Uruguay established joint task-forces with binational command within the scope of a regional repression agreement to fight the threat of subversive organizations. The Condor Operation, as it was denominated, was the pinnacle of international collaboration on security intelligence to persecute and eliminate political opposition, one of the mechanisms of (international) state terrorism (PADRÓS, 2005). Regardless of all the mechanisms of control and vigilance, it was hard to regulate the Brazilian-Uruguayan border on both sides. Brazilian federated state of Rio Grande do Sul

---

<sup>28</sup> Not forgetting to mention Argentina (1976-1983) and Chile (1973-1990).

rapidly became a ‘sensitive area’, remaining under the statute of zone of national security (PADRÓS, 2009):

*De hecho, la frontera terrestre con el Uruguay y la geopolítica del Plata hacían temer una hipotética influencia argentina en la región, lo que justificaba la concentración de unidades militares en ciudades próximas de la frontera. Con la caída de [presidente João] Goulart, surgió una red de caminos ‘invisibles’, sobre la frontera común, usada para conectar la resistencia interna brasileña con el exilio montevideano [...]. Paradójicamente, al comienzo de los años 60, el flujo se modificó; fue cuando ciudadanos uruguayos, presionados por la deterioración general de su país, también comenzaron a atravesar la frontera para buscar protección y estabilidad en el Brasil. Finalmente, al final de los años 70, hubo el impactante extrañamiento frente a los cuerpos de desaparecidos, víctimas de los “vuelos de la muerte”, devueltos por el mar en cada lado del litoral de la frontera Chuí-Chuy (PADRÓS, 2009, no page).*

Such two-way movement, that is, of insurgents, citizens, and solidarity networks on the one hand; and the (joint) repressive action of the military states of Brazil and Uruguay, on the other hand, demonstrated the existence of a double functionality of the international border: a barrier for the former, a fluid zone for the latter (PADRÓS, 2009). The security focus of dictatorial rule, *the rise of state control, and the fear of revolutionary movements pushed informal interactions within the Bucbr to the shades of illegality*. The ‘special (security) status’ of Rio Grande do Sul was accompanied by the careful selection of policymakers and by the militarization of formal relations concerning the cross-border region and its ‘problems’.

During the same period, Brazil and Uruguay helped create several regional bodies. The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), founded by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay in Montevideo (1960) aimed at the deepening of economic regional cooperation through the fostering of free trade and liberalization of tariffs. Despite the growing in membership, LAFTA did not achieved its ambitions. In 1975, the founding of the Latin American Economic System (SELA, in Spanish) targeted the retaking of conversations toward a more solid partnership among Latin American countries. SELA opened the doors for the creation of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI, in Spanish), in 1981, with the objective of facilitating trade negotiations in the continent. Although such regional institutions did not serve for the deepening of cooperation and the increment of economic development in Latin America



(including the Southern Cone), they were important contributions to create a more stable environment during long and hard periods of dictatorships. Also, they concentrated Brazilian efforts of building a regional foreign policy on two fronts, the Southern Cone, and the Amazon (PECEQUILO and CARMO, 2015), which benefited the slow but constant processes of collaboration among the countries of the Eastern Platine region. The Treaty of Cuenca del Plata (1969, but in effect in 1970) had important ramifications for the signatories, especially for Uruguay. The Treaty aimed at the regulation and development of the la Plata waterway regions, comprehending also commercial and cooperation agreements<sup>29</sup>. It placed Uruguay in one side of regional projects in the continent (in opposition to the Chilean regional project), approaching it to Argentina and Brazil; and it reaffirmed the Republica Oriental as an important energy provider, a space of passage, and a touristic center, fostering interrelations to its immediate neighbors. The change of governmental priorities in the Uruguayan democratic transition also expanded the signing and implementation of commercial agreements and became part of its foreign policy agenda (BIZZOZERO, 2010).

#### **2.4 Southern Cone relations toward cooperation: ignoring cross-border regions? (1975-2002)**

It is in the context of dictatorial regime that the Brazilian-Uruguayan border as an institution emerges. Regardless of sectorial cooperation displayed in the beginning of the 1970s, Brazil and Uruguay did not look at their common border as a social space for opportunities. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Commerce, signed in the border town of Rivera (connected by a street to the Brazilian town of Santana do Livramento), in 12 June 1975, despite considering the border a ‘crossing point’ (Art. XXI) (PUCCI, 2010, p. 98), did regard it a strategic and symbolic element. Pucci (2010) elucidates on the importance of this bilateral agreement for the constitution of the Brazilian-Uruguayan border statute:

*Como acordo-quadro que é, o referido ato internacional é a matriz de todas as instituições, programas e acordos derivados subsequentes. É importante, sobretudo, como fundamento jurídico e, por extensão, filosófico das ações de estreitamento dos laços entre os dois países. Mais que um instrumento jurídico, representou um divisor de águas no relacionamento bilateral, pois marcou a decisão de ambos os Estados*

---

<sup>29</sup> The other members were Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Paraguay.

*de tomarem as rédeas da integração, por meio da instauração de mecanismos permanentes de cooperação, entendimento e troca de informações sobre todos os assuntos de interesse comum, bilaterais e multilaterais (Art. 1). Metaforicamente falando, o Tratado de Amizade Cooperação e Comércio abriu a caixa de Pandora dos acordos bilaterais: do total de 192 atos celebrados desde o Tratado de Aliança de 1851, até a presente data [26 de janeiro de 2009], dois terços (126) foram concluídos nos 33 anos subsequentes aos Tratado de 1975 (PUCCI, 2010, p. 98).*

The 1975 ‘umbrella agreement’ also represented a change in the perception of decision-makers, that cooperating closely could bring more benefit than not cooperating (the so-called perception of ‘reciprocal advantage’). The foundation of such a formal architecture facilitated the engenderment of agreements on border affairs. From the signing of the *Tratado de Amizade*, 35 agreements concerning the Brazilian-Uruguayan border were ratified and other three accords are in proceeding (MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES, 2017a).

The creation of the General Commission of Coordination (GCC), connected to the Foreign Ministries of Brazil and Uruguay, had the purpose of studying matters of common interest and recommending measures for the corresponding governments. Although the GCC was founded with certain institutional commitment, the body never summoned during the dictatorial rule, having its first meeting only ten years after it was founded. The signature of the Treaty of Cooperation for the Use of Natural Resources and/or Development of Mirim Lagoon was among the most relevant institutional advances deriving from the 1975 Treaty. It created a framework for future agreements to improve the standard of living of the basin population, and decided about navigation, flood control, irrigation and drainage, mineral resources, and water supply. Such a Treaty was the basis for the establishment of the Mirim Lagoon Board (1963, but implemented only in 1977) and later of the Quaraí river Board (1991, functioning in 1993). Under the GCC, the Subcommittee for the Joint Development of Border Zones (SJDBZ, 1985) was responsible for analyzing, at first, cooperation concerning infrastructure connections, economic complementation, and social development. In 1989, the SJDBZ recommended the creation of Border Committees (BC) in three of the so-called twin-towns (Chuí-Chuy, Santana do Livramento-Rivera, and Jaguarão-Rio Branco), with the primary objective of rapidly resolving operational problems. Three more BCs were created in 1991 (Quaraí-

Artigas) and in 1996 (Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión, and Aceguá-Aceguá) (PUCCI, 2010; RÓTULO; DAMIANI, 2010).

Stagnation, lack of receptivity in the central governments and of celerity to connect local demands and governmental responses and loosing of systemic relevance were the main problems with the functioning of the BCs. The diffuse and bureaucratic path from local revindications to Federal Administrative feedback affected the credibility of the localized institutional bodies. The building of complexity of bilateral cooperation due to the influence of geopolitical perceptions over decision-makers deteriorated the intensity of formal interactions between Brazil and Uruguay. The privilege of central governments over local administrations and the authoritarian developmentalism as the driving-force of international cooperation hindered the construction of a channel able to exchange local demands and central offers of institutional, cooperative solutions. These bilateral bodies created an *empty institutionalization unable to open politically to cross-border social demands in a time of rigid military ruling in Brazil and civil-military dictatorship in Uruguay* (PUCCI, 2010; RÓTULO; DAMIANI, 2010).

The relevance of the Argentine-Brazilian relation for the stabilization of the political environment in the Southern Cone could not be ignored (as it was the case since initial stages of international political economy in the continent). Leading to the founding of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), the relationship between Brazil and Argentina continued to affect Brazilian formal interactions with Uruguay. The redemocratization of both countries in mid 1980s helped build willingness to cooperate. Uruguay, coming out of a period of insulation during dictatorship (CLEMENTE, 2005), took advantage of the opportunity.

On the relation between Brazilians and Argentinians during the period of 1970-1990, Gardini (2010) summarizes his conclusion on the origins of Mercosur:

The [Argentine-Brazilian] diplomatic rapprochement of the late 1970s and early 1980s owed more to systemic factors and changes [economic and political crises] than to internal developments [...]. The long turn toward constructive relations eliminated immediate reasons for conflict but is not to be regarded as a clear antecedent of bilateral integration because similar initiatives were not even put forward. The idea of bilateral integration was conceived in Argentina upon return to democracy as a way to eliminate possible sources of instability for the new government. The idea was first offered in 1984 to a still authoritarian Brazil, which responded sympathetically but was unable to take major initiatives as it was in the final stage of its own democratic

transition. As soon as democratic president Sarney assumed, office negotiations took off. The intention to integrate was announced in November 1985 and the first formal agreement was signed in July 1986 [the Buenos Aires Act]. [...] The passage to the common market remained an aspiration until the early 1990s. The 1988 Treaty of Integration concluded by the first democratic presidents introduced the concept of a common market in the integration process but actually only provided for the formation of a free trade area. Mercosur emerged from the challenges of globalization and the perceived need to engage in competition between regional trade blocs. Systemic considerations regained priority in the international insertion strategies of Argentina and Brazil (GARDINI, 2010, p. 176).

The failures of macroeconomic and foreign policies based on the principles of the ECLAC in the end of the 1980s (national industrialization and continental, introspective external policies), the advance of economic globalization and the subsequent increase of weight of international financial institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund) into domestic affairs of South American countries were the main systemic factors that inclined both Argentina and Brazil to following the so-called Washington Consensus (CERVO, 2000; VISENTINI, 2007). Institutional adjustments (market deregulation, privatization, and liberalization) imposed by such institutions did not consider the impact on domestic and regional spheres (VALADÃO, 2009). The foundation of Mercosur, in 1991, was, in this context, both a consequence of neoliberal process (due to its search for increasing of investments and trade by market liberalization) and a response to the same neoliberal policies (by attempting to use regionalism to preserve industries and reducing US dependence) (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA; CULPI, 2016).

The signature of the foundational Asunción Treaty by Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay, in 1991, drastically changed the characteristics of intra-regional borders. Mercosur considered the costs of intra-regional transactions too significant, particularly due to slow process of border-crossing caused by the necessity of double-checking goods and documents. The border, in this perspective, was perceived as an obstacle to the liberalization of trade, requiring a new control system. In this system, regulated by the Recife Agreement (1993), integrated control areas were to be implemented, implicating the existence of a physical structure capable of concentrating installations and activities of the two countries involved in the circulation procedures. From 1994-2000, Mercosur perfected the Recife Agreement and decided on many of the details concerning the functioning and the regulation of the integrated control system and

the integrated posts (FERRARO, 2013). Mercosur limited its understanding of the border to the so-called ‘border points’, a “linkage place between countries, qualified for entry and exit of persons, goods and means of transportation of persons and cargoes” (MERCOSUR, 1993, Article 1). In the Bucbr, the six border points (and integrated control posts) coincide with the roads coming in and out of the six cross-border urban complexes of the region, the highest number among all the internal borders of Mercosur (MERCOSUR, 1994), which corroborates the Uruguayan historical position of ‘corridor’ between Argentina and Brazil.

The project of regional economic integration of Mercosur softened the hypothesis of conflict among Southern Cone members. Plans for social and economic development – usually tied to the idea of nationalization – did not constitute part of the political agenda. New roads and bridges designed for advancing cooperation in the scope of Mercosur did not aim at the benefit of local populations. If before the creation of Mercosur, the border functioned under the logic of interstate confrontation and territorial protection (in which the country that served best to the interest of border communities attracted such populations in its favor), after the advance of the regional organization, roads and bridges were built only to foster terrestrial trade and to facilitate the circulation of goods of big companies. Border towns became mere ‘areas of service’, passage points in which road haulers could stop before continuing transportation. Border populations perceived stronger presence of the state. *The function of protection and security came out and the function of control and regulation came in.* Control over border populations became higher, not rarely nullifying historical or traditional practices of circulation and trade within the Bucbr. The construction of customs posts, police and migration stations reinforced the presence of the state in many of the international borders of Mercosur, particularly the ones with intense movement of goods and people (GRIMSON, 2001).

Regional policies regarding Mercosurian borders opened trade routes while kept control of the border. In a formal perspective, state and its institutions lowered border barriers, promoting degrees of liberalization and deregulation (what theorists of economic integration would denominate ‘open regionalism’). The informal perspective, particularly at the local level, attests the opposite: the hampering of trans-local mobility and the constant state of control by national authorities. The rise of formal, interstate relations caused informal interactions within the Bucbr to be, if not reduced, reinvented. Moreover, as indicated by Lucena (2012), the once prosperous economic region of the first centuries

of colonization and later nation-building, the Bucbr witnessed a decline in its productive capacity due to the transferring of communication between centers of production, *e.g.* São Paulo, and capitals of consumption, especially Montevideo and Buenos Aires. Before, border towns served as micro-regional markets, obeying to more local than global dynamics and conditions.

Within Mercosur, Brazilian and Uruguayan border towns lost part of their importance even to local economies of their immediate neighbors, becoming, at most, mere corridors of goods. Instead of shopping for supplies within the cross-border urban complex, Mercosurian agreements lowered prices of selected goods in national scale, being more advantageous to buy them in big wholesalers in their own country. This is confirmed in the case-study by Nascimento (1995) about informal trade and smuggling in the cross-border urban complex of Aceguá-Aceguá *vis-à-vis* the establishment of Mercosur:

*Até o início da década de 90, uma diversidade de produtos alimentícios, roupas, eletrônicos, eletrodomésticos, combustíveis, lubrificantes, materiais de construção e outros eram levados de Aceguá para o Uruguai. As mudanças cambiais iniciadas pelo Plano Collor e reforçadas pelo Plano Real [...] começaram a mudar o quadro. Com o ingresso do Uruguai no Mercosul e a entrada cada vez maior de produtos brasileiros sem imposto naquele país – ou com alíquotas de importação muito baixas – a situação ficou mais grave. Estão ficando cada vez menores as vantagens que quileiros e outras pessoas que atravessam a fronteira têm na compra no Brasil. Grande parte dos produtos que antes eram carregados por pequenos contrabandistas de Aceguá para Melo [capital do departamento de Cerro Largo] agora está entrando diretamente no Uruguai, levada por empresas brasileiras. [...] essa mudança também afeta diretamente a economia de Aceguá, que sobrevive basicamente deste chamado comércio-formiga (NASCIMENTO, 1995, p. 64-65).*

The author even points out to the risk of disappearance of Brazilian Aceguá, as its *raison d'être* and main economic activity was becoming obsolete among all the changes caused by formal relations in the Southern Cone. Turning Aceguá into an emancipated municipality and into a big service station was among the cited ways to avoid a melancholic end. History confirmed the former to be the case (officially installed in 2001). Another significant local factor in this new *status-quo* for cross-border urban complexes of the Bucbr is appointed by Lucena (2012), citing interviews with key actors of Rivera-Santana do Livramento. She acknowledges the lack of accelerated adaptation

from local producers of cattle to new market configurations, especially the change from extensive to intensive production, the use of high technology, and the opening toward export production, causing the once powerful and immense cattle raisers of the Bucbr to collapse, generating poverty and more social insecurity.

Integrative and cooperative dynamics within the Southern Cone has called the attention of national authorities to intra-bloc border regions – especially the Bucbr. They started being perceived as “*áreas estratégicas ideales para la experimentación social de la integración regional en donde la cercanía, la contigüidad y el diálogo se sintetizan en intensas relaciones transfronterizas*” (RHI-SAUSI, 2012), p. 1). The rising convergence of Brazilian and Uruguayan policies to such areas produced a mounting consideration of the idiosyncrasies of the Bucbr and the necessity of dealing with complications of the region (SANTOS; SANTOS, 2005). Despite what discursive resources of cooperation or integration may indicate, however, considering the lack of practical transformation of the 1975 bilateral agreement in channeling social demands of local populations of the Bucbr, as well as the economic and social changes triggered by regional policy designs during the first phase of Mercosur (*i.e.* from its foundation until the 1997 crisis), it seems evident that formal relations of the Southern Cone ignored specificities of the Brazilian-Uruguayan border, failing to include the micro-region into formal agendas. On the other hand, the continuity of certain degrees of – always peripheral – localism in the Bucbr in such times of change, coupled with the lack of resilience to new, bigger, and more connected market conditions, imposed border populations to remain relying on informal interactions, apart from statist dynamics or agendas.

## **2.5 Final remarks on the history of an uneven relationship**

The social construction of Bucbr, established by the relationship between formal (state), regulatory processes, actors, and institutions operating in and deciding about the Bucbr and (informal, non-state) local socio-political dynamics and actors, is characterized by the effects of the domestic-international linkage of the trans-locality of border communities, especially during the first three historical periods analyzed in this chapter. The weakness of national frameworks and of centralized governments until the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century (1975) eventually fostered cross-border interactions at the local level in a *de facto*, semiautonomous fashion. Although political alliances and economic microregional

atmosphere were more contingent on trans-local logics and relationships, the dependence and direct influence of central decisions into local matters (such as the populational distribution by the official founding of villages, the military presence in the Bucbr, bilateral or trilateral (dis)agreements, and the continual alteration of borderlines) is undeniable and poses as a major force onto the *modus agendi* of local actors by constantly changing the *status quo* of socio-political and economic affairs, at local, national, and (macro) regional levels.

It is problematic to attempt understanding the relevance of local actors' perceptions on the New Agenda without considering these intricate links between local actors, nation-states, society, and external actors into the Bucbr. History has shown that macro-regional peace was not an indication of micro-regional (local) harmony, as well as centralized agreements were not always consonant to trans-local arrangements (and *vice-versa*). Southern Cone interrelations in the Twentieth Century were different. Interests usually fluctuated according to both governmental and *ad hoc* decisions. The same occurred with decision-making processes at the local level with *caudillos/caudillos* and later politicians and political parties, as well as generals and other military authorities. This includes national resolutions toward the Bucbr, sometimes used to protect the territory from third parties. The ignorance from central decisions toward cross-border regions, and particularly to the Bucbr, is not necessarily related to not knowing the conditions or demands of border communities, but to neglecting the region's specificities in the policymaking processes.

Given the historical development of the relationship between the states involved and local actors, it is not unsound to infer that local communities could feed a sentiment of being left alone, a social belief of having to face challenges on their own, which could come and go as the political game of macro-regional relations was played. In addition to this reality, local actors were supposed to defend their territory from the enemy, which not rarely was their peers across the river, people they had business with, and maybe even friendly relations. Oftentimes, local actors raised families from parties whose origins were on both sides and whose nationality was fuzzy as it was the borderline cutting across the region. In other words, history demonstrates that local actors' interests commonly differed from state actors' interests, even more so considering the strategic use of the Bucbr.



As interests of local actors oscillated according to local, national and regional realities, not rarely against the interests of formal actors of their corresponding nations, it should not be a surprise if their perceptions on national, bilateral, or regional policies about the cross-border region that they decided to make their home were also contrasting to the national governments' and other state actors'. The influence of such a core identity factor for local actors cannot be disregarded. The New Agenda, a bilateral set of policies with clear regulatory objectives could not be expected to create interest among locals – particularly the ones with little insertion in public affairs. Engagement from local civil society actors would then not be expected in great levels. Regarding local actors with exercise of public life, this historical analysis shows that their interests are not easily compatible to the interests of their national authorities, which suggests the New Agenda to occupy an intricate position.

Internal, external, and cross-national pressures constituted key factors in the formation of interests, political alliances (and divisions) in the local context of the Bucbr, also being the case in the processes of delimitation of borders, which did not always coincide with the borders designed in bilateral arrangements. In the last fifteen years, however, the formal approach to the Bucbr has changed. A renovated impulse on the application of social and development policies by Brazil and Uruguay attempted to regulate informal realities within the Bucbr, partially altering the relationship between this (state) effort to institutionalize the region and the informal interactions occurring in the cross-border region. The third chapter of this thesis develops a more detailed contextualization on the creation and operationalization of the New Agenda.

*Distante dos grandes centros,  
as populações fronteiriças parecem, às vezes,  
isoladas ou mesmo abandonadas. Nossa presença aqui hoje  
procura reconhecer e realçar o papel relevante  
que esses homens e mulheres desempenharam, historicamente,  
no fortalecimento dos laços entre os nossos países.  
Para agradecer-lhes e render-lhes homenagem estamos, conjuntamente,  
tomando decisões que contribuirão  
para promover o bem-estar desses cidadãos.*  
(Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, 'Declaration to the Press in Rivera', 2010)

## CHAPTER 3 – CREATION AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF THE NEW AGENDA

How was the New Agenda built? What was/is the institutional space for local actors in its implementation process? And what were the implications for local contexts and for local engagement and compliance? Having developed a historical analysis on the relationship between bilateral (also trilateral) regulatory processes concerning the border of Brazil and Uruguay and the implications on local actors' interests and (trans) local socio-political dynamics in the Bucbr, it is possible to understand the institutional development in which the New Agenda was created and operationalized as well as the practical implications to each of the cross-border complexes that comprise such a region.

Considering the objective of perception analysis, it is not enough to only describe the institutional developments of the New Agenda, but to understand the roles of local actors within it is a crucial step. To study local actors' perceptions on the New Agenda means to identify some of their interests, ideas, identities, beliefs, and ideas *vis-à-vis* the implementation processes of this bilateral plan about the border and about its cross-border dynamics. Such perceptions are both a response to statist structures and formal(izing) relations and a result of trans-local agency and micro-regional historical construction. Before diving into the analysis of perceptions, it is necessary to look at the contingencies for local actors within the established bodies that originated, were incorporated into, or created for the institutionality of the New Agenda. To accomplish this, this chapter will analyze the creation of the New Agenda within the convergent relations of this period. The myriad of actors and institutions, as well as the numerous administrative structures regarding the Bucbr that developed into the creation and later operationalization of the New Agenda produced different institutionalities with a diverse set of objectives. The institutional space for local actors' action within the New Agenda will be analyzed also by comprehending what is its institutional inheritance and what did such previous institutionalities provide as possibilities for local actors' engagement and compliance.

### 3.1 Converging relations leading to the New Agenda

The 1997-2002 period was marked by a transition within Southern Cone relations. The deep global commercial and financial crises that rapidly developed into a

Mercosurian crisis revealed the contradictory character of the regional organism. While focusing on foreign trade and political negotiation, Mercosur did not tackle asymmetry problems or differences in exchange policies. The non-interference policy of the USA in South American relations, particularly after the September 11, 2001, and the slow recovery of international trade paved the way for intraregional cooperation (CERVO and BUENO, 2011). In the interim, presidential diplomacy managed to create an internal agenda, reinforcing the political character of Mercosur and of Southern Cone relations (CARRANZA, 2010; MALAMUD, 2003).

The political convergence between Uruguay and Brazil ran in parallel with other Southern Cone relations, being privileged by the absence of major formal disagreements and of micro, trans-local problems. At the same time, governments of progressive sensibilities gained power in South American continent. Venezuela (1998), Chile (2000), Brazil and Argentina (2003) elected parties to the left of the ideological prism, reinforcing the idea of a ‘regional left’ (Uruguay would elect a progressive president in 2005) (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA; CULPI, 2016). If macro-regional relations served for creating a cooperative, relatively unchanging, and democratic environment (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, 2015) capable of influencing the creation of new cooperation partnerships (MALLMANN; MARQUES, 2013), Brazilian-Uruguayan bilateral relations exploited the notion of ‘prioritizing’ regionalism, strengthening their mutual agenda, which comprised mostly cross-border issues and infrastructure integration.

### **3.2 The institutional DNA of the New Agenda and its legacy to border issues and actors**

The establishment of the New Agenda was preceded by a series of bilateral bodies and legal instruments that attempted to implement development plans in the Bucbr. From the end of the 1980s until the mid-1990s, Brazil and Uruguay created mechanisms to deal with border issues, particularly the ones concerning the movement of people and goods and the lack of infrastructure for border populations. This institutional experience set the basis for the creation of a new framework to avoid past mistakes of old institutionalities. The ‘institutional DNA’ of the New Agenda is formed by five binational bodies congregating distinct levels of national administrations. Pucci (2010) points out that the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Commerce (1975) involves the highest levels of

decision. The General Commission of Coordination (GCC) is formed by sectorial directors of Foreign Relations Ministries and technicians of other ministries. As part of the GCC, the Subcommittee on the Joint Development of Border Areas (later upgraded to Committee status) was also constituted by Foreign Relations officials. Under the jurisdiction of Brazilian and Uruguayan consulates (later organized under the Permanent Group of Consular Coordination), the Border Committees (1989, 1991, 1996), established in the six cross-border urban complexes, were formed by consular officials and local actors, such as public representatives, non-governmental organizations, and economic, cultural, and social agents capable to contribute with knowledge on the demands of each jurisdiction.

*Table 3* (next page) shows the growing institutional recognition of the necessity to listening to local demands and to apply local participation to promote cross-border cooperation and to develop the Bucbr in economic and social terms. The 1975 Treaty of Friendship started a cooperative environment that made possible to acknowledge areas in which Brazil and Uruguay could cooperate. It was the first indication that border issues would be considered a relevant matter in formal relations. Subsequent institutionalities, created after (1985-1996) the military regimes, were established toward building a formal framework to embrace local demands within policymaking processes. *Table 3* indicates that local actors' participation in policy-design before the New Agenda relied heavily on the proper functioning of Border Committees (BC), as all institutionality depended on the channeling of demands through such bilateral, formal bodies. With later incorporation of BCs and their regulatory bodies into the New Agenda, the recurrence of overdependence on this formal communication channel was a great part of its legacy.

The initial enthusiasm and expectation following the establishment of Border Committees (BCs) rapidly changed into frustration. As demands of border populations came in and the identification of common issues within the cross-border urban complexes were in the process of delineation, BCs started showing the limitations of their restricted institutional capacity to forward such demands (in form of propositions) to other formal bodies. Apparently simple, local problems required intricate solutions, such as adjustment of national norms or coordination with authorities of diverse levels of administration (SANTOS; SANTOS, 2005). Besides not having decision power, BC suffered from sluggishness and lack of receptivity by central governments (AVEIRO, 2006). However, despite their limitations, BC served, as antennas of the Bucbr (PUCCI, 2010), leaving a

double legacy that would be later inherited by the New Agenda: on the one hand, a considerable number of local propositions to resolve border problems; on the other hand, a myriad of unsolved border issues with which the old institutionality proved to be incapable to deal.

**Table 3 Pre-New Agenda institutional space for border issues and local participation**

Institutional body	Foundation	Objectives toward the border	Institutional space for local engagement	Outcomes
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Commerce	1975	To facilitate procedures and formalities for border crossing	Non-Existent	Started institutional architecture to include cross-border cooperation as high policy objective
General Commission of Coordination	1985	To identify matters of mutual interest	Non-Existent	Called attention to cross-border issues
Subcommittee on the Joint Development of Border Areas	1985	To analyze possibilities to cooperate in physical integration, economic and social development	Through Border Committees	Created local committees; promoted health, commercial and cultural cooperation; consolidated key issues for cross-border cooperation
Border Committees of Chuí-Chuy, Santana do Livramento-Rivera, and Jaguarão-Rio Branco	1989	To provide quick solutions to operational problems	Semi-regulated forums for agenda formation with active participation of local actors	Issued local propositions for still unresolved issues
Quaraí-Artigas Border Committee	1991	To provide quick solutions to operational problems		
Border Committees of Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión, and Aceguá-Aceguá	1996			
Permanent Group of Consular Coordination	1992	To complement and coordinate Border Committees' activities	Through Border Committees	Issued of recommendations to Consuls and BCs

Source: the author (2017), based on Pucci (2010); Rótulo and Damiani (2010).

The other mentioned binational institutions also left few successful experiences and numerous deficient formal arrangements. In the scope of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Commerce, the General Commission of Coordination (GCC) (Chapter 2, Section 2.4), held only four meetings until 2005. GCC accomplished two interesting tasks in its unstable functioning: the creation of a Master Plan for Joint Urban Development for Santana do Livramento–Rivera (1996) and the exchange of notes

regarding the fixation of the maritime lateral limit (2005). The Mechanism of Consultation and Political Concertation (MCPC), founded in 2005, aimed at the joint analysis of bilateral agenda and common multilateral themes. MCPC included border issues in its discussion, evaluating the need for 'institutional coherence' of border and cross-border initiatives. In the scope of the GCC, the Subcommittee on the Joint Development of Border Areas (1985) was responsible for the creation of the Border Committees (BC) and a series of regulations concerning exchanges within cross-border urban complexes. The Subcommittee's last meeting was in 1997 and faced similar problems to the ones of the Border Committees. The Permanent Group of Consular Cooperation, operational since 1992, tried to assemble BC's common issues, many of which are still in full debate. The Consular Coordination Meetings discussed alternatives to several matters of circulation of people and to articulations of national frameworks, serving nowadays as New Agenda assessment meetings (PUCCI, 2010).

Rótulo and Damiani (2010) highlight the institutional novelty of bilateral agreements concerning Brazilian-Uruguayan 'wet' border preceding the New Agenda. The Treaty of Cooperation for the Use of Natural Resources and/or Development of Mirim Lagoon (hereafter Mirim Lagoon Treaty), provided in the Friendship Treaty (1975) and signed in 1977 within its framework<sup>30</sup>, formed a bilateral body that aimed at promoting local development and the joint use of water and mineral resources of the Mirim Lagoon basin. At first, the Mirim Lagoon Commission had no environmental concerns. It proposed navigation, irrigation and drainage systems, and flood control regulation through the implementation of an intergovernmental structure formed by Foreign Relations Ministries' officials and experts. Today, the functioning of this body requires the participation of the Brazilian Ministry of National Integration (MNI). The engagement of local actors was inexistent until the end of authoritarian rule (1985). With similar structure, Achard (1995) describes, the Cooperation Agreement for the Use of Natural Resources and Development of the Quaraí River Basin, signed in 1991, instituted the Quaraí River Commission (QRC). It incorporated the same objectives of the Mirim Lagoon Commission and added environmental concerns, such as the rational use of water and solution to issues related to water misuse. Environmental impact of infrastructure and

---

<sup>30</sup> The Commission for the Mirim Lagoon (CML) was founded in 1963 to study technical, economic, and social problems related to the proper use of its resources. In 1992, the CML was considering to revise its structure and to elaborate a new action plan (ACHARD, 1995), which would finally occur with the creation of the New Agenda.

conservation of resources were also included among the numerous responsibilities of the QRC. However, as Pucci (2010) underlines, QRC meetings have been sparse due to functional reasons. In 2007, an institutional reform started being discussed in the scope of the New Agenda.

The role of actors from the rice sector (strongest agricultural production of the area followed by cattle raising), particularly within the Mirim Lagoon Commission, in influencing governmental agendas for the construction of infrastructure and the promotion of rice exportation cannot be ignored (RÓTULO; DAMIANI, 2010). Despite not finding favorable institutionality, the rice sector lobby managed to create a channel for communicating its demands. Direct influence or not of this lobbying, Steinke (2007) states that rice sector-led agribusiness in the Mirim Lagoon basin predominates and suppresses other local demands. Water use for irrigation is extensive, which makes the accommodation of economic and social development interests with water and biodiversity preservation the biggest challenge in the area. This leads to the inference that in the face of stronger pressure by economic and commercial actors, it is probable that the influence of non-governmental actors on cooperation agendas and on cross-border issues could also be more intensive.

Two corresponding characteristics emerge amidst several institutionality models for dealing with the border and cross-border issues prior to the New Agenda: *formalism and regulation*. The predominance of officials and structures of Brazilian and Uruguayan Foreign Relations Ministries and the attempt to deal with innumerable areas and issues ignored during authoritarian periods amplified the regulatory character of the institutions toward border issues and populations. In this context, the institutional space for local, border actors were notably limited as well as the outcomes of bilateral bodies' resolutions and originated policies. The legal mechanisms and bilateral bodies that formed the institutional DNA of the New Agenda were thus not primarily concerned with local actors' engagement, the strengthening of democratic fora, or the increase of citizenship provision, but with filling regulation gaps in the bilateral arena whereas fostering development and wealth production. The pre-New Agenda period was thus marked by the structural limitations of institutional bodies, which did not promote engagement of local actors, let alone required compliance, since no laws or regulations were issued in regard to Bucbr's local dynamics.



### 3.3 The New Agenda for Cooperation and Border Development


*A Nova Agenda de Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Fronteiriço Brasileiro-Uruguiaia foi instituída em abril de 2002, com o propósito da “promoção do desenvolvimento integrado da faixa de fronteira comum”. É a mais alta instituição dedicada especificamente ao tratamento dos assuntos de fronteira. Em relação à estrutura descentralizada dos Comitês de Fronteira, que emitiam meras recomendações, trouxe uma mudança qualitativa, ao atrair o debate para cidades maiores, em negociações coordenadas pelas Chancelarias dos dois países. Ao mesmo tempo, na Nova Agenda a dimensão federativa da diplomacia ganhou relevo, ao elevar o [estado federado brasileiro do] Rio Grande do Sul ao status de sede alterna do mecanismo. [...] O documento intitulado “Elementos para uma Política Conjunta em Matéria Fronteiriça” [...] fora elaborado no intuito de estabelecer uma base preliminar para as discussões bilaterais, com vistas a determinar uma “nova agenda” para o relacionamento fronteiriço (PUCCI, 2010, p. 117).*

Rótulo *et al.* (2014) identify four institutional changes applied to the New Agenda, made possible by the political and ideological convergence of Brazilian-Uruguayan national authorities. **(1)** A broader *approach* towards the areas concerning cross-border cooperation, encompassing environment, sustainability, and citizenship, with the inclusion of local actors into the negotiation process. **(2)** A more controlled procedure for agenda developing, defining themes and areas considered top priorities since the launch of the process: health, environment and sanitation, police and judicial cooperation, and development infrastructure. **(3)** It is found a certain hierarchy to the projects of the New Agenda: first, basic needs of local, cross-border communities, particularly the ones identified here as cross-border urban complexes (UCs); second, other projects of local concern. **(4)** Brazil and Uruguay shared a vision on the necessity of a vigorous role of the state as a strategic actor to promote a development model and to facilitate access to financial resources.

The institutionality of the New Agenda started being configured during the writing of the Agreement on Residence, Study, and Work Permit for Brazilian and Uruguayan Border Nationals (hereafter Border Agreement), in 2002. The agreement stipulated that Brazilians and Uruguayans could live, study, and work – with social security benefits – in a twenty kilometers strip area from the borderline in both territories. It also listed border localities enabled to make use of this legal mechanism. In Brazil: Chuí, Santa Vitória do Palmar, Balneário do Hermenegildo, Barra do Chuí, Jaguarão, Aceguá, Santana do

Livramento, Quaraí, and Barra do Quaraí. In Uruguay: Chuy, 18 de Julio, Barra del Chuy, La Coronilla, Rio Branco, Aceguá, Rivera, Artigas, and Bella Unión<sup>31 32</sup>. In addition, the agreement provided for the issuing of a special border document, the *Documento de Fronteiriço* (Border document), in substitution of a visa and other bureaucratic measures. The granted mobility of locals across national borders rapidly evinced the incompatibility and differences between Uruguayan and Brazilian legal and functional frameworks<sup>33</sup>. How to transport moving, to arrange license plates, and to use health services were some of the myriad of questions raised during and after the writing/signature of the agreement. Hence, the mechanisms of the New Agenda became a key space to discuss such matters (SANTOS; SANTOS, 2005).

### Map 3 Towns listed in the revised Border Agreement (2008) and the 20 Km strip



Source: Lemos and Rückert (2015).

<sup>31</sup> The localities chosen to be contemplated by the Border Agreement are the six cross-border urban complexes listed in the introductory section on which this thesis is focused. The exceptions are, in fact, small populational concentrations in the vicinity of the Chuí-Chuy complex (Santa Vitória do Palmar, Balneário do Hermenegildo, Barra do Chuí, Barra del Chuy, and La Coronilla).

<sup>32</sup> In 2008, Villa Isidoro Noblia Uruguayan Municipality and Colônia Nova Brazilian Municipal District, both near Aceguá-Aceguá, were added to the Border Agreement.

<sup>33</sup> See next section for details on the operationalization of the Border Agreement.

*Map 3* (previous page) shows all the chosen UCs and its neighboring villages and the 20 Km strip from the borderline agreed to become an exceptional area cross-border in nature. During the first years of operationalization, the New Agenda privileged the growing dynamics at the local level and attempted to respond to the many demands for, among other things, facilitating the creation of a truly integrated system within cross-border urban complexes, and local-level cooperation. As a result, several sectorial commissions were created to discuss/design alternatives to the questions involved. Some of them, however, were later disabled for not functioning according to their original objectives. This was the case of the Center for the Study and Dissemination of Legal and Integration Aspects in the Border Area (2004-2007) and of the Consular, Police and Judicial Cooperation Nuclei (2002-2007) (PUCCI, 2010).

The New Agenda's institutional design attempted to centralize local demands in a single channel, avoiding imprecisions and superpositions of jurisdictions and the quenching in the process of cross-border cooperation (as in previous mechanisms). The basic structure, modified several times from 2002 until today, was organized from a local perspective in four Work Groups (WGs) that should discuss and pass on their remarks and demands to the High-Level Meeting (HLM), presided by the vice-Foreign Ministers of Brazil and Uruguay. The HLMs aimed at changing the recommendation nature of Border Committees (BCs) by articulating local demands through the presence of central Executive officials with decision-making capacity. They were able either to summon the BCs or to indicate that they would feed the WGs with local demands and information, coordinating and developing a working system for the WGs. The WGs were divided in **(1) Health, (2) Environment and Sanitation, (3) Police and Judicial Cooperation, and (4) Integrated Development**. Despite the initial preservation of the BCs, they eventually migrated to the WGs, which remained as the key institutional space for the participation of local actors. The General Commission of Coordination, the Subcommittee, and the Joint Development of Border Areas were maintained in the original New Agenda structure, but their actions and purposes slowly became irrelevant in the new institutionality. Mirim Lagoon and Quarai River Commissions were being negotiated to be combined in a Water Commission, but conversations terminated abruptly (PUCCI, 2010; RÓTULO; DAMIANI, 2010).


Brazilian and Uruguayan authorities were constantly improving the institutional structure of the New Agenda. After a successful experience with local-based meetings of

mayors and intendents, in 2002, the New Agenda supported the creation of a similar body. In 2003, the Binational Committee of Border Intendants and Mayors (BCBIM) was constituted to develop joint actions to promote development in the border areas. All Executive heads of border municipalities could participate, even the ones that surpassed the 20 Km radius from the borderline. With autonomy to create technical commissions, the BCBIM disposed of Administrative and Executive Offices to manage sessions and meetings and to produce minutes that would be directed to respective consulates. The Border Health Binational Advisory Board (BHBAB, created in 2004 within the Health WG) integrated by Health officials from all Brazilian administrative jurisdictions (national, federated state, and municipalities), Uruguayan Health officials, and Pan-American Health Organization-World Health Organization (PAHO-WHO) representatives (Montevideo Office) started working on epidemiology control, immunization, and staff qualification. The autonomous Binational Health Committee of Santana do Livramento-Rivera (BHCSLR), founded in 2008, was created to deal with the low offer of health services. The Environment and Sanitation WG was subdivided in two technical subgroups: Water and Environmental Resources and Sustainable Development. In practice, these subgroups assessed the work of the Mirim Lagoon and Quarai River Commissions (PUCCI, 2010; RÓTULO; DAMIANI, 2010). Local actors were at the center of negotiations and engaged in designing projects and regulations that, according to them, were fit to the reality of the Bucbr. Health, security and free movement were among the priorities of organized groups and local government representatives.

In 2012, the New Agenda inaugurated a highly dynamic facet of its institutionality. The creation of the High-Level Group (HLG) put in motion the Action Plan for Sustainable Development and Brazil-Uruguay Integration installed other institutional bodies to further bilateral cooperation in many other areas. The Action Plan covered priority areas for the deepening of bilateral, integrative movements. Each theme had its specific group subjected to the HLG: (1) productive integration, (2) science, technology, and innovation, (3) communication and information, (4) transport infrastructure integration, (5) free movement of goods and services, and (6) free movement of persons. Subgroups were free to meet according to availability and priority to each area. In its first two meetings (2013 and 2014), the HLG signed agreements on permanent permit issuing, on legalization of documents, and on commercial and social security accords. Regarding productive integration, the HLG furthered the convergence

for the establishment of the supply chain of goods customs security program, of the Naval and Offshore Agreement, and of energy integration through the construction of wind farms (MESQUITA; GABRIEL, 2016). The High-Level Group also selected other areas requiring special attention: biotechnology, nanotechnology, environment, biomedicine, and information and communication technologies; Interconnection of networks, defense, space affairs and statistics cooperation; completion of the construction of a new bridge over the Jaguarão River and restoration of the Barão de Mauá International Bridge (Jaguarão-Rio Branco) (ALLENDE, 2015). Despite the deepening of numerous conversations (among them, the one to liberate the movement of persons – of high interest from local actors), one can observe the withdrawal of national administrations from the local, cross-border issues that originated the New Agenda. The ‘novel’ demand channels contested with ‘classical’ macro-issues of science, communication, production and movement, which diminished the negotiation power of local actors before conglomerate’s lobbyists and energy and industry sectors.

*Diagram 1* (next page) depicts the organizational structure of the cited bodies of the New Agenda. This figure makes clear the existence of two dimensions in its current framework: a trans-local dimension and a bilateral dimension. The first one refers to bodies and mechanisms created under the supervision and coordination of the High-Level Meeting. The *local cross-border perspective was the focus of these institutions, be it regulating cross-border dynamics or creating mechanisms to improve social and economic conditions at the local level*. Such institutional spaces should privilege and require the participation of local actors, which could observe policymaking processes, discuss and create alternatives, learn technicalities of specific fields, make demands, give policy feedback, and exchange experiences to apply in their locality. The trans-local dimension was responsible for the creation of cooperation projects. The sectorial compartmentalization as also a feature to note in the trans-local dimension. On the other hand, the bilateral dimension of the New Agenda comprises the structure built around the High-Level Group. It prioritizes the continuance of the bilateral efforts by focusing on greater areas of cooperation, *leaving behind the perspective of the cross-border region*, although with the possibility of facilitating local cooperation by investing in structural policy-making through the engenderment of bilateral agreements.

**Diagram 1 Current core organisms of the New Agenda**

Source: the author (2017), based on Pucci (2010); Rótulo; Damiani (2010); Rótulo (2012); Mesquita and Gabriel (2016)<sup>34</sup>.

The institutional development required for the proper operationalization of agreements and projects is as complex as costly, particularly in political, but also in financial terms. Rótulo *et al.* (2014) analyze that the New Agenda's multilevel approach to trans-local issues involves an institutionality able to promote concurrently cooperation, coordination, and formation of networks, all of which rely on several factors, such as nature of the issue, degree and extent of local actors' interest, formation of stakeholder coalitions, and obstacles that projects must surpass to be executed. The interorganizational management prerequisite of the New Agenda institutionality, in which

<sup>34</sup> New Agenda's compartmentalization is greater than portrayed in *Diagram 1*. Subgroups, committees, and boards with little influence in the development of the cross-border cooperation, or called in only without regularity were not depicted. The complementary dimensions structured by the HLG and the HLM, when enjoying proper politico-economic situation, have propelled bilateral cooperation at all levels. However, the fragility of this institutionality – first to local and domestic (political crises and discontinuation), but also to international contexts (economic turmoil) – has hampered the continuation of the New Agenda's impetus.

local, federated, and central actors must coordinate actions to implement projects and operationalize agreements, placed local actors in a space of engagement while demanded proactivity and *negotiation power* to produce practical results (RÓTULO, 2012). Such institutional nature has not favored the implementation or operationalization processes of the New Agenda. On the contrary, it has frozen most plans of local applicability, weakening the influence of this important cooperation set in local contexts and social realities. The institutionality of the New Agenda was thus not only too ambitious in its objectives, but also intricate in its working process:

*La forma de gestión de los proyectos en la NACDF [Nueva Agenda] ha pretendido generar incentivos para el trabajo interorganizacional, promoviendo el quiebre de la fragmentación política del Estado y fomentando la acción coordinada entre administraciones centrales de ambos Estados, de forma conjunta con los actores locales en la resolución de los problemas básicos de las comunidades [...]* (RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014, p. 156).

As this intricated framework required strong organizational, political, and financial capabilities, the New Agenda had become a simplified double-channel institutionality to ensure state rule over border subjects and issues. On the one hand, coordinated demands from local actors to the highest levels of decision-making through chancelleries. On the other hand, regulation and control by national governments through the provision of agreements. Work Groups meetings usually resolved on the most suitable ways to tackle local situations. They could solely discuss with and inform the Brazilian and Uruguayan border consulates (present at and directing the meetings) on such matters. The consulates passed on the propositions to High-Level Group officials, who transmitted local plans/projects to higher national authorities. Demands were lost along the way and numerous plans remained mere ideas. Bilateral agreements and national regulations flowed in the opposite direction, but without necessarily following the New Agenda's institutionality; instead, national channels were used for conducting norms on the local issues in negotiation. Once again, local actors' powerless position could not do much to assert their demands. It is difficult to imagine how local actors can maintain engagement when most of their demands are not being met. The next section details the main agreements of the New Agenda and their outcome to local populations.

### **3.4 Main agreements and projects of the New Agenda (2002-2017)**

The most prolific periods of the functioning of the New Agenda (2003-2004, 2008-2013) have revealed which areas each dimension has prioritized or managed to create agreements/projects. In statistical terms, the bilateral dimension of the New Agenda have primarily engendered agreements on health (55%), security (25%), and education (20%), whereas the trans-local dimension produced projects mainly in education (34%), environment (17%), and social policy (15%) (RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014). Besides the foundational Border Agreement (2002), the bilateral dimension engendered several framework-accords, such as the Supplementary Agreement to the Basic Agreement for Scientific and Technical Cooperation (2004), the Agreement for the Creation of Professional and Technical Border Binational Schools and/or Institutes (2005), and the Agreement on Police Cooperation in the Investigation, Prevention, and Control of Criminal Acts (2004). There is no intention to give full account on achievements of the New Agenda or to assess New Agenda policies. This section will describe the main institutional accomplishments and limitations of the New Agenda that have impacted positively and/or negatively local populations and local realities in the Bucbr in the operationalization and implementation of projects and agreements.

#### **3.4.1 Residence**

Complications on the implementation of the Border Agreement and the Border Document became evident as soon as it came into force. Despite recognizing it as a valuable instrument for social dialogue, Argañaraz, Hernández and Silva (2005) identify problems in the very first year of implementation, such as differences in the cost for obtaining the document (Brazilians payed 15% of the total spent by Uruguayans), lack of information, and even noncompliance to the Agreement. Lemos (2013) remembers that the Border Document was not accepted within the social security electronic system on account of the number of digits of the document (six figures, while Uruguayan system has eight). Until 2012, Universidad de la Republica did not accept students trying to enroll with the Border Document. Such matters highlighted the necessity to build closer relations through the New Agenda, but also became constant issues in other New Agenda policies.




Notwithstanding such difficulties, the capacity to legalize the condition of residents in both sides of the border was undeniable (LEMOS, 2013). People that once had no rights or opportunities in the foreign country (called *indocumentados*, that is, ‘undocumented’) finally had a chance to enter the formal system, to legally live, work, and study. The Border Agreement played a central role as a juridical matrix that served as basis for the creation of other public policies dealing with border populations’ issues (SANTOS; SANTOS, 2005; PUCCI, 2010), which means that the Border Agreement laid the foundations for public discussions forming the very core structure of the New Agenda’s institutionality. Aveiro (2006) also emphasizes that the Border Agreement can be considered the image of the need to articulate towns that become the center of contemporary issues and of the necessity of the active participation of the state in border problems – characterized by a space with the same problems and demands, but with *very distinct ways to deal with daily needs of local populations*. The Border Agreement likewise intensified the reflection on the concepts of citizenship and its exercise within a specific national territoriality, of border and its dividing or filtering capabilities as well as of the role of towns in in a global, intricate world.

The Mercosur Agreement on the Residence of Nationals of States Parties, signed in 2002 (and ratified in Brazil in 2004 and in Uruguay in 2006), grants residence of two years for all nationals of the parties of Mercosur, who are also granted the right to study and work and can request it to become permanent residents (if done so 90 days before the expiration of term). This arrangement competed with the Border Agreement insofar it gave the opportunity to live in the same conditions as citizens with the Border Document, but to all nationals, without any radius limit, and without the geographical limitation of a definite cross-border urban complex. On the other hand, the *Documento de Fronteira* included a five-year term residence instead of the two-year term of the Mercosur Agreement, and (also) the possibility to permanent residence after that period (PUCCI, 2010; LEMOS, 2013).

*Figure 4* (next page) shows the virtual competition between two agreements legislating on similar situations. In three years, the total issuing of documents to nationals of Brazil and Uruguay under the Mercosur Agreement was higher than the document expedition based on the Border Agreement from the time it came into force (2003) until the end of 2008. It is necessary to acknowledge the fact that not all Mercosur Agreement documents were issued to border residents, which weakens the comparative purpose of

Figure 4. Nevertheless, the acceptability of the documents issued through the Mercosur Agreement within national health and social structures is an indirect factor that cannot be ignored in this comparison. Also noteworthy is the great disparity of the proportion of documents issuing of approximately 4:1 under the Border Agreement and 5:1 under the Mercosur Agreement in favor of Uruguay, which can indicate the greater capacity of Brazilian economy to attract labor force or residents looking for better conditions.

**Figure 4 Documents issuing based on the Border and Mercosur Agreements**



Source: the author, based on Pucci (2010).

In this context, it is interesting to observe the creation of a residence, study, and work permit for Uruguayan and Brazilian Border Nationals *willing to provide health services*, accomplished by the Binational Health Committee of Santana do Livramento-Rivera<sup>35</sup> (BHCSLR), a New Agenda's body founded in 2006 to deal specifically with

<sup>35</sup> It is important to note the high level of local actors mobilization involved in health sector within the Committee, which included: *from Brazil* – Municipal Executive Office, Municipal Health Office, Sanitary Surveillance, Municipal Office of Agriculture, Livestock, Supply, and Agrarian Affairs, Union of Workers in Establishments of Health Services, (Municipal) Santanense Society of Medicine, Santa Casa de Misericórdia Hospital, CardioNefroclínica Clinic, Social Pastoral Ministry, Health Municipal Council, Social Pastorals; *Municipal Health Council, Association of Parents and Friends of Exceptional Children, Union of Residents' Associations, Brazilian Bar Association, and the State University of Rio Grande do Sul*; *from Uruguay* – Departmental Executive Office, Sanitation Department, Health Department, Medical Union of Rivera, Federation of Public Health Officials, Uruguayan Health Federation, Medical Councils, Health Committees of the Peripheral Polyclinics, Neighborhood Commissions of the Municipality of

health-related issues of Livramento-Rivera complex (RÓTULO; DAMIANI, 2010). This legal document was signed by the Ministers of Health and sanctioned by the health committees of the respective parliaments of both countries to facilitate the work of Uruguayans and Brazilians in health establishments. It was designed to avoid the replication of the problems occurred during the strike of Brazilian obstetricians in Santana do Livramento, in 2006, which forced more than 40 pregnant women to delivery in Rivera without any legal support. The Brazilian hospital sought to hire Uruguayan doctors in the face of denial of service by Brazilian counterparts, obtaining an unprecedented injunction authorizing the hospital to do so. In 2009, similar occurrences took place in Livramento, and in 2011 in Quaraí (LEMOS, 2013).

Still regarding New Agenda's residence policies, the Subgroup on the Free Movement of Persons of the High-Level Group engendered, in 2012, the Agreement on Permanent Residence to Achieve the Free Movement of People. Signed in 2013 and approved by the Brazilian Senate in December 2016 (Legislative Decree N°152/16), the Agreement continues the intended progression towards the free movement of nationals between Brazil and Uruguay. It grants permanent residence to any national, without costs, by only presenting an identification document (including here the Border Document) and a criminal background negative certificate (or a signed personal statement). It also decided on the absence of the need to translate or authenticate documents, simplifying the residence process (MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES, 2013; CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS, 2016). The *raison d'être* of the Border Document is terminated with the application of this agreement, since it removes the temporary visa requirement prior to the permanent residence. It is, however, a good example of complementarity of the two dimensions of the New Agenda. Acknowledging the intricate process of designing and put into force a legislation to grant residence to all nationals in the intergovernmental structure of the Mercosur, Uruguay and Brazil decided to 'bilateralize' negotiations, braking them into separated processes. The temporary character of the Border Agreement was thus already projected and can be considered the first phase of a bigger process toward the free movement of persons. In addition, the Border Document is the only recognized instrument for Uruguayan doctors willing to work within the Bucbr (in the 20 Km strip), which continues attesting its relevance at the local level.

---

Rivera, Intersindical, Departmental Committee of CAIF Center, Association of Teachers, University Center, Service clubs, Red Cross (SILVA, 2011).

### 3.4.2 Health and sanitation

The creation of the Binational Health Committee of Santana do Livramento-Rivera (BHCSLR, organized in 2005, but formally active in 2008) in which 30 members (15 Uruguayans and 15 Brazilians), distributed among local government officials, health workers, and health care providers and users were organized in five sub-commissions according to urgent areas of the cross-border urban complex: Drugs, HIV, Epidemiology, Traffic Accidents, and Social Protection. The main objective of the BHCSLR was to enable the provision of public health services to both nationals in either side of the borderline (CASSANEGO JR *et al.*, 2012). This remained, however, a sensitive matter. The Supplementary Agreement to the Basic Agreement for Scientific and Technical Cooperation created, in 2004, the Border Health Binational Advisory Board (BHBAB) with the objective to deal with the developments of the Border Agreement in the provision of public health services. As operationalization difficulties persisted, the Livramento-Rivera *ad hoc* local agreement on health services, accorded among the Rivera Hospital Support Committee, Santa Casa de Misericordia Hospital, and the Brazilian Municipal Health Department, in 2006, was, as Pucci (2010) highlights, both commendable and creative. It permitted the pregnant women to deliver in Uruguay with full assistance of public health structure and personnel. However, it was still not clear who would hold civil responsibility in case of accidents or medical malpractice. Payments were also difficult to be recognized by Brazilian system.

The first achievement of the BHBAB was to sign the Supplementary Agreement to the Border Agreement with the objective of resolving conflicts and doubts on the operationalization related to the use of health services. Bontempo (2012) affirms that the function of this legal supplement (internalized in Brazilian Legislation in 2010) was basically to regulate the hiring of Uruguayan doctors by Brazilian hospitals and municipalities and to create a partnership enabling the purchase of health services in Uruguayan hospitals. It also regulated on the circulation of ambulances within a cross-urban complexes and on the registration of birth and death certifications. The response of health organizations, particularly the ones responsible to normalize the sector, was immediate and adverse. Regional and National Medicine Councils strongly opposed the referred agreement, requiring the validation of diploma for Uruguayan doctors desiring to work in the Brazilian 20 kilometers border strip. Uruguayan Medicine College also fought against the bill with the same demands of its counterparts. Rio Grande do Sul

Medical Union lifted an injunction suspending health services by professionals without revalidation. Despite the opposition, judicial decisions have favored the continuance of Uruguayan doctors in Brazilian municipalities, given the fact that towns and villages of the cross-border region do not attract Brazilian medical professionals, upholding the market gap of this sector, leaving border populations without health services (BONTEMPO, 2012). There also remains other issues for the full implementation of the agreement: free circulation of ambulances continues in check, since local and national authorities do not find consensus on the need of the Mercosur insurance policy – Carta Verde – by Brazilian vehicles, and the lack of communication between Uruguayan and Brazilian officials in charge of birth registrations, creating a gap in which it is possible to double register a new-born in both national jurisdictions. It is curious that the non-compliance with the health agreements came from national and regional actors – *not* from local players. National corporate and sectorial interests were in fact the ones opposing the movement of cross-border cooperation, while local interests were concentrated in the provision of a long-time needed service. Also, the engagement of local actors in making the health agreements work was memorable. Not only local authorities, officials and representatives of the corresponding sectors were involved, but media coverage was complete, and the issue was among the daily concerns of citizens (INTERVIEWS #1, #3, #6, #13, #16, #18, #24, #25, #30, #34, #43, #50, #52, #57, 2017, oral information).

Several works (PUCCI, 2010; RÓTULO; DAMIANI, 2010; RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014) concur on the choosing of the most successful project of the New Agenda: the Aceguá-Aceguá Integrated Urban Sanitation Project. Approved in 2012 in the Common Market Council (CMC) of Mercosur, the project aims at the construction of water infrastructure for raw water containment and adduction, for environmental sanitation, and for macro-drainage, which requires the construction of collector systems, pumping stations and wastewater treatment plants on both sides of the Aceguá-Aceguá complex. This project will benefit directly a population of some 3500 inhabitants and will improve the environmental quality of public areas by eliminating clandestine landfills. The project is also expected to reduce populations' health costs, recovering water bodies in the region through water treatment and through elimination of untreated barometric effluents, protecting the waters of De la Mina creek stream and other sources (MERCOCIUDADES, 2013; FOCEM, 2017). Among the political and financial developments of this project, it is notable the intricate network formation of actors and

the several negotiations required to advance the agenda of this small-scale enterprise, as emphasized by Rótulo and authors (2014):

*Primero, el proyecto cuenta con una participación amplia de actores multinivel, que se ubican en ambos Estados, a saber: Ministerios de Relaciones Exteriores (Uruguay y Brasil), Intendencia de Cerro Largo; gobierno de Rio Grande do Sul, prefectura de Aceguá; la empresa pública uruguaya, Obras Sanitarias del Estado (OSE); la Companhia Riograndense de Saneamento (CORSAN); y asesoría técnica de la Universidad Federal de Pelotas (UFPel). Segundo, el proyecto enfrentó obstáculos financieros, jurídicos y políticos en su implementación, que impusieron la necesidad de pactar acuerdos entre las distintas partes involucradas para repartir las contribuciones específicas para el financiamiento. Los primeros impulsos de implementación parcial datan de 2002-2003. Tercero, los esfuerzos políticos y administrativos realizados en el marco de la NACDF consiguieron superar el obstáculo financiero mediante un acuerdo de contribución combinada para el financiamiento del proyecto, en su totalidad de origen público. El financiamiento involucra un fondo regional, el Fondo de Convergencia Estructural del Mercosur (FOCEM), y uno estadual brasileño, la Secretaría Estadual de Habitação e Saneamento del gobierno de Rio Grande do Sul, a través de la CORSAN. El costo total del financiamiento es de US\$ 7.640.524, de los cuales US\$ 5.719.708,43 (75% del valor) es financiado por el FOCEM, validado por la Decisión N° 30/12 del Mercosur (30-11-2012). El saldo del valor (25%) es financiado por el gobierno de Rio Grande do Sul a través de la CORSAN en colaboración con Obras de Saneamiento del Estado (OSE) (RÓTULO et al., 2014, p. 157).*

The integrated sanitation project is currently in execution, but not according to the original project. Due to funding reasons, only the sewage treatment will be implemented. In Uruguay, the bidding process was concluded, and the public Uruguayan company is beginning the construction. According to the Uruguayan intendant, the works are expected to generate around 40 jobs for locals and should be completed by the end of 2018. In the Brazilian territory, expropriation processes and changes of criteria by the Rio Grande do Sul State Foundation for Environmental Protection (FEPAM, in Portuguese) delayed the beginning of the water treatment system construction, which should be cleared to start as soon as the expropriation payments have been concluded (MINUANO, 2017a; b).

### 3.4.3 Education

Concerning education, the partnership between the Brazilian Instituto Federal do Sul (IFSul) and Uruguayan Consejo de Educación Técnico Profesional - Universidad del

Trabajo del Uruguay (CETP-UTU) in Livramento-Rivera started offering professional courses with validation in Brazil and Uruguay (with half of student vacancies to each nationality) under the Agreement for the Creation of Professional and Technical Border Binational Schools and/or Institutes (hereafter Binational Schools Agreement), signed in 2005. Negotiations started in 2006, with the participation of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (BCA) and of officials of the educational institutions involved to designate areas for cooperation (industry, energy, and environment) and to form the binational courses. The formation of a border campus and the hiring of teachers and other professionals was also necessary, which was done in 2010. In 2011, the first classes of the Environmental Control and Informatics for Internet had finally started. In the scope of this partnership, it was decided to operationalize the binational courses to be taught in the mother-language of the teacher; also, that the official language of the course should be defined by which of the two institutions is offering the education; that language courses would be available so the foreign students could be more integrated; and that textbooks should be mainly bilingual (SAN MARTIN and SCHMIDT, 2015)<sup>36</sup>. While the courses took from 2005 to 2011 to be effective, the agreement originating the partnership was promulgated only in 2015 by Brazilian President Rousseff.

Regardless of recognizing the vagarous negotiation, designing and implementation processes, Pucci (2010) discusses on the latent social inclusion of border populations in the cooperation process of this partnership. Disparities of work culture and of professional development possibilities are some of the implementation problems identified by Olvera and Viera (2015), who also highlight the opportunities created by this partnership. Regarding educational and social spheres, they recognize,

*la búsqueda de alternativas que ayuden a democratizar el acceso a los Estudios de nivel Medio Superior y Superior en esta frontera. [...] Una estrategia más dentro de las que buscan respuesta a los diagnósticos existentes sobre la desafiliación institucional y los problemas de la escasa retención de los estudiantes en los tránsitos educativos [...]. Para los investigadores de la región representa una oportunidad de incorporar el plano supranacional al viejo problema de investigación*

---

<sup>36</sup> Today, the offer of binational courses has increased, and the Jaguarão-Rio Branco advanced campus was implemented. At IFSUL at Livramento, it is offered Informatics for Internet (2011), Renewable Energy Systems (2014), Electro-electronics (2014) and in Jaguarão advanced campus, Buildings (2014). At CETP/UTU in Rivera, Environmental Control (2011), Logistics (2014) and Kitchen/Gastronomy (2015), and in Rio Branco, Agriculture/Pasture Rice Production Systems (2015) (DINIS; SILVA, 2016). The efficacious experience of bilingual, binational courses has been serving as a model for future partnerships since the VIII HLM meeting in 2012, but current negotiations are on hold.

*sobre encuentros/desencuentros entre las Políticas Nacionales prescriptas centralmente y las culturas locales* (OLVERA; VIERA, 2015, p. 91).

The Program for Border Intercultural Bilingual Schools (PEIBF, in Portuguese), a Brazilian project designed in 2004 along with Argentina and enlarged in 2008 to be implemented with Paraguay, Venezuela, and Uruguay (within the scope of the Binational Schools Agreement), had the objective of promoting the interaction of educational agents and communities in the Bucbr by granting the direct contact of students with a foreign teacher, who would communicate intercultural subjects in his/her native language. Jaguarão-Rio Branco and Chuí-Chuy were the complexes chosen to start the operationalization of the program. The lack of effective planning, of class materials, and of proposed themes were hindering aspects of implementation (CAÑETE; KERSCH, 2012). In their extensive fieldwork in four schools within the Jaguarão-Rio Branco complex, Boéssio, Silva Júnior and Cunha (2012) also noticed difficulties in understanding the purpose of the program and in giving continuity to meetings and exchange of education professionals.

Education projects, particularly the creation of binational professional schools, are among the most cited examples of good cross-border governance. They were commonly recognized by subjects as a local demand. Most desired such an experience to be in all UCs. Yet, they also acknowledge the need of a greater offer of courses and the expansion of the system to other localities away from the 20 kilometers strip. No matter the interest of local actors, the implementation of more binational schools is costly and not probable to happen in the next years.

#### **3.4.4 Security**

Concerning security, the bilateral dimension of the New Agenda engendered the Agreement on Police Cooperation in the Investigation, Prevention, and Control of Criminal Acts (APC), in 2004. The APC is not a border agreement, since it encompasses cooperation in national territories. However, it also covers border issues. The APC addresses mutual assistance and cooperation, particularly in border areas. It authorizes information exchange among police chiefs and coordination for the capture of fugitives crossing the border (PUCCI, 2010). In 2006, the Brazilian Congress approved the APC, coming into effect in 2008 and being promulgated in 2009 by President Lula da Silva



(BRASIL, 2009). The Uruguayan Parliament approved the APC in two rounds, in 2005 and 2006. It was promulgated in 2007 by President Tabaré Vazquez (URUGUAY, 2007).

Discussions on implementing a permanent plan to reduce criminality rates and to track smugglers and traffickers in the Bucbr have been progressing. Brazilian government has mobilized Rio Grande do Sul's and Uruguay's police forces, along with the Brazilian Federal and Judicial Polices and the Ministry of Justice to coordinate actions to create a suppression and security control mirror-system (ARAÚJO, 2016), in which all countries' forces would apply similar tactics in both territories to strangle criminal activities toward the borderline, reducing the area of illegal action. In the scope of the Border Integrated Management Office (BIMO) of Rio Grande do Sul<sup>37</sup>, inaugurated in November 2016, military forces of the Brazilian federated state and of Uruguay have been developing communication and action strategies against the so-called transnational crimes (such as drug and weapon trafficking, vehicles cloning, cattle rustling etc.). Differences in law and in repression plans are also at the center of dialogue, corroborating the cooperation design of the New Agenda (ZIEBELL, 2016; XAVIER, 2017).

To avoid the New Agenda processes to fall into lethargy (the last plenum of the HLM had been in November 2013) the Secretary General of Foreign Affairs of Brazil, Sergio Danese, and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, José Luis Cancela, launched, in April 2016, the 'Integrated Work Plan for the Brazil-Uruguay Border', prioritizing the following objectives: to stimulate the provision of legal cooperation (particularly the suitability of the already signed agreements), to advance police cooperation, to diversify funding sources, to strength communication and coordination actions, to reduce informality, and to further cooperation in other areas not yet conceived within the original institutionality, such as child labor, human trafficking, small business, and subnational diplomacy, among other things. The need to use New Agenda channels to conclude such a plan was also underlined during the meeting (MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES, 2016).

---

<sup>37</sup> The Border Integrated Management Offices (BIMOs) were created in 2011 in the scope of the Security for Borders National Strategy (ENAFRON, in Portuguese) with the objective of promoting articulation and joint work of Public Security and Defense institutions, in constant dialogue with peers in neighboring countries. BIMOs require the coordination of various actors that operate in the border areas, in their diverse jurisdictions and mandates. It also demands the creation of diplomatic channels with international peers, involving both domestic and international cooperation and coordination actions by the state and its institutions (CARUSO and NASCIMENTO, 2012).

### **3.4.5 Culture**

The New Agenda has also contemplated cultural cooperation within its framework. Specific actions have been carried by Brazilian and Uruguayan authorities to deepen cultural and identity ties of border populations. Among them, the declaration of Santana do Livramento as the symbol of Brazilian integration with Mercosur members, in 2009, the creation of the Calendar of Brazil-Uruguay Cultural Integration, in 2014, and the declaration of the Barão de Mauá International Bridge connecting Jaguarão and Rio Branco as the First Cultural Heritage of Mercosur deserve attention due to their symbolic value towards the macro-regional political use of trans-local representations (COMUNELLO, 2016).

The 2010 Fronteras Culturales movement managed to align municipal, federated/departamental, and national culture policies and to stress the autonomy of cultural organizations and the freedom of participation in cultural actions, engendering communication and synergy among militants of culture, allowing the formation of culture binational commissions. The Border Letter, founding document of the movement, designed objectives culminating in the creation of a permanent cooperative structure to articulate ministries and offices of culture and education as well as local organizations, to simplify cultural exchange by the lowering of administrative barriers, and to facilitate the access to financial resources for cross-border cultural projects. In 2011, Brazilian President Rousseff and Uruguayan President Mujica signed the Protocol of Cultural Intentions aiming at the sharing of experiences on cultural public policies with emphasis on the border. A binational commission, to create the first Calendar of Brazil-Uruguay Cultural Integration, based on the referred protocol, selected numerous events with positive symbolic influence on the border culture, such as international carnival parties, cultural integration seminaries, and various binational festivals and fairs, most of which still occur in the majority of the cross-border urban complexes (ALMEIDA, 2015).

### **3.5 Challenges to the New Agenda**


The achievements of the New Agenda, particularly on the engenderment of residence and education agreements and projects can easily conceal the struggle in implementing cooperation projects and in involving local actors (be it governments, civil society, or companies) into the creation and operationalization of signed agreements and

joint plans. From the viewpoint of the New Agenda's institutionalality, the complexity of the organizational system, its lack of a simple fixed structure to work as an institutional backbone, and its inconstant working pace did not help furthering formalized cross-border cooperation. Rótulo *et al.* (2014) identify two polarized ways to deal with the institutional challenges of the New Agenda. On the one hand, there is the alternative of creating a hard institutionalality, with an executive office, facing the danger of sacrificing flexibility, but achieving efficiency. On the other hand, policymakers can choose to apply a mild institutionalality, creating more thematic commissions and informal meetings, but risking forgetting about efficiency for institutional elasticity. The authors acknowledge the need to find a balanced alternative between flexibility and efficiency. The organizational requirement for the participation and mobilization of local, intermediate, and central governments as well as social actors with structural capacities to operationalize most of the projects is also a critical issue. It is indeed difficult to imagine how subnational actors located among the most penurious areas of the two countries could potentially have institutional capabilities to embark in such intricate endeavors.

The analysis by Rótulo *et al.* (2014) then advances toward discussing the lack of accountability practices and tools within the New Agenda, such as mechanisms to incentive public participation, and facilitated access to information and data on its projects and agreements. The normative character of the New Agenda, however, does not necessarily involve accountability. Brazilian-Uruguayan bilateral relations fostered high-level cooperation in areas considered strategic to both chancelleries, particularly the residence agreement that sought to regulate the *indocumentados* (population without documents) situation. In this context, the institutional inclusion of subnational actors within the New Agenda did not mean that Brazil and Uruguay were engendering public policies through international agreements. It meant a more democratic process into a state's normalizing framework. The transition of the New Agenda to broader, structural areas in the last years and the concomitant abandon of local discussions (and institutionalities) seem to corroborate this claim. The ultimate moments of the ephemeral Border Agreement end up reinforcing the concentration of state apparatus on local matters in the Bucbr. By understanding the New Agenda to be both a product of historical bilateral negotiations between the two countries and a strategy to implement more rapidly the

agreements being discussed within Mercosur (through bilateralization)<sup>38</sup>, it is possible to identify the continuance of the statist agenda in the regionalizing process along with the tendency towards centralized governmental decision-making.

**Figure 5 New Agenda's projects according to implementation status (2002-2013)**



Source: Modified version of Rótulo *et al.* (2014, p. 148).

The sluggishness of implementation processes and the abandon of many of the projects are also core issues yet to be resolved and assessed. As demonstrated in *Figure 5*, despite being created in New Agenda's most prolific period, almost a third of its local projects have had unknown implementation status, and less than 20% of them were executed and achieved their intended goals. From all the 103 projects analyzed by Rótulo *et al.* (2014), more than a half was still in process of implementation. In other words, in a timespan of more than a decade, more than 80% of the projects designed within the

<sup>38</sup> The low levels of Mercosur's institutionalization, the important asymmetries among the Parties, and the consequent diversification of perceptions on the best ways to face regional limitations privileged the creation of alternatives to conduct cooperation or integration policies (MALLMANN, 2007). Among such alternatives, bilateralism has become the *modus operandi* of Mercosur to avoid stagnation, as it enables the controlled payment of political and financial costs of building a region (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, 2015) and can influence the building of new integrative axis through the construction of 'cooperative behavior'. Also, bilateralism can be an opportunity for international insertion (MALLMANN; MARQUES, 2013). Uruguayan-Brazilian cooperation agenda fits into this context of profound limitation of multilateral negotiations in Mercosur and other South American regional organizations (ALVARIZA, 2015).

New Agenda's institutionality were not completed. This means that, as of 2014, nearly eight out of ten cross-border issues requiring local, bilateral solutions were not resolved. Such staggering figures can again indicate the non-priority given to local actors in engaging in formal cross-border cooperation.


Economic factors also cannot be ignored. From 2002 to 2008, Brazil had experienced a rising surplus in its federal budget, achieving record figures. The 2007 world financial crisis, however, proved to have profounder impacts than those initially expected by national decision-makers, diminishing industrial production and employment rates and consequently tax revenue, negatively affecting the federal budget, hence weakening Brazil's investment capacity (MATIAS-PEREIRA, 2009). From all the New Agenda projects, 67% were found to have important financial obstacles to start implementation, and 34% of the total were managed to be implemented by authorities despite presenting budgetary limitations (RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014). Such figures concur with Ramanzini Júnior's and Vigevani's (2010, p. 59) considerations, in which they acknowledge the historical limitation of Brazil to act as a regional paymaster (MATTLI, 1999) in a context in which "*as necessidades da integração são maiores que a capacidade do Brasil de oferecer as contrapartidas exigidas pelos sócios*". In sum, paraphrasing the previous sentence, the necessities of formal cross-border cooperation demonstrated to be too high for Brazil to pay what local actors required.

Juridical and regulatory factors also played a key role in hampering the cooperative process. The parties demanding practical responses from Brazil derive both from the regional context (Uruguay and its local actors) and from within domestic sphere (particularly Brazilian border municipalities forming the six cross-border urban complexes, and public national frameworks), which intricates the operationalization and implementation procedures, requiring a strong political and interinstitutional negotiation and convergence. From all the projects of the New Agenda, 23% presented many types of juridical obstacles. *Only eight percent of juridical obstacles were surpassed towards implementation* (RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014), which indicates the high politico-administrative costs of implementation of projects, corroborated by the experiences described in the previous section.

Another intrincating factor is the possible lobbying against the New Agenda. It is clear, for example, that local commerce and rural production tends to benefit from the great offer of undocumented, illegal workers as a source of inexpensive labor, facilitating

the non-compliance to labor regulations, thus enabling unrestricted movement of inexpensive workforce in and out of national territories. A local society actor acknowledges this problem, centering his explanation on documentation difficulties: *“Temos muitos trabalhadores contratados no Brasil que trabalham no Uruguai, porque muitos donos de loja têm estabelecimentos nos dois lugares. As dificuldades para traduzir documentos e peças nos processos dificultam a aplicação das leis trabalhistas. Por vezes, fazemos nós mesmos as traduções”* (INTERVIEW #7, 2017, oral information).

**Figure 6 Actors’ participation in New Agenda’s projects implementation (2000-2013)**



Source: Modified version of Rótulo *et al.* (2014, p. 149).

Considering the totality of projects within the New Agenda, participation of local actors was meager. As demonstrated in *Figure 6*, the low engagement of local governments and other constitutive actors of local civil society is one of the biggest issues in its operationalization. Rótulo *et al.* (2014) recognize the multilevel dynamics of the New Agenda, which Lemos (2013) likewise acknowledges and on which he bases his analysis of this cooperative phenomenon. Nevertheless, state presence and its numerous institutions and frameworks show encore the tendency of centralization of decision-making, regardless of what the organogram of the New Agenda might suggest. Along with all the structural, institutional problems that created more unresolved issues and non-implemented projects, the statist ‘standardizing-effect’ of the normative actors is also an element to consider. The pressure of the presence of the state and its regulatory

mechanisms tends to create in local actors the effect of waiting on central decisions or instructions, causing them only to produce demands of things to change instead of producing formal alternatives to existing problems within a state-made institutionality. The 83% of participation of national governments, in this context, would promote such an engagement. This could indicate a certain preference to resolve local matters away from the New Agenda.

### **3.5.1 Discrepant national administrative frameworks<sup>39</sup>: Brazilian federalism, Uruguayan centralism and public policies**

The New Agenda has highlighted profound differences between Brazilian and Uruguayan national frameworks, governance structures, and territorial and development policies. Structural dissimilarities have produced negative developments for cross-border cooperation and helped decelerating the bilateral process. The interinstitutional convergence both in the domestic and international spheres required for implementing projects and agreements of the New Agenda have met what Lawrence (1996) denominated *cross-border spillover*: the encounter of cooperative or integrative dynamics at the local scale of border regions, in which the effects of national laws and regulations usually generate juridical inconsistency in systems that are in process of formal integration, such as the cross-border urban complexes. Cross-border spillover involves political and institutional energy to converge and surpass such formal obstacles. Since the New Agenda was built within intergovernmental architecture, it required uninterrupted negotiation towards finding concordance in a multilevel environment, tangling convergent dynamics and the diminishing of cross-border spillover effects. A national government actor recognized these institutional requirement: “*Você tem os acordos tomados no mais alto nível e quando você desce para as questões administrativas, metodológicas, ou de regulamentação, elas muitas vezes colidem com o acordo assinado lá em cima. É necessário fazer um fine-tuning, um acompanhamento (como leis complementares). Às vezes, porém, a regulamentação tarda*”. (INTERVIEW #16, 2017, oral information).

The encounter of Brazilian federalism and Uruguayan centralism constitutes the primary discrepancy for cross-border cooperation. In Brazil, the last decades have

---

<sup>39</sup> Excerpts of this section were accepted to publication as a book chapter (MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, forthcoming) and have been published as article in De Souza (2017).

confirmed the presence of a ‘federative paradox’, in which municipalities were granted relative autonomy and the states of the Federation, semi-autonomy, assumed from the perspective of an inevitable cooperation behavior toward the Union. This entails, however, to consider the international activity of subnational units as a product of ‘natural symbiosis’ of interests, which was never proven to be the case. The notion of authority fragmentation, particularly on matters of international relations, is rejected by the political elites of Brasília. By centralizing decision-making in subjects of foreign policy under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Brazilian federative system upheld a model of partial paradiplomacy, which has triggered uncertainties in the national political arena (SOMBRA SARAIVA, 2004). Within such a system, Brazilian border towns have been constantly questioned by the Union about their ability to act internationally (PRADO, 2014), while the federated state of Rio Grande do Sul, the only one sharing borders with Uruguay, received Chancery status to produce local international agreements, although under strict supervision and tutelage of the Brazilian state (SALOMÓN; NUNES, 2007).

Rio Grande do Sul has developed its international incursions since 1987, with the installation of the International Affairs Special Office (IASO), under Governor Simon. Being reconfigured along with the changes in the executive office, the paradiplomatic exercise of the federated state until 2002 focused on specific, *ad hoc* political interests of each government (NUNES, 2005). The provision of institutional relevance of Rio Grande do Sul within the New Agenda did not change this pattern. Salomón and Nunes (2007) agree that “*SEDAI [IASO] toma conhecimento dos temas tratados, mas não interfere no andamento da iniciativa e não busca coordenar o posicionamento do Estado nas discussões*”. In other words, the federated state has only acted as the executive arms of the national state in the signing of agreements between Brazil and Uruguay. This does not mean, however, that Rio Grande do Sul could not implement policies of its own, provided that they concurred with the national strategy in the scope of the New Agenda. In this regard, although many of the state’s regional cooperation and integration policies did not find place within subnational interests, particularly the effects on the economy at the intermediate scale (NÚÑES, 2014), the New Agenda seemed to be aligned with subnational expectations toward increasing socio-economic development indices.

Clemente and Nilson (2012) compare the Brazilian federative framework with the unitary, centralized Uruguayan system for cross-border cooperation policies:



*Mientras Brasil es un Estado Federal, Uruguay sigue siendo una república unitaria y centralizada. Aun cuando la descentralización posee grandes potencialidades, en el futuro inmediato, la concentración de las decisiones en política exterior en manos de la Cancillería y en la estructura diseñada para la implementación de políticas de frontera, no permite el ejercicio de una “paradiplomacia” en la manera en que es practicada en Brasil. Las unidades subnacionales de Uruguay están lejos de tener un accionar tan vigoroso como Río Grande do Sul, pero sí es factible que, dentro de las capacidades que la nueva ley de descentralización otorga a los municipios, se incremente el espacio para la cooperación transfronteriza y la generación de mecanismos para acciones conjuntas (CLEMENTE; NÍLSON, 2012, p. 777-778).*

The Uruguayan political system, built under the logic of centralization, initiated gradually a top-down trajectory toward the autonomy of subnational entities from the constitutional reform of 1996, putting in motion the institutional consolidation of some of the legal duties linked to the process of decentralization. The creation of the Congreso de Intendentes (a departmental executive officers’ committee) and the Decentralization Sectorial Commission within Uruguayan framework has given some decision-making capabilities for local governments, but still without territorial intervention power (CARDARELLO *et al.*, 2010). The notion of problem-management of the new Uruguayan municipalities – a non-existent governmental level until then – opened the doors to international insertion, included here cross-border cooperation. Within the discussion of the role of Uruguayan subnational entities, the New Agenda intensified the debate for the need to increase political action of border departments and municipalities. The government of Uruguay attempted to redirect the bilateral efforts with Brazil to the sphere of local action. This had converged institutionally local administration structures of Uruguay and Brazil, which tend to share various interests. However, the mentioned concentration of decision-making in foreign policy for the New Agenda remained in Uruguayan Chancellery, as well as the implementation of border policies, making cross-border cooperation virtually impossible by bordering municipalities and even departments of the Oriental Republic.

The Uruguayan ambiguous, ‘decentralized’ institutional design does not grant municipalities any budgetary autonomy or possibility of tax revenue. The Incentive Fund for the Management of Municipalities intends to give municipalities some decision power over local needs. Yet, the *intendente* is the only executive official with expenditure capabilities, leaving municipalities under departmental directives. In addition, a set of

politico-administrative regulations regarding the *intendente*'s power over the exercise of his/her decision-making restricted municipalities of juridical personality and reduced them as a departmental organism. Such legislations render the departments capability to change municipal decisions and even nullify administrative acts of the *alcalde* (municipalities' representative) (BARRETO, 2015). Hence, with no money and no political autonomy, but at the same time, a legitimate, democratic entity (the *alcalde* is elected by the community), Uruguayan municipalities tend to function more as a *reservoir* of local demands. Taks and Chabalgoyti (2015) conclude their analysis on the national territorial planning policies in the North-Eastern border area of Uruguay: "*En teoría, la descentralización sería un gran ejercicio de democracia, donde el poder se divide y se negocia a cada momento. Pero aún falta mucho experimentar para ver cómo se buscan equilibrios entre la institucionalización de estos vínculos entre centro y periferia*".

From the six Uruguayan, local urban populations at the border (forming the complexes with Brazilian municipalities), Bella Unión (department of Artigas), Rio Branco (department of Cerro Largo) and Chuy (department of Rocha) were established in 2010 and Aceguá (department of Cerro Largo), in 2015 (BARRETO, 2015). Artigas (department of Artigas) and Rivera (department of Rivera), on the other hand, are denominated *intendencias* (departmental capitals). Such a context generates uneven discussion dynamics among Uruguayan bordering towns with Brazil within the scope of the New Agenda. Whereas Artigas and Rivera can negotiate on their own behalf, Bella Unión, Rio Branco, Chuy, and Aceguá depend entirely on the political will of representatives that are not located at 'their' border, and whose interests, identities and perceptions are not related necessarily to border issues and/or trans-local interactions, but to the whole of the department.

Brazilian federated system operates contrariwise. Souza (2005) stresses the role of the 1988 Constitution in regulating the federalization process regarding Brazilian municipalities and in establishing the creation of municipal organic laws by elected municipal legislative chambers. Local governments, within this framework, became the main basic education and health providers for local populations, regulated by federal norms and funded by federal funds. This arrangement was conceived in an intricate intergovernmental system that associates incentives and sanctions to municipalities. It provides frequent relations between municipalities and the Union, and limited participation of federated states. Not only embracing the municipal structure, Brazilian

federalism also includes local communities insofar many federal programs request the participation of community counsels to pass on financial resources. There is also municipal tax revenue and redistribution of federal and state taxes, which means the existence of municipal budgets defined by organic law (municipal ‘Constitution’). With financial resources of their own and autonomous legislative and executive systems, Brazilian border municipalities have more institutional capacities to implement foreign policy strategies and to engender cooperation, at least formally. The shortage of vertical and horizontal intergovernmental coordination and of cooperation instruments hinder the formation of negotiation channels (SOUZA, 2005), and increases the dependence of municipalities, particularly the ones with modest economic and social development, on federal structures, programs, and agendas. Such factors intricate the New Agenda operationalization processes, since the solution of practical issues at the local level must undergo a heavy federal structure with virtually no negotiation instruments.

The significance of national frameworks and programs for the New Agenda lies primarily in the system of domestic intergovernmental cooperation and coordination developed within Brazilian federalism<sup>40</sup>. One of the main strategies of multilevel collaboration by the Federation is the implementation of public policies through interinstitutional articulation. Abrucio and others (2010) elucidate such an intricate system:

*Trata-se de um modelo que supõe uma articulação federativa nacional, com importante papel coordenador, indutor e financiador da União, mas que mantém relevante autonomia nas mãos dos governos subnacionais, tanto na implementação como na produção do consenso sobre a política. Para realizar esta produção contínua de consenso e ações colaborativas, o sistema depende de duas coisas: capacidade institucional de o governo federal atuar na área (o que envolve igualmente uma decisão política para ser mais atuante) e a existência de fóruns intergovernamentais de discussão e deliberação, na forma de conselhos horizontais – entre os mesmos níveis de governo – e verticais (ABRUCIO et al., 2010, p. 203-204).*

Public policies on the development of border areas followed the same domestic intergovernmental logic, in which the function *institutional capacity + political will +*

---

<sup>40</sup> Uruguayan centralism diminishes the impact of domestic intergovernmental relations of institutional implementation of public policies. Within such a system, central government–*intendencias* relationship logics is key in understanding the operationalization of development and cooperation policies in the border region (RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014), requiring further research.

*horizontal forums = operationalization of public policies* denotes the formal requirement for the implementation of most of its sectors. However, the experience of fifteen years of the New Agenda demonstrated that such a recipe was punctually and unevenly developed, varying according to national sectors and political phases of each country.

### **3.5.2 Brazilian and Uruguayan national programs at/about the border**

In the process of delimitation of the Border Strip<sup>41</sup>, sanctioned by the Brazilian 1988 Constitution, public policies concerned with such areas have preserved the historical emphasis on security and defense. In the 1990s, in the face of trade liberalization and regional cooperation, particularly with the emergence of Mercosur, Brazil's policies toward the border strip had been altered to meet development goals. In 1999, Brazil created the Social Program of the Border Strip within the scope of the Regional Development Secretariat of the Ministry of National Integration. In 2003, the Border Strip Development Program and later the Border Strip Development Promotion Program (all known by the PDFF acronym) have had constantly been restructured to meet different objectives in such diversified border strips, also defining priority sectors and avoiding the concentration of federal investments in few regions of the early programs (NEVES *et al.*, 2016)<sup>42</sup>.

Persisting structural challenges continually jeopardized the operationalization of the PDFF. The secondary political weight of border development policies within the federal domain, inconsistent resources distribution, budget cuts, and insufficient human resources, local governments' lack of qualified human resources for project planning and administration, weak local institutions with low chances of partnering with federal projects, insufficient local counterpart resources, and difficulties with environmental licensing. Notwithstanding numerous problems, the program remained a central subject in the creation of development policies in coordination with defense and security strategies for the border strip (SCHERMA, 2016). However, the institutional and structural problems of the New Agenda, seemed to have been mimicked from the PDFF program, at least regarding the Brazilian (non) working process.

---

<sup>41</sup> The 'Border Strip' was first regulated by Law 6.634 from 1979, ruled by Decree 85.064 from 1980. It was defined as a region formed by municipalities completely or partially within the range of 150 kilometers from Brazilian borderlines (IBGE, 2017).

<sup>42</sup> For the entire Brazilian normative basis concerning its international borders, see Rocha (2016).

Concerning security and defense, the National Strategy for Public Security at the Borders (ENAFRON, in Portuguese) was created in 2011 to integrate and execute actions of public security policies, coordinating strategies among federal and state public security agencies, the Federal Revenue Office, and the Armed Forces. The establishment of partnerships with adjacent countries for actions implementation and the expansion of personnel and structure for prevention, control, surveillance, and repression in the border strip was also envisaged in ENAFRON's strategic plan. In the scope of the Systemic Integration and Cooperation strategy, coordinated tactical discussions with Uruguay within the Border Integrated Management Office (BIMO) of Rio Grande do Sul took place in 2016 (Section 3.4.4) (SPANIOL, 2015). The creation of the Permanent Commission on Development and Integration of the Border Strip (PCDIBS, or CDIF, in Portuguese) and of the Strategic Plan of Borders, in 2011, alongside with integrative strategies in the scope of national security public policies, also aimed, *inter alia*, at international collaboration *vis-à-vis* the so-called 'new threats', such as terrorism and international drug trafficking. The proper functioning of all cited mechanisms relies on the construction of partnerships among security agents, who can decide on what information to share and how to build interinstitutional relations *in praxis* (DORFMAN, 2015).

Several Uruguayan national institutions have outlined programs to work within the scope of the New Agenda. The Ministry of Livestock, Agriculture and Fisheries have developed actions related to the key productive sectors of the border region. Within the Agriculture Ministry, the National Directorate of Water Resources intervened in conversations within the Quaraí River and Mirim Lagoon Committees, also assisting with research on, protection, and development of water resources. The Ministry of Social Development (MIDES, in Spanish) created in 2006 the 'Border Integration Policies' program within the scope of the Directorate for Decentralization and Participation to assist populations at risk through territorial intervention. The office of the National Public Education Administration has had strong presence in the bordering territories, offering primary, secondary, technical, and teacher educations. State-owned companies have also attempted to embark on the bilateral agenda. The ANCAP (Spanish acronym for National Fuel, Alcohols, and Portland Administration) created a local development hub in Bella Unión in 2005 to develop a sugar and alcohol complex. Power, water, and sanitation

companies also engendered accords to benefit local populations of the Bucbr (CLEMENTE; NÍLSON, 2012).

MIDES's Border Integration Programs created border groups in all cross-border urban complexes (plus one at the Treinta y Tres department). Such groups were integrated by public and private sectors' representatives of Brazil and Uruguay from both local and national spheres. Discussions were organized in themes, such as education, health, culture and identity, labor market, social security, environment, and documentation. One of the mains accomplishments of the border groups was to introject an interactional system of negotiation within the Bucbr and beyond. Brazil started as mere participant in the seminars organized by each local group, but in 2008 became an active member. The Border Integration Programs managed to overcome the historical lack of representation of border communities. In 2009, however, MIDES halted its activities in the scope of the New Agenda (PUCCI, 2010), which after national elections were transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Relations.

### **3.6 Final remarks on the New Agenda's institutionalality**

Structural difficulties of institutional nature seem to be at the core of operationalization issues of the New Agenda. The lack of continuance of cooperative bodies, with absence of a joint strategy towards the building up of border cooperation at the local level halted a myriad of projects at the border since before the bilateral agenda was set. Within the Bucbr, the dissimilar administrative conditions of Brazilian and Uruguayan municipalities intricated cross-border formal cooperation, particularly in the case of the four cross-border urban complexes in which there is no departmental capital. Even in the UCs with capitals (Santana do Livramento-Rivera and Quaraí-Artigas), formal cross-border cooperation remained practically nonexistent. Therefore, the idea of a 'border culture' as a relevant element that hinders the construction of formalized cooperation still finds echo, especially among state or national government actors and scholars investigating cross-border cooperation from an institutional/top-down viewpoint.

Nevertheless, complicated national frameworks and institutionalities – in both countries, but with more weightiness in Brazil – passed on a legacy of sluggishness, non-coordination, and internal and domestic political struggles to the New Agenda insofar it

depended profoundly on the equalized management of these institutions to function. A *fortiori*, the main corollary of the national institutionalities' interposition onto the New Agenda framework was the requirement of converging perceptions toward the construction of joint projects within its scope to mobilize both local actors and national regulators to work in an international environment under the coordination of the chancelleries (as a matter of fact, a serious functional deviation). On the one hand, national regulators did not want to alter a national structure/rule to benefit a limited (border) population. On the other hand, local actors, particularly local governments, did not lean towards compromising autonomy without being certain about the effects of such projects or agreements on political careers and the continuance of a local political plan (ABRUCIO *et al.*, 2010). This situation created an obligation of effective communication mechanisms between national (institutions, ministries, states, and governments) and local actors (from institutions, organizations, and governments) able to create national convergence networks at the border and to concur with the neighboring demands and institutionalities. The only way to build such a channel would have been to enable the continual presence of the national regulator in the Bucbr, diminishing the distance between national and local levels to enhance vertical coordination at domestic spheres, both in Brazil and Uruguay.

The development policies of the New Agenda, not surprisingly following state logics and demands, were indisputably interesting for promoting welfare in the Bucbr. Health, education, security, and citizenship were some of the areas planned to receive attention from national institutions of Brazil and Uruguay. However, as the new Agenda entailed engagement from local actors to function, policymakers should have created a mechanism to promote participation, advertising the main objectives of the bilateral agreements and reaching out to listen to local, societal voices. This exchange is a simple instrument for engagement that was not explored by New Agenda's official. Rather, the bilateral plan was conducted throughout its existence as a traditional foreign policy instrument, even though authorities and scholars did not consider it so. The use of the chancelleries as coordinating bodies corroborates this reasoning.

The institutional investigation of this chapter indicates that the problem of local actors' engagement and compliance appear to be located more at the institutional dynamics of the structural explanation than to be originated in a deviating culture of informality and illegality of local actors. In this scenery, Chapter 4 will provide a local

contextualization that could help one identify other sources of cultural and structural elements able to complement the view on such matters.



*For what you see and hear  
depends a good deal on where you are standing:  
it also depends on what sort of person you are.*  
(C. S. Lewis, 'The Magician's Nephew', 1955)

## CHAPTER 4 – LOCAL CONTEXTS OF THE BUCBR *VIS-À-VIS* THE NEW AGENDA

How are the local contexts of the Bucbr organized? What are the characteristics of the trans-local interactions in each of the six cross-border urban complexes? And how do such interactions relate to the bilateral dynamics engendered between Brazil and Uruguay? These questions are central for understanding the local contexts of the Bucbr within the ‘bigger picture’ of the formal-informal relationship. As actors’ interests rely on his/her intersubjective, personal experiences, the local contexts are a key source of perception-forming elements (ideas, beliefs, identities, and interests). However, the apparent homogeneity of the six cross-border urban complexes (hereafter UCs) of the Bucbr can hide important dissimilarities occurring within each complex and between the towns that compose them. This chapter will analyze five indicators, established by Dilla (2015), that can help one explore and understand the contexts in which the UCs developed trans-local interactions: **(1)** sharing of the same environment, **(2)** spatial configurations, **(3)** primary social relations, **(4)** economic interdependence, and **(5)** construction of formal institutional relations<sup>43</sup>. Such qualitative indicators should not be understood as isolated variables, but as intertwined dynamics occurring in all UCs in unequal degrees.

UCs are clusters of towns facing each other across the borderline with close interrelations in various levels (Chapter 1, Section 1.7.1). They are part of ‘bigger’ regions and systems and can be considered subsystems under the cross-border logic (DILLA, 2008; 2015). *Table 4* (next page) shows the name of each Brazilian and Uruguayan border town forming the six UCs and the urban articulations connects both centers across the border. The atmosphere of amicable relations that the Bucbr has experienced after the period of formation of the nation-states in conjunction with the gradual congruence of the national governments of Brazil and Uruguay to foster bilateral relations (Chapter 2) resulted in the construction of articulation infrastructures to connect urban communities at the border separated by fluvial limits. UCs with adjacent urbanities usually present high degrees of interaction among locals as well as local governments. However, adjacency

---

<sup>43</sup> A sixth indicator, ‘perceptions of mutual need, with which Dilla (2015) proposes to understand if the interactions engendered in UCs affect the perception of locals on the existence of a ‘single’ unit in which both populations acknowledge the need they have on one another, is applied in Chapter 5, Section 5.4, as it ties together all perceptions analyzed in this research.

cannot be considered a prerequisite for such interrelations. In fact, all UCs share numerous complex interactions. The intricate encounter of two national institutionalities in such UCs have led to the construction of multiple networks based on benefit calculations (more details at Section 4.3).

**Table 4 Brazilian-Uruguayan cross-border urban complexes and spatial articulation**

UC	Brazilian municipality	Articulation	Uruguayan municipality
1	Barra do Quaraí	Bridge	Bella Unión
2	Quaraí	Bridge	Artigas
3	Santana do Livramento	International Square	Rivera
4	Aceguá	Road	Aceguá
5	Jaguarão	Bridge	Rio Branco
6	Chuí	Boulevard	Chuy

Source: the author (2017).

**Map 4 The Bucbr**



Source: the author (2017).

*Map 4* (previous page) depicts the Bucbr with the four Uruguayan departments (Artigas, Rivera, Cerro Largo, and Rocha), their capitals, and border municipalities (Bella Unión, Artigas, Rivera, Aceguá, Rio Branco, and Chuy). In Brazilian territory, the federated state of Rio Grande do Sul and its six border municipalities contemplated within the New Agenda (Chapter 3, Section 3.3): Barra do Quaraí, Quaraí, Santana do Livramento, Aceguá, Jaguarão, and Chuí. The blue lines are wet borders and the with lines are contiguous lands crossed by borderlines. Distances from UCs to Rio Grande do Sul's capital (Porto Alegre) vary from 700 km (Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión) to 388 km (Jaguarão-Rio Branco); distances to Montevideo (Uruguayan capital) vary from 327 km (Chuí-Chuy) to 630 km (Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión), which indicates that UCs are virtually halfway from both cities.

*Table 5* (next page) shows the emancipation year of each town within the UCs. Brazilian towns of Barra do Quaraí and Aceguá had only established its government structure in the 1990s, while Quaraí, Santana do Livramento, Jaguarão, and Chuí had implemented local governing and administrative institutions in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This represents an important historical setback for the former *vis-à-vis* the latter in dealing with specific matters of local complexity. Before the creation of an autonomous municipality in Barra do Quaraí and Aceguá, the towns were considered 'municipal districts'<sup>44</sup>, which rendered impossible the access to federal funds for health, education, housing, security, and many other areas. Comparatively, among Brazilian municipalities, Barra do Quaraí and Aceguá have incipient administrations and lack experience to develop formal relations domestically, let alone internationally. Notwithstanding, this can also be an asset. In a place with institutions still in process of installation, the possibilities for local development are abundant, as well as the potential for novel ways of cross-border institutional interaction. As seen in the previous chapter (Section 3.5.1), Uruguayan municipalities do not share the financial and political autonomy of Brazilian municipalities; only Artigas and Rivera have similar status to Brazilian units. Nevertheless, the discrepancy in the emancipation year of the Brazilian municipalities *vis-à-vis* Uruguayan urban centers can indicate that while Brazilian towns have an established administrative know-how rooted in a local political tradition, most Uruguayan

---

<sup>44</sup> “*O distrito é uma circunscrição administrativa, sem personalidade jurídica, cuja existência justifica-se unicamente para uma melhor desconcentração dos serviços públicos a serem prestados pela administração direta*” (BERWIG, 2011, p. 17).

clusters (four out of six) only obtained *in loco* authority pertaining to the community (by election) only in the last few years.

**Table 5 Emancipation year of UCs' municipalities**

Brazilian municipality	Year	Year	Uruguayan municipality
Barra do Quaraí	1997	2009	Bella Unión
Quaraí	1875	1884	Artigas
Santana do Livramento	1857	1884	Rivera
Aceguá	2001	2013	Aceguá
Jaguarão	1832	2009	Río Branco
Chuí	1874	2010	Chuy

Sources: Mazzei and Souza (2013); IBGE (2016). Elaborated by the author (2017).

Despite such differences and the obvious limitations that conventional boundaries may impose, various authors (SANTOS; SANTOS, 2005; AVEIRO, 2006; PUCCI, 2010; RÓTULO and DAMIANI, 2010; MAZZEI, 2013) recognize the societal fluidity of the Bucbr (as a whole) is based primarily on personal and family interactions of local populations. Other researchers (DORFMAN, 2009); (MAGRI *et al.*, 2017) analyze how locals utilize the border to create modalities of interaction, building trans-local networks to solve local issues or to surpass a condition of underdevelopment. Contrasted with other South American border areas, the Bucbr can be considered *sui generis*, given its historical semi-autonomous character, its high demographic density, its amicable environment, the ease of border crossing, and the interest of both national frameworks in its local reality.

#### 4.1 Population data and socioeconomic indices

UCs vary in size. Populations differ from as small as six thousand inhabitants to approximately 150 thousand. Such disparities produce diversified social environments among the UCs in terms of types and intensity of interactions, of urban configurations, of relevance to national governments, and of local problems. *Table 6* (next page) shows the population of each UC from the last available census by municipality. In ascending order, Aceguá-Aceguá is the smaller of the UCs, followed by Chuí-Chuy, Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión, Jaguarão-Río Branco, Quaraí-Artigas, and lastly Santana do Livramento-Rivera. The Bucbr has been decreasing its population in the last decade. Although both border areas have experienced emigration, Uruguayan municipalities had seen smaller departures, decreasing in an average ratio of -0.5% from 2004 to 2011. Brazilian

municipalities had shrunk an average ratio of -8% of their population from 2000 to 2010. Rio Branco (8.5%), Aceguá – UY (1.2%), and Chuí (15.6%) nevertheless had attracted residents in the period studied (MAZZEI; DE SOUZA, 2013). This can be partly explained by the economic crisis blighting Uruguay as well as Brazil. As the cost of living increases, many Uruguayans attempt to move to border areas where the prices are lower (especially to towns that show a tendency to growing, like the new municipalities of Rio Branco and Aceguá).

**Table 6 Population of UCs by municipality**

UC	A- Brazilian mun. (2010)	B- Uruguayan mun. (2011)	C=A+B Total Pop.
1	<i>Barra do Quaraí</i> 4.012	<i>Bella Unión</i> 18.406	22.418
2	<i>Quaraí</i> 23.021	<i>Artigas</i> 40.657	63.678
3	<i>Santana do Livramento</i> 82.464	<i>Rivera</i> 64.465	146.929
4	<i>Aceguá</i> 4.394	<i>Aceguá</i> 1.686	6.080
5	<i>Jaguarão</i> 27.931	<i>Rio Branco</i> 16.270	44.201
6	<i>Chuí</i> 5.917	<i>Chuy</i> 9.758	15.675
<b>Total</b>	<b>147.739</b>	<b>151.242</b>	<b>298.981</b>

Sources: INE (2011); Atlas Brasil (2013); IBGE (2016). Elaborated by the author (2017).

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP)<sup>45</sup> among the Bucbr's subnational units (Brazilian municipalities and Uruguayan departments) is rather evenly distributed. Comparatively, the department of Rivera is responsible for only 2.2% of Uruguayan GDP; Rocha, 1.9%; Cerro Largo, 1.8%; and Artigas, 1.5%. Altogether, the four Uruguayan departments of the Bucbr represent only 7.4% of the economic production of the country (numbers of 2011 official census). The tertiary sector is more than half of the combined GPD of these departments (OPP, 2016). Comparing to the federated state of Rio Grande do Sul, the GDP of Brazilian municipalities occupy a more diverse situation.

<sup>45</sup> The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) can be defined as the “total market value of the goods and services produced by a country’s economy during a specified period of time. It includes all final goods and services – that is, those that are produced by the economic agents located in that country regardless of their ownership and that are not resold in any form. It is used throughout the world as the main measure of output and economic activity” (BODARENKO, 2017, no page).

While Quaraí (451), Santana do Livramento (405), Jaguarão (332), and Chuí (252) are positioned at the end of the table, Barra do Quaraí (88) and Aceguá (45) are situated in the first half of the 497 municipalities. *Table 7* displays the distribution of GDP *per capita* in the Bucbr subnational entities. Except for Barra do Quaraí and Aceguá (both with large rural plantation areas and low population), the other four Brazilian municipalities present more timid numbers of productive capacity per inhabitant in comparison to their Uruguayan neighbors<sup>46</sup>.

**Table 7 GDP *per capita* in the Bucbr (in thousands of USD)**

Brazilian municipality	GDP (2014)	GDP (2011)	Uruguayan department
Barra do Quaraí	14,181.29		
Quaraí	5,791.98	9,308.88	Artigas
Santana do Livramento	6,592.55	9,384.94	Rivera
Aceguá	17,046.37		
Jaguarão	7,765.01	9,661.98	Cerro Largo
Chuí	9,110.88	12,393.43	Rocha
Rio Grande do Sul	12,020.70	14,166.50	Uruguay

Sources: IBGE (2016); OPP (2016). Elaborated by the author (2017).

Considering the calculations for the Human Development Index (HDI)<sup>47</sup>, the Bucbr remains among *the least developed areas* of Uruguay and of the federated state of Rio Grande do Sul. From a comparative perspective, Rivera (18), Artigas (16), and Cerro Largo (15) are among the least advanced departments among all Uruguayan units (19 in total), while Rocha (7) occupies a better position. However, it does not impact the discrepancy of the Uruguayan border area *vis-à-vis* the whole of Uruguay, presenting the meagerest socioeconomic numbers (MAZZEI, 2013). Most of Brazilian municipalities within the Bucbr, in relation to Rio Grande do Sul's counterparts (a total of 497 municipalities), are likewise positioned in the bottom half of the development list: Barra

<sup>46</sup> Uruguayan municipalities do not have this data available. The Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) does not work with this administrative unit. This would however facilitate a comprehension of the UCs and the comparison of urban centers across border. Due to differences of urban infrastructure and services provisions, the Uruguayan towns that are not department capitals would probably show a lower GDP than what is portrayed in *Table 7*.

<sup>47</sup> The Human Development Index (HDI) is a counterpoint to the economic development measured by the GDP. HDI calculates three dimensions of human development – income, education, and health (PNUD, 2017) and is a valuable resource for understanding the socioeconomic conditions of the Bucbr.

do Quaraí (430), Aceguá – BR (361), Quaraí (297), Chuí (288), and Jaguarão (284). Santana do Livramento (207) is the sole town to appear in the upper half of the Brazilian *gaucho* census (IBGE., 2017). Only Santana do Livramento presents a higher HDI than its departmental neighbor Rivera (*Table 8*)<sup>48</sup>.

**Table 8 HDI distribution in the Bucbr (2010)**

Brazilian municipality	HDI	HDI <sup>1</sup>	Uruguayan municipality
Barra do Quaraí	0,662	0,738	Bella Unión
Quaraí	0,704	0,738	Artigas
Santana do Livramento	0,727	0,710	Rivera
Aceguá	0,687	0,740	Aceguá
Jaguarão	0,707	0,740	Río Branco
Chuí	0,706	0,756	Chuy
Rio Grande do Sul	0,746	0,765	Uruguay

Sources: Mazzei and Souza (2012); IBGE (2017). Elaborated by the author (2017).

<sup>1</sup>Departmental figures. No municipal data available.

The low level of socio-economic development of the Bucbr indicates that local actors are preoccupied, first, with their subsistence and the provision of basic needs for their kin. Trans-local interactions are expected to follow this logic as well as the primary interests of local populations at the basis of the social pyramid. Consequently, local government actors are also interested in providing public services to the lowest economic strata, which means to be able to gain access to national funds and programs. One can only infer about the effects on the interest regarding the formalization of cross-border cooperation, expected to be connected to the possibility of providing their population access to basic services, hence decreasing (by sharing) the costs to operate. Moreover, the somewhat higher social indices of Uruguayan towns and departments can indicate the tendency towards using Uruguayan infrastructure by Brazilians and the consequent capital transfer to Uruguayan services providers.

#### 4.2 Sharing of the same environment

The 1067 kilometers of borderline, from the Chuí stream to the Quaraí river mouth into Uruguay river, constitute the area in which Brazilian and Uruguayan urban

<sup>48</sup> HDI of Aceguá (UY) is boosted by the production of its departmental capital (Melo). The same occurs in the cases of Bella Unión (Artigas) and Chuy (Rocha).



populations have settled to form what later would be called border municipalities. Such urban clusters are spread over 320 kilometers of ‘dry border’ and 647 kilometers of rivers, streams, and lagoons (RÓTULO; DAMIANI, 2010). The areas around the borderline, particularly the ones with no fluvial limits, facilitated the interactions from towns of both national territories. The topographical uniformity and the transposability of water courses along the border enabled the proximity of the urban centers and the daily use of common natural resources constituting the sharing of the same environment one of the chief aspects in each cross-border urban complex (UC). Santos and Santos (2005) underline such geographical characteristics of the Brazilian and Uruguayan border areas, the subsequent increase in population density in the UC, and the close interrelations within each UC:

*A quase inexistência de obstáculos naturais favoreceu a formação, ao longo dos limites entre o Brasil e o Uruguai, de uma zona na qual se reconhecem traços comuns, moldada por uma história própria, que veio a constituir uma região com características únicas que a diferencia de outras áreas do Rio Grande do Sul e do Uruguai. Conforme assinala Costa Franco (1993): ‘Nenhuma grande cadeia de montanhas, nenhum intransponível curso d’água, nenhum deserto ou pantanal inabitável separam o Brasil do Uruguai. E, ao revés, como tudo concorreu para aproximar cultural, social e economicamente os dois povos, o resultado final foi uma área de interação intensa’. [...] Ao contrário dos limites ao norte e ao oeste do Brasil, a zona de fronteira com o Uruguai é uma região densamente habitada, na qual se destacam as chamadas cidades integradas, que são bicéfalas administrativamente, mas complementares em todas as demais dimensões [...]. Esses conglomerados urbanos caracterizam-se por uma rede de intensos laços econômicos, culturais e familiares entre as populações dos dois lados da linha de limites, que transitam de um país ao outro, às vezes muitas vezes em um mesmo dia, em suas atividades cotidianas (SANTOS; SANTOS, 2005, p. 45-46, emphasis on the original).*

This deeply shared environment begot circumstances as for the use of the area by local populations and local governments. The study on contraband activities in Santana do Livramento-Rivera by Dorfman (2009) identifies certain elements that the Brazilian-Uruguayan border offers to local populations, which the author denominates ‘the border condition’:

*Um lugar que oferece aos seus habitantes a possibilidade de mobilizar recursos de dois estados nacionais, na forma de diferentes línguas, sistemas legais, educativos, de saúde pública, redes de transportes, políticas econômicas etc. A grande variação dos usos práticos da fronteira se faz a partir do equacionamento de fatores como o câmbio monetário, o custo de vida em cada país [...], legislações nacionais e sua implementação local [...]. Às opções disponíveis e condições*

*impostas aos moradores da fronteira correspondem habilidades por eles adquiridas em vários campos, que permitem que os fronteiriços se comuniquem, se relacionem, trabalhem, produzam bens materiais e imateriais adequados ao lugar em que habitam. As especificidades da fronteira podem ser resumidas na expressão condição fronteiriça* (DORFMAN, 2009, p. 245).

Despite UC's local particularities, the appointed factors are found in throughout the Bucbr. Thus, the Bucbr can be understood as *a space offering specific conditions to local actors*, who can choose from (at least) two governance frameworks and models of policies and who construct (trans-local) networks under the *benefit logic*. Local interactions within the Bucbr, in this perspective, are built to facilitate the practical use of this border condition. Trans-local interactions in the Bucbr are thus spontaneous dynamics based on such advantage calculations, being constructed by both local governments and general population.

### **4.3 Local interactions**

Local interactions within a cross-border urban complex refer to “*un enjambre de cruces, intercambios y comparticiones [...] Son prácticas sociales que revelan tantas solidaridades como cálculos egoístas de beneficio*” (DILLA, 2015, p. 30); they can refer to either amicable or xenophobic relations, to familial or commercial interactions, all of which constitute the source of the functioning of a UC. Simply put, there is no cross-border urban complex without local interactions between urban centers across the border. Trans-local interactions shape not only local reality, but also the way these micro-systems relate to the macro-systems of which they are part. Within the context of international relations, UCs are the *loci* where processes of regionalization – or micro-regionalist dynamics – take place in more tangible ways. *Trans-local interactions are grassroots decisions* on how to relate to entities pertaining to other territorial sovereignty, which is why they are important to explain the low engagement of local actors in the New Agenda. The history of the Bucbr (Chapter 2) indicates that these trans-interactions can be considered both a search for subsistence, given the centuries of ignoring local needs and specificities, and a challenge to national territorialities, which do not acknowledge the spatial particularities of this cross-border region.

**Table 9 Typology of cross-border interactions of UCs (2017)**

Cross-border urban complex	Typology of cross-border interaction
Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión	Promoted structural synapse
Quaraí-Artigas	Promoted structural synapse
Santana do Livramento-Rivera	Spontaneous structural synapse
Aceguá-Aceguá	Capillary, transition to promoted structural synapse
Jaguarão-Rio Branco	Promoted structural synapse
Chuí-Chuy	Promoted structural synapse

Source: the author (2017). Modified version of Ministério da Integração (2005).

Geographers from the RETIS Group of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, studying twin-towns' local interactions for the redesign of the 'Border Strip Program' (Section 3.5.2) for the Brazilian Ministry of National Integration (MNI), and based on the typology of Cuisinier-Raynal (2001), categorized each UC according to the type of cross-border interaction. The UCs' trans-local movements are based on similar historical developments in the entire area comprising the Bucbr, now object of the intricate cooperation agenda under scrutiny, what makes this region an 'active' border<sup>49</sup>. Two categories are used to refer to the Brazilian-Uruguayan UCs: **(1) Synapse** is based on the elevated level of exchange with the support of the bordering states, which commonly build infrastructure to foster, facilitate, and regulate cross-border dynamics. The presence of free trade zones (the so-called duty-free shops) in the Uruguayan urban centers (existing since 1984) and the newly signed law (12.723/2012) also creating free trade zones in Brazilian territory, in 2012, (ODDONE; PRADO, 2015) illustrates the will to further interactions and the concomitant competition among local commerce within UCs. Synapse can be structural or conjunctural. Structural refers to the historical and strong interaction both at urban and rural areas of the municipalities. Work and cultural interchange is also intensive as well as the action of the state. Conjunctural synapse is built under certain market or political conditions, with less regularity. Synapse can also be spontaneous or promoted. As the names suggest, spontaneous synapse commences in local level but develops also in national and/or bilateral levels; promoted synapse are constructed by development policies at the national level. **(2) Capillary** is characterized

<sup>49</sup> Cuisinier-Raynal (2001, p. 214) differentiates 'active' and 'passive' border areas in terms of territorial policy construction: "*Les zones de frontières dites 'actives' devaient susciter l'intérêt à moyen terme de l'État, qui s'attacherait à y inciter les investissements en vue du développement frontalier. Les zones de frontières 'passives' resteraient passives longtemps encore, constituant en quelque sorte le négatif des zones dites 'actives'*".

by the prevalence of local-level, spontaneous interactions, which tend to occur through diffuse exchange among neighbors, with little state intervention, and almost none investment in infrastructure for articulation<sup>50</sup> (MIN, 2005).

In *Table 9* (previous page), the similitude among UCs' typologies of cross-border interaction is clear. Only two UCs differ from the remaining four. The distinction of Santana do Livramento-Rivera UC is related to its historical trans-local interactions, occurring with or despite the state, resulting in the formation of the biggest urban concentration of the Bucbr. One important possible difference in the typology created by the geographers in 2005 is the gradual transition that Aceguá-Aceguá is facing under the changes by the New Agenda. The implementation of the integrated sanitation project (Section 3.4.2), the creation of a free-trade area in the Uruguayan territory, and the presence of an integrated control post of Mercosur (see next Section) altered the exchange environment of this UC, promoting the presence of national and bilateral relations within it.

#### **4.3.1 Similar interactional realities, distinct spaces and priorities**

Applying more focalized lenses onto local interactions, it is possible to identify more nuances to the apparent homogeneity of the UCs that the previous typology might imply. As stated in this chapter's introduction, the six UCs share all the types of interaction here analyzed. However, they differ in intensity. This means that the cross-border networks within each UC contrast in terms of amplitude, usually based on the necessities of locals and of local governments and on geographical conditions, particularly the presence of a fluvial limit between urban areas. During interviews, this was made clear by the emphasis given on certain subjects. In Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión, Livramento-Rivera, and Aceguá-Aceguá, the most common issue raised by respondents was related to health and education services. Quaraí-Rivera, Jaguarão-Rio Branco, and Chuí-Chuy have elected security as the principal problem.


The social networks shaping each UC of the Bucbr, especially in the three adjacent urban configurations (Santana do Livramento-Rivera, Aceguá-Aceguá, and Chuí-Chuy) have constructed a functional logic of a single and ambiguous urbanity – a complex cross-

---

<sup>50</sup> The other categories (not contemplated in the analyzed cases) are: **(3)** Margin, little interaction, no articulative infrastructure; **(4)** Buffer-zone, strategic areas where the state prohibits or restricts the access; and **(5)** Front, plans to populate border areas (MIN, 2005)

border socio-spatiality. *Santana do Livramento and Rivera* share a historical center, in which both urbanities encounter. The international square – a landmark of the historical built friendship – connects both towns in a contiguous, not-controlled area. In fact, *santanenses* (inhabitants of Santana do Livramento) requested the Uruguayan government to establish Rivera in contiguity to their town to mark the peaceful relations locals intended to establish. The everyday practices of residents, with intense interactions between the two populations, begot an extremely permeable and alive border, in which the intensity of crossings and interactions ignore the boundary stones and imaginary lines, allowing high linguistic integration, work, consumption and leisure circulation (GOULART *et al.*, 2017). Such close interrelations impacted the way both towns are organized. Braga and Rigatti (2009) found the urban social configuration of Livramento-Rivera to be symbiotic: Brazilians tend to use Rivera’s downtown as their own, while Livramento’s downtown was placed as a decadent center, specialized in diverse types of services.

**Map 5 S. Livramento-Rivera cross-border urban configuration**




Source: the author (2017). Modified version of Google Maps (2017).

*Map 5* (previous page) shows the urban contiguity of *Livramento-Rivera* and the organization of both towns facing each other. *In loco* observation evidenced the difficulty in identifying the end of Santana do Livramento and the beginning of Rivera or *vice-versa*. The central conjunction of the two urban centers – the rectangular-shaped Praça Internacional – forms a space of separation but also of conviviality: the organization of a popular market with Brazilian and Uruguayan merchants trying to make a living selling regional foods and ornaments; the symbol of this UC, a pair of flags from both states, functions as a meeting point for youth, tourists, and all types of street vendors; a binational Wi-Fi zone also invites for gathering in that area. The intensity of such interactions is also marked by activities at the margin of legality. Along the borderline, commerce is organized to supply the *contrabando-formiga* (or ant-contraband), an expression coined to refer to the daily consumption of products from both territories based on the lowest price and other advantages. Such a practice is found in all the six UCs and has been treated currently with indifference by national authorities of both countries. Another customary practice is to be born on one side and registered on the other side of the border. Sánchez (2002, p. 61-62) reveals that inhabitants of Livramento and Rivera share a different idea of nationality, not related to the territory in which one is born, but to the needs and history of one's family. The typical sentence repeated by locals “*nací allá, pero me registré acá*” (“I was born there but registered here”) would indicate the functional or instrumental utilization of the borderline, related more to circumstantial necessities and less to a territorial normativity or to a law-abiding behavior. This kind of conduct by locals is not only common, but also institutionalized. Authorities of both countries are aware of such illegality but decided not to fight it. The UC's widespread expression “*fazer trampa*” (to use a ‘small lie’ to achieve advantages on either side of the border) expresses the prevalent use of both national institutionalities to one's benefit, such as to register a newborn, to receive pensions from Brazil and Uruguay, to get a retirement plan, or just to buy a new car on the cheapest market.



*Chuí-Chuy* is the second largest urban adjacency of the Bucbr. Both towns are closely connected by a straight avenue, named *Avenida Brasil* in Uruguayan territory and *Avenida Uruguay* in Brazilian territory (Figure 7). The presence of big tax-free stores in Uruguay and their flashy advertising banners is one of the first things noticed when walking along the invisible borderline. On the Brazilian side, big supermarkets and wholesale stores follow the borderline to facilitate the access of Uruguayans coming not only from Chuy, but from all vicinities. In the observatory trip, it was accentuated the fact that all locals to which it was possible to talk were Uruguayans living in Brazilian territory.

**Figure 7 Chuí-Chuy and Aceguá-Aceguá cross-border urban configurations**



Source: the author (2017). Modified version of Google Maps (2017).

The inferior rent prices in Brazil had attracted numerous families, particularly the ones with low purchasing power. One of the greatest differences between the two territorialities was the greater sense of insecurity on the Brazilian side, propelled by the presence of pickpockets, unpaved streets, and open sewage. Chuy, on the other hand, was considerably more urbanized and policed than Chuí. In fact, security was among the first issues highlighted by all respondents of this UC. Among many reasons, the disparity among official census and the actual population of Chuí, which affected the number of police contingent allocated by the federated state of Rio Grande do Sul. Unofficial estimates calculate a divergence of 20% in the populational count. Another factor raised

by the interviewees was the disproportion of the number of security agents between Chuí-Chuy, which drove away certain criminal activities from Uruguay into Brazilian territory. A local government actor emphasizes such a problem in his explanation on the daily difficulties of being a cross-border urban complex:

*A nossa segurança pública é o maior problema. Temos um contingente [de policiais] três vezes menor que Chuy, mas compartilhamos da população do lado uruguaio. Já seria complicado para a polícia lidar só com a nossa população e um contingente tão baixo. Como aqui a gente é uma só cidade, as necessidades e os problemas também são maiores (INTERVIEW #46, 2017, oral information).*

On this regard, a local commissioner calls for specific policies to the region:

*Lo tema de la seguridad está hoy mucho más presente. Antes no tenía nada, controle, nada. Es necesario tener más políticas de seguridad conjuntas, porque los problemas son los mismos. Por ejemplo, una policía de frontera que podría actuar en la zona fronteriza (INTERVIEW #48, 2017, oral information).*

Both police forces attempt on acting in coordination. Much of the joint action, however, requires the *subversion of state territoriality* and other norms of conduct. An anecdote from one of the respondents exemplifies the quotidian of the security agents and their ways to solve problems specific to UCs' social reality:

*Um parente meu foi assaltado do lado brasileiro por um uruguaio. A Brigada [polícia brasileira] pegou ele. Como as delegacias trocam informações a toda hora, logo os uruguaiois identificaram que o assaltante era procurado no Uruguai por homicídio. Os policiais uruguaiois, que foram até a delegacia brasileira pra [sic passim] identificar o cara, conversaram com os brigadianos e entraram em um acordo lá. Chegaram para o meu parente e disseram: “tu tens certeza que não foi do outro lado da avenida que ele te assaltou”? Ele disse que sim. Então eles explicaram que se ele declarasse no boletim de ocorrência que tinha sido do outro lado [o lado uruguaio], eles poderiam prender ele e levar para o Uruguai para cumprir pena por homicídio. Se não, ele seria preso por assalto e todo um trâmite demorado teria que ser feito. Tão demorado, que o cara iria ser solto antes (INTERVIEW #46, 2017, oral information).*

A socio-spatial analysis on the urban configuration of Chuí-Chuy demonstrates that local interactions focus more on market-control and less on space-control, ruling the organization of this UC conurbation. The framework is a conjoined-type (*siamês*):



organized as a single cross-border market, territory, and space aiming at attracting consumers of local and micro-regional areas. The competition logic is ever-present in the *modus vivendi* of locals and local governments. Structures are placed with the objective of promoting one's shop or service and are usually mirrored by competitors (BRAGA; RIGATTI, 2015). The assertion of a Chuy municipality administrator confirms this analysis:

*Acá en Chuy, tenemos total condiciones de solucionar nuestros problemas sin Chuí Brasil. Por supuesto que tenemos buenas relaciones, pero apenas en el ámbito cultural, la amistad... Somos diferentes, ellos tienen el gobierno brasilero, nosotros somos del gobierno uruguayo... Tenemos nuestras desavenencias, el comercio... ahora está mejor en Brasil, pero antes estaba mejor acá* (INTERVIEW #47, 2017, oral information).

*Aceguá-Aceguá* is the smallest of the adjacent urban communities (*Figure 4*, p. 176). Both urban centers share a boulevard separated by an open field, where one of the boundary stones is displayed. *Aceguá-Aceguá* has been experiencing alterations in its urban configuration due to the installation of free-shops in the Uruguayan territory, which increased real estate speculation and attracted financial investments in services (DETONI; ROCHA, 2017). Streets are predominantly unpaved and access to basic services is limited. Brazilian representatives have emphasized the use of the public health sector by Uruguayans, which was provided despite the impossibility of reimbursement by the state. Festivals and fairs are the only jointly organized events, which *Aceguá* (BR) and *Aceguá* (UY) share expenses and knowhow. The presence of tourists, albeit timid, has been increasing in the last years, but does not configure a considerable percentage of the UC's revenue. The low value of Brazilian Real has decreased the pace of development of the tax-free zone, and the UC continued to be a mere passage for Argentinian and Uruguayan tourists going to/from Brazilian Southern beaches (see next Section for more details).

Studying the intercultural education of *Aceguá-Aceguá* students, Moura (2015) identifies a prevalent sense of community to the detriment of a strict sense of society, which tends to reduce the importance of formal, impersonal contracts in face of such intimal, emotional, and primary local interactions of a communitarian socialness. Familial and amicable interactions are thus the core components of the cross-border networks within this UC. They form a relational basis for all other types of trans-local interaction.

Explaining the reasons why the local government offered public services to any local, despite of his/her nationality, a local government actor stated: “*Nós não podemos deixar de atender a mãe do fulano. Mesmo ela sendo uruguaia. Tu entende? (sic) Como posso impedir a mãe de um funcionário nosso, aqui da prefeitura, de ter acesso à saúde pelo simples fato de ela ter nascido do lado uruguaio? Não posso! Por isso, a nossa administração acaba arcando com os custos*” (INTERVIEW #2, 2017, oral information).

**Map 6 Barra do Quarai-Bella Unión-Monte Caseros triple border area**



Source: the author (2017). Modified version of Google Maps (2017).

Populational movements in this UC are characteristic of small townships. Fleitas and Bica (2015) highlight that everyone is acquainted to everyone. Among many types of interaction, the authors emphasize the common costume of Brazilians to buy properties in Uruguay and Uruguayans to own houses and businesses in Brazil; the existence of only one Catholic temple in Aceguá (UY) does not hinder the believers to bring once a year the statue of ‘Our Conquering Lady’ (*Nossa Senhora Conquistadora/Nuestra Señora la Conquistadora*) from the Brazilian town of Bagé to make procession in both towns’ streets; people from the two towns gather to play soccer and organize binational teams (even to play in regional Uruguayan leagues); feasts and cultural manifestations are also organized by all residents. There are two primary schools in the UC, one in Brazil, another

in Uruguay. The locals' choice of primary education is based on differences regarding the school's educational frameworks (integral in Uruguay and part-time in Brazil), easiness of access, and many additional personal or familial circumstances, which makes the student population in both educational systems variable according to such factors. The authors also find that both schools try to ease the curriculum so that students can keep up regardless of the institutions in which they are enrolled.

*Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión* is in fact a triple border (*Map 6*, previous page). Monte Caseros Argentinian municipality shares similar interactions to the ones developed by Uruguayan and Brazilian urban centers although in limited degree. The fact of not having an articulative structure connecting Monte Caseros with Bella Unión hinders cross-border communications. Nevertheless, local governments are highly motivated to further cooperation. Discussions on the building of a bridge are underway by Argentinian and Uruguayan authorities. Rodrigues and Fortunato (2014) describe this UC in more detail:

*A distância de Barra do Quaraí à Bella Unión é de 1 km, transpassado por uma ponte ferroviária inaugurada no ano 1915 e outra rodoviária inaugurada no ano de 1976 e; a distância entre os centros urbanos das duas cidades é de 6 km. Bella Unión e Monte Caseros estão em frente uma a outra, divididas pelo rio Uruguai, sem pontes, com cerca de 1 km de largura, dependendo da época do ano e das cheias; a distância entre o núcleo urbano brasileiro e o argentino é de 7 km, cujo contato principal se dá através do Porto de Bella Unión, através da travessia de balsas diversas vezes no dia, fazendo destas três localidades uma particular conurbação trinacional (RODRIGUES; FORTUNATO, 2014, p. 3-4).*

Trans-local networks are flourishing, prompted by the gap between the provision of health services in Barra do Quaraí and Bella Unión that generated the search for novel arrangements, and by the cultural movements organizations integrative projects. In 2011, a local arrangement was engendered to assure the use of the local hospital in Uruguay by Brazilians. A contract between an Uruguayan company and the Brazilian municipal government for the delivery of emergency health services into Brazilian territory is also active. Concerning non-governmental interactions, the role of the Transborder Movement of NGOs – TMN (*Movimento Transfronteiriço de ONGs/Movimiento Trasfronterizo de ONGs*) is central within this UC. The TMN congregates ten non-governmental organizations from Barra do Quaraí, Bella Unión, Monte Caseros, and neighboring towns.

Created in 2006, the TMN aims at promoting the responsible management of water sources and courses in the triple border area. The objective is to further cooperation at the local and international levels through the organization of events to call attention to such needs. In addition, environmentalists of the TMN has been trying to pass on the creation of a trilateral biological corridor for the ecological development of the area (ROCHA, 2014). Along with Barra do Quaraí, Monte Caseros and Bella Unión are demanding from their national authorities the creation of a trilateral border committee. Among the reasons, respondents refer to the need of having an institutional body located in their area (since they are supposed to meet at the Quaraí-Artigas border committee). Most of them believed the malfunctioning of the former committee was due to not being situated in the triple border area, which did not give them opportunities to discuss things that matter to them, without competing with the subjects chosen by the other UC. The centralization of issues related to the reality of Quaraí-Artigas was among the main complaints regarding the functioning of the New Agenda. Another key issue was to ignore the presence of Monte Caseros. The way out of this dilemma has been the construction of institutionalized cooperation at the local level (see more details in Section 4.7).

When asked to list the main subjects with which they needed to deal regarding the fact that *Quaraí-Artigas* was a UC, Brazilian respondents promptly indicated the disparity between the formal population and the actual population of Quaraí. The present economic conditions lowered the housing prices in Brazilian territory, which attracted, according to local estimates, some five or six thousand new inhabitants in the last few years, or one quarter more than the formal census. Respondents from Artigas pointed out to the struggle of Uruguayan commercial and service establishments to maintain activities in such a negative economic environment. While Quaraí is economically thriving, Artigas is declining. The low intensity of circulation on the Concórdia International Bridge (inaugurated in 1968) has become a mark, except for the constant movement of motorcycles and pedestrians. Respondents from this UC have emphasized the amical relations between the two local governments and the cordiality with which both populations treat one another. As an example, they all refer to the cultural and sports events both towns organize as well as to family bonds (INTERVIEWS #20-26, 2017, oral information). Interactions within this UC is summarized by a local government actor:

*Hay muchas dificultades [para desarrollar interacciones locales]. [...] Hay problemas con las importaciones. Los empleados con frecuencia necesitan ir hasta Livramento [para solucionarlos], incluso en*

*transporte exclusivo entre Artigas-Quaraí. El Mercosur no significó mucho para la frontera porque ya teníamos una integración de hecho. Continuamos trabajando de la misma forma como antes, pero sin legalizar. Hay trámites burocráticos que bloquean todo. [...] Pero tenemos una excelente relación de gobierno [con Quaraí]. Hay problemas comunes y ayudas mutuas. [...] En cuanto al comercio, el cambio que hoy favorece a Brasil, ayer nos favoreció. Permitimos el intercambio libre para el consumo de las personas. El comercio de la ciudad sufre, pero la población se beneficia. Esto hace la vida más barata en Artigas. Sin embargo, los salarios también son más bajos aquí (INTERVIEW #24, 2017, oral information).*

Jaguarão-Rio Branco shares similarities to Quaraí-Artigas regarding the moderate trans-local interactions this UC maintains as well as concerning the type of border (*i.e.* fluvial). Baron of Mauá International Bridge has limited circulation, particularly due to the impossibility of cargo crossing. The bridge, inaugurated in 1930, cannot resist heavy loads, and although numerous conversations and projects had been delineated, the construction of a new bridge is far from being executed. Family ties are also considered the most relevant element of local interactions by respondents, influencing the organization of rural properties both in Brazilian and Uruguayan territories. Apart from the bilateral agreements and projects in the scope of the New Agenda and family and friend relationships (leisure, short-term excursions), Jaguarão-Rio Branco have built networks focused basically on the advantages of currency disparities, such as the *contrabando-formiga* (smuggling for personal use, usually for house and transport essentials) and the market of informal rental. This greater ‘distance’ between the two urban centers was realized in the choice of terms chosen by respondents to refer to the neighbors. All interviewees in this UC have applied several categories of differentiation (between ‘us’ and ‘them’): the ‘pure’ Spanish language in Rio Branco, the untrusty character of Brazilians, the greater involvement of Uruguayans in politics.

These intertwined networks based on familial and amicable relations – which are developed into commercial and other types of formal associations – are not only the foundation of the trans-local interactions, but also a key factor for the preservation of the functioning processes of the UCs. In other words, it is not among most local actors’ interests to unmake such networks, although in three occasions, subjects did mention positive aspects resulted from isolating cross-border communities into separate societies (INTERVIEWS #10, #47, #56, 2017, oral information). The prevalent idea, however,

remains that of union and of the need to expand cooperation with neighbors across the border.

### 4.3.2 Trans-border cultural homogeneity

Trans-local interactions are usually based on certain cultural traits that may assist on the building of a common identity, which Dilla (2015) denominates ‘trans-border cultural homogeneity’ of a UC: “*La mayor parte de las fronteras de América Latina se caracterizan por la compartición de rasgos culturales e incluso por la maduración de perfiles culturales propios que revalidan con fuerza aquel axioma de que los fronterizos siempre se parecen más entre sí que los habitantes de las capitales que los gobiernan*” (DILLA, 2015, p. 30-31). The author acknowledges that the sharing of common cultural traits are not enough to implement deep interrelations between urban centers across borders: “[...] *las evidencias empíricas sugieren que, si bien la homogeneidad cultural es un escenario positivo, no es suficiente para generar interacciones que conduzcan a la maduración del CUT [complejo urbano transfronterizo]*” (DILLA, 2015, p. 31).

Concerning the distribution of *Portunhol/Portuñol* into Uruguayan territory, the Rivera Department is entirely within the area of occurrence, while Artigas and Cerro Largo Departments are just partially within such area. Rocha is the only department under analysis in which there cannot be found the incidence of *Portunhol*, according to research by the Presidency of Uruguay (2008). However, during fieldwork, apart from Jaguarão-Rio Branco<sup>51</sup> (within the Cerro Largo departmental circumscription), respondents by all other UCs (including Chuí-Chuy) have referred to the use of *Portuñol* and the figure of the *gaucho* to illustrate the friendly and historical relationship engendered with the neighbor and the common traits between the urban populations of a UC, to demonstrate the greater similarity between them than to other regions of Uruguay and of Rio Grande do Sul. The *Portunhol* and the *gaucho* can be considered key factors of a cultural homogeneity of the Bucbr, particularly fed by those with familiar ties in both territories and by local governments’ representatives promoting closer cross-border, formal relations. Sturza and Tatsch (2016) consider that at the border areas of Brazil and Uruguay, both Portuguese and Castilian cultures have mixed in a place where the micro-regional *ethos* of the federated state of Rio Grande do Sul is deeply identified with

---

<sup>51</sup> The research by Gonçalves (2013), in which it is attested the unfamiliar use of *Portunhol* by local sellers, corroborates the impression of the non-use of mixed languages in this area.

Argentinian and Uruguayan cultures. This had contributed, in great extent, to the development of the language of the ‘border *gaucho*’, or *gaucho fronteiriço/fronterizo* – a hybridization of Portuguese and Spanish languages. In this context, the Brazilian-Uruguayan border can be considered a ‘space between languages’.

The Bucbr is thus a space from which locals draw a great part of their identity. Analyzing the application of *Portunhol* in Chuí-Chuy, Amaral (2008, p. 17) points out that “*Los hablantes de portuñol de esta frontera brasileño-uruguaya no consideran que su modalidad mixta sea un símbolo de incompetencia lingüística, sino una variedad que les permite definirse como ‘gente de frontera’*”, reflecting the centrality of such an element for local identity construction. Behares (2010) finds in Uruguayan territory a bilingual society composed of Spanish speakers and Portuguese speakers, who in its Uruguayan variant, had always communicated in such a language. *Portunhol/Portuñol*, also denominated *dialectos portugueses de Uruguay* (Portuguese dialects of Uruguay – PDU), is the result of the historical interactions in the Bucbr and the semi-autonomous character of the region (Chapter 2). This does not prevent a countermovement of nationalism or national identity supporters (particularly in Uruguay) to be concomitantly present and active. Moura (2015) and Detoni and Rocha (2017) demonstrate the use of hybrid language to be a source of both pride in local cultural blends and scorn towards the informal, uneducated condition of the Bucbr border population.

A growing cultural expression in the Bucbr is the Carnival parades. Quaraí-Artigas, Santana do Livramento-Rivera, Aceguá-Aceguá, Jaguarão-Rio Branco, and Chuí-Chuy jointly organize the event. Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión have separated spectacles (in 2017, Barra do Quaraí canceled the occasion due to budgetary problems). Uruguayan respondents pointed out to an important singularity of such parades: the similarity to the model developed in the city of Rio de Janeiro, with songs in Portuguese, clothing bought in bigger Brazilian towns (Uruguaiana, Bagé, Pelotas, and Santa Maria), and samba schools. In these events, a mix of the Uruguayan *candombe* and the Brazilian *samba* makes musical performance unique (RETAMAR; RISSO, 2011). Comparatively to other Carnivals in Uruguay (more traditional), the Brazilian influence was not always cherished by Uruguayan subjects, although most recognized the importance of the event as a representation of union and friendship. Brazilian Carnival has reached cultural manifestations in the Uruguayan towns within the Bucbr and has become a mark of

interactions within UCs, especially after the joint organization of the event in five out of six UCs.

These shared cultural elements play a significant role in creating a (cross-border) local identity, more connected to local reality than to the corresponding capitals of border municipalities. Such distinctiveness *vis-à-vis* other national actors and players create, despite the recognized differences among locals of the Bucbr, a sentiment of being part of something exclusive, such as living in a cross-border region. Therefore, it is difficult to infer that the lack of engagement of local actors in cooperate in the scope of the New Agenda has been founded on cultural or identity divergence, prejudice, or other culture-based bias.

#### **4.4 Spatial configurations**

Dilla (2015) explains that *spatial configurations* concern the roles each UC play within a larger space. The usual role of cross-border corridors makes UCs very likely to guarantee the continuity of flows. Braga (2013) explains that the relationship between local practices and regional/global integrative or disruptive environment creates a political statement of complementarity and intermediation in the heart of UCs' functional systems, which are always subjected to the 'opening' or 'closing' of borders and other circumstantial opportunities. Cross-border urban complexes of the Bucbr share similar roles concerning the macro-regional system of which they are part. The current spatial configurations of the UCs are related to the emergence of regionalist dynamics, particularly of Mercosur. History has shown that the Brazilian-Uruguayan border has been constructed by interchangeable conflicts and accords in local and bilateral levels. The bilateral relations in the first three phases analyzed in Chapter 2 (1620-1975) were developed under the national logics of delimitation, security, and defense. State protection and territorial sovereignty were in the core of Brazilian-Uruguayan relations, especially by the role of buffer-state played by Uruguay in times of tension between Brazil and Argentina (DOMÍNGUEZ, 2003). The descending tension between the two biggest nations of the continent was followed by the creation of the 'Treaty of Friendship' between Brazil and Uruguay, which ended the times of agitation and progressively established a cooperative behavior towards their shared border. The subsequent foundation of Mercosur has brought about deep changes into the regional economy,



generating transformation in the *modus operandi* toward the border and the towns located in border areas. Considered a hindrance to the liberalization of trade, CUs became important points of passage and corridors of transportation (FERRARO, 2013), experiencing the presence of the state to control and regulate the increasing fluxes of goods, people, and currency (GRIMSON, 2001).

**Table 10 State control in UCs' area (2017)**


	Barra do Quaraí- Bella Unión	Quaraí- Artigas	Santana do Livramento- Rivera	Aceguá- Aceguá	Jaguarão- Rio Branco	Chuí- Chuy
Brazilian Revenue Service	X	X	X		X	X
Brazilian Federal Police Office			X		X	X
Rio Grande do Sul Revenue Service			X		X	
Brazilian Fiscal Border Point	X	X	X		X	X
Brazilian Dry Port			X		X	
Uruguayan Customs Office	X	X	X	X	X	X
Uruguayan Police Office	X	X	X		X	X
Brazilian Consulate		X	X		X	X
Uruguayan Consulate		X	X		X	X
Integrated Control Area (Mercosur)		X	X	X	X	

Sources: Mercosur (2014); IBGE (2017); MDI (2017); MRE (2017b; 2017c); PF (2017); RFB (2017) Sefaz RS (2017). Elaborated by the author (2017).

*Table 10* shows the presence of state control organisms in each UC of the Bucbr. The discrepancy in the spatial distribution of control mechanisms among the UCs is evident. At one end of the state control spectrum, Aceguá-Aceguá has the presence of only two national/state bodies in its urban area; at the other end, Santana do Livramento-Rivera and Jaguarão-Rio Branco both have all the eight control organisms investigated by this research. This can be partially explained by the differences in size (Aceguá-Aceguá with nearly five thousand inhabitants, Livramento-Rivera with figures of some 150 thousand) and by the central, functional role of Jaguarão-Rio Branco in serving as trade corridor more heavily when compared to Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión or Aceguá-Aceguá.

From the viewpoint of regional network systems, Brazilian and Uruguayan UCs share prominent positions as ‘strategic nodes for globalized trade’, functioning as logistics hubs of Mercosur due to their connecting capacities within an international road system. Braga *et al.* (2016, p. 116, emphasis by the author) describe such flows in detail: “Spreading from Salto [Argentina], it [the urban network integration core limits measurement] encompasses the most part of Uruguay/Brazil borderland, attesting its *porosity, intensive interchanges, and conurbation processes that enhance the urban network importance in structuring and controlling cross-border flows*”.

**Map 7 Road network integration at border areas of Mercosur**



Source: Braga *et al.* (2016, p. 116).

*Map 7* demonstrates the centrality of four UCs of the Bucbr in controlling transportation flows in the highway network of Mercosur: Quaraí-Artigas, Santana do Livramento-Rivera, Aceguá-Aceguá, and Jaguarão-Rio Branco. Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión also presented an elevated level of integration in this mesh, but it is overshadowed by Argentinian-Brazilian Uruguaiana-Passo de los Libres’s higher capacity of road-connecting and usage. It is interesting to note the geopolitical change in the historical role of Uruguay as the tiny country located in between two regional powers. From buffer-state

to corridor-state, Uruguayan territory has been used as passage between Brazil and Argentina, particularly in the commercial exchange of Mercosur and tourist flows among nationals of both countries.

The *symbolic role* of UCs within the spatial organization of macro-regionalist dynamics is also worth mentioning. In 2009, Santana do Livramento was chosen to be the symbol of the Brazilian integration with Mercosurian countries. In 2015, the Barão do Mauá International Bridge (built in 1927-1930 and administered by a binational committee), connecting Jaguarão and Rio Branco, was the first monument to be listed in the Historical Heritage of Mercosur (Iphan, 2015). Local actors constantly promote their border regions as symbols of cooperation, friendship, and cultural richness. Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión share the motto “Three towns, three countries. Only one heart”<sup>52</sup>; the disputed territory of Ilha do Brasil (see Section 2.3) has informally received the denomination of ‘Arbruy Republic’, a combination of the names of the three countries sharing the fluvial border, Argentine (AR) , Brazil (BR), and Uruguay (UY) (Rocha, 2017); Quaraí-Artigas are commonly called by locals (including officials) as ‘Sister-Towns’; Livramento-Rivera is known as the ‘Peace Border’ (*Fronteira da Paz*), ‘*A Mais Irmã de Todas as Fronteiras do Mundo*’ (*La Más Hermana de Todas las Fronteras del Mundo*)<sup>53</sup>, and the ‘Hearth of the Southern Cone’ (LUCENA, 2011). The coat of arms and the flag of the Brazilian municipality of Aceguá display the boundary stone situated in the center of the square besides the international road that separates/connects the town from its Uruguayan homonym.

The Brazilian-Uruguayan UCs also appear as routes of illegal trade and contraband. As Chapter 2 demonstrated, local-level smuggling was not only ordinary, but also accepted as customary practice among locals, being a key source of sustenance for border populations. Merenson (2007) highlights the importance of contraband for local populations with Piriz’s (1970) remarks:

*La frontera salva – [a través del] contrabando hormiga mediante el intercambio comercial tolerado o como quiera llamársele – al habitante pobre de las ciudades y pueblos fronterizos, del pauperismo y la miseria (...) pero el contrabando organizado significa un factor*

<sup>52</sup> The Argentinian town of Monte Caseros is located across Quaraí river, but has no articulation infrastructure with Brazil or Uruguay, which decreases local interactions. Plans to build a bridge connecting Bella Unión and Montes Caseros are underway (see Map 6 for more details).

<sup>53</sup> Of difficult translation, this sentence could be interpreted as ‘the most familial (or neighborly) of all the borders of the world’.

*negativo para la economía departamental y nacional* (PIRIZ, 1970 *apud* MERENSON, 2007, p. 7).

In the late nineties, Santana do Livramento-Rivera was among the main illegal trade routes of Southern South America, connecting Montevideo to Rio Grande do Sul, the adjacent Brazilian federated state of Santa Catarina, and through its capital – Florianópolis – to the Atlantic Ocean (MACHADO, 2000). Dorfman (2009), in her research on contraband in Santana do Livramento-Rivera, maps several networks that feed a grey economy of perishable and industrialized goods and connect two national markets, identifying the cohabitation between the nation-state project and other territorialities, which shows the profound roots of functional illegalities in the scope of macro-systems in which the UCs are connected. This indicates that rather than configuring the ‘criminal’ nature of *fronteiriços/fronterizos*, illegalities at the Bucbr operate within the gaps of national markets and of irregularly integrated economies at the regional level.

Be it associated to functional perspectives or to dysfunctional roles, the Bucbr is immersed in macro-regional spatiality, which situates this region amid a myriad of national projects. However, such key functions played by the UCs have yet not been translated into actual benefits for local actors, who remain actuating in the margins of the regional system. In this context, local demands are yet to be included in the advantages’ package gained by major players. As the New Agenda has, so far, sustained the perpetuation of the marginal role of border actors, it did not offer a very appealing framework of incorporation of such demands. Complying with its institutionality and engaging in projects not presenting advantageous policies for actors that are able to influence other local players do not seem to be a logical response.

#### **4.5 Economic interdependence**

According to Dilla (2015), economic interdependence implies a relationship of shared suitability circumscribing the material reproduction of the towns involved. Such condition, however, is never total, insofar each town in a UC has economic activities that are exclusively connected to their corresponding national frameworks. This means that the towns’ economies within a UC overlap, particularly due to the cross-border nature of primary activities of each town. On the one hand, UCs are part of binational or macro-

regional trade flows (as demonstrated by the spatial arrangements each UC establish within Mercosur, for example). Such relations bring visibility to UCs, but little advantage at the local level (additional state control, presence of illegal groups, and securitization being negative aspects of such a condition). On the other hand, activities based on the multiple local, exchange networks open possibilities toward a bigger labor market and a lower cost of living, generating tangible benefits for the daily lives of local populations.

Machado (2005) lists four economic factors actuating on everyday issues of locals: labor, capital flows, use of land and other natural resources, and collective services consumption. *Labor* interactions is one of the primary effects of populational densification in border areas. In the presence of a bigger, more developed state (as in the case of the Bucbr), opportunities for labor are more numerous, particularly for heavy-duty tasks, such as the construction industry and blue-collar positions in commerce and services. Qualified workers originated from the less developed state tend to leave toward finding better positions in the other urban center. The local labor market of a UC is thus cross-border, which can be beneficial to the less developed country insofar local populations have access to other sources of labor, hence diminishing unemployment rates. However, it can also become an opportunity to exploit illegal workers in the most developed country. According to respondents (INTERVIEWS #3, #10, #11, #33, #48, 2017, oral information), construction industry, local commerce, and agriculture are the main sectors employing irregular workers on both territories. For the referred sectors, the labor market is unitary, although two distinct national territories are in the equation. In fact, many make decisions based on the differences of the Brazilian and Uruguayan labor regulations. Regarding rural workers and their choices on whether to work in Brazil or Uruguay, a local society actor narrated a common occurrence:

*Os trabalhadores brasileiros pedem demissão aqui, ganham seguro-desemprego e vão trabalhar no Uruguai. É ruim para a propriedade rural, a troca de empregados é muito grande. O Uruguai paga em dólar, e eles ficam ganhando duas rendas. [...] Há grandes demandas de mão de obra no Uruguai, o que faz com que eles recrutem trabalhadores brasileiros, que geralmente têm experiência. Como eles pagam em dólar, agora vai muita gente trabalhar lá (INTERVIEW #22, 2017, oral information).*

The presence of tax-free zones in all six Uruguayan urban centers created strategic potentialities of the UCs both for local and national/international actors. At the local level,

it provided job opportunities as well as the possibility – for Brazilians – to buy goods without the burden of multiple duties (Uruguayans cannot shop at such stores). Describing the economic activities in Santana do Livramento-Rivera, Dorfman (2009) emphasizes that the tax-free shops refer both to national logics – embodied by the special extraterritorial regulation – and to international logics – given the consumers at which they aim to sell and the worldwide brands they offer. The potential for development of such zones have attracted foreign companies that can function simply as commercial points or as *maquiladoras*. *Maquiladoras* are companies that buy industrial by-products in Brazil (often in contraband), assemble them into new products, and register either in Brazil or in Uruguay, according to exchange rates and import taxes (MIN, 2005). Informal commerce is likewise highly developed, coexisting with and complementing the formal policies circuit that generated the tax-free trade within the Bucbr (MOURA FILHO, 2010). The flexibility of informal commerce (which is concentrated sometimes in Brazilian territory and products, sometimes in Uruguayan ground and goods) has easily been adapted in the context of the Bucbr as it has organized a great part of socio-spatial patterns of the UCs, particularly of the adjacent urban centers of Santana do Livramento-Rivera, Aceguá-Aceguá and Chuí-Chuí (CAMPOS, 2015).

*Capital flows* is another significant influencing factor on local interactions. Machado (2005) reminds the Brazilian legislation prohibiting foreigners to acquire business within the limits of the border strip. She notes that in many parts of the world, it is a widespread practice for businesspersons to invest on both territories to reduce risks and to guarantee a minimum profit. However, within the Bucbr in general, double citizenship (*doble-chapas*) is not uncommon. Being nationals of both Brazil and Uruguay, company owners can maintain their businesses in both territories, using the macro-economic situation in both countries in their advantage. This is not, however, the case for every company owner or every individual. Hence, one of the biggest markets in the Bucbr is the currency exchange business. There are three types of currency exchange operators: (legal) big exchange houses, usually concentrated in Uruguayan territory due to its more relaxed regulations; itinerant exchange dealers, who work for exchange houses, but feed a parallel, illegal market; and street exchange dealers, informal agents that exploit the varied currency exchange prices found in the legal houses. All three combined create an intricate currency market of contraband, money laundering, and foreign exchange evasion, fueled by the lenient environment of the region (DORFMAN, 2009). It is

possible to identify effortlessly all the three types of currency operators in Santana do Livramento-Rivera and Chuí-Chuy displayed and advertised publicly.

Two dimensions involve the *use of land and other natural resources* in the Bucbr: landowners and agriculture entrepreneurs looking for cheaper properties for producing agriculture goods or for speculating in the market; and rural workers or small farmers – expropriated due to modernization processes – seeking to subsist in the new market conditions (SALES, 1996). Machado (2005) explains that usually in the less developed country, land is less expensive than in the adjacent territory. Uruguayan rural areas within Bucbr are, thus, interesting investments for Brazilians. Numerous traditional families of the region share both nationalities, which can disguise the real origin of financial investments. In any case, “*en Uruguay, la preocupación por la adquisición de tierras en las regiones de frontera, así como la propiedad en manos de sociedades anónimas con acciones al portador que inhiben de conocer la nacionalidad de sus poseedores es un debate actual [entre las autoridades nacionales]*” (NAVARRETE, 2006, p. 10). The production of rice and beef are the primary agricultural areas of which Brazilian companies attempt to dominate (SEAD, 2011?) in Uruguayan border areas.

The lack of asymmetry between Brazilian and Uruguayan urban centers, in economic and societal terms, is a central characteristic of the Bucbr. Towns within a UC cultivate the same products and commodities, share environmental, geographical, and climate conditions, and present similar social indices. This symmetry created a mirrored system, which due to regulatory differences of each national policies, begot a single cross-border economy in each UC. The cross-border economy of the Bucbr is characterized by a ‘pendular movement’: the prosperity of a sector in one town is the decline of that sector in the other town; the peak of a community is the recession of the other urban center (BETANCOR, 2010) A relevant factor is the shift in currency exchange, altering the cost of living in one territory, which can repel or attract residents to one of the sides of the UC, particularly individuals/families in situation of social vulnerability. After the establishment of the Real fluctuation *vis-à-vis* the Dollar, any period of major devaluation (usually connected to macro-economic crises) tends to attract Uruguayans to live in the Brazilian territory due to the lowering of the costs of daily expenses and *vice-versa*: once Real is overvalued, Brazilians penetrate Uruguayan border towns either to live (in the case of locals) or to buy products (in the case of commerce tourists). This phenomenon is also known as ‘seesaw effect’ (MÉLO, 2004).

The sector of *collective services* is the sole segment with a high degree of asymmetry between Brazilian and Uruguayan towns. In this case, urban centers differ greatly in quality and in quantity. In fact, the gap in the provision of health services is the emblem of cross-border relations in the Bucbr. As seen in Chapter 3, the attempt to solve some of the issues involving the delivery and use of health services by locals of both nationalities have triggered negotiations that later developed into the New Agenda. The overall scenario is similar in all UCs: Brazilian urban centers lack human resources, particularly physicians and specialized doctors, which the Uruguayan labor market presents a significant surplus. Local demands are concentrated on being able to hire Uruguayans in local hospitals and clinics without any constraint. The New Agenda has achieved to implement this policy, although with numerous complications yet to be resolved. In UCs where the size of towns differs considerably, Uruguayan urban centers also tend to have better infrastructure. This is the case in Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión, Quaraí-Artigas, and Chuí-Chuy. Local populations and governments demand the unrestricted use of health services, which could diminish expenses of local governments with transportation to the inner side of Brazilian territory to find specialists or specialized treatments, such as hemodialysis (Quaraí), emergency response units (Barra do Quaraí and Chuí), and neonatal and delivery units (Santana do Livramento). Uruguayan towns would also profit by the enlargement of the target population, especially if policymakers could regulate the payment methods from Brazilian local governments to Uruguayan municipalities or health companies. The experience of Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión has served as a laboratory for the refining of this policy (see Section 4.3). Locals usually find informal means to have access to such services. Numerous Brazilians who are *doble-chapas* also have Uruguayan addresses, so they can utilize health services without restrictions (although it is also necessary to pay for insurance). It is not uncommon that in case of emergency, Brazilian health providers request the assistance of Uruguayan services, which are always responded positively. All in all, UCs are cooperative in crisis situations (see an example in Section 3.4.2).

With highly interdependent economies, the Bucbr profits from the border condition in a small-scale market. The flexibilization of regulatory institutions for transportation of goods in larger quantities – an important local demand – would certainly expand such interrelations and provide trans-local interactions a space to create new economies. As national authorities remain resistant to open (more) the borders of the



Bucbr (due to the possibility of mounting uncontrolled import and export), local actors seemed to discredit some (even advantageous) propositions within the New Agenda.

#### **4.6 Local, institutionalized cooperation**

State and civil society, local actors can engender institutional relations with the objective of promoting some form of governance insofar trans-local interactions increase within a UC. Institutional relations entail two levels: **(1)** the binational level deals with the subjects concerning themes of national scales, involving cooperation/integration and *ad hoc* solutions to border problems, such as commerce, migration, security, environment, and others (the New Agenda is the main representation of such relations in the Bucbr); and **(2)** the local level refers to the testing of governance formulas through local agreements involving local governments, decentralized state institutions, and civil society. It is in this level that local actors attempt to apply a cooperative management institution within a double national framework system, which makes the UCs laboratories of paradiplomacy. Such dynamics are commonly more functional than normative, they work more in practical standings and less on producing legal apparatus, which can confuse an inattentive observer searching for strict formality (DILLA, 2015).

Several local relations were instituted within the growing interactions of UCs. In Santana do Livramento-Rivera, numerous institutional relations are part of the daily life of the adjacent urban centers, particularly the ones seeking to amplify the symbolic power of this UC and to expand the commercial and touristic potential of joint projects. With symbolic role, the event of Flag Exchange (*Troca de Pavilhões/Cambio de Banderas*) is organized by the Brazilian Municipal Executive and the Uruguayan Departmental Executive offices. It involves the participation of local detachments of both national armies, of local officials and other authorities, of police departments, and of civil society representatives, who exchange and hoist national and local flags as a sign of enduring peace. A series of tourism events are annually organized by both local governments, by the trade associations of Rivera and Livramento, and by corresponding secretaries of tourism and culture: the Eno-Gastronomy Binational Festival, the Women's International Week, the Binational Carnival, the Easter Fair, the Kites Festival, the *Farroupilha* International Week (promoting *gaúcho's* tradition and remembering Rio Grande do Sul's separatist movements), the Theater Festival, and the Binational Book Fair (Livramento,

2014). Such jointly organized events help alleviate costs, draw more attention to the UC, and involve both infrastructural capacities, such as the hotel chain in Brazil, the Uruguayan tax-free shops, and the services chain offered by both towns. Infrastructural joint actions are also part of the agenda, such as the recovery of (cross-border) side roads, urban cleaning and revitalization of public spaces at the border, and the construction and maintenance of a binational Wi-Fi zone (LIVRAMENTO, 2014).

Legally founded on New Agenda's agreements, the *Contrato de Prestação/Prestación de Serviços/Servicios Sanitarios* (Contract of Provision of Health Services) between the municipal government of Barra do Quaraí and the Uruguayan Health Services National Administration (ASSE) in Bella Unión is helping to achieve a satisfactory level of health services provision, reflecting on the social cohesion of the area under an institutional, subnational agreement. The agreement was built in form of a contract, signed in 2011, for emergency health services to be provided by the Hospital of Bella Unión, which would make available 300 consultations and blood tests for the Brazilian population in exchange of USD 16,200.00 in the period of a year. This contract had positively impacted the municipal budget, since local public health providers did not need to travel 70 Km to Uruguaiana (the nearest Brazilian town) to have access to emergency services (RODRIGUES; FORTUNATO, 2014). Uruguayan health services providers also gained access to a market, until then closed, increasing revenue. Despite the clear advantages for both actors, the contract had not yet been renewed, particularly due to problems with international wire transfer calculations regarding the payment in American Dollars. The municipal government had troubles with fiscal control and did not manage to convince national authorities of the fluctuation (due to differences in exchange rates) of prices in the agreement (INTERVIEW #28, 2017, oral information). Since 2013, to fill the gap generated by the discontinuity of the previous agreement, another contract was issued between Barra do Quaraí and a private health services provider. This agreement states that the Uruguayan company should be on notice with ambulances to provide emergency services in a 12-hour (night) shift, which has helped maintain the delivery of basic health services for the Brazilian population. The contract remains full operative to this day. In 2016, and based on the 'Border Agreement', the Brazilian municipality started employing Uruguayan physicians in the municipal health system. The transfer of funds from the national system to the municipality, however, remains a problem. A local representative explains:

*Como a produção na área de saúde tem que ser enviada [ao Ministério da Saúde], os profissionais têm que ser cadastrados no sistema nacional de estabelecimentos de saúde, e a produção deles deve ser lançada num sistema informatizado que vai para o Ministério. E aí, com aquele histórico todo [de horas de serviço prestadas e de prescrições de medicamentos e exames] é que são feitos os repasses e os financiamentos. E a produção desses médicos uruguaios não pode [ser repassada] porque, diferente do programa “Mais Médicos”, o governo federal não avançou nessa parte [de adaptar o sistema às necessidades de credenciamento] por ter tido muita pressão do CREMERS (do Sindicato dos Médicos) – sabe todo o peso político que tem a classe – então no Congresso não avançou essa questão de regulamentação (INTERVIEW #32, 2017, oral information).*

The Atelier Saladero NGO of Barra do Quaraí is heading the Transborder Movement of NGOs (TMN), which has been recognized as a movement of high interest of local governments by municipal and departmental authorities of Brazil (Decree 050/2006), Uruguay (Law 16.494/2006), and Argentina (Declaration 05/06). The official objectives of the movement are focused on the sharing of scientific and technical support to form a joint plan for ecological awareness at the local level, fostering artistic and cultural events that concur with this ideal (SALADERO, 2006). Local coordination attempts are not limited to civil society movements but comprise local governments. The objective is to create an ‘ecological corridor’, which could benefit both the environment and tourism. To promote the triple border as a single area is at the center of such political arrangements. Local representatives have managed to establish a tri-border, local committee, to rectify disparities that national legislations create at the local level. Although lacking a formalized framework, the committee is currently functioning, and local government actors are lobbying to make their corresponding national authorities to recognize this trans-local, institutional governance body. A local government actor develops on the efforts toward a cross-border governance:

*Estamos participando en coordinaciones, con la gente de la Barra y Argentina, para el corredor ecológico. Para cuidar e crear conciencia de la importancia del medio ambiente, el turismo y la cultura de la tríple frontera. Esas coordinaciones van a ser creadas formalmente. Hay también un comité fronterizo que busca una mejor cooperación e interacción con lo intendente, el prefecto... pero nada más. La organización es local. Hay autoridades provinciales, departamentales e estadauales. Las contradicciones que hay, hablamos de cosas acá, pero las autoridades de cancillería dicen que no es por ahí. Los encuentros sirven para evidenciar las cosas que no son coherentes y hay que corregirlas [...] (INTERVIEW #35, 2017, oral information).*

Other institutionalized cooperation within UCs have not reached any level of structuration, although they are introjected in the *modus operandi* of local governments as a tacit, local norm. Such agreements are the result of the historical development of the UCs as two-headed communities and are constantly negotiated and discussed among local representatives. In Jaguarão-Rio Branco, the joint organization of cultural and sport events is a traditional interaction between the Brazilian *prefeitura* and the Uruguayan *alcaldía*. The interchange of Spanish and Portuguese teachers – once institutionalized under the PEIBF (Section 3.4.3) – after the cuts in funding, had become sporadic events based on personal connections among education professionals. In Chuí-Chuy, the exchange of machinery and personnel for infrastructure recovery works is customary. The jointly organized International Carnival is among the main events of this UC, attracting local visitors and regional tourists; numerous other events are created by the two communities. Police and firemen departments are employed according to necessity in both towns. In Aceguá-Aceguá, an Uruguayan physician was hired and both populations have their medical needs attended. Feasts and fairs are always conceived as a single event for both communities. Nowadays, local governments have initiated talks to improve the area in which the invisible border runs. It is important to note the decade-long negotiations and coordinated actions toward the building of the sanitation project. As works are about to commence, the effect of such internalized cooperation on both communities will be not only positive, but enduring, which can be considered an achievement regarding institutional cooperation in the Bucbr. In Quaraí-Artigas, the Quaraí River Commission used to embrace most discussions among local governments. However, its discontinuity has left institutionalized cooperation limited almost exclusively to cultural events. The rural community and agriculture goods producers, nevertheless, remain active and promote fairs, courses, and other events for farmers and rural land owners in both towns, with intense participation of local populations. Agronomists of both countries constantly monitor activities at the margins of the Quaraí river, communicating with one another in case of adversities.

Irrefutably, institutionalized cooperation is energetic, particularly if one investigates non-structured institutionalities. The need for better managing the cross-border environment is high, and local actors recognize it. The regulatory systems of Brazil and Uruguay remain an impediment for more established ways of trans-local cooperation – the economic condition of such border municipalities also being an important barrier.

Nevertheless, mutual help endures as the most common type of cooperation, which usually requires local actors to enter the realm of illegality. This is probably the sector in which illegal practices most commonly occur, which indicates the urgent need for specific legislation regarding trans-local assistance within the Bucbr.

#### **4.7 Final remarks on the local contexts of the Bucbr and its UCs**

The encounter of fluid borders and populous urban centers stemming from historical, semi-autonomous interactions created intricate overlapping networks sets with double objectives: to endure the hardship of social and political exclusions, and to profit from different frameworks and territorialities. The single geographical environment at which the Bucbr is situated was not enough to foster high degrees of interaction, let alone cooperation in all UCs, which is consistent with a non-determinist understanding on physical settings. Apart from family and amicable relations – present throughout the Bucbr – other interactions have been developed unevenly across the region. More formalized cooperation at the local level was reinforced only after the New Agenda, which shows one of the contributions of this bilateral plan (although still timid). Nevertheless, most institutionalized governance procedures did not leave the realm of informality and remained dependent on the personal engagement of local authorities or representatives.

The permanence of informal networks indicates the malleability of trans-local interactions and cooperation, but also shows the insufficiency of the New Agenda to respond to the needs of local actors for better material and institutional conditions. Local populations and local governments circumscribe their actions within the limits of their own local capacities, which are usually beyond formal institutionalities and national norms. The discrepancy in the level of interactions and cooperation processes among UCs is clear and can be related to macro-dynamics, such as market production patterns, functional interest of national and regional activities, and other processes involving the state, the regional economy, and the interest of other actors. Further research on the impact of these dynamics is required.

The local contexts and the trans-local interactions of the UCs demonstrate that the micro-regional (*i.e.* regionalization) process in the Bucbr is (1) more informal than rigid – individuals, governments, and companies promote their interests though invisible

channels, much related to what Santander (2017) calls ‘silent regionalism’; **(2)** it is more provisional than constant – although some cooperative behaviors have been taken place for decades. The *ad hoc*, solution-oriented activities of mutual help are the rule among UCs’ interrelations; **(3)** it is likely to alter its informal nature on matters involving local governments, seeing that the bilateral agenda and national structures could truly provide a ‘space for action’ to local actors and to their social and political interests (SANTANDER, 2012) – and not only to big companies and national players; **(4)** it can be profitable to national governments once formal integration advances, legalizing the free movement of not only people, but also goods and currency, and with the de-bureaucratization of the labor markets and national regulations; and **(5)** will likely change in nature in the juncture of social and economic development reaching such areas, with better infrastructure for the provision of public services, and access to basic social rights.

If the New Agenda had been created to promote deregulation of trans-local practices, engagement of local actors could have reached higher levels. Being the purpose to provide for some trans-local practices (especially residence and labor activities), compliance with regulatory framework remained low, as well as the participation of local actors in the creation of projects that could improve life in the Bucbr. Considering the percentage of projects halted due to regulatory discrepancy, there was not a reason for local actors to attempt creating programs or strategies with little or no impact in the local scale. This indicates that, despite the central common interest of furthering cross-border cooperation, the means and the manners in which national and local actors had in mind differed greatly. While national players, through the New Agenda, expected to implement a cross-border project within the existent regulations, local actors desired to change the formal structures to better and more freely provide cooperation.

What such complex interrelations demonstrate, above all, is the deeply rooted *modus agendi* of trans-local interactions. In all levels of local society, the other, the neighboring community is acknowledged and is the focal point of numerous types of exchange, from familial and family interactions to institutional (albeit informal) relations among local governments. In other words, the likelihood of persisting with trans-local interactions by local actors is extremely high. Any cooperative agenda in the Bucbr should thus embrace such a social reality as a key resource in the promotion of institutionalized cross-border relations. The New Agenda, when not ignoring such a

reality, attempted to regulate these interrelations without facilitating compliance to new norms, which helped hindering compliance and engagement.

*Los otros murmuré nosotros  
nosotros me puse a gritar despabilando  
amor y hambre  
mientras cruzaba la línea divisoria*  
(Amanda Berenguer, 'Linha Divisória', 1988)



## CHAPTER 5 – LOCAL PERCEPTIONS ON THE NEW AGENDA: BEHIND LOW ENGAGEMENT AND COMPLIANCE RATES

What are local actors' perceptions on the operationalization of the New Agenda? And what can they indicate on the low engagement and compliance levels with its projects and agreements? The specialized literature develops two explanations in the attempt to deal with the problems of low engagement and low compliance of local actors with agreements and projects of the New Agenda. The structural explanation and the culture explanation. The two explanations are *not* understood as Weberian ideal types, or as isolated or excluding indicators, but as intertwined, complementary perspectives. The *structural explanation* (RÓTULO; DAMIANI, 2010; RÓTULO, 2012; RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014) considers the lack of work, human, and financial capacities to hinder local level governments and other local actors to profit or engage on the new cooperative framework. The absence of resources to utilize the complex bilateral structure, from the design process to implementation, would restrain the capacity of local actors to engage or participate. In other words, willing to participate or engage in the New Agenda would not be sufficient for local governments and other local actors to engender formal projects within the scope of the bilateral settlement. Also, institutional limitations of the New Agenda are in the center of this explanation. The structural hypothesis considers that *the lack of institutional and financial resources diminishes the capacity of local governments and other actors to engage and comply (or to maintain engagement and compliance) with the implementation of projects and on the operationalization of agreements*. The counter-hypothesis to this matter states that the lack of institutional and financial resources does not decrease the capacity of engagement and compliance, but local governments and other actors would still prefer to continue applying local techniques of trans-local interaction and cross-border cooperation through informality, illegality, or amicable relations. The demotivation originated in the lack of practical results can be another factor related to the low engagement and participation. Most everyday issues that were object of local scrutiny, discussions and policymaking have become idle at national spheres.

The *cultural explanation* (MACHADO, 2000; BETANCOR, 2008; DORFMAN, 2009; PUCCI, 2010, DORFMAN *et al.*, 2014; ALMEIDA, 2015) finds the border culture to be among the main hindering factors to the progress of formal cooperation within the Bucbr. Local actors would have difficulties comprehending the purpose of certain

agreements and the functioning processes of such intricate plans. They would not accept some of the regulatory conditions to further formal cooperation and therefore would not comply with them. Under this explanation, it is possible to infer that local actors would prefer to remain promoting informal cooperation developed in their historical interactions to their local neighbors. They would also consider the New Agenda processes to be invasive, a policy ‘imported’ from outside. Likewise, the normalizing processes of the bilateral cooperation plan would be considered too deep of a change to the local *modus operandi* of informality (and not rarely illegality). The answer to the question in the beginning of this chapter under this explanation would take into consideration that *there are no specific advantages to local actors’ engagement on the New Agenda, despite what politicians and policymakers usually state, which would indicate that the New Agenda is not a response to local demands, but an agenda about (not for) the border.* A counter-hypothesis to this postulation is that there are clear advantages in implementing projects and operationalizing agreements of the New Agenda to local governments and other actors, but the ‘border culture’ hinders the application of such complicated accords.

Both structural and cultural explanations are complementary accounts that may intertwine and interrelate in different degrees, according to one’s perceptions on the New Agenda or on portions of one’s personal experience with the bilateral set of agreements and projects. Perception is here defined as a socially intersubjective structure comprising beliefs and ideas, which in turn beget identities and interests that ground peoples’ interpretations of reality. *Local actors, through language use, both in verbal and written communication are able to convey their beliefs and ideas, their identities and interests, thus revealing their intersubjective (that is, both a subjective and an objective relational construction) interpretation of reality.* Perceptions of local actors will serve as the fundamental data source to verify the reach of structural and cultural explanations at the local level. This chapter will analyze indicators of both explanations, drawn from the interview and the electronic questionnaire applied to them, in which they communicate their perceptions on the operationalization of the New Agenda.

### **5.1 Structural explanation and local actors’ perceptions**

The structural explanations developed by Rótulo and Damiani (2010), Rótulo (2012), Rótulo *et al.* (2014) find basis on the evident technical complexity of New

Agenda's projects' requirement on what the authors call institutional capacities: work, human, finance, and logistics resources in local and central administrations. In practical terms, local and central governments needed well-equipped personnel, with know-how and education to create and implement projects of cross-border nature. These projects demanded not only knowledge on the areas to which they are intended to impact, but also on the *modus operandi* of both politico-administrative national frameworks as well as regulations and the international law. Such projects also required continuous coordination with local authorities and other actors of both towns of a UC as well as other departmental, federated state, and national representatives of all concerned bodies and organizations, raising costs related to travel and the use of physical structures that could accommodate these many persons. The implementation of projects of the New Agenda required the deployment of personnel to such activities, which in the social reality of towns within the Bucbr meant to leave other areas unattended. The assessments on the functioning of the 'slow' (RÓTULO, 2012, p. 60) and 'inefficient' (RÓTULO; DAMIANI, 2010, p. 18) New Agenda have found an important degree of deficit of such resources, "[...] *una cierta brecha entre la agenda de proyectos presentados y la eficiencia del sistema institucional para implementarlos*" (RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014, p. 154). Sectorial analyses on health (GUIMARÃES; GIOVANELLA, 2005; SILVA; SILVA, 2009; BONTEMPO, 2012; SCHERMA; OLIVEIRA, 2014) and education (BEHARES, 2010; OLVERA; VIERA, 2015) corroborate with this assessment. They recognize that, despite the attention given to such central areas by both national governments, discrepancy of national frameworks and asymmetry, dependence on the willingness of the state, and bureaucratic and juridical obstacles were identified as key issues of the New Agenda, making most projects never 'leave the drawing board', and in the cases in which they did, sluggishness played its role (details on Chapter 3, particularly Section 3.5). This is where the institutional factor plays a key role in hampering engagement and compliance. To engage in such a costly venture, local actors needed to know that the return would come – either in terms of actual benefits to local populations or in terms of political stability (in the case of local government actors) or in terms of economic gain.

Based on the structural explanation literature, *Table 11* (next page) displays four indicators that are here used to categorize local actors' perceptions regarding infrastructure and institutional factors. Each one is divided in positive or negative interpretations of reality. Positive Structural Perceptions (PSP) comprise information on

the proper work of the New Agenda and its required framework, both at local urban centers and at the bilateral institutionality. Negative Structural Perceptions (NSP) contain the opposite evidence: the unfitting functioning of the New Agenda and of its essential politico-administrative structures as well as unsuitable infrastructure available for local actors to make use of the New Agenda.

**Table 11 Indicators of structural perceptions**

POSITIVE STRUCTURAL PERCEPTIONS (PSP)	NEGATIVE STRUCTURAL PERCEPTIONS (NSP)
<p><b><i>Proper local infrastructure</i></b> Sufficient provision of work, human, and financial resources at municipal or departmental levels; the New Agenda has helped providing better infrastructure; their town has sufficient structure of services and public goods in general.</p>	<p><b><i>Inappropriate local infrastructure</i></b> Lack of work, human, and finance capacities at municipal or departmental levels; the New Agenda did not help at all in bettering infrastructure; their town still lacks basic service and provision of public goods.</p>
<p><b><i>Advances in formal cooperation</i></b> Tangible or practical progress through the New Agenda and its framework; agreements helped creating solutions or advantages; projects functioned as to promote development and integration.</p>	<p><b><i>Problems in formal cooperation</i></b> Stagnation or intangibility of New Agenda's agreements of projects; agreements did not help on creating solutions or advantages; projects did not promote development or integration.</p>
<p><b><i>Proper functioning of governmental structures</i></b> Sufficient (political or administrative) state apparatus to deal with local demands; national government structures reach out to local needs, they 'see' the border citizen.</p>	<p><b><i>Malfunctioning of governmental structures</i></b> Unsatisfactory (political or administrative) state apparatus to deal with local demands; national frameworks did not 'see' the border citizen's needs; they lack capillarity.</p>
<p><b><i>Productive vertical relations</i></b> Functioning channels of communication to/from national bodies, organizations, or decisionmakers; formal or informal channels are efficient, with enough information going back and forth; every actor is well briefed about the on-going processes of the New Agenda.</p>	<p><b><i>Unproductive vertical relations</i></b> Nonfunctioning channels of communication to/from national bodies, organizations, or decisionmakers; formal or informal channels are inefficient; no information available on the steps or requirements of projects and agreements.</p>

Source: the author (2017).

The frequency of PSP and NSP was calculated by each respondent's verbal references to the indicators during interviews. For instance, whenever a subject mentions a communication problem with national authorities, he/she is counted as having a perception of 'unproductive vertical relations'. Whenever a respondent gives an example that demonstrates that local infrastructure or public services was worse prior to the bilateral agreements, he/she is reckoned as having a perception of 'advances in formal

cooperation'. Subjects are only counted once per indicator, that is, if one respondent mentions the 'proper functioning of governmental structures' several times during interview, he/she is counted a single time. The higher the number of respondents that refer to a perception, the higher the percentage of such mentions; the lower the number of subjects mentioning a perception, the lower the proportion of references. Subjects who referred to both negative and positive interpretations for the same indicator are counted twice; PSP and NSP are not excluding indicators.

**Table 12 Frequency of PSP and NSP by UC<sup>54</sup>**

<b>Positive Structural Perceptions (PSP)</b>	B-B	Q-A	S-R	A-A	J-R	C-C	<b>BUCBR</b>
Proper local infrastructure	18%	0%	23%	14%	25%	12%	14%
Advances in formal cooperation	54%	33%	47%	57%	25%	37%	42%
Proper functioning of governmental structures	27%	11%	23%	14%	8%	0%	15%
Productive vertical relations	9%	11%	29%	42%	8%	0%	17%
<b>Negative Structural Perceptions (NSP)</b>							
Inappropriate local infrastructure	18%	66%	47%	85%	42%	62%	50%
Problems in formal cooperation	72%	66%	53%	28%	58%	50%	56%
Malfunctioning of governmental structures	45%	44%	47%	28%	41%	25%	40%
Unproductive vertical relations	63%	55%	23%	42%	33%	37%	39%
<i>Average Rate of NSPs</i>	49%	57%	42%	45%	43%	40%	46%
<i>Average Rate of PSPs</i>	27%	13%	30%	31%	16%	12%	21%

Source: the author (2017).

*Table 12* shows the frequency of subjects mentioning perceptions on the New Agenda and its (non-)functioning processes. Numbers in red show the lowest perception rates regarding the indicator of the line associating all cross-border urban complexes (UCs) of the Bucbr. Numbers in blue refer to the highest rate of a specific perception among all UCs. A general overview of local actors' perceptions concerning the structural explanation's elements reveals a correlation between a UC's experience regarding infrastructure and institutional effects of the implementation of the bilateral plan with perceptions of local actors from that UC. When a UC's local actors managed to 'translate' New Agenda's negotiations in practical policies, PSP was higher than in another UC where local actors did not obtain equivalent results. This was observed in six out of eight

<sup>54</sup> The cross-border urban complexes (UCs) of the Bucbr are encoded in this table as follows: Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión (B-B); Quaraí-Artigas (Q-A); Santana do Livramento-Rivera (S-R); Aceguá-Aceguá (A-A); Jaguarão-Rio Branco (J-R); and Chuí-Chuy (C-C). Also for *Table 14*.

indicators (advances in formal cooperation; problems in formal cooperation; proper functioning of governmental structures; malfunctioning of governmental structures; productive vertical relations; unproductive vertical relations). The variance found in the two infrastructure indicators was more connected to local actors' expectations *vis-à-vis* the New Agenda than to the actual infrastructural limitations.

Fifty-four percent of respondents from Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión (B-B) acknowledged the development of the New Agenda as having positive effects on the local reality, particularly relating the bilateral plan to advancements of health services' provision made possible by the 'Health Agreement' (Chapter 3, Section 3.4.2; Chapter 4, Section 4.6). This frequency is particularly high due to the prevalence of Brazilian subjects, who tended to have a more positive perception on the New Agenda than their neighbors from Bella Unión. This can be explained by the fact that Uruguayans did not demand a joint provision of public services in this town (as much as Brazilians), although some respondents recognized the need for common transportation services for sugarcane workers. Although nearly half of respondents recognized the advancements of the New Agenda, this UC presented the highest perception rate on problems in formal cooperation (72%). Local actors' high expectation toward the New Agenda support such negative perception. Difficulties to formalize cooperation for health services provision (*e.g.* to receive Brazilian federal funds for hired Uruguayan services) by Brazilians, and to have a truly free movement of people and goods by Uruguayans were the most common complaints. Also with the highest rate on 'unproductive vertical relations' perception (63%), subjects of this UC mentioned the sluggishness of negotiation processes in the matter that *are* being resolved. The disregard of both national governments to respond to the local demand for a trinational university in the region and for the recognition of the trinational border committee already established at the local level also affected this indicator's rate.

Displaying the second-highest rate on all four NSPs and the lowest rate on the perception on 'proper local infrastructure' (with no mentions at all), Quaraí-Artigas (Q-A) seemed to be among the least favored UCs in the New Agenda according to local actors' perceptions (*Table 12*). This UC also showed the second lowest perception on 'advances in formal cooperation' (33%). Troubles with security and the decrease of federal funds for Quaraí municipality are the most common references by Brazilian subjects. Uruguayans refer to the economic crisis and the subsequent difficulties for local

commerce and to the shrinkage of Artigas's importance in the region as enduring concerns despite the bilateral rapprochement of both countries. The perception that the New Agenda was not able to offer alternatives other than continuing solving local government problems and personal necessities through informal channels explains such low perceptions on the 'proper functioning of governmental structures' and on 'productive vertical relations' (both with 11%). The lack of more vibrant, local institutionalized cooperation processes (Section 4.6) concur with such indicators. The high percentage of mentions to 'inappropriate local infrastructure' (66%) is related to the gap between the actual need for police forces in Quaraí and the current number of law enforcement agents (perceived to be one third less than required). In Artigas, subjects refer to the poor condition of their local airport, which cannot receive flights during the night or in case of poor visibility. Their demand is to make a binational airport, attracting investment to the region (similarly to what is being negotiated in Santana do Livramento-Rivera). The impossibility to cross the border with goods in larger quantities than the personal amount (*e.g.* construction material, health equipment), and to utilize health services in both towns boosted the perception on 'problems in formal cooperation' (66%).

The largest UC of the Bucbr, Santana do Livramento-Rivera (S-R) presented the second highest average rate of PSP (30%) and the second lowest average rate of NSP (42%) (*Table 12*). Interviews showed that this combination concerns two opposite experiences regarding the functioning processes of the New Agenda. On the one hand, numerous subjects regarded the bilateral consonance of the last decade and a half as unimportant to their work or even to their daily lives as border citizens. They refer to the New Agenda as "the project of the national governments" (INTERVIEW #11, 2017, oral information), "a political discourse" (INTERVIEW #10, 2017, oral information), "a good, but inviable idea" (INTERVIEW #13, 2017, oral information). Such actors were inward-oriented, living their lives 'with their backs to the border', indifferent to the border or to cooperating with their fellow *fronteiricos/fronterizos*, which could explain the intermediate level of perception on 'productive vertical relations' (29%). On the other hand, many respondents mentioned setbacks in the bilateral agenda. They were concerned with the lethargic condition in which the New Agenda left the negotiations for hiring Uruguayan doctors, particularly to validate the Health Agreement. The inflexibility of both governments in talks to create a binational industrial plant is also a subject that propelled the highest perception rate for 'malfunctioning of governmental structures'

(47%). Although negotiations at the local level advanced, Brazil and Uruguay remain unaltered in their opposition to concede.

In Aceguá-Aceguá (A-A), two records stand out among the mentions regarding PSPs: the highest rate on ‘advances in formal cooperation’ (57%) and the highest rate for the perception on ‘productive vertical relations’ (42%) among all UCs (*Table 12*). Both numbers are related to the progression of the binational sanitation project (Section 3.4.2), which is considered by local actors to be their most important achievement. This project (and the improvement in health services) helped maintaining low rates on ‘problems in formal cooperation’ and on ‘malfunctioning of governmental structures’ (both at 28%). Despite recognizing the social development enabled by the signature of the treaties in the scope of the New Agenda, local actors give circumstantial (political and economic) conditions at local and bilateral levels for the accomplishment of the project: the national political conjuncture in which progressive governments promoted the development of border regions; and the local cooperative environment that enabled local administrations to negotiate in unison (INTERVIEWS #1; #2; #63, 2017, oral information). The political coordination in local level was shown to surpass the border to the extent that some Brazilian representatives (with Uruguayan nationality) work in Uruguay to lobby or campaign for ideologically similar candidates/parties in their political committee. The low level of local infrastructure is named to be the main reason for the ‘inappropriate local infrastructure’ high rate (85%). The lethargy of the actual construction of the sanitation infrastructure (it has just started in Uruguayan Aceguá (August 2017) and not yet initiated in Brazilian Aceguá), and of regular channels for the development of small municipalities were the two ranked factors in the somewhat elevated level of references to ‘unproductive vertical relations’ (42% of A-A respondents).

The creation of the binational vocational courses in Jaguarão-Rio Branco, the establishment of the Brazilian Dos Pampas Federal University campus in Jaguarão, and the building of municipal structure in Rio Branco were the main references of the improvement of local infrastructure, promoting the highest rate of ‘proper local infrastructure’ among all UCs (25%) (*Table 12*). Nevertheless, only a fourth of the respondents acknowledged advancements in formal cooperation. Subjects perceived a disconnection between local needs and the achievements of the New Agenda. Among the complaints, the disparity between the binational professional courses offered in local schools and the positions in the local labor market, the end of the program for exchange



of teachers (PEIBF), and the neglect of the project of renovation of the historical bridge and of the new bridge construction (both capable of creating local jobs) escalated the perception on the highly problematic process of formal cooperation (58%). However, their demands for local cross-border cooperation are lower than their demands for the betterment of public services, with a third of respondents acknowledging insufficient channels of communication between national authorities and local representatives.


Without any references to the ‘proper functioning of governmental structures’ and to ‘productive vertical relations’, subjects located at Chuí-Chuy (C-C) (*Table 12*) seemed to have lost hope on the promotion of formalized cooperation, deciding to aim solely at the intricate process of *ad hoc* collaboration among local governments and local society representatives. While recognizing advances in formal cooperation, most of the subjects affirm to be working to build the ‘best possible reality’ apart from/despite of national institutions, including the New Agenda. Those actors, who attempt to regulate informal practices or to improve the formal environment for cooperation (aiming at accessing more funds), recognized that there were more problems (50%) than developments (37%) in the institutional framework created by the bilateral action of Brazil and Uruguay. Feeling forgot by national authorities, local actors were focused to solve infrastructure problems (acknowledged by 62% of respondents) of the Chuí-Chuy intricate encounter applying their own means.

Considering the Bucbr in its entirety, one can attest that while 42% of respondents recognize ‘advances in formal cooperation’ generated by the New Agenda, more than half of them (56%) acknowledged its problems (*Table 12*). Although the reasons for such difficulties may differ, most of them were related to the inability of the bilateral agenda to transform agreements and projects into tangible social development measures, particularly into better local infrastructure (50%, against 14% that believe they already have proper structural conditions). The interviews with local actors showed that the unbelief towards the governance setting implemented by national authorities in the scope of the New Agenda, considered not being sufficient to solve the issues of border communities, let alone to foster formalized local cooperation. The high rates of ‘malfunctioning of governmental structures’ (40%) and of ‘unproductive vertical relations’ (39%) – which are not indicators of exclusively border-related issues, but of how national frameworks deal with municipalities’ demands – demonstrate the requirement of better national institutions, especially for attempting to foster development

in cross-border regions. All things considered, the New Agenda is suffering of widespread negative perception regarding its (non-)working processes and institutionalities. If one compares to the positive perceptions related to the New Agenda, such pessimistic interpretation of reality was found in more than twice the mentions, examples, and stories expressed by respondents (46% of NSP against 21% of PSP).

If only these problems could represent enough barriers to the engagement and compliance of local actors with New Agenda's projects and agreements concerning structural elements, the electronic survey applied to subjects interviewed reveals other reasons for such low participation. Questioned about their perceptions on the meetings of the New Agenda (*Figure 8*), approximately 70% of subjects affirmed to be interested in the projects and agreements under discussion. The lack of decisions, the discontinuity of negotiations, and the *ignorance* of national representative regarding the reality and the needs of the border towns were pointed as important sources of negative perception, with nearly 80% of respondents (totally or partially) agreeing to the existence of such deficiencies in the institutionality of the New Agenda. The historical neglect of local needs by central authorities appeared to be the main institutional issue of the New Agenda according to local actors' perceptions. The impossibility to decide and implement conclusions of New Agenda's negotiations revealed to be the second problem of its institutionality.


**Figure 8 Local perceptions on official meetings of the New Agenda**



Source: the author (2017).

Asked to list the main problems of the New Agenda in order of relevance ('1' the most problematic factor and '6' the least challenging aspect) (*Figure 9*), 70% of subjects pointed at the lack of national politicians' understanding on the reality at the border as the most important complication of the bilateral plans about the cross-border region (*Chart A*), corroborating with their perceptions on the official meetings of the New Agenda. The interviews revealed that subjects did not consider the agreements to be enough to give account of the problems that such normalizing documents were created to solve. In addition, respondents argued that they were neither consulted about the issues nor present in the advanced negotiation processes, which indeed occurred within the limits of Brazilian and Uruguayan foreign relations ministries. The genesis of the New Agenda, thus, did not present a bottom-up strategy, which affected its reception by local actors. Such a finding goes against the assumptions of Aveiro (2006), Pucci (2010), and Lemos (2013), who considered it to be an offer of services to locals. Since local actors were later cast out from the negotiation and implementation progressions, it cannot be surprising that the required engagement was not kept strong during the entire process.

**Figure 9 Local actors' perceptions on the main problems of the New Agenda**



Source: the author (2017).

Attesting on the failures of the formalized cooperation at the border, a local government actor affirmed: “*A integração [formalizada] não existe. A maioria das coisas está em papéis. Que abertura é essa que eu não consigo atravessar nenhum produto de um lado para o outro?*” (INTERVIEW #37, 2017, oral information). A working bilateral agenda would, in his perception, finally give local populations the right to cross the border with whatever goods they need/want. Since not even a single project aiming to regulate such crossings managed to leave the local conversation rooms, the New Agenda was perceived as a product of national (not local) interest. A local society actor concurred with the prior statement: “*É um acordo que nasceu morto porque nada se aplicou aqui. Há travas em relação a documentos, a livre-comércio (que não existe), à livre-circulação... Se deu resultado, nós não sabemos e não temos experiência*” (INTERVIEW #44, 2017, oral information). Analyzing the New Agenda from the perspective of Mercosur, another local government actor inferred that “*Para esa frontera, el Mercosur no es nada. Desde el punto de vista nacional es una otra cosa, es importantísimo, pero nosotros acá no nos hace nada. Para Rio Branco es todo lo mismo porque no puedes pasar la mercadería. Pero se produces arroz, entonces vas a vender en Brasil*” (INTERVIEW #42, 2017, oral information).

In conclusion, local actors perceived the New Agenda as a formal national program that ignores/does not acknowledge the needs of border communities, which places them at the margins of the cooperative processes. Being among the most underprivileged populations, the perception of exclusion remained strong, even though local actors participated in the construction of several projects aimed at solving many of their daily life’s problems. However, the engagement in the construction of projects was diminished by the lack of access to funds, financing, or investments. *Figure 9* (previous page) shows that 58% of local actors perceived this to be among the main difficulties of the New Agenda. Local actors’ engagement in the preliminary processes of cross-border development projects was rapidly demotivated by the lack of economic resources to implement many of the solutions drafted in the Border Committees or in the High-Level Meetings of the New Agenda. Results of the survey demonstrate that 70% of respondents agree to the fact that national governments wanted them to implement the projects designed but did not offer them resources to do so. To solve this, local government actors demanded national administrations to recognize cross-border regions as peculiar regions that need specific sources of funding. A local government actor underlined:

*Señalar el Mercosur y el FOCEM como los principales canales de acceso a recursos es importante. Sería necesario tener un capítulo aparte que dé preferencia a proyectos fronterizos. No porque somos llorones, pero si decimos que las zonas más pobres de Uruguay y de Rio Grande del Sur son las zonas fronterizas, y que históricamente esto se ha mantenido, para romper ese ciclo es preciso hacer algo diferente, que es tener políticas públicas específicas (INTERVIEW #15, oral information, emphasis by the author).*

Figure 9 also shows that 52% of local actors perceived the New Agenda to lack coordination among institutions. This corroborates to what was verified in Chapter 3 and agrees with the researches by Rótulo and Damiani (2010), Rótulo (2012), and Rótulo *et al.* (2014). The intricate institutional requirements of the New Agenda and its insufficient response to them were a discouraging factor to a nonstop local actors' active engagement. Many subjects highlighted that the signature of a bilateral agreement was the *beginning* of the implementation process in the New Agenda and to consider it otherwise is to declare the demise of formalized, cross-border bilateral cooperation. As identified by Santos and Santos (2005), the requirement of a 'virtuous cycle', of answering to local demands and adjusting to new matters evolving from such a response was indeed a necessary condition in the negotiation towards a more integrated border in juridical and in political senses. A 'second stage' of operationalization should have entailed the coordination of a myriad of *national and local frameworks and actors* to implement agreements and to complete projects' objectives, which seems to be some of the reasons for the abandonment of projects and the absence of follow-up from national and local policymakers and executive officers. Mentioning the functioning process of the Quaraí Basin Committee, a local society actor stated about the problem of continuance of the New Agenda:

*Como as comissões são órgãos paraestatais, são reconhecidas por ele [Estado], mas contam apenas com a participação do Estado. Nesse desenho, a gente conversa entre nós e, cada um, dentro do seu arcabouço legal, tenta resolver ou consertar os problemas pontuais. Eles entendem que a solução do problema termina com um acordo, mas esse é o início. O acordo são intenções. O desafio é fazer funcionar (INTERVIEW #23, 2017, oral information).*

The problem of inward-oriented institutionality of national frameworks was also recognized by local actors as a hindrance to coordination in the New Agenda. Local actors

acknowledged that they are more (cross-border) integrated locally than in any other level. Many of them also considered that even local, administrative structures did not concede a permanent place for cross-border coordination or formalized relations. Municipal administrations were not built to cooperate with any foreign institutionality. A local social actor evaluated this ambiguous condition of the border reality *vis-à-vis* the formal dynamics of the New Agenda:

Tu não consegues estabelecer uma relação fronteiriça porque as estruturas não se comunicam. São duas estruturas de costas uma para a outra. Falam em integração, mas fazer funcionar é diferente. Ao mesmo tempo, há uma mistura. Tem dois universos diferentes. Por um lado, há intensa integração, mas peculiaridades importantes. O povo é bastante integrado, mas as estruturas não. *Por exemplo, alguns vereadores dedicam parte de suas campanhas em Rio Branco, por causa da população votante que mora lá. Isso não está previsto em lei nenhuma, porque a eleição só ocorre em território nacional. Mas não tem como vencer uma eleição em Jaguarão sem fazer campanha em Rio Branco e vice-versa* (INTERVIEW #39, 2017, oral information, emphasis by the author).

The combination of perceptions of (A) ‘national governments ignore local reality’, of (B) ‘we do not have money to do anything’, and of (C) ‘there is no coordination’ (Figure 9) created a scenario of *local distrust in the bilateral agenda*. Fifty-seven percent of local actors (totally or partially) agreed that the arrangements of the New Agenda ‘served only to satisfy national wishes rather than to develop the border’ (only 30% believed it not to be the case). As another local society actor from Santana do Livramento-Rivera commented, “*Há problemas simples que levam mais de dez anos para serem solucionados, isso quando conseguimos resolvê-los. A maioria deles ainda está ‘na mesma’, sem solução alguma*” (INTERVIEW #8, 2017, oral information); a local government actor told that the binational sanitation agreement in Aceguá-Aceguá “*ficou praticamente parado por 4 anos, por falta de liberação da FEPAM e para adaptação do projeto em relação ao tratamento dos efluentes*” (INTERVIEW #1, 2017, oral information). Numerous other cases were repeatedly brought to light as interviews were made. The positive perception of the functioning of numerous meetings and of all the fuss about the bilateral signing ceremonies rapidly changed into frustration and disbelief. Simple but viable alternatives to social development and to cross-border cooperation could easily alter this setting toward a more participating environment. Ultimately, *local actors wanted practical change in cross-border issues*. The institutional failures of the

New Agenda combined with the lack of investment in the cross-border sector were perceived as *insufficient efforts understood as lack of interest* by national authorities. A local government representative summarized this perception of insufficiency led by the sensation of dissatisfaction due to the lack of interest by national actors:

*Estoy convencido de que la frontera es un lugar de oportunidades. Y corresponde a las políticas públicas hacer que esas oportunidades se materializan, en la medida en que las condiciones generales estén en consonancia. Si queremos hacer una inversión en Rivera y Livramento, salimos en desventajas comparativas con relación a las metrópolis. Tienen puerto, público, universidades, lo que no tenemos. La política pública debe dar un mensaje de que hay un interés público que garantizará ciertas condiciones que favorecen a los inversores. Nuestra comunidad de frontera está lista para dar ese paso (INTERVIEW #15, 2017, oral information, emphasis by the author).*

Physical and human resources were also listed in Rótulo *et al.* (2014) as key infrastructure limitations of the New Agenda's institutionality. However, as displayed in *Figure 9* (charts D and E), less than one-third of respondents perceive the lack of physical infrastructure (buildings, materials, etc.) and the lack of specialized personnel as top issues for the functioning of the bilateral process. Subjects did not see such infrastructure limitations as impediments for advancing the joint agenda at the local level. One of the reasons this research was able to identify is that, although local infrastructure is indeed lacking basic conditions in many areas, the last decade was marked by important improvements in infrastructure settings of UCs along the borderline, both in Brazilian and in Uruguayan towns (an exception would be perceptions of Artigas's actors). A long-term perspective of the local-level conditions by local actors usually weakened a negative perception on the needs for better infrastructure and on more prepared staff.

## **5.2 Cultural explanation and local actors' perceptions**

The culture explanations found in Pucci (2010) finds its foundations on the historical development of a border culture or custom that would be opposite to a law-abiding behavior and would diffuse the limit between legal and illegal. This would require surveillance and control by the state and by national governments. Pucci (2010) understands that the centrifugal factor generated by the action of the state, which pushed away the citizenship of border populations and made border citizens into a problem to be

contained (and not solved), was in its last days. The role played by the creation of the New Agenda, particularly after the signature of the Border Agreement was, according to the author, central in changing this historical relationship. The new condition in which the border citizenship was found (after the New Agenda) should thus be considered the mark of the alleged recognition of border demands to be in higher priority than the great matters of international regionalism. However, the institutional requirements for the operationalization of agreements and the implementation of projects is understood to call for the constant surveillance and control by the state. ‘Surveillance’ to ensure that bilateral agreements would be followed by the actors involved; ‘control’ to guarantee that the local actors would use the right channels to make demands and do the ‘right reading’ of the accords. In his perspective, the border culture is a local handicap, indeed a ‘problem to be solved’: “*As limitações operacionais decorrentes da própria cultura fronteiriça [...] aumentam a responsabilidade do Estado em fazer convergirem os esforços de integração, para que não se dispersem nem se antagonizem*” (PUCCI, 2010, p. 196). Studies on illegal activities in the Bucbr concur with the idea of a border culture that cherishes informal ways to accomplish tasks, contingent, problem-solving illegalities, and unlawful networks of goods, labor, and other transits (MACHADO, 2000; BETANCOR, 2008; DORFMAN *et al.*, 2014; ALMEIDA, 2015). These and other evidences of such a custom were analyzed in Chapter 4.

Based on this literature and the explanation they produced, two indicators are used to categorize local actors’ perceptions regarding culture. Similar to what was done in the structural explanation, each indicator is divided in positive or negative perceptions. Positive Cultural Perceptions (PCP) comprise information on the proper demand incorporation in the New Agenda, and the local recognition of the benefits of norms and regulations of the bilateral plan. Negative Cultural Perceptions (NCP) contain the local perception on the unfitting demand incorporation, and the local acknowledgement of the problems or disadvantages created by the creation of norms and regulations by the New Agenda. *Table 13* (next page) details such indicators.



**Table 13 Indicators of culture perceptions**

POSITIVE CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS (PCP)	NEGATIVE CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS (NCP)
<p><b><i>Proper demand incorporation</i></b> The process of well incorporating local demands into agreements and projects of the New Agenda. When local actors perceive that the agreements and projects of the New Agenda managed to respond to the 'real' needs of their locality, as well as to their 'voices'.</p>	<p><b><i>Unfitting demand incorporation</i></b> The process of poorly incorporating local demands into agreements and projects of the New Agenda. When local actors perceive that their needs have been overlooked or simply partially responded. They did not perceive to be offered a satisfactory solution to their 'real' needs, or a response to their 'voices'.</p>
<p><b><i>Beneficial normatization</i></b> National regulations help the daily life of border populations and the promotion of cross-border interactions. Norms and regulations are perceived as bringing solutions or a necessary order to their life at the border.</p>	<p><b><i>Disadvantageous normatization</i></b> National regulations hamper the daily life of border populations and the promotion of cross-border interactions. Norms and regulations are perceived as making life more difficult by intrincating relations and their daily activities.</p>

Source: the author (2017).

The frequency of PCP and NCP was calculated by respondents' references to the indicators developed in *Table 13*. For instance, whenever subjects mentioned a difficulty related to finding in agreements, institutionalities, and vertical relations a response to their demands, they are counted as having a perception of 'unfitting demand incorporation'; in case subjects referred to stories/examples of how the agreements, institutionalities, and vertical relations fulfilled their expectations or needs, they are counted as perceiving 'proper demand incorporation'. Whenever respondents gave an example that demonstrated how the new regulation, agreement, or law was beneficial to them or to local communities, they were reckoned as having a perception of 'beneficial normatization'; in the cases in which subjects mentioned that the agreements (in part or in total) have hindered or become an obstacle to previous activities/means of cooperating or solving issues, they are counted as having a perception of 'disadvantageous normatization'. Subjects are only counted once per indicator, if one respondent mentions the 'proper functioning of governmental structures' several times during interview, he/she is counted a single time. The higher the number of respondents that refer to a perception indicator, the higher the percentage of such mentions; the lower the number of subjects mentioning a perception indicator, the lower the proportion of references in *Table 14* (next page).

**Table 14 Frequency of PCP and NCP by UC**

Positive Cultural Perceptions (PCP)	B-B	Q-A	S-R	A-A	J-R	C-C	Bucbr
Proper demand incorporation	0%	22%	41%	42%	25%	12%	25%
Beneficial normatization	27%	11%	29%	14%	33%	25%	26%
Negative Cultural Perceptions (NCP)							
Unfitting demand incorporation	72%	44%	41%	28%	25%	37%	42%
Disadvantageous normatization	36%	55%	47%	57%	25%	50%	43%
<i>Average Rate of PCPs</i>	13%	16%	35%	28%	29%	18%	23%
<i>Average Rate of NCPs</i>	54%	49%	44%	42%	25%	43%	43%

Source: the author (2017).

Barra do Quaraí-Bella Unión (B-B) calls attention for the inexistence of mentions on a ‘proper demand incorporation’. Chuí-Chuy (C-C) also presented meager 12% of references of this indicator (*Table 14*). This is much related to the fact that in both UCs, respondents had shown indifference to the normative *modus operandi* experienced during the engendering of the New Agenda. The genesical agreements of the bilateral cooperation between Brazil and Uruguay were indeed created without the active participation of local actors. Aveiro (2006) shows they were constructed on the feedback that chancelleries located at the Bucbr provided national governments. However, the capillarity that foreign relations ministries claimed to have in the Bucbr (PUCCI, 2010; INTERVIEWS #16; #23, 2017) is not supported by this indicator. The low ‘proper demand incorporation’ rate in four out of six UCs indicates that either **(1)** the chancelleries did not manage to listen to what local actors need/want; **(2)** they could not respond to such demands (due to insufficient resources or due to lack of political will); **(3)** they did listen, but *could not understand* local demands; **(4)** they did understand local demands but could not do anything but to pass on such claims through New Agenda’s institutionality.

Number (1) was shown not to be the case of the New Agenda. Chapter 3 already revealed that the institutionality of the New Agenda was able to mobilize local actors to express their ideas and demands. Although number (2) figured as an important impediment for the progression of the New Agenda (Section 5.1), interviews in Barra do Quaraí- Bella Unión, Quaraí-Artigas, Santana do Livramento-Rivera, and Chuí-Chuy showed that more often than not local actors had difficulties *explaining* to national authorities the context in which agreements or projects were supposed to be applied. A great amount of meetings was used to give policymakers a panorama of what kind of

socio-political reality with which they were dealing. The discontinuation of the appointed persons to negotiate intricated the finding of a solution. Every new meeting required more descriptions and justifications on the whys and hows of specific demands. Vertical relations problems affected directly the institutional capacity of national governments and frameworks to comprehend local demands in the context of the Bucbr. Nevertheless, subjects emphasized the merits of their demands, explaining that a diverse, more complex environment entailed different solutions and that it was the reason for them to ask for non-ortodox governance arrangements, which suggests that the lack of understanding of local requests by national politicians and technicians is more related to institutional deficiencies (*e.g.* the absence of a single negotiator for each UC or of national offices located at the border) than to cultural differences between border citizens and national policymakers. This would weaken the suggestion number (3) as explanations were made, and strongly indicates number (4) as a key source of engagement and compliance problems.


Regarding the perception on the normatization processes of the New Agenda, Jaguarão-Rio Branco (J-R) showed the lowest rate (25%) on the disadvantageous character of norms and the highest frequency on the benefits of regulative frameworks (*Table 14*, previous page). For subjects in this UC, regulation was necessary and, while they wanted more freedom to come and go as they pleased with whatever goods they needed, local actors in both towns expressed their demands more in terms of being better integrated to their corresponding national structures, rather than to their neighbor on the other side of the river. The fear of exclusion from national structures was greater than the fear of not being able to cooperate with their neighbor across border. On the other hand, Aceguá-Aceguá (A-A) and Quaraí-Artigas (Q-A) presented the highest mentions on the 'disadvantageous normatization' (57% and 55%, respectively). Local actors in Aceguá-Aceguá showed to be afraid of drastic changes once regulations started being implemented. The uncertainty generated by the recent presence of the state affected the rates of this indicator. In Quaraí-Artigas, subjects required complete freedom from restrictive laws or regulations. They all expressed the interest of having the freedom for performing daily commercial, cultural, and financial exchanges across borders. In both UCs, the New Agenda had a regulative nature, although they differed to perceive it as solely aiming to control (Q-A) or understanding it also as a means toward development (A-A).

Although subjects showed ambiguous responses toward the issue of normatization and presented doubts on when regulations could be considered good or bad for the Bucbr or for their UC, they referred altogether to more negative (43%) than positive (26%) perceptions (*Table 14*). Nevertheless, sometimes the same respondent would give examples on how norms could alter their way of living (in a harmful way) and later in the interview show how regulations were necessary to improve quality of life. A closer look onto this apparent vagueness revealed to be connected to the multiple identities of the individuals being inquired. When referring to private-life experiences, subjects were inclined to perceive the New Agenda as a negative norm-creating institutionality; when mentioning the function/job they performed, they understood it as a necessary condition – provided such norms and regulations were constructed to fill up the ostensible institutional gaps and to facilitate transit and cooperation. This concurs partially with the notion of border culture applied by Pucci (2010) in his explanation on the difficulties of promoting formalized cross-border cooperation. The years living in normative liberty from state regulations did influence local actors in perceiving the presence of the state as a restraining factor of their movements, alliances, and other activities. However, the socio-political role played by the same individuals, considering their duties as society or government representatives, altered their perceptions on the need for (proper) state regulation. Such complex identity construction showed to be the foundation of a dual interest *vis-à-vis* statist regulatory frameworks.

Compliance with state regulation in the scope of the New Agenda was then more ‘agreeable’ when related to the application of formalized forms of cooperation and to the societal/governmental personal function of subjects in the process. However, when referring to day-to-day problems both in personal and in ‘official’ decision-making spheres of the actors interviewed, the idea of being confined by laws and regulations was not appreciated. Their basic justification was that laws and regulations did not allow them to solve their issues in a practical or viable manner. Responses to the electronic questionnaire displayed a clearer divide on how local actors perceived the normatization processes of the New Agenda. *Figure 10* (next page) shows the percentage of respondents agreeing or not to a series of sentences concerning the creation of laws and regulations in the scope of the bilateral plan about the Bucbr. More than half of subjects agreed that ‘creating more regulations would not solve border problems’ (E). Although more than 40% did not share such a perception, this rate could corroborate – at first – the view by

Pucci (2010), which considers border citizens' local culture *the* problem to be solved. Yet, the same (high) rate on the 'A' sentence ('despite good projects and agreements, it was and is much easier to solve problems locally') can indicate that the issue of culture in Pucci (2010) is understood backwards. An inattentive eye would consider it to corroborate the first frequency rate (E). What then can one infer about the results on 'A'? That local actors recognize the positive aspects of regulatory agreements but that *it remains easier* to solve border issues without them. In other words, regulations still do not offer optimal conditions to solve the problems of everyday life of border populations, which ultimately is what border populations have been demanded throughout this research.

**Figure 10 Local actors' perceptions on normalization by the NA**



Source: the author (2017).

A local government actor asked himself on the reasons for their demands being ignored and connected his line of thought to the regulations and control mechanisms during the period of New Agenda's operationalization:

*¿Porque nosotros no colocamos lo control después de las ciudades? Para que no podamos integrar. ¡Las veces que los países instalaran las políticas de 'cero quilos', nunca funcionaran! Los grandes favorecidos son los grandes empresarios, que tienen la capacidad de contornar toda la burocracia e pasar por otros lados. Pero los vecinos que van a pie, de moto, esos no son respectados. Pero son los que más necesitan, y no los que transportan grandes cantidades. [...] Hay que pensar en políticas de frontera. Si estás haciendo política en Porto Alegre o Brasilia,*

pensarás que hay un problema de formación cultural en la frontera. *El mismo cuando se hace la política desde Montevideo para acá* (INTERVIEW #34, 2017, oral information, emphasis by the author).

By not allowing the underprivileged border citizens to strive for survival through the use of the border conditions (Chapter 4, Section 4.2), the New Agenda was perceived to be an instrument of perpetuation of inequality and exclusion. Its norms were thus perceived as an apparatus of the historical, ambivalent relationship between border communities of the Bucbr and national authorities. For most local actors, creating valid (cross) border policies meant legalizing the survival techniques developed in centuries of neglect by the formal nation-state processes. If the New Agenda is not endorsing trans-local dynamics, its norms and regulations will not be perceived as a facilitator of UCs' interactions, hence of cross-border cooperation and of regionalization (which was always understood in terms of integration). However, this seems not to be enough for most respondents to perceive the New Agenda as a normatization structure that hinders trans-local activities, thus making life more difficult (D) – only 36% present such a perception; fifty-four percent disagree (*Figure 10*). One explanation is that the trans-local interactions have continued to be a central form of living in the Bucbr even after the New Agenda. If regulation and control started being implemented, this indicator (D) would be expected to show an elevated level of consensus among local actors.

The isolation of border regions both from their national center (due to the absence of communication and transportation networks, and their minimal political and economic power) and from their neighboring country (due to formal political limits of the territory) created secluded communities (MACHADO, 2005). The Bucbr was not an exception. As any other population, they needed to form functional relationships to operate. The construction of informal, trans-local cooperation networks is part of this relational tissue. As Machado explains, “*sem instituições para instrumentá-la, a cooperação entre países vizinhos em regiões de fronteira tem sido feita informalmente e através de acordos tácitos entre as autoridades locais dos países fronteiriços*” (MACHADO, 2005, p. 258, emphasis by the author). Despite this common informal practice developed to surpass the limitations of territorial and sovereignty logics of the state and the structural isolation, *Figure 10* shows that 45% disagree that the ‘state complicates everything’ (B), and 12% are indifferent to that affirmation, which indicates that local actors' culture does not necessarily justify illegality or informality. Rather, border culture at the Bucbr

substantiates the local *modus vivendi* as long as the state and its formal cooperative structure do not deliver regulation enabling the use of the two national structures, hence permitting the continuance of trans-local subsistence systems.

The cross-border networks of spontaneous contracts among governments, businesses, and ordinary people nor serves a purpose on itself, neither is solely focused on personal advantages in the use of a dual national framework system. It works also as a means to achieve administrative, governance, or political goals and to promote local development. Local society and government actors use subsistence systems to assure the ‘survival of their (cross-border) communities’. *“Trabajamos [juntos] más de hecho que de derecho. Personalmente, prefiero pedir perdón que pedir permiso en muchos casos, porque a veces pedir permiso es no hacer. Si tengo el apoyo de la comunidad para hacerlo, lo hago”* (INTERVIEW #15, oral information). ‘I’d rather ask for forgiveness than ask permission’ – this sentence from a local government actor corroborates with the idea that informal or illegal relationships are a way to bypass the limitations of the state and of bilateral, formal relations. It also indicates that norms and regulations of the New Agenda still do not allow local administrations to solve their common problems in a practical manner. For local actors, when faced with problems in need of tangible solutions, *complying with the New Agenda represented complying with an inefficient system.*

*Se não fosse pela relação que nós temos com os uruguaios, a integração [transfronteiriça] não tinha trazido nenhuma vantagem... dizer que realmente alguma ação melhorou por causa da integração regional [é difícil]. O que acontece é uma boa relação que nós temos com os uruguaios. A gente vai ali, convive com eles, eles vêm aqui, convivem conosco* (INTERVIEW #27, 2017, oral information).

The observation of a local government actor reveals that the sound relationship that local administrations entertain with neighbor municipalities are sometimes the *only resource available*. If not through friendship, how could they solve local issues? Not surprisingly, virtually half of subjects responding to the electronic survey agree that ‘there are more advantages to keep solving border problems through friendship than through agreements and treaties [of the New Agenda]’ (*Figure 10*, item ‘C’). The other half, however, disagree with this assertion. In the interviews, subjects who defended such an argument stated that formal relationships do offer more advantages, which is why they

*should* be more focused on building better agreements, rather than perpetuating informal processes. Most of them, however, acknowledged the difficulties to put this plan into action. Everything considered, only a limited number of local actors perceived the New Agenda to offer conditions to a proper cross-border relationship to their neighbor, which can express why it has been difficult to maintain local actors' engagement in projects and to foster compliance with agreements in the scope of the bilateral process.

An *extremely deficient access to information* has been appointed by most respondents as one of the fundamental issues concerning the lack of compliance with agreements in the scope of the New Agenda, particularly the Border Agreement and its regulations concerning the use of the *Documento de Fronteira*. Besides the obvious impact of the absence of information on the wellbeing of local populations (by not being aware of their rights and duties), the subsequent non-compliance to the documentation agreement and to 'the Mercosur Agreement' affects negatively local public accounts. The 'pendular fluxes', typical of the Bucbr, periodically concentrates populations in one side of the border, which can unbalance governmental accounts due to the intense use of public services by informal residents, which cannot be refunded by the Brazilian system (Chapter 4, Section 4.5). Local actors recognized this problem, and within their function, have been attempting to diminish the impacts both on the lives of locals and on public finances by informally instructing local populations.

*Aqui no município [...] aumentou muito nossa população, até pela situação econômica lá [no Uruguai], que é muito alto o custo de vida [...]. Ai tá (sic) tendo uma migração de uruguaios. O que a gente orienta é que eles encaminhem a documentação para residir legalmente, porque a gente atende [todos os pacientes que aparecem], mas a gente não consegue faturar os procedimentos que são feitos aqui na unidade. [Entretanto], a gente não nega atendimento. A ideia é orientar: "Olha pessoal, vocês têm que procurar se legalizar dentro do município, do país, para nós podermos também ajudar o Seu João, o Seu Joaquim, que moram aqui [...], para a gente poder lançar, faturar e fazer uma verba". Mas todos são atendidos [...]. "O pessoal não tem acesso à informação, não sabe nem os caminhos, uma dificuldade... Todos os encaminhamentos e serviços de legalização, é tudo feito em Uruguiana, e o pessoal não sabe nem para que lado fica a Polícia Federal, [nem] o que é uma aduana. Então eu oriento e ajudo o pessoal para poder encaminhar [os documentos], para poder facilitar o processo (INTERVIEW #31, 2017, oral information).*




To help reduce the impact of the lack of information among populations of the Bucbr, a decentralized national government actor organized a printed handout identifying what they called ‘social resources’ – analogous administrative bodies in UCs’ towns:

*Uno de los trabajos que hicimos aquí [en el MIDES] fue identificar los recursos sociales en las ciudades fronterizas - de educación, seguridad, salud, infancia, energía eléctrica, saneamiento y otros. Porque no se tenía idea de quién recurrir cuando la gente necesitaba hablar con alguien, mucho menos las comunidades necesitadas. Por eso mapeamos las instituciones e hicimos un libro con toda la información, con dirección, teléfonos y las instituciones correspondientes en el territorio brasileño y uruguayo (INTERVIEW #25, 2017, oral information).*

As unimportant as it may sound, simple marketing strategies could have helped local actors acknowledge the benefits of New Agenda’s agreements and underway projects and it could possibly have improved the low compliance and engagement rates of the bilateral plan. As local actors’ resources are indeed scarce, Brazilian and Uruguayan national authorities could have invested on advertising the general objectives of the New Agenda; the agreements signed; how to profit from them; and where to go to do so. Simple information, hardly available to the simple citizen of the Bucbr, to whom the bilateral framework was ultimately addressed, could have raised the engagement of local actors in the New Agenda’s operationalization.

### **5.3 The political issue**

During interviews, respondents indicated that the intricate construction of cross-border political networks had a high impact on local actors’ engagement in the projects of the New Agenda. Machado (2005) points out that local initiatives of cross-border cooperation usually derive from the local interest in establishing regions either as transit corridors or as micro-regional economic centers. A local political elite would be thus a preponderant factor in engendering such initiatives by investing money, time, and negotiation efforts to build cross-border networks. Although towns within a UC can compete (in functional terms), they are also led to form alliances to achieve some of the cited objectives. Hence, the construction of trans-local coalitions can be intricate, and highly influences the (dis)continuation of the New Agenda.

**Figure 11 Perceptions on the influence of local politics in the New Agenda**

Source: the author (2017).

*Figure 11* shows how subjects responded to the perceptions on the influence of local politics in the New Agenda. Although 24% totally disagreed and 30% partially disagreed (54% in total) with the perception that ‘local politics often overcame the support of local governments for binational projects and agreements’ (item A), 36% were inclined toward (totally and partially) concurring with it. However, when asked about the effects of local elections to the continuity of the New Agenda (item B), 66% of respondents agreed that they hindered the progress of projects, against 21% that disagreed with this affirmation. Only 30% (totally and partially) agreed that informal arrangements between *prefeito* and *intendente/alcalde* always worked well, so there was no need to create a formal mechanism (item C), against 60% that (totally and partially) disagreed with this assertion. Results from the electronic survey indicated that when facing a broad perception of a possible harm that local politics can do for the advancement of formal cooperative processes of the New Agenda, most local actors tended to perceive it not to be the case. Nevertheless, when asked to confirm such a perception with more practical examples (affirmations B and C), most subjects (nearly two-thirds of respondents) recognized the impact of local politics on the functioning of the bilateral agenda in the Bucbr. On the engagement of local administrations in the New Agenda, a local

government representative – involved in cross-border policies for more than ten years – sustained this conclusion:

*Há um desengajamento muito grande e uma descontinuação do exercício paradiplomático do município. Poucos veem importância no processo [formal de integração]. Quando alguém se interessa por um tema, pergunta quem vai participar das discussões. E aí diz: “ah, se fulano for, eu não vou.” Ou: “Não tem como tratar desse assunto com o pessoal de tal grupo”. Aí os interesses pessoais e a questão política entram e travam tudo. Falta constância na relação com o vizinho e isso não nos permite usar [essa relação] como uma política válida e positiva. As pessoalidades entram em conflito e travam conversas e negociações. [...] Muitas vezes os prefeitos e outras autoridades não dão importância para aquela reunião e mandam um cara do terceiro escalão, que nem sabe o que está acontecendo. O outro prefeito, que foi, sente que aquilo não vai pra (sic passim) lugar nenhum e tudo termina. Não há continuidade. A cada eleição não sabemos o que vai ser da agenda pra fronteira. É o jeito (brasileiro) de fazer política (INTERVIEW #30, 2017, oral information).*

Other respondents have confirmed such a view. Difficulties in constructing cross-border networks among local governments were constantly brought up as a key factor in the failing to engage in local projects in the scope of the New Agenda. When conversing on the irregularity of local governmental interrelations, another local government actor corroborated with this observation: “*Antes no había nada con Yaguarón, sólo se hablaba. Era necesario un vínculo más fuerte, un vínculo más cercano. El alcalde y el prefeito no tenían contacto, nunca se encontraban. Con la nueva administración, conseguimos sentar y discutir acuerdos reales para nuestras ciudades. Hay más diálogo hoy*” (INTERVIEW #41, 2017, oral information). The absence of someone in charge with the political will to establish a conversation with the neighboring town resulted in the lack of local negotiations, on which the New Agenda’s institutionality laid its foundations for the development of projects. The lack of proximity among local government representatives was also mentioned by another local government actor, who reinforced that such a rapprochement had occurred more through departmental authorities than through municipal relations:

*Por más que se allegaba muy bien Christian [alcalde anterior] con el prefecto, hoy obviamente hay más proximidad, por parte de la misma ideología. Salvo este que es el proyecto que se presentó por parte del gobierno de Cerro Largo [departamento] (no el gobierno de Rio Branco, sino que el gobierno de Cerro Largo con todos los municipios)*

*que es un proyecto mundial [...] (INTERVIEW #42, 2017, oral information).*

The construction of local political alliances, albeit ignored by central authorities, was also key for the success of the New Agenda, as well as bilateral and regional political coalitions. Here, ideology and political congruence played a role in defining the possibilities for local alliances. Friendship relations, which were normally cherished by local actors were in fact more likely to occur among local governments actors' equivalent parties' representatives from Brazil and Uruguay. Not unexpectedly, after interviews were over, many respondents expressed their concerns with political views from their colleagues across the border and with the complications to establish or maintain an open communication channel with them.

#### **5.4 Perception of mutual need**

Perception of mutual need is Dilla's (2015) last indicator in his framework on cross-border urban complexes (applied in Chapter 4). This variable refers neither to a sense of collective belonging, nor to cross-border cultural expressions; neither is it related to the sharing of family bonds or any other personal connection to residents of 'the other side'. Finally, mutual need does not denote processes of identity and culture formation. It is the perception that both communities are tied and connected by a variety of nodes, in the absence of which many things in their daily lives would grow worse. It is the awareness that both are "*mutuamente imprescindibles*" (DILLA, 2015, p. 32), in terms of economic health, public services offer, political stability, societal organization or any other aspect of the functioning and quality of life in a cross-border urban complex. In other words, the perception that the linkages between the two towns of a UC are beneficial to both sides.

Similarly to the way the frequency of structural and cultural explanations was determined, this indicator was calculated by each respondent's verbal references to it during interviews. Mutual need perceptions can reveal the underlying local beliefs favoring or not the existence of trans-local interactions within a UC. Moreover, it can demonstrate central elements of a local culture capable of providing arguments pro or against formal, cooperative strategies. For instance, in case of low rate of mutual need perceptions, it would be expected local actors to refuse to participate in cooperative

projects with neighbors they would rather avoid contact. Contrarywise, elevated levels this indicator could indicate a propensity toward cooperating – formally or informally.

**Table 15 Local actors' perceptions of mutual need**

B-B	Q-A	S-R	A-A	J-R	C-C	Bucbr
82%	66%	76%	71%	50%	100%	75%

Source: the author (2017).

*Table 15* shows the frequency of subjects mentioning perceptions of mutual need. Numbers in red show the lowest perception rates regarding this indicator. Numbers in blue refer to the highest rate of mutual need among all UCs. Chuí-Chuy calls attention for the highest rate (100%). Despite all the problems with cross-border cooperation and the difficulties to apply the agreements signed, all subjects recognized the great capacity of trans-local interactions in promoting welfare in their communities. Most of respondents referred to the existence of a single urban community, although acknowledging the intricate encounter of two different jurisdictions. Jaguarão-Rio Branco calls attention for the opposite reason: only half of respondents perceived a mutual need in interacting with their neighboring community. This corroborates the sentiment of distance from the neighbors and the attempts to integrate nationally by both local governments and by local societies. The general perception from this UC's local actors is that both towns grow inwards and apart.

The overall perception on the mutual need in the Bucbr is that local actors need one another to live their lives with ease. Most respondents (75%) expressed the idea of joint development or of trans-local cooperation as the only way toward appropriate life conditions for themselves and for the general population. As a local government actor summarized: “*Para alcançarmos o desenvolvimento desejado é preciso que trabalhemos juntos*” (INTERVIEW #1, 2017, oral information). Despite acknowledging the hardships in turning such need into an institutionalized cooperation – which did base the arguments of most of the 20% of subjects that expressed their indifference – they understood that jointly ventures are key for promoting the region, particularly their UC.

Oftentimes, respondents referred to the existence of a single town, instead of two urban centers, even in UCs crossed by watercourses with clearer geographical partition,

and although they recognized that it is possible to solve their problems without their neighbor (INTERVIEWS #1, #2, #5, #6, #7, #8, #9, #14, #17, #18, #22, #24, #26, #27, #34, #35, #37, #39, #43, #44, #45, #46, #49, #52, #60, #63, 2017, oral information). “*Aqui é uma fronteira seca, menos burocrática e com muitas nacionalidades. Aqui não se enxerga muito que há duas leis diferentes e duas jurisdições diferentes*” (INTERVIEW #44, 2017, oral information), Another local government actor explained: “*É possível resolver nossos problemas sozinhos, mas com muito mais dificuldades. Por que fazer tudo duas vezes se podemos ter uma só estrutura para servir os dois lados? É isso que o cara que faz o acordo não entende. Aqui, somos uma só cidade, mas com leis diferentes*” (INTERVIEW #46, 2017, oral information, emphasis by the author).

It is by identifying that both communities experience common problems that local actors believe that joint projects/works are the best way to promote development and to provide welfare. However, the difficulties in building formal cooperation can sometimes originate critiques toward bilateral agreements (the New Agenda included), as expressed by a local society actor: “*Somos prácticamente lo mismo. Esta interacción natural es perjudicada por las reglas y acuerdos*” (INTERVIEW #35, 2017, oral information). This acknowledged ‘natural interaction’ is the basis of a fuzzy, but strong identity of the *fronteiriço/fronterizo*: a peaceful citizen who desires none but to enjoy life and to benefit from the ‘border condition’ with his/her neighbors. All the complex sets of bilateral agreements can somewhat hinder the border citizens of their way of life. Nevertheless, most subjects emphasize the desire to take further steps to formalized cooperation and are not satisfied with the current conditions of trans-local interactions.

### **5.5 Final remarks on local perceptions on the New Agenda**

“Public policies *must* give a message of interest by ensuring investment conditions” (INTERVIEW #15, 2017, oral information). That is the bottom line of the general perception regarding local actors’ engagement in the projects of the New Agenda as well as in the lack of compliance with its agreements and frameworks, in the light of the structural explanations. By not having the certainty that national governments were designing plans to guarantee juridical, institutional, and economic circumstances to implement local or multilevel policies, local actors tended to perceive Brazilian and Uruguayan bilateral initiatives in the scope of the New Agenda as focused on the

promotion of national – not local – interests. Local actors' individual experiences with the negotiation and implementation processes of the New Agenda revealed for them a non-working institutionality that influenced their perceptions on the bilateral plan. Negative perceptions regarding infrastructure and institutional conditions were double the rate of positive perceptions concerning the same structural factors (46% of NSP against 21% of PSP).

Local actors' perceptions related to cultural factors have followed similar pattern to those associated with institutionality and infrastructure. "I prefer to ask for forgiveness than to ask for permission in many cases, because sometimes asking for permission is not doing [anything]" (INTERVIEW #15, 2017, oral information). When institutionalities do not meet the needs of border populations, local governments and society actors bypass laws and regulations. The inadequacy of normative frameworks in dialoguing with the *sui generis* reality of the Bucbr – unlike any other area both in Brazil and in Uruguay – leaves no choice for local actors, but to act according to pressing issues. The institutional limitations of the New Agenda precluded a more equilibrated perception rate: the average degree of positive perceptions was nearly half compared to that of negative perceptions (23% of PCP against 43% of NCP). Interviews have indicated that a border culture was less of a source of noncompliance than the present institutionality created to deal with border issues.

The elevated level of perception of mutual need across the Bucbr indicates that trans-local interactions are not only common, but the rule for most subjects interviewed. It is even possible to refer to an intrinsic, historically built, cross-border identity of communities that require interactions across border to function and to develop. This could indicate that local actors are/were inclined to support cooperative plans that included their neighboring fellows across the border, which means that the reasons for their low participation in projects of the New Agenda are not originated in identity factors. However, interviews also revealed a resistance to cooperation, which could hinder the participation in projects in at least two UCs. Jaguarão-Rio Branco, with 50% of respondents not perceiving mutual need vis-à-vis their neighbor community; and Quaraí-Artigas, with its 34% of subjects that do not believe to exist beneficial mutuality between their urban centers. Nevertheless, the general perception of mutual need outweighs its absence in 3:1, which consolidates the view of an amicable social environment in the Bucbr and the propensity towards cooperation.

## CONCLUSIONS

After a long journey among local interpretations of a multilevel set of policies designed for promoting a regionalist agenda, this conclusion cannot provide a definitive answer, but an open resolution on the matters analyzed – a distinct perspective. The problems of engagement in and compliance with the New Agenda by local actors lie in a complex tissue of ideas, institutions, and actors. According to a reflectivist and constructivist account, such a tissue was constructed on different beliefs and values expressing dissimilar identities and interests, which makes it perceived differently among an actor's experiences and contexts.

A historical reconstitution of the social construction of the Bucbr – not only viewed from the 'official', state perspective and not only understood within the scope of micro-regionalist past – entailed a history of the relationship between formal and informal. It revealed a lengthy period of neglect toward the border and its reality, which was responded in recurrent attempts to acquire different degrees of autonomy by local actors. The New Agenda, scholarship states, was created to change this historical ignorance of border reality and demands (SANTOS; SANTOS, 2005; AVEIRO, 2006; PUCCI, 2010; LEMOS, 2013). Nevertheless, it was also clear that local actors did not engage as much as they were expected, showing meager numbers of participation in New Agenda's projects (RÓTULO *et al.*, 2014). Also, compliance appears as a critical issue in the questionable success of the New Agenda in its purpose of regulating informalities at the border (PUCCI, 2010). Undeniably, after fifteen years, there remains more interrogations than answers in such matters, which leads the conclusion to this thesis's original question: *If the New Agenda is a response to local demands, why was/is there such low engagement and compliance of local actors with its projects and agreements?*

The theoretical lenses applied in this research (that is, a plural IR reflectivism and constructivism) allows the understanding of engagement in and compliance with the New Agenda beyond (but not excluding) the building of formal organizations and regional policies regarding the complex sociopolitical and spatial development of the Bucbr. The constructivist account helps recognize the unremitting (de)construction of the Bucbr by institutions, actors, and ideas (as summarized by Riggiozzi (2012)). The reflectivist comprehension of social reality permits identifying *what* actors, ideas, and institutions



are at stake by pointing out that actors' *interests* on this continuous process *do matter* in the sociopolitical equation of region-building. More importantly, that the sociopolitical and spatial microdynamics of region-building are equally significant.

Considering that interests are based on ideas, beliefs, interactions, identities, and (local) contexts, understanding interests of the actors involved in the New Agenda requires having knowledge on the circumstances they interact as well as on their ideas, beliefs, and identities through which they interact (ADLER, 1997; COLLIN, 1997). Such circumstances are related to the everyday conditions in which they perform their actions, which concern not only the state apparatus built to deal with their demands, but also the conceptions they share on such structure and on one another. These elements represent altogether the pillars of local identities and indicate the ideas and beliefs they share (or not) about the other (the bordering neighbor), their social space (the Bucbr), and on the reasons they support, participate or reject (statist) strategies of cooperation (such as the New Agenda). Thus, understanding more deeply the problems of engagement in and compliance with the New Agenda (that is, outside the theoretical and methodological scopes of Santos and Santos (2005), Aveiro (2006), Pucci (2010), Rótulo and Damiani (2010), Rótulo (2012), Lemos, 2013, and Rótulo *et al.* (2014)) entails the employment of a more comprehensive perspective, one that embraces the logics of non-state actors located in the Bucbr, who live and (trans)form the region despite/beyond formal agreements. This theoretical process is here defined as the *merging* of formal and informal (SÖDERBAUM, 2004; 2005; 2013).

The study of *perception* as the central, analytical concept ties together the ideational factors (ideas, beliefs, identities, interests) to the material world of structural limitations (infrastructure, geographical conditions, funding capabilities, institutional design, etc.), which can inform on the practical, factual responses to the normative constructs of the New Agenda (GUROWITZ, 1999; BUENO, 2009; BURGEMEESTRE *et al.*, 2014). In other words, the use of perception of local actors acknowledges the *agency* of such informal (non-state) actors in the social (de)construction of the Bucbr while providing data to answer the problem of the thesis. It also sheds light on the local interpretations regarding the material restraints of the local actors and the consequent decisions they make *vis-à-vis* the New Agenda. More importantly, the perception of local actors on the New Agenda can disclose the underlying (and sometimes latent) reasons for

the low engagement and compliance, be they related to institutional and/or infrastructural conditions or based on local understandings of one's advantages and/or needs.

Based on such theoretical and conceptual framework, and to help answer the central question, the *first hypothesis* of this thesis considers that the lack of institutional and infrastructural resources would have diminished the capacity of local actors to engage in the implementation of projects and to comply with the operationalization of agreements (or to maintain engagement and compliance). A counter-hypothesis, on the other hand, considers that the lack of institutional and infrastructural resources did not decrease the capacity of engagement and compliance, but local governments and other actors would have preferred to continue applying techniques of trans-local interaction and cross-border cooperation through informality and illegality.

The interviews and electronic survey indicate that the matter of compliance is deeply connected to the institutional failures of the New Agenda and of the national administrations in general. Border culture *per se* could not be appointed as the sole or the primary constitutive element of the slow and ineffective institutionality of the bilateral plan about the border. Border culture could be considered, among many factors, *a key, but ignored element* within negotiation processes once the New Agenda started implementation. To function, the multilevel character of this bilateral plan about the border required a change of not only (trans-)local culture, but also of national cultures regarding the *modus operandi* of socio-political relationships within a diversified policy framework – a change in institutional, political, and cultural terms in all levels of governance. Local actors' low compliance with New Agenda's agreements and frameworks reflected, first, the disparity between local demands and state regulatory offers. Thus, the low level of local actors' engagement in New Agenda's projects was not only to be expected but could even be prevented. The institutional and infrastructure limitations of the bilateral plan did not offer alternatives for implementing formalized cross-border cooperation without long, political, and tiresome negotiations among trans-local actors, national administrations, and a myriad of central authorities, most of which were gone before the end of talks, due to electoral changes and other political and/or economic reasons.

As articulated by a local society actor, the New Agenda suffered from a 'power problem', that is, the power that state actors were not ready to concede to the local level. "*O Estado quer manter o poder, e as pessoas são instrumentos [para efetivar esse poder].*"

Os comitês [da Nova Agenda] são como bodes na sala. *As pessoas não sabem usar isso, o governo perde o controle e dá um escanteio. A população quer avançar; mas não conseguimos, então, daí, [isso nos] desmotiva*” (INTERVIEW #20, 2017, oral information). ‘The goat in the room’ was the expression used to describe the New Agenda: a framework that local actors attempted to apply in their benefit, but that state actors did not know how to make use, given its strangeness *vis-à-vis* the established relationship between national institutionalities and local realities. This reflects the difficulty governments of Brazil and Uruguay have been facing with the reescalation of policymaking and of governance strategies. The New Agenda, in this regard, maintained creation, implementation, and operationalization of policies in the Bucbr within the socio-spatial logic of nation-State, even though it somewhat attempted to alter its territoriality with its decentralized, complex organogram.

Therefore, to base the lack of engagement of local actors solely on cultural factors that would allegedly augment the propensity towards undertaking informal or illegal activities across border can be highly problematic. Besides, this research did not find any evidence that can support the existence of a set of ideas or values that could potentially undermine local actors’ capacities in understanding or applying laws and regulations of the New Agenda. Neither can it affirm that local culture hindered local actors of finding proper channels to express their demands. Rather, proper channels were hardly present in New Agenda’s institutionalities; and most of its regulations did not facilitate the reality of living in a cross-border region. *En passant*, the New Agenda replicated the complex and ineffective *modus operandi* of South American regional organisms (such as Mercosur), with no multilevel coordination and no executive leader, but a dispersed organogram highly dependent on political concertation in all stages and levels of the cooperative processes. This posed as a key structural issue, since the need to create local, political alliances and to connect them with central administrative bodies was never taken into consideration.

It is not clear if the provision (in the future) of social and economic development in the Bucbr would alter these perceptions. Considering that many of the issues demanding non-orthodox solutions by local actors were/are originated in the lack of infrastructure and basic social services in each urban center of the Bucbr, a change in this scenario could potentially affect local demands. The border condition, however, would remain a local reality, which would likely be one of the sources of socio-economic and

political activities. Trans-local interactions, it is believed, would also continue to exist, if not augment, given their roots in local identities and in expressed interests during interviews.

The *second hypothesis* of this thesis considers that there were no specific advantages for local actors to engage in the New Agenda, despite what scholars affirm, which would indicate that the New Agenda is not a response to local demands, but an agenda *about* (not *for*) the border. Its counter-hypothesis, on the other hand, pointed out that there were clear advantages to local actors in implementing projects and operationalizing agreements of the New Agenda, but the border culture hindered the application of such complicated accords.

It is not possible to affirm that the New Agenda have not offered advantages for local actors of the Bucbr. The advances made toward the full residence permit for not only local populations, but all nationals, was a concrete development of the New Agenda's discussions and long-term projects. Notwithstanding the regulation problems regarding the employing of Uruguayan physicians in the 20-km border strip, UCs are managing to hire more doctors for their public health facilities. For the first time, the Bucbr started to tackle the historical lack of medical services. The creation of binational schools also found place in local actors' positive perceptions. The access to education was among the primary demands of the Bucbr and has been partially responded under the educational programs of the New Agenda.

Nevertheless, this investigation finds that local actors' demands go much beyond such irrefutable progress. Their perception that the New Agenda have not provided them the opportunity to assure that their demands were being listened – such as having a single intermediary between them and central authorities, participating in final negotiation processes, and creating more tangible solutions (greater and more numerous than the ones mentioned) – corroborates the initial idea that the New Agenda had never been a response to local demands, but a bilateral plan *about* the border. Ultimately, local actors' perceptions on the New Agenda revealed that while this Brazilian-Uruguayan plan attempted to regulate informalities at the border and to deliver a solution for some cross-border problems, *local actors wanted to be able to explore legally the border condition with autonomy.*

*La cuestión transfronteriza siempre estuvo presente. En los últimos tiempos, el mensaje político de los gobiernos nacionales y*

*subnacionales tuvo una mirada de simpatía hacia la frontera, dieron espacios para las comunidades fronterizas. [Sin embargo], la materialización de las políticas públicas en los territorios de frontera ha sido prácticamente ninguna. No ha habido un espacio legal y un espacio normativo que promueva efectivamente la frontera para que pueda desarrollarse. No ha habido una inversión pública diferenciada para romper con la tradición de que la frontera es la 'zona a ser cuidada', pero la 'zona a promover'. Las inversiones se han centrado en el combate al tráfico de armas, narcóticos, que han sido y son necesarios. Pero todas las cosas positivas, de alguna manera, no son atendidas (INTERVIEW #15, 2017, oral information, emphasis by the author).*

The excerpt of a local government actor's interview demonstrates the perception that the New Agenda did not offer the Bucbr 'a legal and normative space' in which the region could implement local development strategies. The idea that the New Agenda kept the historical character of the relationship with the state, in which the Bucbr requires attention, security, and control remains in the perceptive reality of local actors. For local actors, there was no change in the way the state treated them or in the way central governments managed trans-local affairs. The formation of a legal, normative space that could 'promote the Bucbr' finds echo in the local actors' perceptions uncovered by Mallmann and Clemente (2017). In their investigation on territorial policies of Brazil and Uruguay at the border, a local government actor specifies the need for engendering a treaty that could give the Bucbr semi-autonomy to deal with subjects exclusively focused on cross-border issues that would not affect the strategies of international insertion of Brazil and Uruguay. Whether this is possible is a matter that requires further discussions.

Another identity factor is noteworthy – the analysis on the perception of mutual need reveals a cultural basis in local actors' *modus agendi*. Interviews disclose the general belief that trans-local interactions are beneficial to every community in the UCs. There is the general idea that 'doing things together is better and easier than doing things alone' (INTERVIEWS #2, #8, #20, #46, 2017, oral information). From this viewpoint, if the New Agenda were just an enabler of more profound/formalized cooperation between neighboring towns throughout the Bucbr, it would hardly face resistance from local actors. Rather, they would participate with all resources available. Therefore, to refer to local culture as a deterring factor in New Agenda's progression can be mistaken and fruit of misinformed facts on local realities of Brazilian-Uruguayan border communities. Perhaps one of the greatest problems relating the New Agenda and the low levels of

participation and engagement was/is to have neglected the border culture and its ‘mutuality’ factor. This identity element could have been considered an important societal and political asset in negotiations to mobilize local actors to cooperate. It could have been used to activate trans-local networks by promoting the New Agenda as a truly bottom-up strategy, not only concerned about regulating historical interactions of the Bucbr, but also involved with empowering cooperation between friendly communities – from the border, to the border. The absence of such an approach once again corroborates the hypothesis of the New Agenda as a plan *about* the border.

The issues of lack of engagement and compliance by local actors in the New Agenda has more to do with the unsatisfactory formal (state) offer of an innovative (at least in South American experience) model of institutionality than to a local culture of informality and illegality. If the New Agenda were developing the creation of an area with a higher degree of (trans-local) autonomy, in which local actors could legally profit from the complex encounter of two territorialities and national frameworks (which is in use since the beginning of colonial times in the ‘shadows’ of the system), local actors’ perceptions would likely (and obviously) be more positive toward the bilateral agenda. In the end, local actors demand a more democratic ‘space for action’ (SANTANDER, 2012), in which they could entertain formalized, cross-border relations with their neighbors, resolving local issues without the restraint of state, regulatory policies. They demand normative freedom to promote cross-border paradiplomacy, to the extent its practice ceases to be ‘cross-border’ in nature. It is a way of profiting from the existence of the border without the juridical and jurisdictional limits that the border provides. Such (improbable) requests can be considered the continuation of the historical attempt to subvert state territoriality, transforming an ignored region into a central territory with its own (recognized) logics and dynamics, and by doing this, promoting local development for cross-border populations. Despite the sharing of such an underdeveloped reality with many other areas of Brazil, Uruguay, and throughout the continent, the Bucbr has in its history a border that unlocks exclusive possibilities, which local actors have not disregarded and from which they will probably continue profiting.

Local actors’ demands are not concerned with profiting from the border condition *per se*; neither are they built around the necessity to cooperate. They already enjoy many of the particularities of the Bucbr and they already collaborate in numerous informal fashions (as demonstrated in Chapter 4). Furthermore, and more importantly, local actors

cherish the historically constructed trans-local networks as part of themselves, of their identity as (cross-)border citizens. The prominent level of perception of mutual need reveals that, by recognizing that they entertain close inter-relations, the overall interest among local actors is, if not to *reinforce such relationships, to at least guarantee their continuance*. Thus, reactive feedbacks in case of a bilateral plan willing to alter or end this way of living could not be regarded as a surprise. This does not entail aversion to norms and regulations, but dissatisfaction to not responding effectively to such local claims while attempting to increase control of such historical interactions, both of which were outcomes of the New Agenda.

Concerning such trans-local interactions and the (cross-)border identities of which they are integral parts, from the viewpoint of the ‘formal-informal relationship’, it is possible to affirm that local actors’ overall perception is that while they are close to one another in the informal, local realm, they remain far from one another in the formal, institutionalized sphere. The ambiguous roles local actors perform with their peers – sometimes personal and problem-solving, representing themselves and/or their communities; sometimes blasé and ceremonial, on behalf of the state and the position they fill in the office (usually in the presence of national authorities) – substantiate the dissimilar realities of formal and informal relationships in the Bucbr: informally, so close; yet, formally, so far. The contrasting difference in the terrestrial distance between Brasília and Montevideo (roughly 3000 Km) and the closeness of UCs and of their communities are a snapshot of the discrepancy of the political atmosphere among the New Agenda officials and local actors. Nevertheless, this research demonstrates that the political game at the local level also contributed for a more intricate negotiation process in the New Agenda, which yet did not lower local perceptions of mutual need. The sole subject of unambiguous unanimity was the need for more autonomy to build cooperative arrangements.

The autonomous institutionality desired by local actors is a way to assure the conservation of local actors’ *modus agendi*, the preservation of the close interconnections UCs developed in the last four centuries. However, such desired autonomy could also potentially change the historical way formal, state actors and informal, non-state actors relate. It would grant local actors more decision and political power and create a new category of political players in the region. It would also make the New Agenda obsolete, as novel channels of coordination would have to be created, and interests of local actors

would become more relevant in the political arena. Finally, the Bucbr would become institutionalized at the transnational level. The feasibility of such an endeavor is, yet, questionable, to say the least. The New Agenda's fifteen-year experience shows that both Brazilian and Uruguayan states are indeed concerned with offering better infrastructure and access to citizenship (albeit their sluggishness), but without giving away their authority as nation-states. Hence, local actors will most likely continue to demand what they have been demanding from the state since the beginning of modern history: alternatives to develop and better socio-economic conditions and trans-local interactions, with or without autonomy – but preferably with it.



## REFERENCES

## Books

- ABBOTT, A. **Chaos of Disciplines**. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
- BADIE, B. **La fin de territoires. Essai sur le désordre international et sur l'utilité social du respect**. Paris: Fayard, Collection l'espace du politique, 1995.
- BADIE, B.; SMOUTS, M-C. **Le retournement du monde. Sociologie de la scène internationale**. Paris: Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques & Dalloz, 1992.
- BALASSA, B. **The Theory of Economic Integration**. Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin Inc, 1961.
- BERGER, P. L.; LUCKMANN, T. **The Social Construction of Reality: a Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge**. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966.
- BERWIG, A. **Direito municipal**. Ijuí, RS: Editora Unijuí, 2011.
- BRESLIN, S.; HOOK, G. D. **Microregionalism and World Order**. Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
- BRICEÑO RUIZ, J. **El Mercosur y las Complejidades de la Integración Regional**. Buenos Aires: Teseo, 2011.
- BUZAN, B. **People, States & Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era**. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1991.
- BUZAN, B.; WÆVER, O. **Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- CERVO, A. L. **Relações internacionais da América Latina: velhos e novos paradigmas**. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2007.
- CERVO, A. L.; BUENO, C. **História da Política Exterior do Brasil**. Brasília: UnB, 2011.
- COLLIN, F. **Social Reality**. London: Routledge, 1997.
- DABÈNE, O. **América Latina no século XX**. Porto Alegre: Edipucrs, 2003.
- \_\_\_\_\_. **The politics of regional integration in Latin America: theoretical and comparative explorations**. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- DORATIOTO, F. **O Brasil no Rio da Prata (1822-1994)**. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2014.

FAWCETT, L.; HURRELL, A. **Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

FERREIRA, G. N. **O Rio da Prata e a consolidação do estado imperial**. São Paulo: Hucitec, 2006.

GAMBLE, A.; PAYNE, A. **Regionalism and World Order**. London: Macmillan Press, 1996.

GARDINI, G. L. **The origins of Mercosur: Democracy and regionalization in South America**. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

GILPIN, R.; GILPIN, J. M. **The political economy of international relations**. Princeton; Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1987.

GOERTZ, G. **Social Science Concepts: A User's Guide**. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

GOES FILHO, S. S. **Navegantes, Bandeirantes, Diplomatas: Aspectos da descoberta do continente, da penetração do território brasileiro extra-Tordesilhas e do estabelecimento das fronteiras da Amazônia**. Brasília: IPRI, 1991.

\_\_\_\_\_. **As fronteiras do Brasil**. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2013.

GRUGEL, J.; HOUT, W. **Regionalism Across the North-South Divide: State strategies and globalization**. London and New York: Routledge, 1999.

GUIMARÃES, S. P. **Desafios brasileiros na era dos gigantes**. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto, 2005.

GUZZINI, S.; LEANDER, A. **Constructivism and international relations : Alexander Wendt and his critics**. London and New York: Routledge, 2006.

HAAS, E. B. **The Uniting of Europe**. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958.

HEATER, D. B. **The Idea of European Unity**. Leicester, London: Leicester University Press, 1992.

HOOK, G. D.; KEARNS, I. **Subregionalism and World Order**. Houndmills and London: Macmillan Press, 1999.

JACKSON, P. T. **The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of science and its implications for the study of world politics**. London and New York: Routledge, 2011.

JÖNSSON, C.; TAGIL, S.; TÖRNQVIST, G. **Organizing European Space**. London: Sage Publications, 2000.

KATZENSTEIN, P. J. **A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium.** Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.

KEOHANE, R. O.; NYE, J. S. **Power and interdependence: World politics in transition.** Boston: Little Brown, 1977.

KLOTZ, A. **Norms in International Relations: the Struggle Against Apartheid.** Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995.

KÜHN, F. **Breve História do Rio Grande do Sul.** 3ª Edição. Porto Alegre: Leitura, 2007.

KRAMSCH, O.; HOOPER, B. (Ed.) **Cross-Border Governance in the European Union.** Oxfordshire, New York: Routledge, 2004.

LAWRENCE, R. Z. **Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Deeper Integration.** Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1996.

LEYSSENS, A. **The Critical Theory of Robert W. Cox: Fugitive or Guru?** Houndmills and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

LINDBERG, L. N. **The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration.** Stanford - CA: Stanford University Press, 1963.

LUCENA, M. G. **A condição social fronteiriça Brasil-Uruguaí no Mercosul.** Pelotas: Editora da Universidade Federal de Pelotas, 2012.

MANSFIELD, E. D.; MILNER, H. V. **The Political Economy of Regionalism.** New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1997.

MATTLI, W. **The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond.** Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

MAZZEI, E. **Fronteras que nos unen y límites que nos separan.** Montevideo: Udelar, Centro de Estudios de la Frontera, 2013.

MAZZEI, E.; DE SOUZA, M. **La frontera en cifras.** Montevideo: Udelar, Centro de Estudios de la Frontera, 2013.

MITRANY, D. **A working peace system.** Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966.

MONIZ BANDEIRA, L. A. **O expansionismo brasileiro e a formação dos estados na Bacia do Prata: Argentina Uruguaí e Paraguai, - da colonização à Guerra da Tríplice Aliança.** São Paulo, Brasília: Ensaio, UnB, 1995.

MORAVCSIK, A. **The choice for Europe: Social purpose and State power from Messina to Maastricht.** Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.

ONETO Y VIANA, C. **La diplomacia del Brasil en el Río de la Plata**. Montevideo: Librería de la Universidad, 1903. Disponível em: < <https://archive.org/details/ladiplomaciadelb00onetooft> >. Acesso em: 18/05/2017.

ONUF, N. **World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations**. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989.

PECEQUILO, C. S.; CARMO, C. A. D. **O Brasil e a América do Sul : relações regionais e globais**. Rio de Janeiro: Alta Books Editora, 2015.

PENTLAND, C. **International Theory and European Integration**. London: Faber and Faber, 1973.

PERKMANN, M.; SUM, N.-L. **Globalization, Regionalization and Cross-Border Regions**. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.

PRADO, F. P. **Edge of empire: Atlantic networks and revolution in Bourbon Rio de la Plata**. Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2015.

PRESCOTT, J. R. V. **Political Frontiers and Boundaries**. London: Allen & Unwin, 1987.

PUCCI, A. S. **O estatuto da fronteira Brasil-Uruguaí**. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2010.

REICHEL, H. J.; GUTFREIND, I. **As raízes históricas do Mercosul: a Região Platina colonial**. São Leopoldo: Unisinos, 1996.

RESENDE, É. S. A.; MALLMANN, M. I.; (Ed.). **Mercosul - 21 anos: maioridade ou imaturidade?** 1st. Curitiba-PR: Appris, 2013.

RIGGIROZZI, P.; TUSSIE, D. **The Rise of Post-Hegemonic Regionalism: the Case of Latin America**. London, New York: Springer, 2012.

RODRÍGUEZ O, J. E. **The independence of Spanish America**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

ROSAMOND, B. **Theories of European integration**. Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 2000.

SAURUGGER, S. **Théories et concepts de l'intégration européenne**. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 2010.

SEARLE, J. **The Constuction of Social Reality**. London: Simon & Schuster, 1995.

SOARES, T. **História da formação das fronteiras do Brasil**. Rio de Janeiro: Biblioteca do Exército, 1973.

SÖDERBAUM, F. **The Political Economy of Regionalism: The Case of Southern Africa**. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

- \_\_\_\_\_. **Rethinking Regionalism**. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016.
- SÖDERBAUM, F.; SHAW, T. M. **Theories of New Regionalism**. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- STRUMINSKI, E. **Brasil e Uruguai: fronteiras e limites**. Ilhéus, BA: Editus, 2015a.
- TAVARES, J. A. G.; ROJO, R. E. **Instituições política comparadas dos países do Mercosul**. Rio de Janeiro: Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 1998.
- TAYLOR, P. G. **International Organization in the Modern World: The Regional and the Global Process**. London: Pinter Pub, 1993.
- TELÒ, M. **European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era**. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007.
- VALLE, J.; MATHEU, J. D. V. **Obras. Tomo II. "El amigo de la Patria"**. Guatemala: Sánches & de Guise, 1930.
- VAN LANGENHOVE, L. **Building Regions: The Regionalization of the World Order**. Farnham, Burlington: Routledge, 2011.
- VARGAS, F. A. **Formação das fronteiras latino-americanas**. Brasília: FUNAG 2017.
- VAUGHAN-WILLIAMS, N. **Border politics: the limits of sovereign power**. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009.
- VIANNA, H. **História Diplomática do Brasil**. Rio de Janeiro: Editora do Exército, 1958.
- WEISIGER, A. **Social Theory of International Politics**. Cambridge: University Press, 1999.
- WIENER, A.; DIEZ, T. **European Integration Theory**. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

### Book chapters

- ABRUCIO, F. L.; SANO, H.; SYDOW, C. R. T. Radiografia do associativismo territorial brasileiro: tendências, desafios e impactos sobre as regiões metropolitanas. In: MAGALHÃES, F. (Ed.). **Regiões metropolitanas no Brasil: um paradoxo de desafios e oportunidades**. New York: Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento, 2010. cap. 7, p. 197-234.
- ÁVILA, A. L. D. Caudilhos e fronteiriços: a Revolução Farroupilha e seus vínculos rio-platenses. In: CARELI, S. D. S. e KNIERIM, L. C. (Ed.). **Releituras da História do Rio Grande do Sul**. Porto Alegre: CORAG, 2011. p. 181-202.

BARNETT, M. Social Constructivism. In: BAYLIS, J. e SMITH, S. (Ed.). **The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations**. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. p. 251-270.

BENTANCOR, G. Una frontera singular. La vida cotidiana en ciudades gemelas: Rivera (Uruguay) y Sant'Ana do Livramento (Brasil). In: NÚÑES, Â.; PADOIN, M. M., *et al* (Ed.). **Dilemas e Diálogos Platinos: Fronteiras**. Dourados: UFGD, 2010. Cap. 4, p. 73-106.

BOUZAS, R.; SOLTZ, H. Institutions and Regional Integration: the Case of Mercosur. In: BULMER-THOMAS, V. (Ed.). **Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean: the Political Economy of Open Regionalism**. London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 2001. p. 98-118.

BURGEMEESTRE, B.; HULSTIJN, J.; TAN, Y.-H. Norm Emergence in Regulatory Compliance. In: XENITIDOU, M. e EDMONDS, B. (Ed.). **The Complexity of Social Norms**. Heidelberg: Springer, 2014. p. 123-140.

BURGESS, M. Federalism. In: WIENER, A. e DIEZ, T. (Ed.). **European Integration Theory**. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. p. 25-44.

CARDARELLO, A. *et al*. Mucho ruido...y algunas nueces. Los vaivenes de la descentralización en la administración Vázquez (2005-2010). In: MANCEBO, M. E. e NARBONDO, P. (Ed.). **Reforma del Estado y políticas públicas de la Administración Vázquez: Acumulaciones, conflictos y desafíos**. Montevideo: CLACSO. Fin de Siglo Editorial. Instituto de Ciencia Política/UdelaR, 2010. p. 54-73.

CASTRO, I. E. D. O problema da escala. In: CASTRO, I. E. D.; GOMES, P. C. D. C., *et al* (Ed.). **Geografia: conceitos e temas**. 2nd. Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil, 2000. p. 117-140.

CLEMENTE, I. B.; MALLMANN, M. I. Mercosur e integración fronteriza: la cooperación transfronteriza entre Brasil y Uruguay. In: MAZZEI, E. (Ed.). **Las sociedades fronterizas: visiones y reflexiones**. Montevideo: Udelar, Comisión Coordinadora Interior, Centro de Estudios de la Frontera, 2017. p. 95-108.

CRUXEN, E. B. A ocupação ibérica do território e as disputas pelas fronteiras do continente de Rio Grande. In: CARELI, S. D. S. e KNIERIM, L. C. (Ed.). **Releituras da História do Rio Grande do Sul**. Porto Alegre: CORAG, 2011. p. 65-88.

DE LOMBAERDE, P.; GARAY, L. J. El nuevo regionalismo en América Latina. In: DE LOMBAERDE, P.; KOCHI, S., *et al* (Ed.). **Del Regionalismo Latinoamericano a la Integración Interregional**. 2008: Fundación Carolina y Siglo XXI, 2008. p.3-35.

DILLA, H. A. Las ciudades en las fronteras: introducción a un debate. In: DILLA, H. A. (Ed.). **Ciudades en la Frontera**. Cristo Rey: Manatí, 2008. p. 15-30.

DORFMAN, A. Enafro e suas materializações no Rio Grande do Sul. In: MALLMANN, M. I. e MARQUES, T. C. S. M. (Ed.). **Fronteiras e relações Brasil-Uruguaí**. Porto Alegre: ediPUCRS, 2015. cap. 11, p. 199-212.

FAWCETT, L. Regionalism from an Historical Perspective. In: FARRELL, M.; HETTNE, B., *et al* (Ed.). **Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice**. London, Ann Arbor (MI): Pluto Press, 2005. p. 21-37.

GRIMSON, A. Fronteras, estados e identificaciones en el Cono Sur. In: MATO, D. (Ed.). **Estudios latinoamericanos sobre cultura y transformaciones sociales en tiempos de globalización - 2**. Caracas and Buenos Aires: Clacso, 2001. p. 89-102.

HETTNE, B. Regionalism, Security and Development: A Comparative Perspective. In: HETTNE, B.; INOTAI, A., *et al* (Ed.). **Comparing Regionalisms: Implications for Global Development**. London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001. p. 1-53.

\_\_\_\_\_. The New Regionalism Revisited. In: SÖDERBAUM, F. e SHAW, T. M. (Ed.). **Theories of New Regionalism**. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. p. 22-42.

\_\_\_\_\_. The New Regionalism: Implications for Development and Peace. In: HETTNE, B. e INOTAI, A. (Ed.). **The New Regionalism: Implications for Global Development and International Security**. Helsinki: UNU/WIDER, 1994. p. 1-50.

HOCKING, B. Patrolling the 'Frontier': Globalization, Localization and the Actorness of Non-Central Governments. In: ALDECOA, F. e KEATING, M. (Ed.). **Paradiplomacy in Action: the Foreign Relations of Subnational Governments**. London, New York: Routledge, 1999. p. 17-39.

KEOHANE, R. O. Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics. In: KEOHANE, R. **Neorealism and its critics**. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. p. 1-26.

LAURSEN, F. Requirements for Regional Integration: A Comparative Perspective on the EU, the Americas and East Asia. In: LAURSEN, F. (Ed.). **Comparative Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond**. Surrey: Ashgate, 2010. p. 239-270.

LEMOS, B. D. O.; RÜCKERT, A. A. A Nova Agenda para Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Fronteiriço entre Brasil e Uruguai: repercussões territoriais nas cidades gêmeas de Sant'Ana do Livramento e Rivera. In: MALLMANN, M. I. e MARQUES, T. C. S. (Ed.). **Fronteiras e relações Brasil-Uruguai**. Porto Alegre: EDIPUCRS, 2015. p. 147-162.

LEVI, L. Altiero Spinelli: Founder of the Movement for European Unity. In: LEVI, L.; CORBETT, R., *et al* (Ed.). **Altiero Spinelli: European Federalist**. Brussels: European Parliament, 2009. p. 7-12.

MACHADO, L. O. Estado, territorialidade, redes: cidades-gêmeas na zona de fronteira sul-americana. In: SILVEIRA, M. L. (Ed.). **Continentes em chamas: globalização e território na América Latina**. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2005. p. 246-284.

MAGRI, A. J. et al. Entre lo local y lo regional: ciudades de frontera e integración regional transfronteriza en Uruguay. In: MAZEI, E. (Ed.). **Las sociedades fronterizas: visiones y reflexiones**. Montevideo: UdelaR, CCI, CEF, 2017. p. 49-94.

MALAMUD, A. Presidentialism and Mercosur: A Hidden Cause for A Successful Experience. In: LAURSEN, F. (Ed.). **Comparative Regional Integration: Theoretical Perspectives**. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003. p. 53-73.

\_\_\_\_\_. Interdependência, liderança e institucionalização: o déficit triplo e as perspectivas negativas para o Mercosul. In: RESENDE, É. S. A. e MALLMANN, M. I. (Ed.). **Mercosul 21 anos: maioria ou imaturidade**. Curitiba: Appris, 2013. p.229-252.

MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, G. Integração ou regionalismo? Estudando fronteiras na América Latina. In: ACOSTA, W. S. (Ed.). **Repensar las fronteras, la integración regional y el territorio**. Heredia, Costa Rica: CLACSO, IDEPO, Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica, 2017. p.125-132.

\_\_\_\_\_. Potencialidades e limites da paradiplomacia na região transfronteiriça de Brasil e Uruguai. In: ODDONE, N. (Ed.). **Integración y Paradiplomacia Transfronteriza**. Tijuana, México: El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, forthcoming.

MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, G.; CULPI, L. La réinvention du Mercosur à la lumière des synergies politico-idéologiques sud-américaines. In: SANTANDER, S. (Ed.). **Concurrences régionales dans un monde multipolaire émergent**. Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2016. p. 101-114.

MOURA, L. L. D. L. O ensino por projetos em territórios simbólicos: formação intercultural na fronteira de Aceguá. In: DORNELLES, L.;COUTO, R. C. D., *et al* (Ed.). **Interculturalidade nas fronteiras: espaços de (con)vivências**. Bagé, Jaguarão (RS): Universidade Federal do Pampa, 2015. p. 64-80.

NEUMANN, I. B. A region-building approach. In: SÖDERBAUM, F. e SHAW, T. M. (Ed.). **Theories of new regionalism: a Palgrave reader**. Hampshire (UK) & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. p. 160-178.

NIEMANN, A.; SCHMITTER, P. Neofunctionalism. In: WIENER, A. e DIEZ, T. (Ed.). **European Integration Theory**. Second Edition. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. p. 45-66.

NÚÑES, T. A Experiência da Assessoria de Cooperação e Relações Internacionais do Governo do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul. In: MARCOVITCH, J. e DALLARI, P. B. A. (Ed.). **Relações Internacionais de Âmbito Subnacional: A Experiência de Estados e Municípios no Brasil**. São Paulo: Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Universidade de São Paulo, 2014. p. 48-56.

OLVERA, R.; VIERA, P. Internacionalización de la Educación: una experiencia educativa en zona de frontera, sus oportunidades y desafíos. In: DINIS, M. A. P. e MELLO, L. M. D. (Ed.). **Cursos binacionais: relatos de uma experiência inovadora**. Santana do Livramento - RS: Cia do eBook, 2015. p. 87-95.

PEDRÓN, O. Episodios Históricos. In: AUNATI, D.;BENEDETTO, M., *et al* (Ed.). **Artigas**. Montevideo: Nuestro Tiempo, 1970. p. 5-10.



PIRIZ, J. J. Claroscuros de una ubicación. In: A., V. (Ed.). **Artigas. Los Departamentos**. Montevideo: Nuestra Tierra, 1970.

POSTEL-VINAY, K. The Spatial Transformations of International Relations. In: SMOUTS, M.-C. (Ed.). **The New International Relations: Theory and Practice**. London: C. Hurst & Co., 2001 [1998]. p. 88-99.

REICHEL, H. J. Fronteiras no Espaço Platino. In: BOEIRA, N.; GOLIN, T., *et al* (Ed.). **Colônia**. Passo Fundo: Méritos, 2006. Cap. III, p. 43-64.

RHI-SAUSI, J. L.; COLETTI, R. Cross-border regional integration and cooperation in Latin America: experiences and perspectives. In: UE-AL, O. D. C. D. (Ed.). **Year book for decentralised cooperation**. Montevideo: Observatorio de Cooperación Descentralizada Unión Europea - América Latina, 2010. p. 182-204.

RISSE, T. Social constructivism and European integration. In: WIENER, A. e DIEZ, T. (Ed.). **European Integration Theory**. Second Edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. p. 144-162.

SAN MARTIN, A. S.; SCHMIDT, R. V. Cooperação educacional no Mercosul: desafios na implementação de uma escola técnica com cursos binacionais na região de fronteira Brasil/Uruguai. In: DINIS, M. A. P. e MELLO, L. M. D. (Ed.). **Cursos binacionais: relatos de uma experiência inovadora**. Santana do Livramento - RS: Cia do eBook, 2015. p. 22-35.

SANTANDER, S. Invariances et ruptures dans le Mercosur. In: SANTANDER, S. (Ed.). **Relations internationales et régionalisme**. Liège: Presses Universitaires de Liège, 2012. p. 12-32.

SMITH, S.; OWENS, P. Alternative Approaches to International Theory. In: BAYLIS, J. e SMITH, S. (Ed.). **The Globalization of World Politics: an Introduction to International Relations**. 3rd Edition. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Chapter 12, p. 271-293.

SÖDERBAUM, F. Introduction: Theories of New Regionalism. In: SÖDERBAUM, F. e SHAW, T. M. (Ed.). **Theories of New Regionalism**. London, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. p. 1-21.

\_\_\_\_\_. Exploring the Links between Micro-Regionalism and Macro-Regionalism. In: FARRELL, M.; HETTNE, B., *et al* (Ed.). **Global Politics of Regionalism: Theory and Practice**. London and Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2005. p. 87-103.

SPANIOL, M. I. (Re)estruturação das ações de segurança pública, prevenção, repressão e controle, através da Enafron, ante as principais incidências criminais na fronteira. In: MALLMANN, M. I. e MARQUES, T. C. S. (Ed.). **Fronteiras e relações Brasil-Uruguai**. Porto Alegre: ediPUCRS, 2015. Cap. 10, p.183-198.

SPINELLI, A. The Growth of the European Movement Since the Second World War. In: HODGES, M. (Ed.). **European Integration**. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972. p. 43-68.

TAKS, J.; CHABALGOITY, M. Desafíos para un nuevo ordenamiento territorial en Uruguay: El caso de la Región Este y su frontera con el Brasil. In: MALLMANN, M. I. e MARQUES, T. C. S. M. (Ed.). **Fronteiras e Relações Brasil-Uruguaí**. Porto Alegre: EdIPUCRS, 2015. Cap. 9, p.163-180.

### Journal articles

ACHARYA, A. Comparative Regionalism: A Field Whose Time has Come? **The International Spectator**, v. 47, p. 3-15, 2012.

ADLER, E. Seizing the middle ground: constructivism in world politics. **European Journal of International Relations**, v. 3, p. 319-363, 1997.

ALMEIDA, P. R. A economia internacional no século XX: um ensaio de síntese. **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, v. 44 n. 1, p. 112-136, 2001.

ALVAREZ, M. C.; SALLA, F. Estado-nação, fronteiras, margens: redesenhando os espaços fronteiriços no Brasil contemporâneo. **Civitas**, v. 13, n. 1, p. 9-26, 2013.

ALVARIZA, R. A. La bilateralidad Uruguay-Brasil en las presidencias de José Mujica y Dilma Rousseff: apuntes desde la política exterior uruguaya. **Conjuntura Austral**, v. 6, n. 27-28, p. 16-39, 2015.

ANDERSON, J.; O'DOWD, L. Borders, border regions and territoriality: Contradictory meanings, changing significance. **Regional Studies**, v. 33, p. 593-604, 1999.

ARGAÑARAZ, J. C.; HERNÁNDEZ, T. N.; SILVA, M. Z. El documento especial de fronterizo: objeto e instrumento del diálogo social. **Boletín Cinterfor**, Montevideo, n. 156, p. 81-104, 2005.

BARBÉ, E. El estudio de las Relaciones Internacionales: ¿crisis o consolidación de una disciplina? **Revista de Estudios Políticos (Nueva Época)**, v. 65, p. 173-196, 1989.

BARCELÓ, N. S. 1851-1909: La influencia del Brasil en la delimitación de las fronteras de la República Oriental del Uruguay. **Intellector**, v. XII, n. 24, p. 107-116, 2016.

BARRETO, A. A. D. B. Desenho Institucional, Expectativas e Impasses na Criação do Município no Uruguai (2009-2014). **Revista Sul-Americana de Ciência Política**, v. 3, n. 1, p. 39-66, 2015.

BEHARES, L. E. Apresentação: Educação fronteiriça Brasil/Uruguai, línguas e sujeitos. **Pro-Posições**, v. 21, n. 3 (63), p. 17-24, 2010.

BETANCOR, G. T. Las fronteras en un contexto de cambios: la vida cotidiana en ciudades gemelas-rivera (Uruguay) y Sant'Ana do Livramento (Brasil). **Ateliê Geográfico**, v. 2, n. 1, p. 18-42, 2008.

BIERNACKI, P.; WALDORF, D. Snowball Sampling: Problems and Techniques of Chain Referral Sampling. **Sociological Methods & Research**, v. 10, n. 2, p. 141-163, 1981.

BIZZOZERO, L. R. Uruguay y los procesos de integración regional: Trayectoria, cambios y debates. **Civitas: Revista de Ciências Sociais**, v. 10, n. 1, p. 97-117, 2010.

BJÖRKDAHL, A. Norms in International Relations: Some Conceptual and Methodological Reflections. **Cambridge Review of International Affairs**, v. 15, n. 1, p. 9-23, 2002.

BOÉSSIO, C. P. D.; SILVA JÚNIOR, B. S. D.; CUNHA, Y. K. Programa Escola Intercultural Bilingüe de Fronteira: primeiros anos na fronteira Jaguarão/Brasil - Rio Branco/Uruguai. **Revista de Políticas Públicas**, v. 16, n. 2, p. 421-431, 2012.

BRUNET-JAILLY, E. Theorizing Borders: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. **Geopolitics**, v. 10, p. 633-649, 2005.

BRUNETEAU, B. The Construction of Europe and the Concept of the Nation-State. **Contemporary European History**, v. 9, p. 245-260, 2000.

BØÅS, M.; MARCHAND, M. H.; SHAW, T. M. The weave-world: Regionalisms in the south in the new millennium. **Third World Quarterly**, v. 20, p. 1061-1070, 1999.

CAÑETE, G. L. R.; KERSCH, D. F. Representações sociais de envolvidos na implementação do PEIBF: um exemplo do Rio Grande do Sul. **Cadernos de Linguagem e Sociedade**, v. 13, n. 1, p. 102-128, 2012.

CASSANEGO JR, P. et al. Accountability em Órgãos Bi-nacionais: Estudo na "Fronteira da Paz". **Cadernos Gestão Pública e Cidadania**, v. 17, n. 61, p. 193-212, 2012.

CERVO, A. L. Sob o signo neoliberal: as relações internacionais da América Latina. **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, v. 43, p. 5-27, 2000.

CLEMENTE, I. La región de frontera Uruguay-Brasil y la relación binacional: Pasado y perspectivas. **Revista Uruguay de Ciencia Política**, v. 19, p. 165-184, 2010.

CLEMENTE, I.; NÍLSON, D. H. Políticas de cooperación, integración fronteriza y desarrollo territorial en la frontera Uruguay-Brasil (2002-2012). **Geo UERJ**, v. 23, p. 763-792, 2012.

COX, R. W. Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory. **Millennium - Journal of International Studies**, v. 10, p. 126-155, 1981.

\_\_\_\_\_. Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations : An Essay in Method. **Millennium - Journal of International Studies**, v. 12, p. 162-175, 1983.

CUISINIER-RAYNAL, A. La frontière au Pérou entre fronts et synapses. **L'Espace géographique**, v. 3, n. 30, p. 213-230, 2001.

DE LA REZA, G. A. Antecedentes de la integración latinoamericana: Los congresos de unión y confederación del siglo XIX. **Revista de Historia de América**, n. 127, p. 95-116, 2000.

DE LIMA, M. G. L.; MOREIRA, R. J. A Fronteira Binacional (Brasil e Uruguai): Território e Identidade Social. **Ediciones UNL**, 2009.

DE LOMBAERDE, P.; SÖDERBAUM, F.; VAN LANGENHOVE, L. The Problem of Comparison in Comparative Regionalism. **Review of International Studies**, v. 36, p. 731-753, 2010.

DE SOUZA, G. M. Paradiplomacy in the cross-border region of Brazil and Uruguay: Between legal vacuum and regulatory discrepancy. **Intellector**, v. 14, n. 27, p. 85-98, 2017.

DIEZ, T.; STETTER, S.; ALBERT, M. The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration. **International Organization**, v. 60, n. 3, 2006, pp. 563-593.

DILLA, H. A. Los complejos urbanos transfronterizos en América Latina. **Estudios Fronterizos, Nueva Época**, v. 16, p. 15-38, 2015.

DINIS, M. A. P.; SILVA, P. H. A. Experiências, desafios e estratégias do campus Santana do Livramento, Instituto Federal Sul-Rio-Grandense, com os primeiros cursos binacionais entre Brasil e Uruguai. **Revista GeoPantanal**, v. 11, n. 21, p. 127-140, 2016.

DORFMAN, A.; FRANÇA, A. B. C.; SOARES, G. D. O. Marcos legais e redes de contrabando de agrotóxicos: análise escalar a partir da fronteira Brasil-Uruguai. **Terr@Plural**, v. 8, n. 1, p. 37-53, 2014.

DUFRECHOU, L. E. B. Crisis liberal en Uruguay: violencia política y autoritarismo (1967-1985). **Cuadernos Iberoamericanos. Revista de Historia y Comunicación**, v. 1, p. 144-160, 2015.

ELDEN, S. Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Identity and the Sanctity of Borders. **SAIS Review of International Affairs**, v. 26, p. 11-24, 2006.

FAWCETT, L. Between West and non-West: Latin American Contributions to International Thought. **The International History Review**, v. 34, p. 679-704, 2012.

FAWN, R. 'Regions' and their study: wherefrom, what for and whereto? **Review of International Studies**, v. 35, p. 5-34, 2009.

FRANCO, S. D. C. Panorama sócio-cultural da fronteira Brasil - Uruguai. **Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do Rio Grande do Sul**, n. 129, p. 139-151, 1993.

GADELHA, C. A. G.; COSTA, L. Integração de fronteiras: a saúde no contexto de uma política nacional de desenvolvimento. **Cadernos de Saúde Pública**, v. 23, p. S214-S226, 2007.

GEZELIUS, S. S. Do Norms Count? State Regulation and Compliance in a Norwegian Fishing Community. **Acta Sociologica**, v. 45, p. 305-314, 2002.

GOULART, S.; MISOCZKY, M. C.; FLORES, R. K. Contradições e Dinâmicas Sociais e Econômicas na Fronteira da Paz. **Desenvolvimento em Questão**, v. 15, n. 38, p. 7-43, 2017.

GRIMSON, A.; VILA, P. Forgotten Border Actors: the Border Reinforcers. A Comparison Between US-Mexico Border and South American Borders. **Journal of Political Ecology**, v. 9, p. 69-87, 2002.

GROS, E., HÉCTOR. O tratado brasileiro-uruguaio de 1909 e a revisão, por razão de justiça, do tratado de limites de 1851. **Revista de Informação Legislativa**, v. 21, n. 84, p. 233-250, 1984.

GUIMARÃES, L.; GIOVANELLA, L. Municípios brasileiros fronteiriços e Mercosul: características e iniciativas de cooperação em saúde. **Saúde em Debate**, v. 29, p. 248-257, 2005.

GUROWITZ, A. Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, Immigrants, and the Japanese State. **World Politics**, v. 51, n. 3, p. 413-445, 1999.

HAAS, E. B. The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America. **JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies**, v. 5, p. 315-343, 1967.

HAAS E. B.; ROWE, E. T. Regional Organizations in the United Nations: Is there Externalization? **International Studies Quarterly**, v. 17, n. 1, pp. 3-54, 1973

HAMATI-ATAYA, I. Reflectivity, reflexivity, reflexivism: IR's 'reflexive turn' — and beyond. **European Journal of International Relations**, v. 19, p. 669-694, 2013.

HETTNE, B. Beyond the 'New' Regionalism. **New Political Economy**, v. 10, p. 543-571, 2005.

HETTNE, B.; SÖDERBAUM, F. The New Regionalism Approach. **Politeia**, v. 17, p. 6-21, 1998.

\_\_\_\_\_. Theorising the Rise of Regionness. **New Political Economy**, v. 5, p. 457-472, 2000.

HOFFMANN, A. R.; COUTINHO, M.; KFURI, R. Indicadores e Análise Multidimensional do Processo de Integração do Cone Sul. **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, v. 51, n. 2, p. 98-116, 2008.

HOFFMANN, S. The European Process at Atlantic Crosspurposes. **JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies**, v. 3, p. 85-101, 1964.

HURRELL, A. Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics. **Review of International Studies**, v. 21, p. 331-358, 1995.

\_\_\_\_\_. One world? Many worlds? The place of regions in the study of international society. **International Affairs**, v. 83, p. 127-146, 2007.

JILBERTO, A. E. F.; HOGENBOOM, B. Latin American Experiences with Open Regionalism: Introduction. **International Journal of Political Economy**, v. 26, p. 3-13, 1996.

KANTOR, I. Usos diplomáticos da ilha-Brasil: Polemicas cartográficas e historiográficas. **Varia Historia**, v. 23, n. 37, p. 70-80, 2007.

LAINE, J. P. The Multiscalar Production of Borders. **Geopolitics**, v. 21, p. 465-482, 2016.

LAPID, Y. Through Dialogue to Engaged Pluralism: The Unfinished Business of the Third Debate. **The Unfinished Business of the Third Debate**, v. 5, p. 128-131, 2003.

LELOUP, F.; STOFFEL, S. Intégration régionale et frontière dans le Mercosur: entre théorie, principes et réalités. **Mondes en développement**, v. 3, p. 73-80, 2001.

LEMOS, B. D. O.; RÜCKERT, A. A. A Nova Agenda para Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Fronteiriço entre Brasil e Uruguai: repercussões territoriais nas cidades-gêmeas de Sant'Ana do Livramento e Rivera. **Revista Política e Planejamento Regional**, v. 1, p. 138-158, 2014.

LIMPO, L. A. P. Proyección americana de la Guerra de las Naranjas y Tratado de Badajoz. **Revista de Estudios Extremeños**, v. LVII, n. 3, p. 919-961, 2001.

MACE, G. Regional Integration in Latin America: A Long and Winding Road. **International Journal**, v. 43, p. 404-427, 1988.

MACHADO, L. O. Limites e fronteiras: da alta diplomacia aos circuitos da ilegalidade. **Revista Território**, v. V, n. 8, p. 7-23, 2000.

MACHADO, L. O.; NOVAES, A. R.; MONTEIRO, L. D. R. Building Walls, Breaking Barriers: Territory, Integration and the Rule of Law in Frontier Zones. **Journal of Borderlands Studies**, v. 24, n. 3, p. 97-114, 2009.

MALAMUD, A. Conceptos, teorías y debates sobre la integración regional. **Norteamérica**, v. 6, p. 219-249, 2011.

MALLMANN, M. I. Límites y perspectivas de la integración suramericana. **Cuadernos sobre Relaciones Internacionales, Regionalismo y Desarrollo**, v. 2, p. 39-67, 2007.

MANSFIELD, E. D.; MILNER, H. V. The New Wave of Regionalism. **International Organization**, v. 53, p. 589-627, 1999.

MARCHAND, M. H.; BØÅS, M.; SHAW, T. M. The political economy of new regionalisms. **Third World Quarterly**, v. 20, p. 897-910, 1999.

MATIAS-PEREIRA, J. Efeitos e custos da crise financeira e econômica global no Brasil. **Observatorio de la economía latinoamericana**, n. 108, p. n.p., 2009. Disponível em: < <http://www.eumed.net/cursecon/ecolat/br/09/jmp.htm> >. Acesso em: 18/07/2017.

MATIUZZI DE SOUZA, G. Demandas por regulação na região fronteira brasilo-uruguaia. **Século XXI**, v. 5, p. 13-32, 2014.

\_\_\_\_\_. Parceria estratégica Brasil-Uruguaia no contexto da inserção internacional brasileira (2003-2014). **Monções - Revista de Relações Internacionais da UFGD**, v. 4, p. 165-185, 2015a.

\_\_\_\_\_. The progressive regional agenda for South America: the case of Mercosur and its borders. **Conjuntura Global**, v. 4, p. 390-402, 2015b.

\_\_\_\_\_. The institutionalization process of border integration in Mercosur (2003-2015): regional uncoordinated attempts toward social development. **Fédéralisme Régionalisme [En ligne]**, v. 16, 2016. Disponível em: < <http://popups.ulg.ac.be/1374-3864/index.php?id=1654> >. Acesso em: 10/05/2017.

MAZZEI, E. El comercio ambulante en la frontera uruguayo-brasileña: Informalización económica, social y política. **Revista de Ciencias Sociales**, v. XV, n. 20, p. 63-74, 2002.

MENDES, P. E. A (re)invenção das relações internacionais na viragem do século: o desafio do construtivismo. **Relações Internacionais**, v. 36, p. 105-118, 2012.

MERENSON, S. El “rincón de la rinconada”: lecturas de la frontera, narrativas de la nación. Bella Unión, República Oriental del Uruguay. **Revista electrónica del Instituto de Altos Estudios Sociales de la Universidad Nacional de General San Martín**, v. 1, n. 2, p. 1-19, 2007.

MESQUITA, A. L.; GABRIEL, V. D. R. Grupo de Alto Nível Brasil-Uruguaia (GAN): um novo paradigma para a integração produtiva no Mercosul. **Revista de Direito Internacional**, v. 13, n. 1, p. 44-60, 2016.

MITRANY, D. The Prospect of Integration: Federal or Functional. **JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies**, v. 4, p. 119-149, 1965.

MORAVCSIK, A. Negotiating the Single European Act: National Interests and Conventional Statecraft in the European Community. **International Organization**, v. 45, p. 19-56, 1991.

MURPHY, A. B. Regions as social constructs: the gap between theory and practice. **Progress in Human Geography**, v. 15, p. 23-35, 1991.

MÉLO, J. L. B. D. Fronteiras: da linha imaginária ao campo de conflitos. **Sociologias**, v. 6, n. 11, p. 126-146, 2004.

NEUMANN, I. B. A region-building approach to Northern Europe. **Review of International Studies**, v. 20, p. 53-74, 1994.

NEWMAN, D. Borders and Bordering: Towards an Interdisciplinary Dialogue. **European Journal of Social Theory**, v. 9, p. 171-186, 2006.

NOY, C. Sampling Knowledge: The Hermeneutics of Snowball Sampling in Qualitative Research. **International Journal of Social Research Methodology**, v. 11, n. 4, p. 327-344, 2008.

OBYDENKOVA, A. New Regionalism and Regional Integration: the Role of National Institutions. **Cambridge Review of International Affairs**, v. 19, p. 589-610, 2006.

ODDONE, N. Cooperación Transfronteriza en América Latina: Una aproximación teórica al escenario centroamericano desde la experiencia del Proyecto Fronteras Abiertas. **Oikos**, v. 13, p. 129-144, 2014.

ODDONE, N.; PRADO, H. S. D. A. Free shops en zona de frontera del Mercosur: Oportunidad o desafío para la integración a la luz de la reciente legislación brasileña. **Tempo do Mundo**, v. 1, n. 2, p. 105-119, 2015.

PAASI, A. Europe as a Social Process and Discourse: Considerations of Place, Boundaries and Identity. **European Urban and Regional Studies**, v. 8, p. 7-28, 2001.

PADRÓS, E. S. El vuelo del cóndor en la frontera uruguayo-brasileña: la conexión represiva internacional y el operativo zapatos rotos. **Estudio Historicos**, v. 1, p. s.p., 2009.

PHILLIPS, N. The Rise and Fall of Open Regionalism? Comparative Reflections on Regional Governance in the Southern Cone of Latin America. **Third World Quarterly**, v. 24, p. 217-234, 2003.

POSTEL-VINAY, K. Local actors and international regionalism: The case of the Sea of Japan zone. **The Pacific Review**, v. 9, n. 4, p. 489-503, 1996.

PRADO, F. P. Colônia do Sacramento: a situação na fronteira platina no século XVIII. **Horizontes Antropológicos**, v. 9, p. 79-104, 2003.

PRADO, H. S. D. A. A paradiplomacia no processo de integração regional: o caso do Mercosul. **Conjuntura Austral**, v. 5, p. 103-123, 2014.

PURCELL, M. Citizenship and the Right to the Global City: Reimagining the Capitalist World Order. **International Journal of Urban and Regional Research**, v. 27, n. 3, p. 564-590, 2003.

PUTNAM, R. D. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. **International Organization**, v. 42, p. 427-460, 1988.



RACINE, J.-B.; RAFFESTIN, C.; RUFFY, V. Echelle et action, contributions à une interprétation du mécanisme de l'échelle dans la pratique de la géographie. **Geographica Helvetica**, v. 35, p. 87-94, 1980.

RAMANZINI JÚNIOR, H.; VIGEVANI, T. Autonomia e integração regional no contexto do Mercosul: uma análise considerando a posição do Brasil. **Observatorio Social de América Latina (OSAL)**, n. 27, p. 45-66, 2010.

RANGEL, C. R. D. R. Fronteira Brasil-Uruguaí: espaço nacional, lugar regional. **Territórios e Fronteiras**, v. 6, n. 2, p. 9-32, 2005.

RATTI, R.; SCHULER, M. Typologie des espaces-frontières à l'heure de la globalisation. **Belgeo. Revue belge de géographie**, 2013. Disponível em: <<http://belgeo.revues.org/10546>>. Acesso em: 03/02/2017.

RECKZIEGEL, A. L. S. Aparício Saraiva: um caudilho de duas pátrias. **Estudios Historicos**, v. 4, p. s.p., 2010.

RENGGER, N. Pluralism in International Relations Theory: Three Questions. **International Studies Perspectives**, v. 16, p. 32-39, 2015.

RETAMAR, H. J. C.; RISSO, C. L. S. La frontera entre Uruguay y Brasil y la realidad del español en comunidades fronterizas. **Cadernos do Aplicação**, v. 24, n. 1, p. 95-105, 2011.

RIGGIROZZI, P. Region, Regionness and Regionalism in Latin America: Towards a New Synthesis. **New Political Economy**, v. 17, p. 421-443, 2012.

ROCK, D.; LÓPEZ-ALVES, F. State-building and political systems in nineteenth-century Argentina and Uruguay. **Past & Present**, v. 167, n. 1, p. 176-202, 2000.

RODRÍGUEZ, A. M. La frontera Uruguay-Brasil y el desarrollo local. **Nóesis: Revista de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades**, v. 19, n. 37, p. 14-51, 2010.

RUDOLPH, C. Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in a Global Age. **International Studies Review**, v. 7, p. 1-20, 2005.

RÓTULO, D. et al. Gobernanza y políticas de cooperación fronteriza: el caso Brasil-Uruguay. **Revista del CLAD Reforma y Democracia**, v. 58, p. 135-166, 2014.

RÓTULO, D. D. Políticas públicas para la cooperación fronteriza en el caso Uruguay-Brasil: avances y desafíos. **Revista da Eurorexión Galicia-Norte de Portugal**, v. 19, p. 51-63, 2012.

SALES, T. Migrações de fronteira entre o Brasil e os países do Mercosul. **Revista Brasileira de Estudos Populacionais**, v. 13, n. 1, p. 87-98, 1996.

SALOMÓN, M.; NUNES, C. A ação externa dos governos subnacionais no Brasil: os casos do Rio Grande do Sul e de Porto Alegre. Um estudo comparativo de dois tipos de atores mistos. **Contexto Internacional**, v. 29, p. 99-147, 2007.

SÁNCHEZ, C. B. The European Union and Mercosur: a case of inter-regionalism. **Third World Quarterly**, v. 20, n. 5, p. 927-941, 1999.

SANTANDER, S. Un regard comparatif sur les régionalismes africain et latino-américain. **Transformations: Revue Interventions Économiques**, Hors-Série, Mars, p. 6-9, 2017.

SANTOS, E. D.; SANTOS, L. C. V. G. Cooperação na fronteira Brasil-Uruguaí: um novo paradigma? **Política Externa**, v. 14, p. 45-52, 2005.

SCHERMA, M. A. Rumo à cooperação e ao desenvolvimento: as políticas brasileiras para a faixa de fronteira. **Carta Internacional**, v. 11, n. 3, p. 32-55, 2016.

SCHULTZ, H. Twin towns on the border area as laboratories of European integration. **ISIG Journal**, v. XVII, p. 157-166, 2009.

SÖDERBAUM, F. Rethinking regions and regionalism. **Georgetown Journal of International Affairs**, v. 14, p. 9-18, 2013.

OMBRA SARAIVA, J. F. Del federalismo centralista al paradigma del federalismo cooperativo: las relaciones internacionales de Brasil y su política de comercio exterior. **Integración & Comercio**, v. 21, p. 85-107, 2004.

SOUZA, C. Federalismo, desenho constitucional e instituições federativas no Brasil pós-1988. **Revista de Sociologia e Política**, n. 24, p. 105-121, 2005.

STRUMINSKI, E. Fronteiras e confrontos, Brasil-Uruguaí. **TerraPlural**, v. 9, p. 24-53, 2015b.

STURZA, E. R.; TATSCH, J. A fronteira e as línguas em contato: uma perspectiva de abordagem. **Cadernos de Letras da UFF**, n. 53, p. 83-98, 2016.

VALADÃO, M. A. P. Washington Consensus and Latin America Integration: MERCOSUR and the Road to Regional Inconsistencies - To Where Are We Going Exactly? **Law and Business Review of the Americas**, v. 15, p. 207-220, 2009.

VALENCIANO, E. O. La frontera: un nuevo rol frente a la integración - la experiencia en el Mercosur. **Ensaio FEE**, v. 1, n. 1, p. 185-205, 1996.

VAN HOUTUM, H. An Overview of European Geographical Research on Borders and Border Regions. **Journal of Borderlands Studies**, v. 15, p. 57-83, 2000.

VAN LANGENHOVE, L. Why We Need to 'Unpack' Regions to Compare Them More Effectively. **The International Spectator**, v. 47, p. 16-29, 2012.

VISENTINI, P. G. F. O Brasil, o Mercosul e a integração da América do Sul. **Revista de Estudos e Pesquisas sobre as Américas**, v. 1, p. 82-94, 2007.

VÄYRYNEN, R. Regionalism: Old and New. **International Studies Review**, v. 5, n. 1, p. 25-51, 2003.

WARLEIGH-LACK, A. Towards a Conceptual Framework for Regionalisation: Bridging 'New Regionalism' and 'Integration Theory'. **Review of International Political Economy**, v. 13, p. 750-771, 2006.

WENDT, A. Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics. **International Organization**, v. 46, p. 391-425, 1992.

\_\_\_\_\_. Collective Identity Formation and the International State. **The American Political Science Review**, v. 88, p. 384-396, 1994.

WILLIAMS, J. Territorial Borders, International Ethics and Geography: Do Good Fences Still Make Good Neighbours? **Geopolitics**, v. 8, p. 25-46, 2003.

### Laws and decrees

BRASIL. DECRETO Nº 6.731, DE 12 DE JANEIRO DE 2009. Brasília. Nº 6.731. 2009.

CÂMARA DOS DEPUTADOS. Decreto Legislativo Nº 152, de 2016 - Acordo. Brasília, 2016. Disponível em: <  
<http://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/decleg/2016/decretolegislativo-152-19-dezembro-2016-784057-acordo-151598-pl.html>>. Acesso em: 02/07/2017.

MERCOSUR. CMC/DEC. Nº 05/93: Acordo para Aplicação dos Controles Integrados na Fronteira entre os Países do Mercosul denominado “Acordo de Recife”. Article 1. 1993.

\_\_\_\_\_. GMC/RES Nº 3/94: Puntos de Frontera. ANEXO SGT Nº 2/REC Nº 5/94. 1994.

MIN (Ministério da Integração Nacional). PORTARIA No - 125, DE 21 DE MARÇO DE 2014. Diário Oficial da União Nº 56. República Federativa do Brasil. Brasília: Imprensa Nacional. 125: 45f. 2014.

ROCHA, C. Base normativa e proposições legislativas sobre fronteiras no Brasil. Consultoria Legislativa da Área XVII - Segurança Pública e Defesa Nacional. Brasília: Câmara dos Deputados, 2016.

URUGUAY. Asunto: 26946. Montevideo, 2007. Disponível em: <  
<https://parlamento.gub.uy/documentosyleyes/ficha-asunto/26946>>. Acesso em: 05/05/17.

### Newspaper articles

ARAÚJO, N. **Contra el narcotráfico y la trata de personas: Plan de combate a delitos en la frontera con Brasil**. El País. Melo, Uruguay, 2016. Disponível em: <  
<https://www.elpais.com.uy/informacion/plan-combate-delitos-frontera-brasil.html>>. Acesso em: 03/05/2017.

MINUANO, J. **Fepam libera licença ambiental para obra de saneamento em Aceguá.** Jornal Minuano. 2017a. Disponível em: <  
<http://www.jornalminuano.com.br/noticia/2017/07/05/fepam-libera-licenca-ambiental-para-obra-de-saneamento-em-acegua>>. Acesso em: 02/08/2017.

MINUANO, J. **Obra de saneamento de Aceguá/Uruguai tem prazo para começar.** 2017b. Jornal Minuano. Disponível em: <  
<http://www.jornalminuano.com.br/noticia/2017/06/08/obra-de-saneamento-de-acegua-uruguai-tem-prazo-para-comecar>>. Acesso em: 15/07/2017.

### Papers in scientific events

BONTEMPO, C. G. C.; NOGUEIRA, V. M. R. As relações Brasil Uruguai no âmbito da cooperação em saúde: uma breve análise a partir do séc. In: XX. III CEPIAL - CONGRESSO DE CULTURA E EDUCAÇÃO PARA A INTEGRAÇÃO DA AMÉRICA LATINA: SEMEANDO NOVOS RUMOS. Curitiba. 2012.

BRAGA, A. et al. Brazilian Southern Borderland Strategic Circuits: a Network Approach. In: TERRITOIRE, C. I. D. S. D., En quête de territoire(s) ? Looking for territories?, 2016, Grenoble, France. 17-18/03. p. 113-118.

BRAGA, A. D. C.; RIGATTI, D. International conurbations along Brazil-Uruguay border: How ambiguity drives spatial patterns and social exchange. In: KOCH, D.; MARCUS, L., *et al.*, 7TH INTERNATIONAL SPACE SYNTAX SYMPOSIUM, 2009, Stockholm. KTH. p. 1-13.

Sep \_\_\_\_\_. A Configuração espacial da conurbação Chuy (UY) / Chuí (BR) e a emergência de um território transfronteiriço. In: 4ª CONFERÊNCIA DO PNUM: MORFOLOGIA URBANA E OS DESAFIOS DA URBANIDADE, 2015, Brasília. Portugues Network of Urban Morphology, 25-26/06. p. 1-20.

BUENO, A. M. C. Perspectivas contemporâneas sobre regimes internacionais: a abordagem construtivista. ISA-ABRI JOINT INTERNATIONAL MEETING. Rio de Janeiro: Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro: 2009. p. 1-15.

BÜHRING, M. A. (Re)definição de fronteira(s) e cidades-gêmeas: Brasil e Uruguai. In: XXIV CONGRESSO NACIONAL DO CONPEDI - UFMG/FUMEC/DOM HELDER CÂMARA. POLIDO, F. B. P.; DEL OLMO, F. D. S., *et al.* **Anais...** Belo Horizonte: CONPEDI. v. 25. 2015. p. 315-345.

CAMPOS, H. Á. Cidades em fronteira: discussão sobre seus múltiplos significados. In: I COLÓQUIO INTERNACIONAL DE HISTÓRIA CULTURAL DA CIDADE. Porto Alegre/RS. 2015. p. 393-406.

CARUSO, H.; NASCIMENTO, N. Desafios para a implementação de políticas de pessoal de segurança pública nas fronteiras brasileiras: nota técnica. In: FÓRUM BRASILEIRO DE SEGURANÇA PÚBLICA. São Paulo: Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, 2012.

COMUNELLO, F. J. Produção cultural e ativismo político na fronteira entre Brasil e Uruguai. In: 40º ENCONTRO ANUAL DA ANPOCS. Caxambú - MG:ANPOCS. 2016. p. 1-21.

DETONI, L. P.; ROCHA, E. Cartografia das Cidades Pequenas: o caso de Aceguá/BR e Acegua/UY. In: XVII ENCONTRO NACIONAL DA ASSOCIAÇÃO NACIONAL DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO E PESQUISA EM PLANEJAMENTO URBANO E REGIONAL. São Paulo. 2017. p. 1-15.

DJENDEREDJIAN, J. C. Da locum melioribus: Política imperial, procesos de poblamiento y conformación de nuevos espacios de poder en la frontera platina a fines del siglo XVIII. In: SEGUNDA JORNADA DE HISTÓRIA REGIONAL COMPARADA E PRIMEIRA JORNADA DE ECONOMIA REGIONAL COMPARADA. FEEE/PUCRS. Porto Alegre 2005.

FERRARO, D. Políticas y iniciativas en Mercosur en el ámbito de la integración fronteriza. In: XXIV REUNIÓN DE DIRECTORES DE COOPERACIÓN INTERNACIONAL DE AMERICA LATINA Y CARIBE: COOPERACIÓN REGIONAL EN EL ÁMBITO DE LA INTEGRACIÓN FRONTERIZA. San Salvador, El Salvador. 2013. p. 1-13.

FLEITAS, C. P.; BICA, A. C. Fronteiras educacionais: um olhar sobre o município binacional de Aceguá (BR/UY). In: II ENCONTRO DE CIÊNCIA E TECNOLOGIA DO IF SUL CAMPUS BAGÉ. Bagé (RS): Unipampa, ENCIF 2015.

GOLIN, T. Cartografia da geopolítica e da guerras: Brasil Meridional. In: XI ENCONTRO ESTADUAL DE HISTÓRIA: HISTÓRIA, MEMÓRIA E PATRIMÔNIO. Rio Grande: Universidade Federal do Rio Grande (FURG). 2012. p. 1583-1591.

MALLMANN, M. I.; CLEMENTE, I. Descentralização e federalismo em processos de cooperação transfronteiriça: o caso de Brasil e Uruguai. In: 9º CONGRESSO LATINOAMERICANO DE CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA. *Anais...* Montevideo: Associação Latino-americana de Ciência Política (ALACIP). 2017. 1-21.

MALLMANN, M. I.; MARQUES, T. C. S. A crise do multilateralismo e o Mercosul: O surgimento de uma nova lógica de integração? In: 4º ENCONTRO NACIONAL DA ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE RELAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS. Belo Horizonte 2013.

RANGEL, C. R. D. R. Os exilados brasileiros no Prata: entre a revolução e a ordem (1930-1935). In: V ENCONTRO DA ANPHLAC. Belo Horizonte-MG, 2000.

RECKZIEGEL, A. L. S. A instalação do Estado Nacional e as tensões fronteiriças: Uruguay e Rio Grande do Sul no período 1822-1851. In: PRIMEIRAS JORNADAS DE HISTÓRIA COMPARADA. Porto Alegre-RS: FEE. 2000. p. 15-22.

RODRIGUES, H. S.; FORTUNATO, A. Acordos Internacionais e Saúde na fronteira brasileiro-uruguaia de Barra do Quaraí – Bella Unión. In: III SEMINÁRIO INTERNACIONAL DE CIÊNCIAS SOCIAIS E CIÊNCIA POLÍTICA: POLÍTICA,

SOCIEDADE, EDUCAÇÃO E SUAS FRONTEIRAS. **Anais...** São Borja, RS: Unipampa, 2014. p. 1-16.

RÓTULO, D.; DAMIANI, O. Integración fronteriza en el Mercosur: el caso Uruguay Brasil. In: V CONGRESO LATINOAMERICANO DE CIENCIA POLITICA. BUENOS AIRES: ASOCIACIÓN LATINOAMERICANA DE CIENCIA POLITICA, 2010.

SCHRODER, V. F.; KONRAD, J.; RODRIGUES, P. R. A produção do espaço no Rio Grande do Sul no período colonial. In: XV CONGRESSO DE INICIAÇÃO CIENTÍFICA. Pelotas: UFPel, 2006.

SILVA, M. P. D.; SILVA, F. P. D. A fronteira Brasil/Uruguai: Um estudo da política internacional para a saúde na fronteira. In: XXVII CONGRESO DE LA ASOCIACIÓN LATINOAMERICANA DE SOCIOLOGÍA. VIII JORNADA DE SOCIOLOGÍA DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE BUENOS AIRES. Buenos Aires, 2009.

### Theses and dissertations

ALMEIDA, L. N. **O Estado e os ilegalismos nas margens do Brasil e do Uruguai: um estudo de caso sobre a fronteira de Sant'Ana do Livramento (BR) e Rivera (UY).** 2015. 249f. (Doutorado em Sociologia). Departamento de Sociologia, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo.

ARNONI, R. K. **A tradição das marcas de gado nos Campos Neutrais, RS/ Brasil.** 2013. 170f (Mestrado em Memória Social e Patrimônio Cultural). Programa de Pós-Graduação em Memória Social e Patrimônio Cultural, Universidade Federal de Pelotas, Pelotas/RS.

AVEIRO, T. M. M. **Relações Brasil-Uruguai: a nova agenda para a cooperação e o desenvolvimento fronteiriço.** 2006. 238f. (Mestrado em Relações Internacionais). Instituto de Relações Internacionais, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília.

BONTEMPO, C. G. C. **A cooperação em saúde nas cidades gêmeas do Brasil e Uruguai: os caminhos institucionais e os arranjos locais (2003-2011).** 2012. 107f. (Mestrado em Política Social). Programa de Pós-Graduação em Política Social, Universidade Católica de Pelotas, Pelotas.

BRAGA, A. D. C. **A espacialização de trocas multiculturais em conurbações internacionais da fronteira Brasil-Uruguai.** 2013. 567f. (Doutorado em Planejamento Urbano e Regional). Faculdade de Arquitetura e Urbanismo, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre.

COSTA, M. V. D. **A Revolução Federalista (1893-1895): o contexto platino, as redes, os discursos e os projetos políticos liberal-federalistas.** 2006. 290f. (Mestrado em Integração Latino-americana). Programa de Pós-Graduação em Integração Latino-americana Universidade Federal de Santa Maria, Santa Maria (Rio Grande do Sul).

DORFMAN, A. **Contrabandistas na fronteira gaúcha: escalas geográficas e representações textuais.** 2009. 360f. (Doutorado em Geografia). Centro de Filosofia e

Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Geografia, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina, Florianópolis.

**DUARTE MARTINS, R. A ocupação do espaço na fronteira Brasil-Uruguay: A construção da cidade de Jaguarão.** 2001. 280f. (Doutorado em Arquitectura). Departament de Composició Arquitectònica, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Barcelona.

**ERBIG JR, J. A. Forging frontiers: Félix de Azara and the Making of the Virreinato del Río de la Plata.** 2010. 61f. (Masters of Arts in History). Department of History, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

**GONÇALVES, D. P. O falar dos comerciantes brasileiros na fronteira de Jaguarão-Rio Branco.** 2013. 132 f (Mestrado em Letras). Centro de Letras e Comunicação, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Letras, Universidade Federal de Pelotas, Pelotas/RS.

**LEMONS, B. D. O. A Nova Agenda para Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Fronteiriço entre Brasil e Uruguai: Repercussões territoriais nas cidades-gêmeas de Sant'ana do Livramento e Rivera.** 2013. 218f. (Mestrado em Geografia). Programa de Pós-Graduação em Geografia, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre.

**LUCENA, M. G. Territorialidade de fronteira: uma contribuição ao estudo da questão fronteiriça Brasil-Uruguai no contexto do Mercosul.** 2011. 189f. (Doutorado em Ciências). Instituto de Ciências Humanas e Sociais, Universidade Federal Rural do Rio de Janeiro.

**MOURA FILHO, J. L. D. Multiterritorialidade em regiões transfronteiriças: Estudo de duas cidades gêmeas na fronteira Brasil/Uruguai.** 2010. 329f. (Doutorado em Desenvolvimento Regional). Programa de Pós-Graduação em Desenvolvimento Regional, Universidade de Santa Cruz do Sul, Santa Cruz do Sul (RS).

**NASCIMENTO, S. D. S. O distrito de Aceguá e o Mercosul.** 1995. 104f. (Mestrado em História Íbero-Americana). Departamento de História, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre.

**NAVARRETE, M. Región Fronteriza Uruguayo-Brasilera - Laboratorio Social para la Integración Regional: Cooperación e Integración Tranfronteriza.** 2006. 72f. (Diploma en Estudios Internacionales e Integración). Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la República, Montevideo.

**NUNES, C. J. D. S. A paradiplomacia no Brasil: o caso do Rio Grande do Sul.** 2005. 162f. (Mestrado em Relações Internacionais). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas. Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre.

**PADRÓS, E. S. 'Como el Uruguay no hay...' Terror de Estado e segurança nacional. Uruguai (1968-1985): do Pachecato à ditadura civil-militar.** 2005. 880f. (Doutorado em História). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre.

SÁNCHEZ, A. Q. **A fronteira inevitável: um estudo das cidades de Rivera (Uruguai) e Santana do Livramento (Brasil) a partir de uma perspectiva antropológica.** 2002. 209f. (Doutorado em Antropologia Social). Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre.

SCHAEFER, R. H. **The Paraguayan War and the Platine Balance of Power.** Paper #2262. 1975. 88f. (Master of Arts in History). Portland State University, Portland.

STEINKE, V. A. **Identificação de áreas úmidas prioritárias para conservação da biodiversidade na Bacia da Lagoa Mirim (Brasil - Uruguai): subsídio para gestão transfronteiriça.** 2007. 138f. (Doutorado em Ecologia). Departamento de Ecologia, Universidade de Brasília, Brasília.

WEERTS, L. **Mutations et utilisations du concept de "frontière" dans l'intégration européenne. Une analyse des recompositions des modes de gouvernement et de légitimation dans l'ordre politique européen.** 2004. n.f. (Doctorate in International Relations). The Free University of Brussels, Brussels.

### Websites

ATLAS BRASIL. Atlas do desenvolvimento humano do Brasil. Disponível em: < <http://atlasbrasil.org.br/2013/pt/consulta/> >. Acesso em: 16/07/2017.

BODARENKO, P. Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Encyclopædia Britannica, 2017. Disponível em: < <https://www.britannica.com/topic/gross-domestic-product> >. Acesso em: 09/08/2017.

FOCEM. Saneamento Urbano Integrado Aceguá/Brasil e Aceguá/Uruguai. Montevideo, 2017. Disponível em: < <http://focem.mercosur.int/pt/projeto/saneamento-urbano-integrado-acegua-brasil-e-acegua-uruguai/> >. Acesso em: 15/07/2017.

IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística). Áreas Especiais: Cadastro de Municípios localizados na Faixa de Fronteira. 2016. Disponível em: < <http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/geociencias/geografia/fronteira.shtm?c=3> >. Acesso em: 19/07/2017.

\_\_\_\_\_. Conheça cidades e estados do Brasil. Brasília, 2017. Disponível em: < <https://cidades.ibge.gov.br/v4> >. Acesso em: 19/07/2017.

INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística). Instituto Nacional de Estadística de Uruguay. Censos 2011. Disponível em: < <http://www.ine.gub.uy/web/guest/censos-2011> > Acesso em: 02/07/2017

IPHAN. Ponte Internacional Barão de Mauá - Brasil e Uruguai. 2015. Disponível em: < <http://portal.iphan.gov.br/pagina/detalhes/1126/> >. Acesso em: 06/08/2017.

MDI (Ministerio del Interior). Uruguay. Links del Gobierno. 2017. Disponível em: < <http://www.minterior.gub.uy/index.php/links-de-gobierno> >. Acesso em: 03/08/2017.



MERCOCIUDADES. Saneamento Urbano Integrado Aceguá-Brasil, Aceguá-Uruguai. 2013. Disponível em: < <http://www.mercociudades.org/pt-br/node/4523> >. Acesso em: 15/07/2017.

MERCOSUR. CMC/DEC. Área de Controle Integrado – ACI. 2014. Disponível em: < <http://idg.receita.fazenda.gov.br/orientacao/aduaneira/importacao-e-exportacao/recinto-alfandegados/area-de-controle-integrado-aci> > Acesso em: 03/08/2017.

MRE (Ministério das Relações Exteriores). Atos assinados por ocasião da visita do Ministro das Relações Exteriores da República Oriental do Uruguai, Luis Almagro – Brasília, 9 de julho de 2013. Nota 239, Brasília, 2013. Disponível em: < <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/component/content/article?id=3518:atos-assinados-por-ocasio-da-visita-do-ministro-das-relacoes-exteriores-da-republica-oriental-do-uruguai-luis-almagro-brasilia-9-de-julho-de-2013> >. Acesso em: 02/07/2017.

\_\_\_\_\_. Nota 154: Plano Integrado de Trabalho para a Fronteira Brasil-Uruguai – 2016. 2016. Disponível em: < <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-imprensa/13851-plano-integrado-de-trabalho-para-a-fronteira-brasil-uruguai-2016> >. Acesso em: 30/06/2017.

\_\_\_\_\_. Sistema Atos Internacionais. Banco de Dados do SAI, 2017a. Disponível em: < <http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/> >. Acesso em: 08/03/2017.

\_\_\_\_\_. Portal Consular. 2017b. Disponível em: < <http://www.portalconsular.itamaraty.gov.br/> >. Acesso em: 03/08/2017.

\_\_\_\_\_. Representation of Uruguay in Brazil. 2017c. Disponível em: < [http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/templates/padraogoverno01/pesquisa-postos/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=11822&Itemid=478&cod\\_pais=URY&tipo=enb&lang=en-GB](http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/en/templates/padraogoverno01/pesquisa-postos/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11822&Itemid=478&cod_pais=URY&tipo=enb&lang=en-GB) >. Acesso em: 03/08/2017.

OPP. Oficina de Planeamiento y Presupuesto. Producto Interno Bruto Regional 2008-2011: Principales resultados. Dirección de descentralización e inversión pública: Montevideo, marzo de 2016. Disponível em: < [http://www.otu.opp.gub.uy/sites/default/files/docsBiblioteca/producto\\_2008\\_2011.pdf](http://www.otu.opp.gub.uy/sites/default/files/docsBiblioteca/producto_2008_2011.pdf) >. Acesso em: 02/07/2017.

PF (Polícia Federal Brasileira). Superintendência Regional no Rio Grande do Sul. 2017. Disponível em: < <http://www.pf.gov.br/institucional/unidades/superintencias-e-delegacias/rio-grande-do-sul> > Acesso em: 03/08/2017.

PNUD. Desenvolvimento Humano e IDH. 2017. Disponível em: < <http://www.br.undp.org/content/brazil/pt/home/idh0.html> >. Acesso em: 09/08/2017.

RFB (Receita Federal do Brasil). Unidades de Atendimento ao Contribuinte - Rio Grande do Sul. 2017. Disponível em: < <http://idg.receita.fazenda.gov.br/contato/unidades-de-atendimento/rio-grande-do-sul> >. Acesso em: 03/08/2017.

ROCHA, A. Pedalando Trinacional. 2014. Disponível em: < <http://www.trinacional.com/ambiente/pedalando.html> >. Acesso em: 22/08/2017.

\_\_\_\_\_. Portal Trinacional. 2017. Disponível em: < <http://www.trinacional.com/> >. Acesso em: 06/08/2017.

SEAD. Concentración, extranjerización y uso de la tierra en el Mercosur. 2011? Disponível em: < [http://www.mda.gov.br/sitemda/sites/sitemda/files/user\\_arquivos\\_64/Sintesis%20Regional%20Estudios%20sobre%20CE%20de%20la%20Tierra%20Mercosur%20ST.pdf](http://www.mda.gov.br/sitemda/sites/sitemda/files/user_arquivos_64/Sintesis%20Regional%20Estudios%20sobre%20CE%20de%20la%20Tierra%20Mercosur%20ST.pdf) >. Acesso em: 09/08/2017.

SEFAZ-RS. Secretaria da Fazenda do Estado do Rio Grande do Sul. Locais de Atendimento. 2017. Disponível em: < <http://receita.fazenda.rs.gov.br/locais-de-atendimento> >. Acesso em: 03/08/2017.

\_\_\_\_\_. ANEP impulsa programa de educación en portugués de inmersión para la frontera con Brasil. 2008. Disponível em: < <http://archivo.presidencia.gub.uy/web/noticias/2008/05/2008050910.htm> >. Acesso em: 10/08/2017.

WIKIMEDIA COMMONS CONTRIBUTORS, 'File:PAMPAS.png', Wikimedia Commons, the free media repository, 12 May 2017. Disponível em: < <https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=File:PAMPAS.png&oldid=243895304> >. Acesso em: 22/10/2017.

XAVIER, L. Gabinete de Gestão Integrada de Fronteiras recebe as polícias da Argentina e do Uruguai. 2017. Disponível em: < <http://www.ssp.rs.gov.br/gabinete-de-gestao-integrada-de-fronteiras-recebem-as-policias-da-argentina-e-do-uruguai> >. Acesso em: 14/07/2017.

ZIEBELL, R. SSP inaugura Gabinete de Gestão Integrada de Fronteira. 2016. Disponível em: < <http://www.ssp.rs.gov.br/ssp-inaugura-gabinete-de-gestao-integrada-de-fronteira> >. Acesso em: 14/07/2017.

### Working papers

ALLENDE, R. A. **Um balanço da relação entre Uruguai e Brasil: Evolução, convergências e integração**. Relatórios dos Países. MATTHÄUS, F. C. Brasil: Fundação Konrad Adenauer no Brasil: 14f. 2015.

CARRANZA, M. **Mercosur, the Global Economic Crisis, and the New Architecture of Regionalism in the Americas**. Buenos Aires: FLACSO 2010.

CLEMENTE, I. B. **Política exterior de Uruguay, 1830-1895: Tendencias, problemas, actores y agenda**. Documento de Trabajo N° 69. Unidad Multidisciplinaria - Programa de Población. Montevideo: Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Udelar 2005.

DE LOS SANTOS, C. F. **Soberanía e identidad nacional en el Uruguay del novecientos: Incidencias regionales y nacionales en la gestación del Tratado de Rectificación de Límites entre Uruguay y Brasil en 1909**. Montevideo: FHCE, 2010.

DOMÍNGUEZ, J. I. **Boundary Disputes in Latin America**. Preaceworks 50. Washington: United States Institute of Peace. 2003.

KEATING, M. **Paradiplomacy and Regional Networking**. Forum of Federations: an International Federalism. Hanover. 2000.

NIEBUHR, A. **Spatial Effects of European Integration: Do Border Regions Benefit Above Average?** HWWA Discussion Paper No. 307, 2005.

RHI-SAUSI, J. L. **Gobernabilidad, convivencia democrática y fronteras**. Gobernabilidad y convivencia democrática en América Latina - Documentos Cooperación Transfronteriza: Flacso, AECID. 2012.

SELA (Sistema Económico Latinoamericano y del Caribe). **La Integración Fronteriza en el Marco del Proceso de Convergencia de América Latina y El Caribe**. SP/Di N° 21-12/Rev. 1. Caracas: Secretaría Permanente del SELA, 2012.

WEISIGER, A. **Shifting Power and Regional Conflict: Explaining Persistent Regional War**: University of Pennsylvania: 42f., 2011.

#### Other documents

AMARAL, T. R. D. **El portuñol en la frontera Brasil-Uruguay: ¿Definición lingüística o estrategia comunicativa?** Presentación de slides. 2008. Disponible em: < [https://www.academia.edu/6420897/El Portuñol en la Frontera Brasil-Uruguay Deficiencia Lingüística o Estrategia Comunicativa](https://www.academia.edu/6420897/El_Portuñol_en_la_Frontera_Brasil-Uruguay_Definición_Lingüística_o_Estrategia_Comunicativa) >. Acesso em 10/08/2017.

LIVRAMENTO, Prefeitura Municipal. **A integração de dois países: Brasil-Uruguay - Livramento e Rivera**. Apresentação de slides. Santana do Livramento: Assessoria de Comunicação da Prefeitura Municipal. 2014.

MIN (Ministério da Integração Nacional). **Proposta de reestruturação do Programa de Desenvolvimento da Faixa de Fronteira: bases de uma política integrada de desenvolvimento regional para a Faixa de Fronteira**. Proposta de política pública. Brasília: MIN, 2005.

\_\_\_\_\_. **Faixa de fronteira: Programa de Promoção do Desenvolvimento da Faixa de Fronteira - PDF**. Apresentação de estudo para proposta de política pública. Secretaria de Programas. Brasília: SPR 2009.

NEVES, A. J. D.; SILVA, J. C. D.; MONTEIRO, L. C. D. R. **Mapeamento das políticas públicas federais na faixa de fronteira: interfaces com o plano estratégico de fronteiras e a estratégia nacional de segurança pública nas fronteiras**. Brasília: Ministério da Justiça e Cidadania. Secretaria Nacional de Segurança Pública, 2016.

SALADERO, A. **Movimento Transfronteiriço de ONGs.** Informativo da ONG Atelier Saladero. Barra do Quaraí. 2006.

## **APPENDIX A – Interview Script**

### **I Context**

1. How long do you live here and what do you do?
2. Are there peculiarities/special characteristics in your work/function related to the fact that you are in this twin-town?
3. What are the key issues/subjects that you deal with in your function/position regarding your twin-town?

### **II Perceptions on the New Agenda**

4. Have you worked in any cross-border/binational project? If so, which one?
5. What information do you have about the New Agenda?
6. Do the agreements in the scope of the New Agenda affect your town? What are the positive and negative aspects of the agreements and projects that you have knowledge about? Can you give examples?
7. How does regional integration affect daily life in your region?

### **III Perceptions on the cross-border urban complex and interrelations**

8. Is it possible to solve the problems related to your work or to your town without the neighbors across the border?
9. How would you describe the relationship to your neighboring community, beneficial, disadvantageous, or both/neither? Why?
10. Are there other ways in which both towns interact, besides the examples already given?

## APPENDIX B – Electronic Questionnaire (Portuguese Version)

### NOVA AGENDA FRONTEIRIÇA BRASIL-URUGUAI

#### BEM-VINDO!

**Você foi selecionado** para participar de *investigação científica sobre a agenda de cooperação e desenvolvimento fronteira Brasil-Uruguai*. Essa pesquisa está sendo feita a partir da Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS) e da Universidade de Liège (ULg).

Queremos entender o que os atores **da fronteira** pensam sobre a agenda bilateral para que, no futuro, políticas melhores possam ser desenvolvidas.

O questionário é totalmente **sigiloso** e **confidencial** e todas as perguntas são de uso exclusivamente acadêmico-científico.

A duração é de apenas 10 minutos. As perguntas obrigatórias estão marcadas com um asterisco (\*). Depois de analisados e publicados, os resultados serão compartilhados com você por meio do seu endereço eletrônico.

#### PERFIL PESSOAL

1. Nome
2. Função
3. Instituição/órgão
4. E-mail (não obrigatório)
5. Cidade (drop-menu)
  - a. Aceguá (BR)
  - b. Aceguá (UY)
  - c. Artigas
  - d. Barra do Quaraí
  - e. Bella Unión
  - f. Chuí (BR)
  - g. Chuy (UY)
  - h. Jaguarão
  - i. Melo
  - j. Quaraí
  - k. Rio Branco
  - l. Rivera
  - m. Sant'Ana do Livramento
  - n. Outro
6. Selecione **todos os eventos que participou**, referentes à Agenda Brasil-Uruguai para a fronteira (Nova Agenda): (múltipla opção)
  - a. Reunião de Alto Nível (RAN)
  - b. Comissão Binacional de Saúde
  - c. Comissão Binacional de Intendentes e Prefeitos
  - d. Grupos de Trabalho (ou seus subgrupos)
  - e. Comitê de Fronteira
  - f. Comitês Binacionais de Bacia (do Rio Quaraí, da Lagoa Mirim)
  - g. Grupos de Fronteira do MIDES
  - h. Outro: QUAL?

7. Cite um projeto ou acordo que você trabalhou. O que aconteceu com ele, foi implementado, foi esquecido, se tornou inviável?

<b>FUNCIONAMENTO DA NOVA AGENDA</b>
-------------------------------------

8. Escolha do mais importante (1) ao menos importante (6), quais as principais dificuldades para não levar adiante os projetos bilaterais de integração fronteiriça:
- Falta de verba, financiamento ou investimento.
  - Carência de estrutura física nos municípios (prédios, espaços, infraestrutura etc.)
  - Falta de interesse dos atores locais.
  - Deficiência de pessoal especializado (para fazer projetos, conseguir financiamento, conhecer leis internacionais etc.)
  - Falta de compreensão dos políticos nacionais sobre a realidade na fronteira.
  - Carência de coordenação entre as instituições
9. **Em relação aos eventos que participou**, selecione o grau de concordância das afirmações abaixo, de acordo com a escala:  
( *Discordo totalmente*,  *discordo parcialmente*,  *indiferente*,  *concordo parcialmente*,  *concordo totalmente*)
- Havia espaço para muita discussão, mas pouca decisão prática.
  - Os representantes **locais** não se interessavam pelas pautas/projetos.
  - Havia poucas reuniões, precisava haver mais.
  - Os representantes **nacionais** não conheciam a realidade da fronteira.
  - Faltava continuidade nas conversas e decisões.
10. **A respeito dos acordos bilaterais** firmados entre Brasil e Uruguai para a fronteira, selecione o grau de concordância das afirmações abaixo:
- Os acordos traziam mais dificuldades do que soluções para os problemas na fronteira.
  - Os acordos precisavam ser mais discutidos com quem vive e conhece a fronteira.
  - Os acordos serviam apenas para satisfazer vontades nacionais, e não para desenvolver a fronteira.
  - Os acordos eram bem construídos, mas os atores locais não se importavam em fazê-los funcionar.
11. **Em relação aos projetos locais discutidos e acordados** nos eventos, selecione o grau de concordância das afirmações abaixo:
- Os projetos eram bons, mas não resolviam inteiramente os problemas que procuravam solucionar
  - Os projetos resolviam os problemas, mas não eram de interesse das instituições envolvidas.
  - Os projetos eram positivos, mas os atores locais não se interessavam por eles.
  - Os projetos satisfaziam plenamente as necessidades das populações locais, mas poucos vingaram por falta de interesse político.
  - Os projetos, quando implementados, criavam mais problemas que soluções.
12. Você tem conhecimento de projetos locais feitos nas reuniões que participou e que não foi implementado?
- Sim. Qual?

- b. Por que?
- c. Não

<b>INTERESSE DOS ATORES LOCAIS</b>
------------------------------------

13. **Quanto ao envolvimento e interesse dos atores locais de sua fronteira** em relação aos acordos e projetos binacionais, selecione o grau de concordância das afirmações abaixo:
- a. Os atores locais apenas se envolviam quando algum interesse seu não estivesse sendo prejudicado.
  - b. A política local muitas vezes se sobrepôs ao apoio dos governos locais a projetos e acordos binacionais.
  - c. Apesar dos bons projetos e acordos binacionais, é muito mais fácil continuar a resolver os problemas localmente.
  - d. Formalizar a cooperação fronteiriça não é interessante, porque o Estado complica tudo.
  - e. Há mais vantagens em permanecer resolvendo os problemas da fronteira na base da amizade do que por acordos e tratados.
  - f. As regulamentações dos acordos e projetos binacionais dificultam muito o dia a dia do fronteiriço.
  - g. Em geral, os projetos desenvolvidos dentro da agenda binacional eram muito onerosos/custosos para o município.
  - h. Não era possível coordenar ações dos dois lados da fronteira.
14. **Quanto à baixa continuidade dos projetos** da Nova Agenda fronteiriça, selecione o grau de concordância das afirmações abaixo:
- a. Muitos começaram os projetos por incentivo nacional, mas não acreditavam que eles fossem melhorar a realidade fronteiriça, por isso desistiam deles.
  - b. Os custos políticos locais para a implementação dos projetos eram muito altos.
  - c. Os governos nacionais queriam que implementássemos os projetos, mas não nos davam recursos para isso.
  - d. Não tínhamos pessoas capacitadas para levar os projetos adiante.
  - e. A falta de profissionais com conhecimento sobre os projetos impedia que eles fossem implementados.
  - f. Criar mais regulamentações não resolveria os problemas das fronteiras.
  - g. As vantagens que os projetos ofereciam eram menores que as dificuldades que criavam.
  - h. Os projetos eram complexos e resolver as questões com o vizinho sempre foi muito simples.
  - i. Para implementar um projeto era necessário desistir de outras formas de solução e isso não era bom.
  - j. Os acordos informais entre prefeito e intendente/*alcalde* sempre funcionaram bem, por isso não havia necessidade de criar um mecanismo formal.
  - k. As eleições locais dificultaram a continuidade dos projetos, porque eles dependem da vontade do político.
  - l. As diferenças de autonomia dos municípios, geradas pelas estruturas de governança desiguais dos dois países, impediu que muitos projetos fossem adiante.
  - m. A boa integração **de fato** das cidades não nos incentivou a buscar a integração **de direito** (regulamentada).
  - n. Minha fronteira não é integrada, por isso não havia razão para implementar os projetos criados.



- o. A integração de direito (regulamentada) complica as relações com o vizinho, já que não nos possibilita criar novas alternativas no dia a dia.
- p. A regulamentação da integração das cidades da fronteira visa o controle e não o bem-estar da população.
- q. As relações de amizade entre governantes e influentes locais foram e são suficientes para o bom desenvolvimento da fronteira.

## APPENDIX C – Datasets and Raw Tables

Datasets, raw tables, and highlights of transcribed interviews are available at: <https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.c.3891178>. To access such data, a password can be made available upon request. Please send a message to [gustavo.matiuzzi@gmail.com](mailto:gustavo.matiuzzi@gmail.com).

**To cite this collection** – Matiuzzi de Souza, Gustavo (2017): Datasets and raw tables (Bucbr). figshare. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.c.3891178> Retrieved: 17:19, Nov 01, 2017 (GMT).



Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul  
Pró-Reitoria de Graduação  
Av. Ipiranga, 6681 - Prédio 1 - 3º. andar  
Porto Alegre - RS - Brasil  
Fone: (51) 3320-3500 - Fax: (51) 3339-1564  
E-mail: [prograd@pucrs.br](mailto:prograd@pucrs.br)  
Site: [www.pucrs.br](http://www.pucrs.br)